FDA's "Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices" guidance — final, issued 28 December 2016 — is where the Agency spells out how it expects medical device manufacturers to monitor, assess and fix cybersecurity vulnerabilities once a device is already on the market. Per its own Introduction, the FDA issued it "to inform industry and FDA staff of the Agency's recommendations for managing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities for marketed and distributed medical devices," and it "establishes a risk-based framework for assessing when changes to medical devices for cybersecurity vulnerabilities require reporting to the Agency" under 21 CFR Part 806. Like all FDA guidance documents, it is nonbinding: it "does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public," and a manufacturer may use an alternative approach that satisfies the underlying statute and regulations instead.
Key takeaways
- Everything in the reporting framework turns on one binary call.
- For uncontrolled-risk vulnerabilities, manufacturers "must report these vulnerabilities to the FDA according to 21 CFR part 806" unless they already reported under Parts 803 or 1004.
- Source: FDA, Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (2016), Section VII examples.
- Source: eCFR, 21 CFR Part 806, current as of 10 November 2026.
What is the core distinction between controlled and uncontrolled risk?
Everything in the reporting framework turns on one binary call. The guidance defines:
- Controlled risk: present "when there is sufficiently low (acceptable) residual risk of patient harm due to a device's particular cybersecurity vulnerability."
- Uncontrolled risk: present "when there is unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to inadequate compensating controls and risk mitigations."
The definitions in Section IV base the call on three factors: the likelihood of exploit, the impact of exploitation on the device's safety and essential performance, and the severity of patient harm if exploited. Section VI turns that into a process built on two axes, exploitability and severity of patient harm, with compensating controls taken into account. For exploitability it points to CVSS version 3.0 as one scoring tool, and for severity it borrows the five ISO 14971 levels, from negligible to catastrophic (see our ISO 14971 guide). FDA asks for a "binary determination" even when the matrix is unclear: every vulnerability ends up controlled or uncontrolled.
A fix for a controlled-risk vulnerability is generally a "cybersecurity routine update or patch", a device enhancement rather than a correction, so it is "generally not required to report... as corrections under 21 CFR part 806." That carve-out does not cover fixes for vulnerabilities with "a reasonable probability that use of, or exposure to, the product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death."
Uncontrolled risk: what is the 30-day/60-day path that avoids a Part 806 report?
For uncontrolled-risk vulnerabilities, manufacturers "must report these vulnerabilities to the FDA according to 21 CFR part 806" unless they already reported under Parts 803 or 1004. FDA then states it "does not intend to enforce reporting requirements under 21 CFR part 806" when all four of these are met:
- No known serious adverse events or deaths are associated with the vulnerability.
- Within 30 days of learning of it, the manufacturer tells customers and the user community, identifies interim compensating controls and documents a remediation plan with its timeline rationale. The notice must at minimum (a) describe the vulnerability and an impact assessment, (b) state that efforts to address the risk are underway, (c) describe compensating controls, if any, and (d) commit to a fix or a defence-in-depth strategy and to further communication.
- Within 60 days, the manufacturer fixes the vulnerability, validates the change and distributes the fix so residual risk is acceptable. A compensating control can be the long-term answer if it brings risk down, and follow-up with users can run past day 60.
- The manufacturer actively participates in an ISAO that shares medical device vulnerabilities and threats (the guidance names NH-ISAC) and gives it the customer communications.
Miss any one and the guidance's own examples end in an 806.10 report: a manufacturer that patches an implantable device's hard-coded password within 60 days but is not in an ISAO "reports this action to the FDA under 21 CFR 806.10." Without remediation, FDA warns the device may be "in violation of the FD&C Act and subject to enforcement or other action."
Which reporting path applies to which vulnerability?
