Two lab technicians in safety glasses testing medical-device equipment, one at a computer and one adjusting an instrument rack

Medical & regulated devices

IMDRF N73: principles and practices for SBOM in medical device cybersecurity

Last updated:

A medical device manufacturer that already produces a software bill of materials for FDA's Section 524B duty is not starting from a different list when a hospital, a notified body, or an international regulator in another IMDRF-member market asks for the same artifact. IMDRF N73, "Principles and Practices for Software Bill of Materials for Medical Device Cybersecurity" (IMDRF/CYBER WG/N73FINAL:2023, published 13 April 2023), is the international reference point behind that overlap — a set of SBOM best practices meant to work across jurisdictions rather than a regulator-specific checklist.

Key takeaways

  • It covers devices that contain software, including firmware and programmable logic (pacemakers and infusion pumps are its examples), software as a medical device, and in vitro diagnostic devices.
  • Section 5.2.1 of N73 says each SBOM entry should identify each software component and that SBOMs "should be as complete as possible", because depth drives usefulness.
  • Manufacturers, on generating, maintaining and distributing an accurate SBOM across a device's life cycle, not just at the point of initial clearance or approval.
  • A new device SBOM is due with every product release and every product update (section 5.2).

Where does N73 sit in IMDRF's cybersecurity guidance?

N73 is the SBOM-focused sibling to IMDRF N70 on legacy medical device cybersecurity — per IMDRF's own published development timeline, both documents went through public consultation in 2022 and were finalised two days apart in April 2023. That pairing is not a coincidence: N70's legacy-device risk assessment depends on knowing exactly what software a fielded device runs, and N73 is where that software-transparency practice is detailed. Both trace back to the Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) framing IMDRF's N60 guidance first introduced; N60 already listed an SBOM as part of the customer security documentation.

The final N73 text (section 2) sets three limits on its own scope that matter when you build a process from it:

  • It covers devices that contain software, including firmware and programmable logic (pacemakers and infusion pumps are its examples), software as a medical device, and in vitro diagnostic devices.
  • It is limited to the potential for patient harm. Data-privacy harm is acknowledged but out of scope.
  • This first edition leaves cloud services out of the SBOM, while reminding manufacturers that cloud components still belong in their risk evaluation. It also focuses on cybersecurity, not on licensing or intellectual property.

What should an N73 SBOM contain?

Section 5.2.1 of N73 says each SBOM entry should identify each software component and that SBOMs "should be as complete as possible", because depth drives usefulness. Consistent with NTIA's minimum elements (see our SBOM minimum elements guide), the baseline is seven elements:

Element What N73 means by it
Author name The entity (person or organisation) that produced the SBOM file
Timestamp Date and time the SBOM data was assembled
Software component vendor (supplier) The entity that creates and identifies the component; for commercial software, normally the legal business name
Software component name The name the original supplier gives the unit of software
Software component version The supplier's identifier for that specific version
Unique identifier An identifier that serves as a look-up key in relevant databases
Relationship That an upstream component X is included in software Y

Two additions are named on top of the baseline. A component hash is recommended because it helps map a component to data sources. A component's end-of-support (EOS) date "could be provided as supplemental information", because it supports risk management across the life cycle. Licence data is not in the baseline list: the document notes that an SBOM can serve licensing purposes but keeps its own focus on cybersecurity.

Who is N73 written for?

Unlike guidance that treats SBOM purely as something a manufacturer hands over once, N73 — consistent with N60 and N70's stakeholder-inclusive structure — addresses three audiences together:

  • Manufacturers, on generating, maintaining and distributing an accurate SBOM across a device's life cycle, not just at the point of initial clearance or approval.
  • Healthcare providers, on using a received SBOM for their own risk management — the same use case IMDRF N70's legacy-device guidance assumes is available when a provider assesses whether a fielded device can still be reasonably protected.
  • Regulators, for whom an SBOM in a premarket submission is, in N73's words, "one indicator that the MDM has a mature cybersecurity program" and allows a more complete benefit-risk assessment.

When must a new device SBOM be issued?

A new device SBOM is due with every product release and every product update (section 5.2). N73 separates two things: the device SBOM is a released artefact that is replaced, not edited, while the SBOM content behind it lives in the manufacturer's software component repository and is maintained under configuration management.

Section 5.1 lists where that content comes from: in-house development records, SBOMs supplied by commercial vendors, documentation shipped with open-source software, and the output of software composition analysis tools. It explicitly includes components inside peripherals that are part of the medical device system, and firmware or PLC software whose vendors may supply their own SBOMs.

Section 5.4.1 then lists events that should produce a new SBOM:

  • remediation of a vulnerability through an upgrade, update or patch;
  • new functions added to the device software;
  • one component exchanged for another, or a component added or removed;
  • changes to third-party components on the device hardware or operating system because of end-of-life or end-of-support decisions, security patches or new versions.

