MDCG 2019-16, "Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices," is the EU's main interpretive guidance on how connected medical device manufacturers meet the cybersecurity essential requirements already written into MDR Annex I (Regulation (EU) 2017/745) and IVDR Annex I (Regulation (EU) 2017/746). First published in December 2019 and revised as Rev.1 in July 2020, it was endorsed by the Medical Device Coordination Group (MDCG) — Member State representatives chaired by the European Commission — but, as the document states of itself, it "is not a European Commission document" and carries no independent legal force; only the Court of Justice of the EU can bind interpretation of Union law. In practice, it is the reference manufacturers, notified bodies and consultants use to turn MDR/IVDR's high-level essential requirements into a workable pre-market and post-market cybersecurity programme.
A note on sourcing: this guide is drawn from the MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 PDF on the European Commission's health site, cross-checked against the MDR, IVDR, NIS2 and CRA texts in the Official Journal. The Commission's list of endorsed MDCG documents still showed Rev.1 (July 2020) as the current edition on 12 November 2026.
Key takeaways
- A note on sourcing: this guide is drawn from the MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 PDF on the European Commission's health site, cross-checked against the MDR, IVDR, NIS2 and CRA texts in the Official Journal.
- From MDR and IVDR Annex I; the guidance adds none of its own.
- Integrator. Installs and configures the system securely at the operator's site and supports patching.
- Security guidelines for integrating, configuring and maintaining the device.
Where do the requirements actually come from?
From MDR and IVDR Annex I; the guidance adds none of its own. Its Table 1 lines up 17 Annex I topics that it treats as cybersecurity-relevant:
| Topic | MDR Annex I | IVDR Annex I |
|---|---|---|
| Device performance; risk reduction; risk management system; risk control measures | 1; 2; 3; 4 | 1; 2; 3; 4 |
| Minimisation of foreseeable risks and side-effects | 8 | 8 |
| Combination or connection of devices and systems | 14.1 | 13.1 |
| Interaction between software and the IT environment | 14.2(d) | 13.2(d) |
| Interoperability and compatibility | 14.5 | 13.5 |
| Repeatability, reliability and performance | 17.1 | 16.1 |
| State-of-the-art development, incl. information security, V&V | 17.2 | 16.2 |
| Minimum IT requirements | 17.4 | 16.4 |
| Unauthorised access | 18.8 | — |
| Lay persons | 22.1 | — |
| Residual risks; label warnings | 23.1(g); 23.2(m) | 20.1(g); 20.2(m) |
| Residual risks in the instructions for use | 23.4(g) | — |
| Minimum IT requirements in the instructions for use | 23.4(ab) | 20.4.1(ah) |
The central clause is Annex I Section 17.4 MDR / 16.4 IVDR: manufacturers "shall set out minimum requirements concerning hardware, IT networks characteristics and IT security measures, including protection against unauthorised access, necessary to run the software as intended." Section 1.4 adds the MDR articles that carry cybersecurity into conformity assessment (Art. 52), post-market surveillance (Arts. 83–86), vigilance and trend reporting (Arts. 87–89) and technical documentation (Annexes II and III). For a clause-by-clause view of the regulation itself, see our MDR Annex I cybersecurity guide.
Who is responsible for what?
The regulations bind only the manufacturer, but Section 2.6 describes a "joint responsibility" with others:
- Integrator. Installs and configures the system securely at the operator's site and supports patching. If the manufacturer contracts out integration, "all obligations and liabilities resulting from that integration remain with the manufacturer."
- Operator (for example a hospital). Follows the manufacturer's security instructions, applies patches when that is its job, keeps the environment secure, and notifies the manufacturer "without delay" of a suspected security event.
- Users. Clinicians and patients follow the instructions for use; the instructions for use should take into account the users' age or other limiting factors.
Section 2.6 also says any modification, including installing third-party software or patches, "should always be under explicit published guidance of the manufacturer." That makes patch instructions part of the product.
What does secure design and manufacture involve?
