ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023, "Standard for medical device security – Security risk management for device manufacturers," is the first normative standard — not a technical report — dedicated specifically to how a medical device manufacturer should run security risk management, from design through post-production. Published by the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) on 21 December 2022 and approved as an American National Standard, it sits inside the same ISO 14971 risk management framework device makers already use for safety, adding a parallel process for security risk. FDA recognized SW96 in 2023, and FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance now cites it, with AAMI TIR57, as a model for the security risk management plan and report, while naming IEC 81001-5-1 as an example Secure Product Development Framework.
A note on sourcing: AAMI and ANSI sell SW96's full text. This guide quotes the scope and rationale published in FDA's recognition record for SW96, FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance, FDA's Federal Register recognition notice, and an independent secondary analysis that quotes the standard's purpose statement. Clause-level detail beyond what is quoted and attributed below is not drawn from the purchased full text.
Key takeaways
- A note on sourcing: AAMI and ANSI sell SW96's full text.
- It covers security risk management for the whole device life cycle, from threat identification at design to patching and retirement in the field.
- a security risk management file, maintained for each medical device system, that incorporates the plan and the records showing it was followed.
- Because nobody can estimate the probability of a deliberate attack from historical data, so FDA asks for exploitability instead.
What does SW96 actually cover?
It covers security risk management for the whole device life cycle, from threat identification at design to patching and retirement in the field. FDA's recognition record reproduces the scope: SW96 "provides requirements and guidance when addressing design, production and post-production security risk management for medical devices within the risk management framework defined by ISO 14971." The record lists the tasks the standard is meant to support; grouped by phase:
| Phase | Tasks named in SW96's scope |
|---|---|
| Design | Identify threats, vulnerabilities and assets of the device, its components and supply chain vendors; estimate and evaluate security risks; determine risk controls; verify and monitor their effectiveness; create design features that enable post-production security management and integration with hospital network security |
| Coordination | Assess security risk to decide when action is required, and coordinate with safety risk management; coordinate communications and risk activities with healthcare delivery organizations (HDOs); state the security expectations for those who deploy the device |
| Post-production | Run an enterprise-wide process for post-production security interactions; manage and monitor fielded devices containing software (including firmware), programmable logic or hardware; run a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process; manage security patching |
| End of life | Plan for device retirement; End of Support (EOS) and End of Guaranteed Support (EOGS) are milestones in the post-production phase |
The record adds two lineage notes: SW96 "expands on the information provided in Clause 10 'Production and post-production activities' of ISO/TR 24971", and it references the coordinated safety/security assessment approach in Clause 9 of AAMI TIR57. Device and firmware teams already running a firmware SBOM and a vulnerability disclosure policy will recognize most of the post-production rows.
What are the process, plan and file SW96 asks for?
Three linked artifacts, mirroring the structure ISO 14971 already uses for safety:
- a security risk management process that a manufacturer establishes and documents;
- a security risk management plan, developed in accordance with that process; and
- a security risk management file, maintained for each medical device system, that incorporates the plan and the records showing it was followed.
An independent secondary analysis quotes the standard's purpose statement directly — SW96 exists "to specify requirements ... on how medical device manufacturers should manage security risk throughout the life cycle of a medical device within the risk management framework defined by ISO 14971" — and describes roughly 14 of the standard's 61 pages being spent on the process alone, a level of procedural detail it compares to ISO 14971 and contrasts with the shorter treatment in TIR57 and TIR97. The same analysis groups the requirements into design-phase risk management, post-production processes, monitoring and coordination with HDOs, and patch delivery and end-of-life management.
Why can't security risk use ISO 14971's probability model?
Because nobody can estimate the probability of a deliberate attack from historical data, so FDA asks for exploitability instead. ISO 14971:2019 defines risk (3.18) as the combination of the probability of harm and its severity. FDA's recognition record for SW96 carries a note that its premarket guidance "explicitly states this probabilistic model does not apply to cybersecurity, substituting exploitability - the feasibility and technical means by which a vulnerability can be exploited - as the operative basis for security risk estimation," and that standards referencing risk for cybersecurity "should reflect this distinction."
