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Medical & regulated devices

NIST SP 800-172 Rev. 3 (enhanced security requirements for CUI), explained

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NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3, "Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information" — organized into the same 17 requirement families as SP 800-171 and totaling 103 active enhanced requirements — is NIST's supplement to SP 800-171 for the subset of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is tied to a "critical program" or a "high value asset (HVA)" — categories the publication treats as likely targets of the advanced persistent threat (APT). Per its own abstract, the publication is "designed as a supplement to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-171 to protect against advanced persistent threats," and it explicitly does not replace SP 800-171's baseline: its requirements are "implemented in addition to security requirements in SP 800-171, since those requirements are not designed to address the APT." Revision 3 was approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 27 April 2026 and published in May 2026, authored by Victoria Pillitteri and Ron Ross, superseding the original 2 February 2021 edition.

Key takeaways

  • Like SP 800-171, Rev.
  • E: enhances an SP 800-171 requirement.
  • Section 2.2 frames the requirement set as a multidimensional, defense-in-depth protection strategy with three elements.
  • Many requirements contain bracketed organization-defined parameters (ODPs), such as "[Assignment: organization-defined system components]" or "[Selection: at startup; ...]".

How many families and active requirements does it have?

Like SP 800-171, Rev. 3 organizes its content into 17 families (Table 1 in the publication). Appendix C's summary table (Table 2) assigns identifiers from 03.01.01E through 03.17.05E. Counting those identifiers in the final PDF gives 115 numbered slots. Of those, 12 are marked "Withdrawn", each pointing to the requirements that now cover it, which leaves 103 enhanced security requirements in force. The February 2021 edition had 35.

Counted from Table 2 (SoftWSP count, 12 November 2026):

Family Active E T S Withdrawn
03.01 Access Control 16 15 0 1 1
03.02 Awareness and Training 4 2 1 1 0
03.03 Audit and Accountability 4 4 0 0 0
03.04 Configuration Management 7 7 0 0 1
03.05 Identification and Authentication 7 5 1 1 0
03.06 Incident Response 4 4 0 0 0
03.07 Maintenance 1 1 0 0 0
03.08 Media Protection 4 3 0 1 0
03.09 Personnel Security 2 1 1 0 2
03.10 Physical Protection 2 1 0 1 0
03.11 Risk Assessment 8 4 1 3 4
03.12 Security Assessment and Monitoring 4 2 1 1 0
03.13 System and Communications Protection 16 4 1 11 0
03.14 System and Information Integrity 15 2 7 6 4
03.15 Planning 3 0 1 2 0
03.16 System and Services Acquisition 1 0 0 1 0
03.17 Supply Chain Risk Management 5 0 3 2 0
Total 103 55 17 31 12

The weight is uneven. Access Control is almost all "E" (sharpened SP 800-171 requirements), while System and Communications Protection and System and Information Integrity carry most of the "S" and "T" requirements. Those are the deception, isolation and integrity capabilities that need new engineering rather than tighter policy. Enhanced requirements always carry a trailing "E". The publication says the sequential numbering does not mean 03.01.01E enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.01.01; where a link exists, the discussion section names it.

What do the E, T and S types mean?

Appendix C tags every requirement with one of three types:

  • E: enhances an SP 800-171 requirement. The requirement sharpens or extends a named requirement already in SP 800-171. Example: 03.01.01E Dual Authorization ("Enforce dual authorization for [organization-defined privileged commands...]") enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.01.02 and traces to SP 800-53 control AC-03(02).
  • T: tailored back in from SP 800-53B. Sourced to a security control that SP 800-171 had tailored out of the SP 800-53B moderate baseline. SP 800-172 reinstates it for the APT case. Example: 03.14.01E Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity (SI-07).
  • S: strengthens, without a direct SP 800-171 mapping. Sourced straight from an SP 800-53 control and included because it strengthens protection for CUI tied to a critical program or HVA. Examples: 03.01.04E Concurrent Session Control (AC-10) and 03.14.10E Protection of Boot Firmware (SI-07(10)).