Chapter 3 sets out eight practices, close to the structure of IEC 62443-4-1:
- Security management across the lifecycle;
- Specification of security requirements;
- Secure by design, including defence in depth;
- Secure implementation (externally provided components fall under practice 1);
- Security verification and validation testing;
- Management of security-related issues;
- Security update management, with regression testing and timely release;
- Security guidelines for integrating, configuring and maintaining the device.
Table 3 gives an indicative list of security capabilities: automatic logoff, audit controls, authorization, configuration of security features, cybersecurity product upgrades, personal data de-identification, data backup and disaster recovery, emergency access, personal data integrity and authenticity, malware detection and protection, node authentication, person authentication, physical locks, system and OS hardening, security and privacy guides, personal data storage confidentiality, transmission confidentiality and transmission integrity. The list closely follows the security capabilities of IEC TR 80001-2-2, which the MDS2 form also uses; IEC TR 60601-4-5 turns them into technical specifications.
Section 3.7 names testing as "the primary means of security verification and validation": security feature testing, fuzz testing, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, secure code analysis, and tools that scan for open source components "to identify components with known issues."
Is security risk management a separate process?
No. Section 3.2 says security risks are named within the MDR risk management process "to avoid any misunderstanding that a separate process would be needed," while accepting that "specific methods and requirements are however used for security risks." The security process has the same elements as ISO 14971 safety risk management: plan, analysis, evaluation, control, residual risk evaluation and reporting. Annex IV shows the two processes feeding each other.
Where safety and security collide. The guidance's example: blanking a screen protects personal data, but on an interventional device or a vital-signs display it is a safety hazard and should not be implemented. Section 3.4 adds that exploiting a known vulnerability (one with a CVE) may be "foreseeable" for risk management, and that CVSS can support likelihood estimates. Section 3.5 asks for an overall benefit-risk analysis, not one per security risk.
Many manufacturers still keep a separate security risk file, as ANSI/AAMI SW96 describes; under MDCG 2019-16 it should be presented as part of one risk management system, with security hazards visible in the safety analysis.
What must the instructions for use and security documentation say?
Section 3.6 sets the principles for the operating environment: the device "should be as autonomous as possible in terms of IT security," the manufacturer's assumptions about the environment must be written in the instructions for use, and environment controls should not compensate for device vulnerabilities "unless there is sufficient justification." Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then list what to disclose. In the instructions for use (Annex I 23.4):
- a high-level risk profile and security objectives (23.4(g));
- operating system specifications and how update integrity is assured (23.4(h), (k));
- security configuration options, with "the highest possible security settings selected by default," default-password change at first login, and step-by-step update instructions (23.4(i));
- required IT skills (23.4(j)) and workstation minimums (23.4(q));
- the environment assumptions, risks outside it, platform minimums, recommended controls and backup/restore (23.4(ab)).
In administrator or security manuals, the guidance lists a Software Bill of Materials, user roles and privileges, logging capacity, "an exhaustive matrix of the network data streams," cloud data locations and safeguards, and firewall rules. Section 4.3 adds a list of ports and interfaces, network diagrams, forensic log descriptions and incident instructions for healthcare providers, and calls the MDS2 "an industry-wide and globally accepted form" for this information. Because threats change, it suggests keeping security information in electronic form that can be updated.
What do post-market surveillance and vigilance require?
Cybersecurity is part of the PMS system under MDR Art. 83 / IVDR Art. 78, which must actively collect field experience, "including third party software and hardware components." Findings must update the clinical evaluation, the benefit-risk determination, the design and instructions for use, the security risk assessment, verification and validation, and the technical documentation (Section 5.1).
For serious incidents and field safety corrective actions (MDR Art. 87 / IVDR Art. 82), Section 5.2 points to IMDRF codes:
| IMDRF annex | Code | Term |
|---|---|---|
| Annex A (device problem), level 2 | A1105 | Computer System Security Problem |
| Annex A, level 3 | A110501 | Application Security Problem |
| Annex A, level 3 | A110502 | Unauthorized Access to Computer System |
| Annex C (root cause), level 3 | C1007 | Software Security Vulnerability |
The running text of Section 5.2 attaches "A110502" to "Computer System Security Problem"; Table 4 gives A1105 as the parent, so use the table. Incidents with cybersecurity root causes are also subject to trend reporting under MDR Art. 88, and the guidance calls IMDRF coding of non-serious incidents "desirable."