The guidance's examples map onto four outcomes:
| Situation after your risk assessment | FDA reporting path | Records and other duties |
|---|---|---|
| Controlled risk, fix is a routine update or patch | No Part 806 report | Keep the risk assessment and change records; PMA holders list it in the annual report |
| Uncontrolled risk, no known serious adverse events, all four conditions met (30/60 days, ISAO) | FDA does not intend to enforce the Part 806 report | Keep evidence for each condition; PMA holders summarise remediation in the annual report |
| Uncontrolled risk, any condition missed (for example no ISAO membership or fix after day 60) | Part 806 report under 21 CFR 806.10 | Customer notice and remediation still expected |
| Exploitation caused or contributed to serious injury or death | Medical device report under Part 803, plus 806.10 for the correction | Emergency patch and notification |
Source: FDA, Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (2016), Section VII examples.
A change that significantly modifies the device can also need a new 510(k) or a PMA supplement; the guidance asks manufacturers to assess whether each fix needs one.
What does 21 CFR Part 806 require when a report is due?
Part 806 is short, and three sections matter for cybersecurity work:
| Section | Requirement |
|---|---|
| 806.1(b)(1) | Exempts actions that "improve the performance or quality of a device but that do not reduce a risk to health", the legal basis for treating routine patches as enhancements |
| 806.10(b) | A required report is due "within 10-working days of initiating such correction or removal" |
| 806.10(f) | No 806 report if the correction was already reported under Part 803 or 1004 |
| 806.20 | Corrections not reported still need a record with a "justification for not reporting", reviewed by a designated person, kept "2 years beyond the expected life of the device" |
Source: eCFR, 21 CFR Part 806, current as of 10 November 2026.
The 806.20 record is where the 30/60-day evidence lives. If FDA asks why a cybersecurity correction was not reported, that file should show the risk assessment, the dated customer notice, the validated fix and the ISAO sharing.
What counts as "active participation" in an ISAO?
Because ISAO participation gates the reporting relief, Section IX lists four criteria FDA "intends to consider":
- The manufacturer is a member of an ISAO that shares vulnerabilities and threats affecting medical devices.
- That ISAO has documented policies for participant agreements, business processes, operating procedures and privacy protections.
- The manufacturer shares vulnerability information with the ISAO, including customer communications.
- The manufacturer has documented processes for assessing and responding to ISAO intelligence, traceable to its device risk assessments and mitigations.
FDA recommends keeping "objective evidence" against all four. Membership alone, without sharing and traceability, does not meet the guidance's framing.
What goes into the PMA periodic report?
For PMA devices with annual reporting under 21 CFR 814.84, Section VIII lists what to include for each cybersecurity change or compensating control:
- how the vulnerability was found and a short description;
- the risk assessment conclusion, controlled or uncontrolled;
- the change made, compared with the approved version, and its rationale;
- other submissions or devices changed for the same vulnerability;
- related events (MDR or recall numbers) and the UDI, if available;
- a link to the ICS-CERT or other government or ISAO advisory, if any;
- all customer notifications, and the date and name of the ISAO told;
- references to other submissions (PMA supplement, 30-day notice, 806 report) or the basis for concluding none was needed.
How does Section 524B change postmarket duties?
It turns parts of the 2016 recommendations into law for cyber devices. Section 524B of the FD&C Act, added by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 and in force since 29 March 2023, applies to 510(k), PMA, De Novo, PDP and HDE submissions for a "cyber device": one that includes software, can connect to the internet and could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. What the submission must contain is covered in our FDA premarket cybersecurity guide; after clearance, the commitments become operating duties:
| 2016 guidance (nonbinding) | Section 524B(b) (statute) |
|---|---|
| Monitor and assess vulnerabilities; coordinated vulnerability disclosure | (b)(1) a plan "to monitor, identify, and address, as appropriate, in a reasonable time, postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure" |
| Controlled risk: routine updates and patches | (b)(2)(A) updates and patches "on a reasonably justified regular cycle" for "known unacceptable vulnerabilities" |
| Uncontrolled risk: fix within 60 days | (b)(2)(B) "as soon as possible out of cycle" for "critical vulnerabilities that could cause uncontrolled risks" |
| Know your software components | (b)(3) a software bill of materials |
Section 301(q)(3) of the Act makes "the failure to comply with any requirement under section 360n–2(b)(2)", the update-and-patch duty, a prohibited act. The 30/60-day framework is still FDA's stated way to decide reporting, but for a cyber device the patching itself is no longer only a recommendation.
