HHS's 405(d) Program is the US healthcare sector's main public-private cybersecurity guidance effort, and its flagship output — Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices: Managing Threats and Protecting Patients (HICP) — sets out 10 recommended practices, including network-connected medical device security (Practice #9), that hospital procurement teams increasingly expect a connected medical device vendor to map its controls against. Created under Section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, HICP is voluntary, not a regulation, but a later statutory amendment gave it real regulatory weight by making "recognized security practices" — a term that names 405(d) directly — a factor HHS must consider when setting HIPAA fines.
Key takeaways
- From one paragraph of federal law.
- Four linked documents.
- Five threats and ten Cybersecurity Practices (CSPs).
- Practice 9 in Technical Volume 2 (pages 100–123) tells hospitals to extend Practices 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to medical devices rather than build a separate program.
Where does the 405(d) mandate come from, and who wrote HICP?
From one paragraph of federal law. Section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 directs HHS to establish, with DHS, NIST and industry, "a common set of voluntary, consensus-based, and industry-led guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes" that cost-effectively reduce cybersecurity risk for a range of health care organizations and "are updated on a regular basis." The same subsection limits HHS: it grants no authority to audit compliance or to condition federal grants or contracts on it, and nobody is liable for choosing not to take part.
HHS convened the 405(d) Task Group in May 2017 through the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Partnership. The 2023 edition's acknowledgements put participation at "more than 150 members" from the public and private sectors, and describe the Task Group as a standing group within the Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) Joint Cybersecurity Working Group. That is a different model from a government-authored crosswalk such as NIST SP 800-66 for the HIPAA Security Rule.
What is in the HICP 2023 publication set?
Four linked documents. HICP was first released in 2018; HHS and the HSCC issued the 2023 edition jointly on 17 April 2023, according to the AHA/Health-ISAC release notice. The PDFs are hosted on hhscyber.hhs.gov:
| Component | Audience | What it contains |
|---|---|---|
| Main Document | Executives, all staff | Five threats, ten practices at summary level, Table 1 "best fit" sizing |
| Technical Volume 1 | Small organizations | Ten practices with "S" sub-practices (for example 9.S.A) |
| Technical Volume 2 | Medium and large organizations | Ten practices with "M" and "L" sub-practices, metrics |
| Resources and Templates | Implementers | Assessment toolkit (Appendix E), NIST Cybersecurity Framework mapping |
The Main Document's Appendix A tables list 22 sub-practices for small, 40 for medium and 34 for large organizations (the Technical Volumes number a few of them differently). HICP calls itself "descriptive, rather than prescriptive," says the practices are not prioritized, and recommends starting with a risk assessment. One detail matters to device makers: Table 1 places "smaller device manufacturers" in the medium category and "large device manufacturer" in the large one, so a manufacturer is also an HICP audience for its own enterprise network.
Which threats and practices does HICP cover?
Five threats and ten Cybersecurity Practices (CSPs). The five threats are social engineering, ransomware, loss or theft of equipment or data, insider data loss, and "attacks against network connected medical devices that may affect patient safety." The ten practices, as listed in the Main Document:
| CSP | Practice |
|---|---|
| 1 | Email Protection Systems |
| 2 | Endpoint Protection Systems |
| 3 | Access Management |
| 4 | Data Protection and Loss Prevention |
| 5 | Asset Management |
| 6 | Network Management |
| 7 | Vulnerability Management |
| 8 | Security Operation Centers and Incident Response |
| 9 | Network Connected Medical Devices |
| 10 | Cybersecurity Oversight and Governance |
The Main Document's Table 6 threat profile lists the device weaknesses HHS has in mind: default passwords left unchanged, legacy equipment, slow patching, device heterogeneity, flat networks, devices that an intrusion detection system cannot monitor, and "cybersecurity profile information" that is "not readily available" to the hospital. Most of these can only be fixed with the manufacturer's help.
What does Practice 9 ask a hospital to do?