The premarket guidance itself says cybersecurity risks are "difficult to predict", that security risk assessment processes "focus on exploitability", and that safety and security risk management are "distinct but connected processes." It recommends "both a safety risk assessment and a separate, accompanying security risk assessment." A premarket exploitability assessment can assume the worst case and control for it, or justify a reasonable estimate across the total product life cycle. In SW96 terms, the security file holds the exploitability-based assessment, and any path to patient harm crosses into the ISO 14971 safety file.
Where does SW96 sit relative to TIR57, TIR97 and IEC 81001-5-1?
SW96 does not replace AAMI's earlier guidance; AAMI's catalogue description says it "is intended to be used in conjunction with AAMI TIR57 and AAMI TIR97." TIR57 and TIR97 are Technical Information Reports — informative, consensus guidance — while SW96 is a standard with requirements. All three appear in FDA's Recognized Consensus Standards database, each with "Complete standard" as its extent of recognition:
| Document | Status | FDA recognition no. | Date of entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAMI TIR57:2016, Principles for medical device security — Risk management | Technical Information Report | 13-83 | 27 June 2016 |
| AAMI TIR97:2019, Principles for medical device security — Postmarket risk management for device manufacturers | Technical Information Report | 13-112 | 23 December 2019 |
| ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 | American National Standard | 13-131 | 9 October 2023 |
SW96 also complements, rather than duplicates, IEC 81001-5-1, the standard covering security activities in the health software life cycle. FDA's guidance draws the same line: it names the Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan (JSP2), IEC 81001-5-1 and ANSI/ISA 62443-4-1 as possible SPDF frameworks, and points to TIR57 and SW96 for how "security and safety risk management processes should interface." A team working toward both typically runs IEC 81001-5-1's process activities to produce the evidence that fills SW96's risk management file.
How has FDA recognized SW96, and what does recognition change?
FDA added ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 to its Recognized Consensus Standards database on 9 October 2023, and announced the recognition publicly on 7 November 2023. The addition was formalized in FDA's periodic Federal Register notice, "Recognition List Number: 061" (89 FR 15202, published 1 March 2024), which lists SW96:2023 as new entry Recognition No. 13-131 under "Q. Software/Informatics," with "Complete" as its extent of recognition.
Recognition lets a manufacturer cite conformance to SW96 in a premarket submission's declaration of conformity, rather than describing an equivalent process from scratch. It is a separate mechanism from the statutory Section 524B "cyber device" duties (SBOM, vulnerability-monitoring plan, patching process). The recognition record says so: "Conformance to this standard may not satisfy all the cybersecurity requirements outlined in Section 524B of FD&C Act or the recommendations in the FDA's Premarket Cybersecurity Guidance." See FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices for that statutory baseline.
What does FDA expect in the security risk management report?
FDA recommends "a security risk management plan and report such as that described in AAMI TIR57 and ANSI/AAMI SW96", and says such a report "should be sufficient to support the security risk management process aspect" of a submission. The guidance, issued 3 February 2026, lists what the report should include; the right-hand column is the evidence a firmware team typically owns:
| Report element in FDA's guidance | Firmware-team evidence |
|---|---|
| System threat modeling | Data-flow diagram of device, app, cloud and service interfaces |
| Cybersecurity risk assessment | Exploitability-based assessment per threat, linked to safety hazards |
| Software Bill of Materials | SBOM generated from the shipped image, not only from source manifests |
| Component support information | Supplier support status and end-of-support dates per component |
| Vulnerability assessments | Known CVEs per component, with how each is controlled |
| Unresolved anomaly assessments | Open defects with security impact and their justification |
The report should also summarize the risk evaluation methods, state the residual risk conclusion, list the mitigation activities, and "provide traceability between the threat model, cybersecurity risk assessment, SBOM, and testing documentation." Ordering the vulnerability list with KEV and EPSS helps the report show why some findings were fixed first.
Worked example: how does SW96 handle a new CVE after release?
Synthetic example for illustration; the device, CVE and dates are invented. A bedside patient monitor ships with an embedded Linux image that includes an open-source TLS library.