Two more changes since 2016: FDA's current download of the guidance opens with a note that it "was issued prior to the effective date" of the Quality Management System Regulation (in force 2 February 2026), so its references to 21 CFR 820.30(g) and 820.100 should be read against the QMSR. And the guidance index, checked on 13 November 2026, still lists the 2016 document as final.
Worked example: what does day 0 to day 60 look like?
Synthetic example, not a real product. A maker of a networked infusion pump (510(k)-cleared in 2024 as a Section 524B cyber device) learns from a researcher on day 0 that the pump's management interface accepts unauthenticated dose-limit changes from the hospital network.
Day 0–3:acknowledge the researcher, open a case, score exploitability (network, no privileges) with the CVSS calculator, and rate severity as critical under ISO 14971. Result: uncontrolled risk. No adverse events known. Day 5:share the finding through the ISAO the company already belongs to, with traceability to the risk file. Day 21:send the customer notice with all four elements: description and impact, "efforts are underway", the interim control (block the management port at the hospital firewall) and a commitment to a fix. Give the ISAO a copy the same day. Day 52:release a validated firmware update that requires authentication, after design-control verification. Day 60 onward:confirm uptake with hospitals, record everything in the 806.20 file, and list the change in the next annual report if the pump were a PMA device.
Because all four conditions held, no 806 report is needed. Had the company not been an ISAO member, the same timeline would end in an 806.10 report within 10 working days of starting the correction.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Joining an ISAO after the vulnerability arrives. The criteria need documented sharing and processes, which take time to show.
- Counting days from the patch date. Both clocks run from when the manufacturer learns of the vulnerability.
- A customer notice missing an element. Each of the four elements is a minimum, not a menu.
- No 806.20 record. Not reporting still needs a written justification reviewed by a designated person.
- Treating 524B as premarket paperwork. The (b)(2) patch duty applies for the life of a cyber device, and missing it is a prohibited act.
- Reading the 2016 text in isolation. Its QSR citations predate the QMSR, and its premarket cross-references have been replaced several times; the IMDRF legacy device guidance and AAMI SW96 are useful companions for older fleets.
Can AI help with the controlled/uncontrolled risk classification?
It can gather the exploitability evidence, but the classification stays a human call. The guidance's test turns partly on likelihood of exploit, which CISA's KEV catalog and FIRST's EPSS score help estimate (see KEV and EPSS prioritization). SoftWSP builds a CycloneDX SBOM from a device's firmware, matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, and an AI step drafts a cited report, for example which finding is KEV-listed or has a high EPSS score, for the manufacturer's engineer to weigh against safety and essential performance. It does not decide controlled versus uncontrolled, whether the 30/60-day conditions are met, or whether a Part 806 report is due.
SoftWSP can run the monitoring and disclosure process this framework expects as a service: see PSIRT as a service and, for the firmware analysis behind the risk assessment, device firmware security. For the coordinated-disclosure policy both FDA documents expect, start from our vulnerability disclosure policy template.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is FDA's "Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices" guidance?
It is a final, nonbinding guidance document FDA issued on 28 December 2016 (draft issued 22 January 2016) to inform industry and FDA staff of the Agency's recommendations for managing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities in marketed and distributed medical devices. Per its own Introduction, the guidance "establishes a risk-based framework for assessing when changes to medical devices for cybersecurity vulnerabilities require reporting to the Agency and outlines circumstances in which FDA does not intend to enforce reporting requirements under 21 CFR part 806." As of October 2026, FDA's own guidance index still lists the document as final and current, with no formal revision or supersession despite later statutory change (see below).
What is the difference between "controlled risk" and "uncontrolled risk" in this guidance?
The guidance defines controlled risk as present "when there is sufficiently low (acceptable) residual risk of patient harm due to a device's particular cybersecurity vulnerability," and uncontrolled risk as present "when there is unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to inadequate compensating controls and risk mitigations." The assessment behind that classification is based on an evaluation of three factors the guidance names directly: the likelihood of exploit, the impact of exploitation on the device's safety and essential performance, and the severity of patient harm if exploited. A fix for a controlled-risk vulnerability is generally a "cybersecurity routine update or patch" — a type of device enhancement that manufacturers are "generally not required to report... as corrections under 21 CFR part 806."