Practice 9 in Technical Volume 2 (pages 100–123) tells hospitals to extend Practices 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to medical devices rather than build a separate program. Its sub-practices, with the vendor dependency each one creates:
| Sub-practice | What the hospital does | What it needs from the device maker |
|---|---|---|
| 9.M.A Asset Management | Hardware and software inventory in a CMMS, passive discovery, data wiping at decommissioning | "A full listing of software components … with at least major version information" |
| 9.M.B Endpoint Protections | Anti-malware, local firewall, encryption at rest, allowlisting, password changes, routine patching | No hardcoded or default passwords; signed, reliable updates and notice when they exist |
| 9.M.C Identity and Access Management | Unique vendor credentials, MFA for remote access, "attended" vendor sessions only | Remote-support design that works with the hospital's MFA and approval flow |
| 9.M.D Network Management | Dedicated restricted segments, micro-segmentation | A documented list of required flows and ports |
| 9.M.E Vulnerability Management | Risk categorization, disclosure intake, SBOM lookups against NVD, controlled scanning | A vulnerability disclosure program and agreed risk categories |
| 9.M.F Contacting the FDA | Escalation to [email protected] when a high risk gets no manufacturer support | Responsive support, so this step is never needed |
| 9.L.A Security Operations and Incident Response | Device-segment logs to a SIEM, baselines, incident plays (Table 15) | Incident contact and log formats |
| 9.L.B Procurement and Security Evaluations | Security requirements in RFIs and RFPs, MDS2, risk triage, contract language | MDS2, SBOM, architecture diagram, end-of-life dates |
The Main Document's Appendix A labels some of these sub-practices differently (9.M.A appears there as "Medical Device Management"); the Technical Volume holds the text, so cite its labels. Volume 2 also tells hospitals not to run vulnerability scans against devices in clinical use, and to take "extreme caution" with any scan the device vendor has not approved.
What will a hospital ask a device maker for?
The procurement and vulnerability sub-practices translate into a fairly predictable request list. Technical Volume 2 says the hospital "should insist on receiving a MDS2" and "consider requesting an SBOM and an Enterprise Architecture Diagram to create a complete Vendor Assessment Package." Expect:
- a current MDS2 form (Volume 2 points to the 2019 NEMA worksheet);
- an SBOM with component names and versions, usable for NVD lookups;
- a network and architecture description: ports, protocols, required peers;
- a written statement of no hardcoded or default passwords and of signed updates;
- remote-access terms: unique credentials per vendor engineer, MFA, attended sessions;
- the product security team's contact and the vulnerability disclosure process;
- the expected end-of-life and end-of-support dates, with at least three years' notice where none are set;
- contract language, often based on the HSCC Model Contract-Language for Medtech Cybersecurity (MC2).
Response times hospitals will quote back to you. Technical Volume 2, Table 14, gives a "general rule" for uncontrolled risks: the vendor communicates and the hospital sets an interim mitigation within 30 days, and the vendor produces a remediation that the hospital implements within 60 days. Controlled risks follow routine patching. Volume 2 says this is in line with FDA's postmarket cybersecurity guidance.
Volume 2's suggested metrics include the "number of devices that have unknown risks due to lack of manufacturer-disclosed information." A vendor with complete disclosures keeps that number low for its customers.
Why does a voluntary document carry regulatory weight?
Because of Public Law 116-321, approved 5 January 2021. It added Section 13412 to the HITECH Act: when deciding HIPAA fines, the length and extent of an audit, or the remedies in a resolution agreement, HHS "shall consider whether the covered entity or business associate has adequately demonstrated that it had, for not less than the previous 12 months, recognized security practices in place." The definition of recognized security practices names NIST's standards and guidelines, "the approaches promulgated under section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015," and other programs recognized through regulation.
The law also sets limits. HHS may not increase fines or audits for lack of these practices, nobody is liable for not adopting them, and HHS's authority to enforce the HIPAA Security Rule is unchanged. For a device maker, the effect is indirect but real: a hospital that wants to show 12 months of HICP-aligned practices needs documented evidence for its medical devices too, and much of that evidence comes from the vendor.
How do the 2024 HPH CPGs build on HICP?