MonitorThe post-production process re-checks the released SBOM against public vulnerability data each week. A new critical CVE in the TLS library appears, and it is on the CISA KEV catalogue. AssessThe security team rates exploitability: the library terminates the monitor's connection to the central station, which is reachable from the hospital network. Rated high. Coordinate with safetyLoss of the central-station link delays alarms, a hazard already in the ISO 14971 file. The security file records the new cause; the safety team confirms the existing alarm-loss mitigation still holds. CommunicateThrough the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process, the manufacturer sends affected HDOs a notice with a compensating control (restrict the port to the central-station subnet). PatchA firmware update with the fixed library is verified and released; the SBOM and the security risk management file are updated. RetireUnits past their End of Guaranteed Support date receive the notice but no patch, as the support policy states; the file records that decision.
FDA's postmarket cybersecurity guidance governs the US reporting side of the same event, and the EU MDR Annex I guide covers the European one.
What is a workable starting point?
Map your existing ISO 14971 safety risk file against SW96's security risk management file structurebefore starting from scratch — the two run in parallel, and security risks with patient-harm potential feed back into the safety file. Treat TIR57 and TIR97 as implementation detail, SW96 as the binding structureIf your team already has TIR57/TIR97-based processes, the gap is usually formalizing them into SW96's process/plan/file artifacts. Write the security risk management report to FDA's element list— threat model, risk assessment, SBOM, component support, vulnerability and anomaly assessments — with traceability between them. Cite SW96 recognition as a conformance aid, not a Section 524B substituteThe statutory SBOM and vulnerability-monitoring plan content still has to be in the submission. Buy the primary text before writing SOPs that cite clause numbersThis guide's structure comes from FDA's records and a secondary summary, not from the purchased standard. Pair SW96's risk artifacts with IEC 81001-5-1's life-cycle activitiesif your product is health software or software as a medical device (SaMD).
What are the common pitfalls?
- Scoring security risks by probability. FDA's note on the recognition record rejects that model for cybersecurity; use exploitability.
- Treating SW96 as the SPDF. It is the risk management piece; FDA names IEC 81001-5-1, JSP2 and ISA 62443-4-1 as SPDF frameworks.
- Stopping at release. Most of SW96's scope list is post-production: monitoring, CVD, patching and retirement.
- An SBOM from source manifests only. Vendor binaries and the board support package sit in the shipped image, not in the build manifest.
- Leaving end of support undefined. EOS and EOGS are named milestones; without dates, the retirement plan has nothing to point to.
Where does AI fit into an SW96 risk management file?
SoftWSP doesn't run SW96's security risk management process — that process, plan and file stay the manufacturer's own documented responsibility. What the platform does is narrower: it extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories. AI then drafts a cited findings report — which components carry a known vulnerability, which are KEV-listed or high-EPSS — that an engineer reviews before it feeds the SBOM and vulnerability-assessment elements of the file. Watchlist alerts can follow a CVE id or a vendor and product. SoftWSP does not assess exploitability or reachability, write VEX statements, assign risk scores, or re-match each new release on its own.
SoftWSP's device and firmware security work can help structure the threat identification, SBOM, and vulnerability-monitoring evidence a security risk management file needs: see Device & Firmware Security.
This guide is built from FDA's recognition records and premarket cybersecurity guidance, FDA's Federal Register recognition notice, AAMI's and ANSI's public catalogue descriptions, and one independent secondary analysis — not from the full paywalled standard text. It is not a substitute for the purchased standard, FDA's current guidance, or regulatory/legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023?
ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023, "Standard for medical device security – Security risk management for device manufacturers," is an American National Standard published by the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) on 21 December 2022 (ISBN 978-1-57020-862-1, 61 pages). Per its scope, as reproduced by multiple standards catalogues, it "provides requirements and guidance when addressing design, production and post-production security risk management for medical devices within the risk management framework defined by ISO 14971," covering how to identify threats, vulnerabilities and assets across a device and its supply chain; estimate and evaluate the resulting security risks; determine risk controls; and manage and monitor fielded devices containing software, firmware, programmable logic or hardware for security vulnerabilities. This guide cites AAMI's and ANSI's own catalogue and scope descriptions and FDA's recognition notice; AAMI/ANSI's full paywalled text was not independently read for this guide, so clause-level wording beyond what is quoted here should be confirmed against the purchased standard.
