IEC 80001-1:2021, "Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices — Part 1," is the international standard that tells a healthcare organization — or whoever it assigns the job to — how to manage risk when connecting medical devices and health software to a shared IT-network. Per its own Clause 1 Scope, it "specifies general requirements for ORGANIZATIONS in the application of RISK MANAGEMENT before, during and after the connection of a HEALTH IT SYSTEM within a HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE, by addressing the KEY PROPERTIES of SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS and SECURITY whilst engaging appropriate stakeholders." Edition 2 was published in September 2021, replacing the original 2010 edition; a further revision is already in early development — see the FAQ below.
Key takeaways
- The standard's Introduction targets HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS, but it does not lock responsibility to a hospital's own IT department.
- Clause 4 (Principles) frames RISK MANAGEMENT under this standard as protecting three KEY PROPERTIES together, not security in isolation: SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS and SECURITY.
- Clause 6 holds the RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS itself.
- IEC 80001-1 puts its requirements on the ORGANIZATION, not on the manufacturer.
Who does IEC 80001-1 apply to?
The standard's Introduction targets HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS, but it does not lock responsibility to a hospital's own IT department. Clause 4 (Principles) separates two things that are easy to blur. First, "accountability for the RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS remains with the HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATION." Second, "a HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATION may assign responsibility for RISK MANAGEMENT of the HEALTH IT SYSTEM and/or HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE to a different ORGANIZATION such as providers of HEALTH IT SYSTEMS, HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE or a collaboration of HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS." A device maker that runs a managed network for a hospital can therefore do the work, but the hospital still answers for the process.
Clause 5.1 confirms that the requirements "apply to HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS and other ORGANIZATIONS seeking conformance," and that requirements for healthcare delivery organizations only "are clearly identified." Clause 3.7 defines a named role, the HEALTH IT RISK MANAGER: the "person accountable for risk management of a HEALTH IT SYSTEM." Clause 5.4.5 requires TOP MANAGEMENT to identify one "who has the necessary qualifications, knowledge and competence." These quotes come from IEC's own authorized preview of the standard.
The scope covers systems ranging from "small departmental networks to large integrated infrastructures spanning multiple locations as well as cloud-based services operated by third parties," and within the wider ISO 81001-1 lifecycle model, IEC 80001-1 explicitly covers one phase only: "the generic lifecycle phase 'implementation and clinical use.'" Device and software development is out of this standard's scope — that is where IEC 62304 and IEC 81001-5-1 apply instead (see below).
What do the KEY PROPERTIES and the framework clauses require?
Clause 4 (Principles) frames RISK MANAGEMENT under this standard as protecting three KEY PROPERTIES together, not security in isolation: SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS and SECURITY. The clause states that "RISK MANAGEMENT creates and protects value. It contributes to the demonstrable maintenance or/and improvement of SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS and SECURITY in the implementation and use of connected HEALTH IT SYSTEMS," and that the process "is scalable and can be customised and made proportionate to the ORGANIZATION's objectives." A note adds that risk "is balanced across the KEY PROPERTIES wherever practical": a firewall rule that blocks an alarm feed improves security and harms safety.
Clause 5 (Framework) then sets out what an ORGANIZATION's program has to include:
| Framework element | What it requires |
|---|---|
| Leadership and commitment (5.2) | TOP MANAGEMENT ensures RISK MANAGEMENT runs through the whole HEALTH IT SYSTEM lifecycle; the ORGANIZATION "shall establish and adhere to a defined PROCESS for RISK MANAGEMENT" |
| Integrating RISK MANAGEMENT (5.3) | RISK MANAGEMENT must be part of, not separate from, the ORGANIZATION's "purpose, governance, leadership, commitment, strategy, objectives and operations" |
| Design/planning (5.4.1) | A RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN for new implementations and modifications alike, scaled to the HEALTH IT SYSTEM, with a RISK ANALYSIS framework, acceptance criteria and "a reference to any ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS" |
| RISK MANAGEMENT FILE (5.4.2) | Establish, maintain throughout the lifecycle, and keep recoverable in the event of failure — see the FAQ for the full requirement text |
| SOCIOTECHNICAL ECOSYSTEM (5.4.3) | Establish and maintain "a defined list of ASSETS that interface with or constitute part of a HEALTH IT SYSTEM," accounting for external factors (regulation, contracts, network complexity) and internal ones (governance, standards adopted, capability) |
| Commitment (5.4.4) | TOP MANAGEMENT is accountable for adherence to the plan and for compliance, and shall "authorise the sale or deployment of the HEALTH IT SYSTEM" |
| Roles (5.4.5) | Authorities and responsibilities assigned at all levels, including a HEALTH IT RISK MANAGER |
Clauses 5.4.6 to 5.7 continue with resources, communication and consultation, implementation, evaluation and improvement. Informative Annex A is an "IEC 80001-1 requirements mapping table" that pulls the requirements together. The IEC webstore lists the full document at 75 pages, published 2021-09-21, with a stability date of 2028.