Changes are to be communicated to healthcare providers regularly, "in an actionable and machine-readable format". For firmware-based devices, the practical work of extracting components from a built image is covered in our firmware SBOM guide.

How should the SBOM reach hospitals, and who may see it?

N73 (section 5.3) does not pick one distribution channel, but it encourages standardised, automated discovery and exchange. Hospitals first need to know an SBOM exists — for example through the customer security documentation, the MDS2 form, a publish/subscribe channel or an interface on the device — and SBOMs should be provided initially as part of procurement. Table 1 of the document weighs the options; a condensed reading:

Channel Main advantage Main drawback
Inside customer security documentation No special tools Not automated; hard to tie back to the exact device version
Separate electronic file from the manufacturer Preferably machine-readable; access can be controlled Not automated; must be redistributed with every update
On the device (display, download) Always the right version Needs physical or network access, storage space and, on battery devices, power
API on the device Can be automated No defined API standard; needs tooling and connectivity
Manufacturer-managed repository Automatable, access-controlled Hospitals must check many vendor sites
Centralised (third-party or hospital) repository One place for many vendors IP and liability questions; must hold every fielded version, not only the newest

N73 also says medical device SBOMs "should be classified as sensitive/confidential information", that the channels must protect them, and that recipients need their own controls for integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.

What does N73 expect healthcare providers to do with it?

Section 6.1 tells providers to request an SBOM for any device that will join their network, and to be able to ingest it. In order:

  1. Keep a complete asset inventorywith unique device identifiers, so each SBOM maps to the right device; N73 points to the UDI plus the device or software version.
  2. Check completenessagainst the seven baseline elements.
  3. Ingest automatically where possibleTable 2 compares SIEM, CMDB/CMMS, vendor-risk systems and custom scripts; a CMDB or CMMS gives the most direct link to individual assets.
  4. Run a secured, searchable SBOM repositorywith role-based access, because an SBOM can also serve as a map for an attacker.
  5. Monitor and talk to the manufacturerWhen a listed component has a known vulnerability, N73 recommends manufacturer–provider communication; a manufacturer "may provide interim mitigation guidance" using VEX (section 7.2.2), described in NTIA's VEX overview. See CSAF and VEX for device makers.

Does N73 mandate a format?

No. N73 names three automated formats — CycloneDX, SPDX and SWID — and asks for delivery "through a standard format and automated distribution and ingestion mechanism", but it does not mandate one. This mirrors FDA's own premarket cybersecurity guidance, which likewise asks for a machine-readable SBOM without naming a required format. See CycloneDX vs SPDX for how the two leading formats compare if a manufacturer needs to pick one.

How does N73 line up with FDA Section 524B and the EU MDR?

FDA's Section 524B premarket cybersecurity requirement is a binding US statutory duty; N73 is non-binding international guidance with no independent legal force anywhere. The two are connected through people and process rather than legal citation: FDA co-chaired the IMDRF Cybersecurity Working Group that produced N73, and FDA's own guidance describes itself as well-aligned with IMDRF's broader cybersecurity guidance suite. In the EU, MDCG 2019-16 rev. 1 (section 4) lists a software bill of materials among the security information often shared in administrator or security documentation; see EU MDR Annex I cybersecurity requirements.

Topic IMDRF N73 FDA premarket guidance MDCG 2019-16 rev. 1
Legal force None Supports a binding 524B duty Guidance on binding MDR/IVDR requirements
Baseline fields Seven NTIA-based elements NTIA minimum elements Not specified
Support status EOS date as optional supplement Level of support and end-of-support date expected Not specified
Known vulnerabilities Monitored alongside the SBOM; VEX as a channel Listed in the submission, including CISA KEV entries Not specified
Hospital use Detailed (section 6) Labelling and customer information Security documentation for operators

FDA's SBOM items come from section V.A.4 of its guidance; our KEV and EPSS guide covers the catalogue it names. A manufacturer building its SBOM process to N73's principles is building toward what a 524B submission needs, but FDA's current guidance text, not N73, is what a US submission is checked against.

Worked example: what does one release cycle look like?

Synthetic example. The device, versions and dates are invented for illustration.

A manufacturer ships a networked infusion pump, firmware 3.2, sold in the US and the EU.

  1. CollectThe build pipeline records every component of 3.2, including the Wi-Fi module's vendor-supplied SBOM, in the software component repository (N73 5.1).
  2. GenerateAt release, a CycloneDX device SBOM is produced with the seven baseline elements, a hash for each component and EOS dates where suppliers publish them (5.2.1).
  3. DistributeHospitals receive it during procurement through the customer portal, marked confidential; the MDS2 form states that it exists (5.3).
  4. MonitorMonths later, a new advisory lists a vulnerable version of the TLS library in 3.2. The manufacturer's assessment finds that an interim network restriction reduces exposure and publishes that guidance with a VEX statement (7.2).
  5. ChangeRelease 3.3 swaps in the fixed library version. That is a 5.4.1 event, so a new device SBOM is generated and pushed to the same channel.
  6. Hospital sideEach hospital's CMDB links pumps by UDI and software version to the matching SBOM, so pumps still on 3.2 stay visible until they are updated (6.1).