How is SW96 different from AAMI TIR57 and TIR97?
TIR57 ("Principles for medical device security — Risk management," 2016) and TIR97 ("Principles for medical device security — Postmarket risk management," 2019) are AAMI Technical Information Reports — informative, consensus-based guidance documents, not standards. SW96 is AAMI's first normative *standard* on the topic: per AAMI's own scope language it is "intended to be used in conjunction with AAMI TIR57 and AAMI TIR97," but unlike them it sets binding requirements rather than only recommendations. Independent secondary analysis (an AAMI-recognized medical device security consultancy) describes SW96 as devoting roughly 14 pages to describing the security risk management process alone — a level of procedural detail the consultancy compares to ISO 14971 itself, and well beyond TIR57/TIR97's shorter treatment of the same process.
How does SW96 relate to ISO 14971, the medical device safety risk standard?
SW96 is explicitly written to operate inside ISO 14971's existing risk management framework rather than replace it. Per the purpose statement an independent secondary source quotes directly from the standard, SW96 exists "to specify requirements ... on how medical device manufacturers should manage security risk throughout the life cycle of a medical device within the risk management framework defined by ISO 14971." In practice this means a manufacturer already running an ISO 14971 safety risk management process extends it with SW96's parallel security risk management process, plan and file, rather than building a wholly separate security program — and security risks capable of causing patient harm are expected to feed into the ISO 14971 safety risk file.
Has FDA recognized SW96, and what does that mean for premarket submissions?
Yes. FDA added ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 to its Recognized Consensus Standards database on 9 October 2023 and formally announced recognition on 7 November 2023, and the standard was published as a new entry (Recognition No. 13-131, category Software/Informatics, "Complete" extent of recognition) in FDA's periodic Federal Register notice, "Modifications to the List of Recognized Standards, Recognition List Number: 061," 89 FR 15202 at 15208 (1 March 2024). FDA recognition means a manufacturer can cite conformance to SW96 as part of the declaration of conformity supporting a premarket submission's cybersecurity information, in place of describing the same process from scratch; it does not itself waive any of the separate statutory Section 524B "cyber device" duties — see [FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices](/guides/fda-premarket-cybersecurity-medical-devices/) for those. FDA recognition of a standard is also distinct from, and does not require, purchasing or implementing every AAMI/ANSI companion document (TIR57, TIR97) sold alongside it.
Sources
- ANSI Webstore: ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 — Standard for medical device security — Security risk management for device manufacturers (publisher AAMI, catalogue record, ISBN 978-1-57020-862-1, 61 pages, published 2022-12-21)
- AAMI Array: ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023 (publisher's own catalogue page and DOI record, Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation)
- Federal Register: Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 — Modifications to the List of Recognized Standards, Recognition List Number: 061, 89 FR 15202 (new entry 13-131, ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023, Software/Informatics, published 2024-03-01)
- FDA: Recognized Consensus Standards database (search tool; SW96:2023 listed as Recognition No. 13-131, date of entry 2023-10-09)
- AAMI Array: "FDA Recognizes Cybersecurity and Data Security AAMI Standards for Health Technology" (AAMI's successor publishing platform for its 7 November 2023 pressroom announcement)
- MD101 Consulting (Software in Medical Devices blog): "AAMI SW96 2023 – The keystone of security risk management for medical devices" (independent secondary analysis quoting SW96's purpose statement, page-count comparison to TIR57/TIR97 and ISO 14971)
- FDA Recognized Consensus Standards: ANSI/AAMI SW96:2023, recognition no. 13-131 (scope, extent, rationale note on exploitability and Section 524B)
- FDA Recognized Consensus Standards: AAMI TIR57:2016, recognition no. 13-83
- FDA Recognized Consensus Standards: AAMI TIR97:2019, recognition no. 13-112
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance issued 3 February 2026)
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