FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices: Section 524B explained

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Since 29 March 2023, a premarket submission for a US medical device that counts as a "cyber device" must come with cybersecurity information that was never required before: a vulnerability-monitoring plan, evidence of a secure development and patching process, and a software bill of materials (SBOM). This duty comes directly from statute, Section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, not just from guidance, and FDA can refuse to even accept a submission that leaves it out.

Key takeaways

  • Section 524B, "Ensuring Cybersecurity of Devices," was added to the FD&C Act by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Public Law 117-328, Division FF, Title III, Section 3305), enacted 29 December 2022.
  • contains technological characteristics validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.
  • See vulnerability disclosure policy template for a starting point on the coordinated disclosure piece, and firmware SBOM for building the SBOM itself when source code is incomplete.
  • The guidance does not mandate CycloneDX or SPDX by name.

Where the duty comes from

Section 524B, "Ensuring Cybersecurity of Devices," was added to the FD&C Act by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Public Law 117-328, Division FF, Title III, Section 3305), enacted 29 December 2022. The amendment took effect 90 days after enactment, on 29 March 2023; submissions made before that date are not subject to it. It is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360n-2.

What counts as a "cyber device"?

Section 524B(c) defines a cyber device as a device that:

  1. includes software validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor as a device or in a device;
  2. has the ability to connect to the internet; and
  3. contains technological characteristics validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.

All three conditions apply together. A device with embedded software but no network connectivity at all falls outside the definition; FDA's own FAQ page uses this same three-part description.

What a cyber device submission must include

FDA's plain-language summary of the Section 524B(b) duties groups them as:

Duty What it means in practice
Vulnerability-monitoring plan A plan to monitor, identify, and address, in a reasonable time, postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure and related procedures
Security assurance and updates Processes and procedures giving reasonable assurance that the device and related systems are cybersecure, and a way to make postmarket patches and updates available
Software bill of materials An SBOM covering commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software components used in the device

See vulnerability disclosure policy template for a starting point on the coordinated disclosure piece, and firmware SBOM for building the SBOM itself when source code is incomplete.

FDA's premarket guidance, and why its title keeps changing

FDA has reissued and retitled its main premarket cybersecurity guidance more than once as it folds in statutory and quality-system changes: a 2014 original, a 27 September 2023 final version titled "Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions," a 27 June 2025 update adding a section specifically on Section 524B cyber devices, and a further retitling to "...Quality Management System Considerations..." to align with FDA's new Quality Management System Regulation (21 CFR Part 820). Always check FDA's live guidance page for the current version and date before citing a specific title or date, since this document has already been superseded multiple times.

SBOM format: machine-readable, not a mandated schema

The guidance does not mandate CycloneDX or SPDX by name. It asks for a machine-readable SBOM consistent with the minimum elements identified in NTIA's October 2021 "Framing Software Component Transparency" document, and states that industry-accepted SBOM formats are encouraged. In practice, CycloneDX and SPDX are the two formats most device makers already use to meet that machine-readable expectation; see firmware SBOM for how each compares for embedded devices.

Refuse-to-accept: the enforcement teeth

FDA backed Section 524B with a specific refuse-to-accept (RTA) policy, published as a Federal Register notice on 30 March 2023 (88 FR 19148, Docket FDA-2023-D-1030). FDA described a transition period during which it generally did not issue RTA decisions for premarket submissions based solely on missing Section 524B information, instead working with sponsors through the interactive or deficiency-review process, before full RTA enforcement began on 1 October 2023. From that date, a cyber device submission that lacks the required cybersecurity information can be refused before FDA even begins substantive review, which is a harder stop than a deficiency letter during review.

Postmarket duties do not stop at clearance

Section 524B's premarket duties sit alongside FDA's older "Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices" guidance (final, December 2016), which covers how manufacturers should manage cybersecurity risk after a device is marketed and distributed: monitoring, risk assessment, and timely patching across the product's life. A cyber device's premarket vulnerability-monitoring plan is, in effect, the forward-looking commitment that the 2016 postmarket guidance expects manufacturers to execute on.

Why this looks familiar if you already build for the EU

The shape of Section 524B — an SBOM, a vulnerability-handling and disclosure process, and a patching duty — closely parallels the EU Cyber Resilience Act's Annex I Part II requirements (SBOM, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, fixing without delay); see CRA Annex I explained. Medical devices are explicitly excluded from the EU's RED cybersecurity delegated act and EN 18031 (Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and 2017/746 devices are carved out of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30); see EN 18031 explained for firmware teams for that exclusion. In other words, a connected medical device maker selling into both the US and EU needs the FDA 524B package and a separate, CRA-aligned package — the underlying engineering work (SBOM, disclosure process, patch pipeline) overlaps heavily, but the legal submissions do not substitute for each other.