HHS (through ASPR) released the Healthcare and Public Health Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals on 24 January 2024. The HHS CPG page says they were "built off the chassis of CISA's CPGs" (see our CISA CPGs guide) and informed by HICP, and links each goal to HICP sub-practices and NIST controls.
| Tier | Goals |
|---|---|
| Essential (10) | Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities; Email Security; Multifactor Authentication; Basic Cybersecurity Training; Strong Encryption; Revoke Credentials for Departing Workforce Members; Basic Incident Planning and Preparedness; Unique Credentials; Separate User and Privileged Accounts; Vendor/Supplier Cybersecurity Requirements |
| Enhanced (10) | Asset Inventory; Third Party Vulnerability Disclosure; Third Party Incident Reporting; Cybersecurity Testing; Cybersecurity Mitigation; Detect and Respond to Relevant Threats and TTPs; Network Segmentation; Centralized Log Collection; Centralized Incident Planning and Preparedness; Configuration Management |
Three goals point straight at suppliers: Vendor/Supplier Cybersecurity Requirements, Third Party Vulnerability Disclosure and Third Party Incident Reporting. The CPG page maps all three to HICP 10.M.B (risk assessment and management), adding 7.M.D and 8.M.C for incident reporting, and none to Practice 9, so a hospital may ask the same questions through its vendor-risk process rather than its clinical engineering team.
What does the proposed HIPAA Security Rule change mean for device makers?
It would tie some hospital duties to the FDA status of your device. On 6 January 2025 HHS published a proposed rule, HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information (90 FR 898; comments closed 7 March 2025). Its preamble names HICP and the CPGs among the resources it considered. The proposed encryption and multifactor authentication requirements include exceptions for FDA-authorized devices that depend on the submission date and on manufacturer support:
- submitted before 29 March 2023: the exception applies only if the hospital deploys the manufacturer's required or recommended updates;
- submitted on or after 29 March 2023 and no longer supported: the same condition;
- submitted on or after 29 March 2023 and still supported by the manufacturer: excepted.
29 March 2023 is the date FD&C Act Section 524B took effect for cyber device submissions. If the rule were finalized in this form, a published support period and timely patches would directly affect your customers' compliance. The Federal Register showed no final rule under RIN 0945-AA22 when checked on 12 November 2026.
How does this fit alongside FDA's device-specific duties?
HICP is guidance for healthcare organizations; FDA's rules bind the manufacturer. A US device maker typically needs FDA premarket cybersecurity evidence under Section 524B (SBOM, vulnerability monitoring plan) and a working FDA postmarket process, and will meet HICP Practice 9 and CPG questions in procurement. The documents do not cross-reference each other, so build one evidence set: inventory, SBOM, risk file per AAMI SW96, and customer security documentation in the style of the HSCC Joint Security Plan.
Worked example: how would a pump maker answer a Practice 9 questionnaire?
Synthetic example, not a real product. A maker of a networked infusion pump receives a security questionnaire from a 400-bed hospital that cites HICP 9.L.B and 9.M.E.
Disclosure packageThe team sends the current MDS2, a CycloneDX SBOM for firmware 4.2 and the drug-library server, and a flow diagram listing three required connections. CredentialsIt confirms there is no shared service password: field engineers get named accounts, and remote support uses the hospital's MFA gateway with sessions the hospital approves. UpdatesIt describes signed firmware packages and its customer notification channel. Vulnerability termsIt accepts the hospital's 30/60-day language for uncontrolled risks and explains how it classifies risks under FDA's postmarket guidance. LifecycleIt states the support end date for the current model, more than three years out.
The pump vendor answers once, in a format it reuses for the next hospital.
How should a device maker start?
Treat HICP as a customer requirement, not a certificationThere is nothing to certify against; "HICP-aligned" questions are about evidence for Practice 9 and the vendor goals in the CPGs. Build the disclosure package onceMDS2, SBOM, network flows, remote-access design and support dates answer HICP, the CPGs and most of FDA's labeling expectations. Publish a support periodHospitals plan around end-of-support dates, and the proposed HIPAA changes would make that date matter more. Quote primary textUse the Technical Volume's sub-practice labels and the statute's wording in formal responses. Keep your own network in scopeTable 1 lists device manufacturers as HICP organizations too.
SoftWSP helps with the software side of that package: it extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image, matches the components it identifies against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF advisories, and drafts a cited findings report that an engineer reviews. It does not complete an MDS2 or assess a hospital against HICP. See Device & Firmware Security, and the firmware SBOM guide for the inventory itself.
This guide summarizes the HICP 2023 Main Document and Technical Volume 2, the HHS CPG page, US statutes on govinfo and the Federal Register record, as read on 12 November 2026. It is general information, not legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the 405(d) Program, and what law created it?