Which lifecycle phases does Clause 6 cover?
Clause 6 holds the RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS itself. Clause 6.1 covers RISK ANALYSIS, RISK EVALUATION and RISK CONTROL. Clause 6.2 then adds requirements for each lifecycle phase, using the six subclause titles below from the standard's contents. The right-hand column is this guide's reading of what each phase needs from the device supplier. It is not text from the standard.
| Clause 6.2 phase | What the RISK MANAGEMENT FILE typically needs | Input a manufacturer can provide |
|---|---|---|
| 6.2.2 Acquisition | Risks known before purchase; contract terms on support and disclosure | Security capability disclosure, SBOM, support end date |
| 6.2.3 Installation, customization and configuration | Network placement, hardening choices | Ports, protocols and services list; hardening guide |
| 6.2.4 Integration, data migration, transition and validation | Interfaces and data flows tested | Data-flow description, interface specifications |
| 6.2.5 Implementation, workflow optimization and training | Residual risks communicated to staff | User security guidance |
| 6.2.6 Operation and maintenance | Patch, monitoring and incident handling | Advisories, validated patch notices, contact for vulnerability reports |
| 6.2.7 Decommission | Data removal, retirement of credentials | Sanitization instructions |
What should a device manufacturer supply to the organization?
IEC 80001-1 puts its requirements on the ORGANIZATION, not on the manufacturer. The manufacturer's contribution is the ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS that the RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN must reference. Informative Annex B, "Guidance for accompanying document information," lists what those documents should cover. Its subclause titles in the contents are:
| Annex B topic | Evidence a device team can prepare |
|---|---|
| B.2 Information system categorization | Category of data handled and the device's clinical role |
| B.5.1 Environment description | Intended network environment and dependencies |
| B.5.2 Network ports, protocols and services | Every listening port and protocol, by firmware version |
| B.5.3 Purpose of connection to the health IT infrastructure | Why the device needs the network at all |
| B.5.4 / B.5.5 Networking requirements, required IT-network services | Bandwidth, latency, DNS, NTP, directory services |
| B.5.6 Data flows and protocols | Source, destination and encryption of each flow |
| B.6.2 Malware / antivirus / allow-list | Supported protection and validated tools |
| B.6.3 Security exclusions | Scans or agents that the device does not tolerate |
| B.6.4 System access | Accounts, roles, remote service access |
| B.7 RISK MANAGEMENT | Residual risks the hospital must control |
Two other documents carry the security part. IEC TS 81001-2-2:2025 gives a common set of security capabilities for the exchange between manufacturers and healthcare delivery organizations. Per its IEC webstore abstract, it "withdraws and replaces" IEC TR 80001-2-2 and IEC TR 80001-2-8, extends the scope to all health software, and removes the Configuration of Security Features (CNFS) capability. The MDS2 form, published by NEMA as a free worksheet, is the questionnaire most hospitals ask for. It maps its questions to the IEC TR 80001-2-2 capabilities. Our MDS2 guide explains each section. For device-level security capabilities, see IEC 60601-4-5.
A firmware SBOM is the input that keeps the B.7 risk entries current. When a new CVE lands on a component, the hospital's risk manager can check it against the list of shipped components rather than waiting for a support ticket.
What changed in Edition 2, and what revision follows?
Edition 2 (2021) is a full technical revision of the first edition, published in 2010 under the "roles, responsibilities and activities" framing; IEC's own publication record states Edition 2 "cancels and replaces" that first edition. The foreword lists three significant technical changes. The structure changed "to better align with ISO 31000". It establishes "requirements for an ORGANIZATION in the application of RISK MANAGEMENT" rather than describing roles and activities. It adds the principles in Clause 4. As of November 2026, ISO's committee page for the standard lists the current stage as 90.92 ("International Standard to be revised") and names a successor, ISO/CD 81001-4-1, at committee-draft stage. A committee draft can change heavily before publication, so this guide quotes no requirement from it.
How does this fit with IEC 62304, IEC 81001-5-1 and ISO 14971?
