IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021, "Medical electrical equipment — Part 4-5: Guidance and interpretation — Safety-related technical security specifications," is a Technical Report published by the IEC in January 2021 (Edition 1.0) that adapts IEC 62443-4-2's industrial security requirements into seven foundational requirements — identification and authentication, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, and resource availability — scored as a device's capability security level (SL-C). It answers a specific, practical question: when a hospital network integrator asks "how secure is this infusion pump, patient monitor or imaging workstation?", what common vocabulary should the manufacturer and the integrator use to answer? It was prepared by Subcommittee 62A, "Common aspects of electrical equipment used in medical practice," within IEC Technical Committee 62, "Electrical equipment in medical practice."
Key takeaways
- Rather than inventing a new security framework for medical devices, IEC TR 60601-4-5 explicitly borrows one that already existed for industrial control systems.
- In-vitro diagnostic devices (IVD) are entirely out of scope.
- These seven requirements are what a medical device's capability security level (SL-C) is measured against.
- Because the TR modifies IEC 62443-4-2 rather than replacing it, the component requirements of 4-2 are the practical starting list.
What does it do as a bridge from industrial security to medical devices?
Rather than inventing a new security framework for medical devices, IEC TR 60601-4-5 explicitly borrows one that already existed for industrial control systems. Its own Introduction, readable in the free IEC preview, states it "references already existing SECURITY LEVEL (SL) requirements for components of an IT-NETWORK as listed in IEC 62443-4-2:2019" and "modifies IEC 62443-4-2:2019 only for specific aspects of MEDICAL DEVICES in MEDICAL IT-NETWORKS." The "component requirements" (CRs) it specifies for medical devices are, per its own text, "mainly derived from the IT-NETWORK 'system requirements' (SRs) in IEC 62443-3-3, which are in turn derived from the overall foundational requirements defined in IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009" — with an added layer of medical-device-specific "requirement enhancements" (REs) on top.
Its normative references are narrow and specific: IEC 60601-1:2005 (plus its 2012 and 2020 amendments), the base medical electrical equipment safety standard, and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 itself.
Who is it for, and what does it exclude?
Per Clause 1, the document "provides detailed technical specifications for SECURITY features of MEDICAL DEVICES used in MEDICAL IT-NETWORKS," covering medical electrical equipment, medical electrical systems and medical device software, and "is applicable to MEDICAL DEVICES with external data interface(s) — for example when connected to a MEDICAL IT-NETWORK or when a human interface is used for processing... CONFIDENTIAL DATA." Three explicit exclusions matter for scoping a security review:
- In-vitro diagnostic devices (IVD) are entirely out of scope.
- Industry protocols themselves — the document names DICOM and HL7 specifically — are not covered; it addresses the device's security posture, not the wire protocols it speaks.
- Non-medical-device software on a medical IT network that doesn't meet the definition of medical device software is out of scope, even if it runs on the same network.
The intended audience, per the Introduction, is medical device manufacturers and compliance authorities first, with medical IT-network integrators as a secondary audience who use a device's declared capability level to decide what additional network-level countermeasures they need to add. The Introduction also tells manufacturers which question to answer: "what specifications can be allocated and which specifications need to be native in the MEDICAL DEVICE" — a device can rely on a higher-level entity such as the hospital network for some capabilities, as long as that is documented.
What are the seven foundational requirements?
Like the IEC 62443 series it borrows from, IEC TR 60601-4-5 organizes security around seven foundational requirements originally defined in IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009:
| Requirement | Abbreviation |
|---|---|
| Identification and authentication control | IAC |
| Use control | UC |
| System integrity | SI |
| Data confidentiality | DC |
| Restricted data flow | RDF |
| Timely response to events | TRE |
| Resource availability | RA |
These seven requirements are what a medical device's capability security level (SL-C) is measured against. The document is careful to scope SL-C narrowly: it is "a measure of the effectiveness strength of the COUNTERMEASURES... for the addressed SECURITY property," evaluated at the device level — not the target security level (SL-T) a network operator sets for a zone of their network, nor the achieved security level (SL-A) of the network as a whole once the device is integrated. Both SL-T and SL-A are explicitly out of scope for this document; it only standardizes the device side of that equation. Countermeasures that raise a device's SL-C can be technical (firewalls, cryptography), administrative (policies and procedures) or physical (a locked cabinet, an encapsulated circuit board) — the standard treats all three as valid, not just code-level controls.
Which IEC 62443-4-2 requirements sit under each one?