What is the PRA/DLO/CRS protection strategy?

Section 2.2 frames the requirement set as a multidimensional, defense-in-depth protection strategy with three elements. Each requirement is tagged with the elements it supports:

  • Penetration-Resistant Architecture (PRA): technology, engineering and procedures that limit an adversary's opportunities to compromise a system and establish a persistent presence.
  • Damage-Limiting Operations (DLO): procedural and operational measures that help an organization detect successful compromises (detected and undetected) and limit their effects.
  • Cyber Resiliency (CRS): the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from and adapt to adverse conditions, cross-referenced to SP 800-160 Volume 2.

Each requirement also names the adversary effects it should produce, from five: preclude, expose, redirect, impede and limit, detailed in Appendix D. Section 3 states that "ideally, the selected requirements should be balanced across the three protection strategies", because selecting requirements in one area only "could result in an unbalanced response strategy for dealing with the APT."

What are organization-defined parameters?

Many requirements contain bracketed organization-defined parameters (ODPs), such as "[Assignment: organization-defined system components]" or "[Selection: at startup; ...]". Appendix E lists them. NIST assigns no values. If a federal agency does not assign them, the publication says "nonfederal organizations must assign those values to complete the requirements" (footnote 16). Once set, the values become part of the requirement. CMMC is one place where values are already fixed: 32 CFR 170.14(c)(4) Table 1 prints its DoD-assigned ODPs in italics. For a supplier, ODPs decide which components a requirement reaches, so ask the customer for its assigned values before scoping product work.

Which enhanced requirements land on devices and firmware?

About a dozen requirements can only be met if the device itself supports them. SP 800-172 is written for the contractor's systems, but footnote 20 counts "cyber-physical components (e.g., programmable logic controllers [PLC] or medical devices)" and mobile devices as system components. Those requirements become purchase criteria for whoever supplies the device:

Requirement Type, source What the product has to support Strategy
03.05.01E Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication E, IA-03(01) Mutual, cryptographic device authentication before a connection PRA
03.05.03E Device Attestation E, IA-03(04) Identification based on configuration and known operating state, for example a cryptographic hash PRA
03.05.04E No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators E, IA-05(07) No plaintext credentials in firmware, scripts or "other forms of static storage" PRA
03.14.01E Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity T, SI-07 A way to detect unauthorized changes to firmware PRA, DLO
03.14.08E Integrity Checks T, SI-07(01) Integrity checks at startup, at transitional states or at a set frequency PRA
03.14.09E Cryptographic Protection S, SI-07(06) Signed hashes or digital signatures over software and firmware PRA, DLO
03.14.10E Protection of Boot Firmware S, SI-07(10) Verify the "integrity and authenticity of updates to the firmware prior to applying changes" and block unauthorized modification PRA
03.13.13E Port and Input/Output Device Access S, SC-41 Physically or logically disable USB and other ports PRA
03.04.02E Automated Unauthorized Component Detection E, CM-06/CM-08(03) Be discoverable and identifiable on the network PRA, DLO
03.17.03E Component Authenticity T, SR-11 Anti-counterfeit evidence for hardware and firmware PRA, DLO
03.17.04E Provenance S, SR-04 A chronology of origin, development, ownership and changes PRA, DLO
03.17.05E Supply Chain Integrity – Pedigree S, SR-04(04) For software, "the composition of open-source and proprietary code, including the version of the component" DLO

On 03.17.05E, the discussion names "software component inventory" and SWID tags among the evidence a manufacturer can supply, which is where an SBOM fits. The secure boot and hardware root of trust guide covers 03.14.09E and 03.14.10E in hardware terms, and the firmware SBOM guide covers the composition evidence. How an assessor examines each of these is in our SP 800-172A assessment guide.

How does this fit with SP 800-171 and CMMC Level 3?