A workable starting process

  1. Classify each product against the three-part cyber device definitionbefore you scope a submission; connectivity plus vulnerable software characteristics is the trigger, not just "has software."
  2. Build the SBOM early, from source where you have it and from binary analysis of the firmware image where you do not; see firmware SBOM.
  3. Write the vulnerability-monitoring plan and coordinated disclosure policy before submission, not after; FDA expects these as submission content, not a post-clearance promise.
  4. Confirm the current guidance title and date on FDA's own guidance pagebefore citing it in a submission narrative, since it has changed more than once since 2023.
  5. Keep the postmarket process runningafter clearance; Section 524B's premarket plan is only credible if the 2016 postmarket guidance's monitoring and patching expectations are actually followed.

SoftWSP builds SBOMs from device firmware, matches components against known vulnerabilities, and helps structure the vulnerability-monitoring and disclosure processes a cyber device submission needs: see device firmware security and PSIRT as a service.

This guide is general information, not legal advice. It does not constitute FDA regulatory or legal counsel; confirm current guidance documents and submission requirements directly with FDA before relying on them.

Sources

  1. Public Law 117-328 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023), Division FF, Title III, Section 3305 (FD&C Act Section 524B)
  2. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
  3. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices – Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance)
  4. Federal Register 88 FR 19148: Refuse to Accept Policy for Cyber Devices Under Section 524B (Docket FDA-2023-D-1030)
  5. FDA: Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (guidance, December 2016)

Frequently asked questions

What is a 'cyber device' under FDA rules?

Section 524B(c) of the FD&C Act defines a cyber device as one that (1) includes software validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor as a device or in a device, (2) has the ability to connect to the internet, and (3) contains technological characteristics validated, installed or authorized by the sponsor that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.

Since when has FDA required cybersecurity information in premarket submissions?

Section 524B was added to the FD&C Act by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Pub. L. 117-328), enacted 29 December 2022, and took effect 90 days later on 29 March 2023. Submissions made before that date are not subject to it.

What must a cyber device premarket submission include?

FDA's plain-language summary of Section 524B(b) is: a plan to monitor, identify and address postmarket vulnerabilities including coordinated vulnerability disclosure; processes to provide reasonable assurance the device and related systems are cybersecure, including making patches and updates available; and a software bill of materials covering commercial, open-source and off-the-shelf software components.

Does FDA require a specific SBOM format like CycloneDX or SPDX?

No. FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance asks for a machine-readable SBOM consistent with the minimum elements in NTIA's October 2021 'Framing Software Component Transparency' document, and says industry-accepted SBOM formats are encouraged, without naming CycloneDX or SPDX specifically.

What happens if a cyber device submission is missing the required cybersecurity information?

FDA can refuse to accept the submission for review (a 'refuse to accept', or RTA, decision). FDA's RTA guidance describes a transition period during which it worked with sponsors through the review process rather than issuing RTA decisions on this basis alone, before shifting to full RTA enforcement from 1 October 2023.