What are the common pitfalls?

  • One SBOM per product family. N73 ties the SBOM to each release and update; hospitals running mixed versions need every applicable SBOM, not only the newest.
  • Stopping at the main processor. Peripherals, radio modules and PLC firmware that belong to the medical device system are in scope.
  • Treating the SBOM as a vulnerability report. Section 5.4 is explicit that an SBOM does not state whether a component is vulnerable; that needs monitoring and, where useful, VEX.
  • Publishing it openly. N73 classes device SBOMs as sensitive and expects protected channels.
  • Copying the 2022 draft. Several online summaries quote the consultation draft; section numbers and wording changed in the final text.
  • No unique identifiers. Without a look-up key per component, automated matching against vulnerability databases breaks down.

What should manufacturers do now?

  1. Build one SBOM practice that satisfies N73's principles, rather than a US-specific SBOM and a separate international one — the content overlap is close enough that duplicating the work rarely pays off.
  2. Feed the SBOM into legacy-device risk assessment, not just regulatory submissions — see IMDRF N70 for how the two documents are meant to work together.
  3. Pick a machine-readable format your tooling and customers already support— CycloneDX vs SPDX covers the practical tradeoffs — rather than waiting for N73 or FDA to name one.
  4. Share the SBOM with healthcare providers, not only regulatorsN73's stakeholder structure assumes providers use the artifact directly for their own risk management, which only works if the manufacturer actually distributes it.
  5. Add EOS dates and hasheswhere suppliers make them available; FDA expects support information anyway.

Where does SoftWSP fit?

SoftWSP extracts a CycloneDX JSON SBOM from a firmware image, matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and produces an AI-drafted report with citations that an engineer reviews before it is sent. It does not write VEX statements or judge exploitability in your device; that assessment stays with your team. See Device & Firmware Security.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is IMDRF N73?

IMDRF/CYBER WG/N73FINAL:2023, 'Principles and Practices for Software Bill of Materials for Medical Device Cybersecurity,' is a final guidance document from the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's Cybersecurity Working Group, published 13 April 2023 after public consultation in 2022. It sets out best practices for generating, managing, distributing and using SBOMs across a medical device's life cycle.

Who is N73 written for?

N73 addresses the full chain of medical-device SBOM stakeholders together: manufacturers that generate the SBOM, healthcare providers that receive and use it for their own risk management, and regulators that may request it as part of a submission or postmarket inquiry. This mirrors the stakeholder-inclusive structure of N70, its companion legacy-device document, rather than treating SBOM as a manufacturer-only compliance artifact.

Does IMDRF N73 require a specific SBOM format like CycloneDX or SPDX?

N73 provides high-level principles and best practices for SBOM content and process rather than mandating one machine-readable schema. This mirrors FDA's own approach in its premarket cybersecurity guidance, which also declines to name a specific format and instead points to the component-level minimum elements industry-accepted formats like CycloneDX and SPDX can satisfy; see our CycloneDX vs SPDX guide for how the two leading formats compare.

How does N73 relate to FDA's Section 524B SBOM requirement?

They are not the same instrument — Section 524B of the US FD&C Act is a binding statutory requirement, while N73 is IMDRF guidance with no independent legal force in any jurisdiction. But FDA co-chaired the IMDRF working group that produced N73, and FDA's own premarket cybersecurity guidance describes itself as well-aligned with IMDRF's cybersecurity guidance suite, so a manufacturer building one SBOM practice to IMDRF's principles is typically building toward, not away from, what a 524B submission needs.

What should an SBOM under N73 actually identify?

Per consistent secondary-source summaries of the guidance, an effective medical-device SBOM should identify each software component and its known dependencies, the supplier, the version, applicable unique identifiers, the relationships between components, and relevant licence information — closely mirroring the NTIA minimum-elements framing FDA itself references. Confirm the exact field-level recommendations against IMDRF's own published N73 text before building a template from this summary alone.

Sources

  1. IMDRF: Principles and Practices for Software Bill of Materials for Medical Device Cybersecurity (N73, document page)
  2. IMDRF: Medical Device Cybersecurity Working Group — Strategic Plan progress report (N78), legacy/SBOM document timeline
  3. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices – Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance, SBOM section)
  4. IMDRF/CYBER WG/N73FINAL:2023 final text (copy hosted by Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
  5. NTIA: The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (2021)
  6. NTIA: Vulnerability-Exploitability eXchange (VEX) overview
  7. MDCG 2019-16 rev. 1: Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices (July 2020)
  8. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices premarket guidance (PDF)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

IMDRF N73: principles and practices for SBOM in medical device cybersecurity