IEC 80001-1 is deliberately narrow: it governs the implementation and use phase of a HEALTH IT SYSTEM once it is being connected to a network, not how the medical device software inside it was built. IEC 62304 governs the medical device software development lifecycle itself; IEC 81001-5-1 adds security-specific activities to that same development lifecycle; and ISO 14971 governs product-level risk management for the device as manufactured. A healthcare delivery organization deploying a networked infusion pump or imaging system typically has to satisfy all three in combination: the manufacturer's ISO 14971 risk file and IEC 62304/IEC 81001-5-1 development evidence travel with the device, while IEC 80001-1 governs what the deploying organization does with it once it is live on the hospital network. None of the three substitutes for the others. For software update practices that affect an already-deployed HEALTH IT SYSTEM's risk posture, see also ISO 24089 on software update engineering, and for the device manufacturer's own premarket cybersecurity expectations in the largest single regulated market, see FDA premarket cybersecurity.
What does a worked example look like?
Synthetic example, for illustration only. The hospital, device and findings are invented.
A 400-bed hospital connects 60 new infusion pumps and their drug-library server to a clinical VLAN. Its HEALTH IT RISK MANAGER runs the project like this:
Assign rolesThe contract makes the pump maker responsible for the server's patching. The hospital's TOP MANAGEMENT keeps accountability and signs the deployment approval required by 5.4.4 c). Open the RISK MANAGEMENT FILEon day one, with the plan, the acceptance criteria and a reference to the maker's accompanying documents. Read the Annex B-style documentsThe maker's ports list shows TCP 443 for library updates and TCP 22 for remote service. The MDS2 answers "yes" for remote service, with the access method described. Check the SBOMOne component in the server's firmware has a CVE listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The maker's advisory names a fixed release, so the risk entry records the version to install before go-live. Control the residual risksSSH is allowed only from the maker's jump host during scheduled service windows. The pumps keep running from a cached drug library if the server fails, which protects SAFETY and EFFECTIVENESS while SECURITY controls stay strict. Plan for decommissioningThe file records the maker's sanitization steps for the pump memory.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating the MDS2 as the risk file. The disclosure is an input; the hospital's own analysis, evaluation and control decisions are the record.
- Assigning accountability away. Responsibility can move to a supplier; accountability for the process stays with the healthcare delivery organization.
- Security-only analysis. A control that breaks a clinical workflow or alarm path trades one KEY PROPERTY for another.
- A static asset list. Clause 5.4.3 asks the ORGANIZATION to maintain the list, so firmware updates, new ports and new data flows have to reach it.
- Citing withdrawn documents. IEC TR 80001-2-2 and 80001-2-8 were replaced by IEC TS 81001-2-2:2025.
- No path for new vulnerabilities. Without an SBOM or a supplier advisory feed, the operation and maintenance phase has no input when a CVE lands.
Where should a team start?
Decide, in writing, which ORGANIZATION carries RISK MANAGEMENT responsibility for each HEALTH IT SYSTEM, and record that accountability stays with the healthcare delivery organization. The assignment has to be explicit, not assumed. Stand up one RISK MANAGEMENT FILE per HEALTH IT SYSTEM project, from day oneClause 5.4.2's three requirements — establish at project start, maintain throughout the lifecycle, keep recoverable on failure — are easiest to meet if the file exists before the first design decision, not retrofitted later. Build the SOCIOTECHNICAL ECOSYSTEM asset list before finalizing network design, not after — Clause 5.4.3 expects the asset inventory and understanding of the organization's internal/external context to inform the RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN, not just document it afterward. Ask suppliers for the Annex B topics, an IEC TS 81001-2-2 capability disclosure or MDS2, and an SBOMduring acquisition, when contract terms can still require them. Keep IEC 80001-1 evidence separate from the device manufacturer's own IEC 62304/ISO 14971 file, even where they describe the same physical device — an auditor assessing the deployed network will expect to see the deploying organization's own RISK MANAGEMENT FILE, not just a copy of the manufacturer's premarket documentation. Track ISO/CD 81001-4-1's progressif your organization's RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN has a multi-year horizon. It is the committee-named successor, but a committee draft is too early to plan specific compliance activities against.
For a device maker, the useful hand-off is evidence the hospital can check. SoftWSP's device and firmware security review extracts an SBOM from the firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON. It matches the components against NVD, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST EPSS scores and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report that an engineer reviews before release (see KEV and EPSS prioritization). The review does not decide exploitability and does not write VEX statements; those judgements stay with the manufacturer's engineers. It complements, and does not replace, the deploying organization's own IEC 80001-1 program: see device and firmware security.