Section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) directed HHS to pursue a more coordinated approach to healthcare-sector cybersecurity, in partnership with industry, rather than issuing a standalone regulation. HHS convened the 405(d) Task Group in 2017 through the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Public-Private Partnership, a group whose membership the 2023 edition's acknowledgements put at more than 150 people from the public and private sectors, working toward consensus-based guidance rather than a government-authored standard.
What is HICP, and what does it actually contain?
Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices: Managing Threats and Protecting Patients (HICP) is the Task Group's flagship voluntary guidance, first issued in 2018 and updated in a joint HHS/Healthcare and Public Health Sector Coordinating Council release on 17 April 2023. It is published as a set of linked documents rather than one text: a Main Document covering the sector's top cybersecurity threats and ten recommended practices at a high level, a Technical Volume 1 scaled for small organizations, a Technical Volume 2 scaled for medium and large organizations, and a Resources and Templates volume that includes a HICP assessment tool and a mapping to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Which of the ten practices covers medical devices, and what changed in the 2023 edition?
Secondary coverage of the 2023 edition (Clearwater Security's guide, NexusConnect's summary of the Task Group's own release) describes medical device security as Practice #9 of the ten — titled around "network connected medical device security" in the updated text — sitting alongside email protection, endpoint protection, access management, data protection, asset management, network management, vulnerability management, security operation centers and incident response, and (tenth) cybersecurity oversight and governance. The 2023 edition's top-five-threats list includes "attacks against network-connected medical devices" directly, and reporting on the update describes Practice #9 as substantially expanded with new sub-practices addressing device connectivity risk, reflecting the sector's growing reliance on networked medical equipment since the prior HICP edition.
How does HICP relate to HIPAA enforcement, and to HHS's 2024 Cybersecurity Performance Goals?
HICP itself is voluntary guidance, not a regulation — but Congress gave it indirect regulatory weight via Public Law 116-321 (enacted 5 January 2021), which added Section 13412 to the HITECH Act and directs HHS's Office for Civil Rights to consider whether a covered entity or business associate had "recognized security practices" — a defined term that explicitly includes approaches promulgated under Section 405(d) — "in place" for the preceding 12 months when deciding HIPAA fines, audit scope and resolution-agreement terms. OCR has been explicit that this is not a safe harbor or immunity, only a mitigating factor it must consider. Separately, HHS published new Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector-specific Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) on 24 January 2024 — ten "essential" and ten "enhanced" voluntary goals that secondary reporting describes as built in part on HICP's practices, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and CISA's own Cybersecurity Performance Goals, with HHS stating it would consider proposing the CPGs' incorporation into future enforceable requirements.
Sources
- govinfo: Public Law 114-113, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Section 405(d) (Division N — Cybersecurity Act of 2015)
- govinfo: Public Law 114-113, Section 405(d) text (HTML edition)
- govinfo: Public Law 116-321, HITECH Act Section 13412 text (HTML edition)
- govinfo: Public Law 116-321 — amendment to the HITECH Act requiring HHS to consider recognized security practices (enacted 5 January 2021)
- HHS 405(d) Program: official program site
- HHS Cybersecurity Program (hhscyber.hhs.gov): HICP Main Document PDF
- HHS Cybersecurity Program (hhscyber.hhs.gov): HICP 2023 Technical Volume 2, Cybersecurity Practices for Medium and Large Healthcare Organizations (Practice 9, pp. 100–123)
- HHS Cyber Gateway: HPH Cybersecurity Performance Goals (essential and enhanced goals, HICP sub-practice mapping)
- Federal Register: HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information, proposed rule, 90 FR 898 (6 January 2025)
- American Hospital Association: joint HHS/405(d)/Health Sector Coordinating Council release announcement, Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP) 2023 and supplements (24 April 2023 notice)
- Clearwater Security: The Guide to 405(d) Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (secondary analysis of HICP structure and the 10 practices)
- American Hospital Association: HHS Releases New Voluntary Performance Goals to Enhance Cybersecurity Across the Health Sector (30 January 2024 notice, HPH CPGs)
- McGuireWoods: OCR Seeks Input on "Recognized Security Practices" as Mitigating Factor for HIPAA and HITECH Fines
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