Which cybersecurity incidents count as serious?
Annex II gives 22 worked rows, marked as illustrative only. A selection:
| Device | Event | Serious? |
|---|---|---|
| External programmer for a deep brain stimulator | Custom malware alters stimulation parameters | Yes |
| Pacemaker | Request flooding drains the battery early | Yes |
| Implantable pulmonary artery pressure sensor | Data modified in transit, causing misdiagnosis | Yes |
| Any device on Windows | Worm encrypts the hard drive; device unavailable | Yes (indirect, availability) |
| Warming therapy device for premature babies | Weak service password used to export patient data via USB | No (security risk only) |
| Patient monitoring system | Eavesdropping between monitor and central station | No (security risk only) |
| X-ray machine | Legacy third-party interfaces compromised; delayed diagnosis | Yes |
The pattern: a confidentiality loss alone is a security incident (and possibly a GDPR breach), while loss of therapy, wrong data used for diagnosis, or unavailability that delays care can make it a serious incident. The MR rows show the limit: a scanner taken offline, with the patient scanned elsewhere, was judged not serious.
Do the Annex III standards give a presumption of conformity?
Mostly not. Annex III lists EN ISO 14971, EN 62304, ISO 31000, ISO/IEC 27000 and 27001, EN 60601-1-x, IEC 82304-1, ISO/IEC 80001-1 and related technical reports, "ISO/IEC 80001-5-1" (the project published as IEC 81001-5-1), IEC 62366, IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2, and IEC TR 60601-4-5. Its disclaimer says they "cannot provide a presumption of conformity, unless they are harmonised" and published in the Official Journal.
We checked the Commission's harmonised standards page, its summary list and the MDR implementing decisions up to (EU) 2026/2479 on 12 November 2026. Of the Annex III entries, EN ISO 14971:2019/A11:2021 (Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/757) and parts of the EN 60601-1 family have references published under the MDR. EN 62304, EN IEC 81001-5-1, IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 and the 80001 series do not. IEC 62304 and IEC 81001-5-1 remain strong state-of-the-art evidence, but not a conformity shortcut.
What has changed in EU law since Rev.1?
Three changes a manufacturer should factor in:
| Act | What it means for a medical device maker |
|---|---|
| NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Replaced the NIS Directive that Section 6.1 cites. Annex II ("other critical sectors") lists the manufacture of medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and Annex I's health sector covers makers of devices on the public health emergency critical devices list. Size thresholds and national transposition decide whether your company is in scope. See our NIS2 guide. |
| Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 | Article 2(2) excludes products to which the MDR or IVDR apply. Health-monitoring wearables outside the MDR/IVDR are class I important products under Annex III. Companion apps, gateways and other products that are neither devices nor accessories under the MDR can fall under the CRA. See our CRA guide. |
| IMDRF N60, Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity | Cited as a draft in Rev.1; issued as final guidance in March 2020. See our IMDRF guidance explainer. |
How should a manufacturer start?
Map your technical file to Table 1Every row needs an answer, even if it is "not applicable, because …". Keep one risk management systemShow security hazards in the safety analysis and security controls checked for safety side-effects. Write the security documentation as a setInstructions for use, administrator manual, MDS2 and SBOM, kept consistent and versioned. Pre-map vigilance to A1105/A110501/A110502 and C1007, so a security root cause goes through the same Art. 87 channel as any other serious incident. Cite standards for what they areUse EN ISO 14971 for presumption of conformity; cite IEC 62304, IEC 81001-5-1 and IEC 62443 as state of the art. Recheck the MDCG list before citing a revision
SoftWSP helps with the component evidence behind this: it extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image, matches the components it identifies against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF advisories, and drafts a cited findings report that an engineer reviews. It does not write the technical documentation or decide whether an incident is serious. See Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarises MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 and the MDR, IVDR, NIS2 and CRA texts as published in the Official Journal, read on 12 November 2026. MDCG guidance is non-binding by its own terms; this guide is not a substitute for the regulations, the current MDCG list or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is MDCG 2019-16, and is it legally binding?