Because the TR modifies IEC 62443-4-2 rather than replacing it, the component requirements of 4-2 are the practical starting list. The CR titles below are from the contents of the IEC 62443-4-2:2019 preview (a selection, not the full set). The MDS2 and FDA columns are SoftWSP's reading of where the same topic appears in the MDS2 form and in Appendix 1 of FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance; neither IEC nor FDA publishes this crosswalk.
| FR | Example IEC 62443-4-2 CRs | MDS2 categories | FDA Appendix 1 category |
|---|---|---|---|
| IAC | CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication; CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication; CR 1.11 Unsuccessful login attempts | PAUT, NAUT | Authentication |
| UC | CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement; CR 2.5 Session lock; CR 2.8 Auditable events; CR 2.13 Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces | AUTH, ALOF, AUDT | Authorization |
| SI | CR 3.1 Communication integrity; CR 3.2 Protection from malicious code; CR 3.4 Software and information integrity; CR 3.10 Support for updates; CR 3.14 Integrity of the boot process | TXIG, MLDP, SAHD, IGAU, CSUP | Code, Data, and Execution Integrity; Firmware and Software Updates |
| DC | CR 4.1 Information confidentiality; CR 4.2 Information persistence; CR 4.3 Use of cryptography | STCF, TXCF, DIDT | Confidentiality; Cryptography |
| RDF | CR 5.1 Network segmentation; CR 5.2 Zone boundary protection | CONN, NAUT | — (covered by the guidance's architecture views) |
| TRE | CR 6.1 Audit log accessibility; CR 6.2 Continuous monitoring | AUDT | Event Detection and Logging |
| RA | CR 7.1 Denial of service protection; CR 7.3 Control system backup; CR 7.4 Control system recovery and reconstitution; CR 7.8 Control system component inventory | DTBK, SBOM | Resiliency and Recovery |
For the industrial original of each CR, see IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements; for the system-level SRs they derive from, IEC 62443-3-3.
How does essential function differ from essential performance?
IEC 60601-1 already defines essential performance — the minimum safe behavior a device must maintain under normal and single-fault conditions. IEC TR 60601-4-5 adds a parallel, security-specific concept it calls essential function: "a function or capability that is required to maintain BASIC SAFETY, ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE, a minimum of clinical functionality... and operational AVAILABILITY" specifically in the context of "a successful attack on the MEDICAL IT-NETWORK and its connected MEDICAL DEVICES." The practical implication: a device under active attack is allowed to lose non-essential features and still be considered compliant, as long as its essential function survives. The document names the three failure modes it's trying to prevent: loss of protection, loss of control, and loss of view.
How do compensating countermeasures and break-glass access fit in?
Two definitions in Clause 3 do a lot of work in practice. A compensating countermeasure is one "employed in lieu of or in addition to inherent SECURITY capabilities to satisfy one or more SECURITY requirements." The TR's own examples include a locked cabinet or an encapsulated printed circuit board, and a supplier whose MRI machine cannot meet the asset owner's access control requirements, so the supplier "puts a firewall in front of the MRI machine and sells it as a system." A compensating countermeasure has to be written down as part of what the device ships with; an integrator cannot credit a control nobody told them about.
A FIRECALL is the "method established to provide emergency access to a secure MEDICAL DEVICE," also called a "break glass" feature, with a usual review process afterwards and typically a one-time user ID or password. This is the same capability MDS2 question EMRG-1 asks about. Pair it with least privilege (definition 3.15), "commonly implemented as a set of roles": emergency access is the documented exception to the role model, not a shared administrator password.
What is in each clause, and what sits behind the paywall?
IEC TR 60601-4-5 is a copyright-protected IEC publication, not an open document. Per the IEC webstore listing, the 51-page Edition 1.0 report carries a list price of CHF 335 (ISBN 978-2-8322-9227-3), with a stability date of 2028. The free preview covers the foreword, introduction, Clause 1 scope, Clause 2 normative references, the first terms and definitions, and the full table of contents, which shows where the working material sits:
| Part | Content (titles from the contents; the preview shows titles only) |
|---|---|
| Clause 4 | Common security constraints: support of essential function, compensating countermeasures, least privilege, data minimization, overarching constraints including hardware security |
| Clause 5 | Security levels for the different foundational requirements, and modified specifications for security levels |
| Clause 6 | Technical description |
| Clause 7 | Mapping of requirements to SL-C, including Table 1 "Mapping of single requirements to capability security levels" |
| Annex A.1–A.3 | Rationale: type-testable security properties, with Table A.1 exemplary criteria for selecting SL-T; typical network connections (implant and programmer, patient device and doctor's computer, hospital network); ME systems |
| Annex A.4 | Correlation to existing regulations, standards and technical specifications |
| Annex A.5–A.7 | Zones and conduits with SL-T; documentation of SL-C (Table A.2, an exemplary SL-C vector); IEC 62443 concepts used |
| Annex A.8 | Correlation with IEC TR 80001-2-2 |
So a manufacturer can scope the work and fix its vocabulary from the preview, but the per-requirement level table that makes a real SL-C assessment possible is in the paid text. ISS AG (cited above) reads the report as helping with the EU MDR's General Safety and Performance Requirements; the contents confirm that Annex A.4 covers correlation to regulations, with the detail in the paid text.