All guides in this cluster: Medical & regulated devices

ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 (medical device security risk management), explainedWhat ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 covers: its security risk management process/plan/file structure inside the ISO 14971 framework, how it differs from AAMI TIR57 and TIR97, FDA's 2023 recognition, and why its primary text is paywalled.UN R155, UN R156 and ISO/SAE 21434: automotive cybersecurity and software updates explainedUN Regulation 155 (CSMS), UN Regulation 156 (SUMS) and ISO/SAE 21434: scope, EU mandatory dates, and how the standard and type-approval law fit together.DICOM and PACS cybersecurity: why medical imaging still runs unauthenticated by defaultDICOM, the protocol behind every PACS archive and imaging workstation, assumes a trusted network and ships authentication as an optional add-on. What NEMA's PS3.15 secure-use profiles actually require, what a 2019 audit of 2,300 exposed PACS servers found, and what CISA's 2026 OFFIS DCMTK advisory shows about where imaging software is failing today.DORA: the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act, explainedWhat Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) requires of EU financial entities and their ICT providers — entry into force, scope, the main requirement areas, and the delegated technical standards filling in the detail.EU MDR (Regulation 2017/745) Annex I cybersecurity requirements, explainedWhat Regulation (EU) 2017/745's Annex I actually requires for software and connected medical devices: points 17.1-17.4, the state-of-the-art and minimum IT requirements duties, and how this binding text differs from MDCG 2019-16 guidance.FDA eSTAR: what the cybersecurity section of the submission template requiresWhat FDA's eSTAR template requires for device cybersecurity, when it became mandatory for 510(k)/De Novo, and how it gates a submission before review.FDA postmarket management of cybersecurity in medical devices, explainedFDA's controlled-vs-uncontrolled risk framework, the 30-day/60-day remediation window that avoids a 21 CFR Part 806 report, ISAO participation criteria, and how this 2016 guidance still sits alongside Section 524B's newer premarket duties.FDA's predetermined change control plan (PCCP) guidance for AI-enabled medical devices, explainedFDA's final guidance (4 December 2024, revised 18 August 2025, docket FDA-2022-D-2628): what a PCCP must contain, which submission pathways it covers, and how it lets an AI-enabled device update without a new marketing submission for every change.FDA QMSR (21 CFR Part 820): the ISO 13485 harmonization, explainedWhat the FDA's Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR) actually changed in 21 CFR Part 820: the ISO 13485:2016 incorporation by reference, the February 2, 2026 compliance date, and what FDA says it does and doesn't require.HHS 405(d) HICP (Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices), explainedHHS's 405(d) Program and its Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP): the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 mandate, the 2023 edition's 10 practices including network-connected medical device security, and the 2024 HPH Cybersecurity Performance Goals built on top of it.HL7 FHIR API security: what the standard protects, and what CMS now requiresHL7's own FHIR specification says plainly that FHIR is not a security protocol — authentication, authorization and per-record access control are left to implementers. A 2021 test of production FHIR APIs found broken object-level authorization in every one tested, and CMS's 2024 interoperability rule now makes OAuth 2.0 and SMART App Launch mandatory by 1 January 2027.The HSCC Joint Security Plan (JSP2): a total-product-lifecycle guide for medical device makersWhat the Health Sector Coordinating Council's Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan v2.0 (March 2024) covers, what changed from the 2019 original, and how it relates to FDA and AAMI SW96 guidance.IEC TR 60601-4-5: security capabilities for medical devices, explainedIEC TR 60601-4-5:2021 explained: how it adapts IEC 62443-4-2's industrial security requirements into capability security levels (SL-C) for medical electrical equipment, the seven foundational requirements, and what's openly available versus paywalled.IEC 62304: medical device software life cycle processes, explainedWhat IEC 62304:2006+AMD1:2015 actually requires: its nine clauses, the three software safety classes, how Class A differs from B/C evidence, FDA recognition, and the Edition 2 revision in progress.IEC 80001-1:2021: risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devicesWhat IEC 80001-1:2021 (Edition 2) actually requires of organizations connecting medical devices and health software to IT-networks — the SAFETY/EFFECTIVENESS/SECURITY key properties, the RISK MANAGEMENT FILE, and how it differs from IEC 62304 and IEC 81001-5-1.IEC 81001-5-1: security activities in the health software product life cycle, explainedWhat IEC 81001-5-1:2021 actually requires: its six security-activity clauses, how it extends IEC 62304 and supports IEC 62443-4-1, FDA's recognition of it, and the Transitional Health Software path.IMDRF N70: principles and practices for legacy medical device cybersecurityWhat IMDRF's N70 guidance says about legacy medical devices: its cybersecurity definition of 'legacy,' manufacturer and healthcare-provider recommendations, and how FDA's own legacy-device definition traces back to it.IMDRF's Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity, explainedIMDRF/CYBER WG/N60FINAL:2020: what the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's cybersecurity guidance says, its Total Product Life Cycle framing, and how it relates to MDCG 2019-16 and FDA's premarket/postmarket guidance.IMDRF N73: principles and practices for SBOM in medical device cybersecurityWhat IMDRF's N73 guidance recommends for medical device software bills of materials: generation, management and sharing across manufacturers, healthcare providers and regulators, and how it relates to FDA's Section 524B SBOM duty.ISO 14971: medical device risk management, explainedWhat ISO 14971:2019 (Third Edition) actually requires: its ten-clause risk management process, what it excludes, FDA's 2019 recognition and the ISO 14971:2007 transition deadline, and how it relates to ISO/TR 24971 and AAMI SW96.ISO 24089 (Road vehicles — Software update engineering), explainedWhat ISO 24089:2023 actually requires: its organizational, project, infrastructure and campaign-level clauses, how it relates to UN R156 and ISO/SAE 21434, and what the 2024 amendment changed.ISO/SAE 21434 (road vehicles — cybersecurity engineering), explainedISO/SAE 21434:2021's 15-clause structure, the TARA (threat analysis and risk assessment) process, Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL), and how it relates to UN R155's CSMS mandate.MDCG 2019-16: the EU's guidance on cybersecurity for medical devicesMDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 (July 2020): how the EU's Medical Device Coordination Group maps MDR/IVDR Annex I cybersecurity essential requirements to pre-market design, documentation and post-market vigilance duties.MDS2 explained: what the Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security actually coversMDS2 (ANSI/NEMA HN 1-2019) is the standardized form hospitals use to ask medical device makers 23 questions about security controls, from authentication to SBOM. 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FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices: Section 524B explained