MDCG 2019-16, "Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices," is a guidance document endorsed by the Medical Device Coordination Group (MDCG), the body established under Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (MDR) and composed of representatives of every EU Member State, chaired by a European Commission representative. It was first published in December 2019 and revised (Rev.1) in July 2020. The document itself states plainly that it "is not a European Commission document and it cannot be regarded as reflecting the official position of the European Commission," and that "any views expressed in this document are not legally binding and only the Court of Justice of the European Union can give binding interpretations of Union law." In practice, manufacturers and notified bodies treat it as the standard reference for how to interpret MDR/IVDR's cybersecurity essential requirements, even though it has no independent legal force of its own.
What does MDCG 2019-16 actually require manufacturers to do?
It does not create new legal requirements; it explains how to fulfil cybersecurity-relevant essential requirements already in MDR Annex I and IVDR Annex I — covering device performance, risk reduction, the risk management system, risk control measures, minimisation of foreseeable risks, interoperability, state-of-the-art development taking into account information security, minimum IT requirements, protection against unauthorised access, and the corresponding instructions-for-use disclosures. The guidance groups its recommendations into secure design and manufacture (Chapter 3), documentation and instructions for use (Chapter 4), and post-market surveillance and vigilance (Chapter 5).
How does MDCG 2019-16 relate to FDA's Section 524B rules and to IEC/ISO standards like 62304, 81001-5-1 and 62443-4-2?
MDCG 2019-16 and FDA's Section 524B premarket cybersecurity duties address the same underlying engineering work — secure design, risk management, documentation, vulnerability handling and post-market monitoring — under two separate legal systems that do not cross-reference each other; see our guide to [FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices](/guides/fda-premarket-cybersecurity-medical-devices/). MDCG 2019-16's own Annex III lists standards it considers relevant without endorsing any as sufficient for a presumption of conformity, including EN ISO 14971 (safety risk management), IEC 62304 (software lifecycle), ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 80001-1 and 80001-5-1, IEC 62443-4-1 and 62443-4-2, and IEC/TR 60601-4-5 — the same family of standards covered elsewhere on this site. The Annex III disclaimer is explicit: these standards "cannot provide a presumption of conformity, unless they are harmonised under" the MDR/IVDR and published in the Official Journal.
Has MDCG 2019-16 been updated since 2020, and does it reflect NIS2 or the Cyber Resilience Act?
No confirmed further revision beyond Rev.1 (July 2020) was found as of this guide's publication — check MDCG's own live list of endorsed guidance documents before relying on a specific edition. The document's Chapter 6 discussion of "other legislation" cites the original 2016 NIS Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/1148), which has since been repealed and replaced by the NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555); see our guide to [NIS2](/guides/nis2-directive-explained/). MDCG 2019-16 predates both NIS2 and the EU Cyber Resilience Act (which in any case excludes medical devices already regulated under MDR/IVDR from its scope), so neither is discussed in the document's text.
Sources
- European Commission / MDCG: MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 — Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices (endorsed document, December 2019; Rev.1 July 2020)
- European Commission: Guidance — MDCG endorsed documents and other guidance (list page hosting MDCG 2019-16 and other MDCG guidance)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices (MDR), Article 103 (Medical Device Coordination Group) and Annex I
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2017/746 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices (IVDR)
- EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 cited in MDCG 2019-16 Chapter 6
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Article 2(2) scope exclusion for MDR/IVDR products and Annex III
- European Commission: Harmonised standards under the medical devices regulations (list of OJ implementing decisions)
- EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/757, harmonised standards under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (EN ISO 14971:2019/A11:2021)
- European Commission: Legal notice — reuse policy for Commission website content (Commission Decision of 12 December 2011; CC BY 4.0 default licence for EU-owned content)
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