Is it recognised by FDA or harmonised under the EU MDR?
Neither, as of 12 November 2026. A title search for "60601-4-5" in FDA's Recognized Consensus Standards database returns no record for the TR, unlike IEC 81001-5-1 or the MDS2 standard. In the EU, MDCG 2019-16 rev.1 lists IEC/TR 60601-4-5 in its Annex III, under a disclaimer that the listed standards "cannot provide a presumption of conformity, unless they are harmonised" and published in the Official Journal; see the MDCG 2019-16 guide for the current harmonisation picture.
That still makes it useful evidence. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 Annex I 18.8 requires devices to "protect, as far as possible, against unauthorised access that could hamper the device from functioning as intended," and 17.4 requires "minimum requirements concerning hardware, IT networks characteristics and IT security measures." An SL-C vector with its allocation notes is a structured way to state both.
Worked example: how would a hypothetical bedside monitor document its SL-C?
Hypothetical device and values, for illustration only; the TR's own SL-C tables are in the paid clauses. A maker of a networked bedside patient monitor prepares SL-C documentation for hospital integrators.
State the essential functionLocal alarms and local display of vital signs keep working if the central-station link is lost or attacked; this avoids loss of view and loss of protection. List every external data interfaceWired Ethernet to the central station, Wi-Fi, and a USB service port. All three bring the monitor into scope. Decide native versus allocated per FRUser authentication on the service menu is native; network segmentation (RDF) is allocated to the hospital network, and the documentation says so. Record compensating countermeasuresThe USB port sits behind a cover that needs a tool to remove (physical), and the service procedure restricts its use (administrative). Write the vector with a rationale per entry, using the FR order of IEC 62443 (table below). Hand the integrator a package, not a number:the vector, the allocation notes, the network diagram and a list of ports and services. The integrator compares it with the SL-T of the zone the monitor joins and adds countermeasures where the vector falls short. Keep the MDS2 consistentwith the vector, for example DC against the STCF and TXCF answers.
The resulting synthetic vector:
| FR | IAC | UC | SI | DC | RDF | TRE | RA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claimed SL-C (synthetic) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Rationale | Unique service accounts | Role-based menus | Signed updates, secure boot | Patient data encrypted in transit only | Segmentation allocated to network | Local log, no remote export | Alarms run without the network |
What are the common pitfalls?
- Quoting one number. SL-C is per foundational requirement; a single "SL 2 device" claim hides the weak entries.
- Confusing SL-C with SL-A. The device declares capability; the achieved level depends on the network it joins, which is out of the TR's scope.
- Forgetting service and debug interfaces. USB and service ports are external data interfaces too (CR 2.13 covers physical diagnostic and test interfaces in 62443-4-2).
- Undocumented allocation. "The hospital firewall handles that" only counts if the integration documentation says so.
- Treating it as a conformity shortcut. It is a Technical Report with no FDA recognition and no harmonised status.
Where should a manufacturer start?
Use SL-C as a conversation starter with hospital IT, not a self-certification— the goal of the document is a shared vocabulary between manufacturer and integrator, not a pass/fail gate a device can claim on its own. Map your existing IEC 62443-4-2:2019 work firstif you've already done component-level security work for an industrial or adjacent product — this document is explicitly a medical-specific adaptation of that same requirement set, not a from-scratch framework. Document essential function separately from essential performancein your risk file — reviewers familiar with IEC 60601-1 will expect the safety term; this document's security-specific essential function concept needs its own explicit treatment. Budget for the full text before attempting a real SL-C assessment— the free preview establishes scope and vocabulary, but the actual requirement-to-level mapping tables that make the assessment possible are in the paywalled clauses. Cross-check against [IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/) directlyif budget is a constraint — since this document is derived from it, a thorough 62443-4-2 review covers much of the same technical ground even without the medical-specific wrapper. Coordinate with the network sideIntegrators work under IEC 80001-1; the allocation notes are the hand-over point.
SoftWSP covers one input to the SI and RA rows: the platform extracts an SBOM from the device firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, which serves as the component inventory, and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories (CSAF), with an AI-drafted, cited report that an engineer reviews. It does not score SL-C, test the device or judge whether a matched vulnerability is reachable. See firmware SBOM and Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarizes the publicly available preview and catalogue metadata for IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021 (foreword, introduction, Clauses 1-3, contents); it is not a substitute for the full, licensed standard.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC TR 60601-4-5, and what does it apply to?
IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021, "Medical electrical equipment — Part 4-5: Guidance and interpretation — Safety-related technical security specifications," is a Technical Report (not a full International Standard) published by the IEC in January 2021, Edition 1.0, prepared by Subcommittee 62A ("Common aspects of electrical equipment used in medical practice") of IEC Technical Committee 62 ("Electrical equipment in medical practice"). Per its own Scope (Clause 1), it "provides detailed technical specifications for SECURITY features of MEDICAL DEVICES used in MEDICAL IT-NETWORKS," covering medical electrical equipment, medical electrical systems and medical device software, and applies specifically to devices "with external data interface(s)" — for example connected to a network, or with a human interface used to enter, capture or view confidential data. It explicitly does not apply to in-vitro diagnostic devices, to industry protocols like DICOM and HL7 themselves, or to non-medical-device software on a medical IT network.
How does it relate to IEC 62443-4-2 and IEC 60601-1?
The document's own Introduction describes it as building directly on IEC 62443-4-2:2019 (component-level security requirements for industrial automation and control systems), stating it "references already existing SECURITY LEVEL (SL) requirements for components of an IT-NETWORK as listed in IEC 62443-4-2:2019" and "modifies IEC 62443-4-2:2019 only for specific aspects of MEDICAL DEVICES in MEDICAL IT-NETWORKS." Its normative references are IEC 60601-1:2005 (plus its 2012 and 2020 amendments) for the base safety/essential-performance framework, and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 for the security-requirement source material it adapts. In practice it acts as a bridge: it takes an industrial-control-systems security standard and restates it in medical-device terms without creating a competing, incompatible security model.
What are the seven foundational requirements, and what is a capability security level (SL-C)?
Clause 1 of the document states it is "based on the seven foundational requirements described in the state-of-the-art document IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009," which it lists as: identification and authentication control (IAC); use control (UC); system integrity (SI); data confidentiality (DC); restricted data flow (RDF); timely response to events (TRE); and resource availability (RA). A capability security level (SL-C) is defined, per the document's own text, as "a measure of the effectiveness strength of the COUNTERMEASURES, which are either separate or integral to a MEDICAL DEVICE, for the addressed SECURITY property" — distinct from the target security level (SL-T) of the network it sits in, and the achieved security level (SL-A) of the network as a whole, both of which this document explicitly leaves out of scope. Countermeasures can be technical (e.g., firewalls), administrative (policies and procedures) or physical (e.g., locked cabinets, encapsulated circuit boards).
What's the difference between "essential function" and "essential performance" in this document?
The document is explicit that the two terms are distinct even though they sound similar: essential performance is the existing IEC 60601-1 safety concept, covering a device's behavior under normal and single-fault conditions. Essential function is a security-specific term this document defines: "a function or capability that is required to maintain BASIC SAFETY, ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE, a minimum of clinical functionality... and operational AVAILABILITY" specifically when considering "a successful attack on the MEDICAL IT-NETWORK and its connected MEDICAL DEVICES." The point is that a device can lose non-essential functionality during a cyberattack and still be considered to have held its ground, as long as it preserves its essential function — the loss of which the document calls, respectively, loss of protection, loss of control and loss of view.
Is the full text of IEC TR 60601-4-5 freely available?
No — it is a copyright-protected IEC publication. Per the IEC's own webstore listing, the 51-page Edition 1.0 document carries a list price of CHF 335 and ISBN 978-2-8322-9227-3, with a stability date of 2028 (the point at which IEC will reconfirm, revise, amend or withdraw it). IEC does make a free preview available covering the foreword, introduction, scope, normative references and terms/definitions (roughly the first 15 pages) through its standards-preview partners; this guide draws only on that publicly readable preview plus the IEC's published abstract and metadata — it does not reproduce the paywalled normative Clauses 4 through 7 or Annex A, which contain the full SL-C requirement mapping table and worked examples.
Sources
- IEC: IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021 official publication page (abstract, edition, price, ICS code, technical committee)
- IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021 — free preview (foreword, introduction, scope, normative references, terms and definitions)
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components (normative reference)
- ISS AG: news summary of IEC TR 60601-4-5:2021 (secondary analysis, including a stated correlation to EU MDR General Safety and Performance Requirements — unconfirmed against the paywalled Annex A.4 text)
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — free preview (contents with component requirement titles CR 1.1 to CR 7.8)
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance, 3 February 2026), Appendix 1 security control categories
- FDA: Recognized Consensus Standards database (title search for 60601-4-5, no record on 12 November 2026)
- MDCG 2019-16 rev.1, Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices (July 2020), Annex III standards list
- Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (MDR), Annex I sections 17.4 and 18.8, EUR-Lex
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