When does FDA say it will not enforce 21 CFR Part 806 reporting for an uncontrolled-risk vulnerability?
The guidance lists four circumstances that must all be met: (1) there are no known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the vulnerability; (2) "as soon as possible but no later than 30 days after learning of the vulnerability," the manufacturer communicates with customers and the user community, identifies interim compensating controls, and documents a remediation plan with its timeline rationale; (3) "as soon as possible but no later than 60 days after learning of the vulnerability," the manufacturer fixes the vulnerability, validates the change, and distributes the deployable fix so residual risk reaches an acceptable level; and (4) the manufacturer "actively participates as a member of an ISAO that shares vulnerabilities and threats that impact medical devices... and provides the ISAO with any customer communications upon notification of its customers." A manufacturer that does not meet all four — for example, one that is not an active ISAO participant — must report the vulnerability to FDA under 21 CFR Part 806 instead, per the guidance's own worked examples.
What criteria does FDA use to decide if a manufacturer is an "active participant" in an ISAO?
Section IX lists four criteria FDA says it will consider: (1) the manufacturer is a member of an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) that shares vulnerabilities and threats affecting medical devices, such as the guidance's own example, NH-ISAC; (2) that ISAO has documented policies for participant agreements, business processes, operating procedures and privacy protections; (3) the manufacturer shares vulnerability information with the ISAO, including customer communications about cybersecurity vulnerabilities; and (4) the manufacturer has documented processes for assessing and responding to vulnerability and threat intelligence the ISAO provides, traceable to the manufacturer's own risk assessments and mitigations. The guidance recommends manufacturers keep objective evidence against all four criteria if they want FDA to credit them as active participants.
Has this 2016 guidance been updated or replaced, and how does it relate to FDA's newer premarket cybersecurity requirements?
The 2016 postmarket guidance itself remains in effect and, per FDA's own guidance index as of October 2026, has not been formally withdrawn or revised — even though the regulatory landscape around it has changed substantially since 2016. Separately, Section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, added by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 and effective 29 March 2023, created a new, binding statutory requirement for premarket "cyber device" submissions — an SBOM, a vulnerability-monitoring plan and a secure-update process — that did not exist when this guidance was written. See [FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices](/guides/fda-premarket-cybersecurity-medical-devices/) for Section 524B itself. Because this guidance predates Section 524B, SBOM practice and some cited sub-regulatory references (e.g., an NIST SP 800-53A-derived threat definition, a 2014 content-of-premarket-submissions guidance later superseded), readers should treat its reporting-relief framework as still FDA's stated postmarket position, while confirming current FDA guidance pages for anything that depends on post-2016 statutory or sub-regulatory changes.
Sources
- FDA: Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices — Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff (final guidance, issued 28 December 2016, draft issued 22 January 2016; full text of Definitions, General Principles, Risk Management, Remediating and Reporting, ISAO criteria and Appendix sections)
- FDA: guidance document index entry for "Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices" (current status page)
- 21 CFR Part 806 — Medical Devices; Reports of Corrections and Removals (eCFR, current text)
- NIST: Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.0 (the Identify/Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover framework the guidance's Appendix recommends structuring a postmarket cybersecurity program around)
- FDA: current download of the 2016 postmarket guidance, with the QMSR cover note (QMSR effective 2 February 2026)
- 21 CFR 806.10 — Reports of corrections and removals (eCFR)
- 21 CFR 806.20 — Records of corrections and removals not required to be reported (eCFR)
- 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 — FD&C Act Section 524B, Ensuring cybersecurity of devices (Cornell LII)
- 21 U.S.C. 331(q)(3) — prohibited act: failure to comply with Section 524B(b)(2) (Cornell LII)
About this guide
SoftWSP Regulation Desk
Covers the Medical & regulated devices cluster: 30 guides.

In this cluster
Questions about this page?