This guide quotes IEC's authorized preview of IEC 80001-1:2021 (Foreword, Introduction, Clauses 1 to 5.4.5 and the contents list), the IEC webstore and ISO's committee page. Clause 6 and Annex B are described from their subclause titles only; the purchased standard is the authoritative text, and this guide is not compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What does IEC 80001-1:2021 actually require, in its own words?
Per the standard's own Clause 1 (Scope): "This document specifies general requirements for ORGANIZATIONS in the application of RISK MANAGEMENT before, during and after the connection of a HEALTH IT SYSTEM within a HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE, by addressing the KEY PROPERTIES of SAFETY, EFFECTIVENESS and SECURITY whilst engaging appropriate stakeholders." It is published by IEC as Edition 2.0, dated 2021-09, under ICS codes 11.040.01 and 35.240.80, and was prepared by a Joint Working Group of IEC Technical Committee 62's Subcommittee 62A (common aspects of electrical equipment used in medical practice) together with ISO Technical Committee 215 (Health informatics).
Who is the "ORGANIZATION" this standard puts requirements on?
The standard's Introduction frames the target reader as a HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATION, but it explicitly allows that responsibility to move: "a HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATION may assign responsibility for RISK MANAGEMENT of the HEALTH IT SYSTEM and/or HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE to a different ORGANIZATION such as providers of HEALTH IT SYSTEMS, HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE or a collaboration of HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS." In practice that means a hospital, a system integrator, or even a medical device manufacturer providing a managed network service can carry that assigned responsibility, depending on how the relationship is contracted, while Clause 4 keeps "accountability for the RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS" with the HEALTHCARE DELIVERY ORGANIZATION — the standard does not assume the work is always done by the hospital's own IT department.
What is a RISK MANAGEMENT FILE, and what does Clause 5 require of it?
Clause 5.4.2 is explicit: "The ORGANIZATION shall: a) establish, at the start of a project, a HEALTH IT SYSTEM RISK MANAGEMENT FILE; b) maintain the RISK MANAGEMENT FILE throughout the lifecycle of the HEALTH IT SYSTEM; and c) ensure that the RISK MANAGEMENT FILE is recoverable in the event of failure." The standard describes it as "a store of all records which relate to the RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS and any decisions that influence RISK MANAGEMENT," built on a RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN that Clause 5.4.1 says should include a RISK ANALYSIS framework, defined risk acceptance criteria, a list of relevant procedures/policies/resources, and references to any accompanying documents.
How does Edition 2 (2021) differ from the original 2010 edition, and is a further revision already coming?
IEC 80001-1:2021 "cancels and replaces" the first edition (published 2010, titled around "roles, responsibilities and activities") as a technical revision, per IEC's own publication record. The retitled Edition 2 — "Safety, effectiveness and security in the implementation and use of connected medical devices or connected health software" — restructures the document to align with the generic risk-management standard ISO 31000:2018, reframes the content as requirements an ORGANIZATION must meet rather than a roles/activities description, and adds the principles-based framing in Clause 4. ISO's own committee tracker (as read for this guide) lists the standard's current stage as 90.92 ("International Standard to be revised") and names **ISO/CD 81001-4-1** as a successor document already in development at committee-draft stage; because a CD is an early, unpublished draft, this guide treats its eventual scope and content as **unconfirmed** rather than citing any specific requirement from it.
Sources
- IEC 80001-1:2021 — Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices — Part 1: Safety, effectiveness and security in the implementation and use of connected medical devices or connected health software (Edition 2.0, 2021-09; Scope, Introduction, Clause 3 definitions, Clause 4 Principles, Clause 5.1-5.4.4 Framework, and Annex A/B table of contents read from IEC's own authorized preview)
- ISO/committee.iso.org: IEC 80001-1:2021 listing (lifecycle stage 90.92, TC 215, successor ISO/CD 81001-4-1 noted as in development)
- ISO: IEC 80001-1:2021 catalogue entry (title, edition, publication record, supersession of the 2010 first edition)
- IEC webstore: IEC 80001-1:2021 (Edition 2.0, published 2021-09-21, 75 pages, stability date 2028)
- IEC webstore: IEC TS 81001-2-2:2025 — security capabilities for disclosure and communication; withdraws and replaces IEC TR 80001-2-2 and IEC TR 80001-2-8
- IEC webstore: IEC TR 80001-2-2:2012 (withdrawn 2025-10-01, replaced by IEC TS 81001-2-2:2025)
- NEMA: Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security (MDS2) worksheet, ANSI/NEMA HN 1-2019 form
About this guide
SoftWSP Regulation Desk
Covers the Medical & regulated devices cluster: 30 guides.

In this cluster
Questions about this page?