SP 800-172 requirements are not mandatory by default. Federal agencies select a subset based on mission need and risk and convey it through a contract, grant or agreement; there is "no expectation that all of the enhanced security requirements will be selected." Agencies may scope the requirements to the components that process, store or transmit the CUI, protect them, or "provide a direct attack path to such components". Isolating that CUI in a separate security domain is the usual way to keep the scope small. A companion publication, SP 800-172A Rev. 3, supplies the assessment procedures.

For defence contractors, CMMC Level 3 is the main channel. Under 32 CFR 170.14(c)(4), its requirements "are selected from NIST SP 800-172 Feb2021": 24 of the 35 requirements in that edition, with DoD parameters assigned (eCFR text). Three of the 24 matter directly to device makers:

  • IA.L3-3.5.1e: bidirectional, cryptographically based and replay-resistant authentication of systems and components before a network connection.
  • SI.L3-3.14.1e: verify the integrity of security-critical and essential software "using root of trust mechanisms or cryptographic signatures".
  • SI.L3-3.14.3e: ensure "specialized assets including IoT, IIoT, OT, GFE, Restricted Information Systems, and test equipment" are in scope or "segregated in purpose-specific networks".

Rev. 3 withdraws the corresponding slot, 03.14.03E, and points to 03.15.01E Security Architecture, 03.13.16E System Partitioning and three SP 800-171 requirements instead. The CMMC rule text, not Rev. 3, is what a Level 3 assessment checks. As of 12 November 2026 that text still cites the February 2021 edition, so connected devices in a Level 3 enclave stay explicitly in scope unless they are segregated. Our SP 800-171 / CMMC 2.0 guide covers the Level 2 baseline, and the SP 800-171A guide covers how it is assessed.

What changed from the 2021 edition?

Per Appendix F, Rev. 3 is a substantive rewrite. It increases the specificity of requirements to "remove ambiguity" and clarify assessment scope, and groups related requirements. It removes "outdated and redundant" requirements and adds new ones based on threat intelligence, empirical attack data and an expanded scope that covers integrity and availability, not confidentiality alone. It also adds requirement titles, restructures the discussion sections, aligns the language with SP 800-53, and adds Appendix C (summary table) and Appendix E (ODPs). The protection-strategy mapping moves from a separate appendix into each requirement. The jump from the original edition straight to "Revision 3" is a one-time revision-number change "for consistency with SP 800-171r3". It is not a new numbering scheme.

Worked example: what a gateway maker builds for a Level 3 customer

Synthetic example, not a real company or assessment. A maker of an industrial Ethernet gateway sells to a defence contractor preparing for CMMC Level 3. The contractor's security questionnaire translates into product work:

Customer question CMMC / Rev. 3 reference Product answer
Is the firmware integrity-checked at boot? SI.L3-3.14.1e / 03.14.09E, 03.14.10E Signed bootloader and image, update signature checked before flashing, rollback blocked
Does it authenticate both ways? IA.L3-3.5.1e / 03.05.01E Mutual TLS with a per-device certificate injected at the factory
Can it sit in the CUI enclave? SI.L3-3.14.3e / 03.13.16E Documented as an OT asset, deployable in a segregated VLAN
Are there hard-coded credentials? 03.05.04E No shared default password; per-unit secrets stored encrypted
What is inside it? 03.17.05E CycloneDX SBOM per firmware release, with component versions
Can unused ports be disabled? 03.13.13E USB console disabled by default, configuration-locked

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Confirm the requirements apply before building to themSP 800-172 matters once an agency has designated CUI as tied to a critical program or HVA and put a selected subset in a contract. It is not a general hardening baseline to adopt unprompted.
  2. Ask which edition and which ODP valuesA CMMC Level 3 customer is assessed against the 24 February 2021 requirements with DoD values; a civilian agency contract may cite Rev. 3.
  3. Treat the E/T/S tag as a planning signal"E" requirements extend existing SP 800-171 work; "S" requirements such as decoys or boot-firmware protection are new capabilities that usually need separate budget and tooling.
  4. Check the protection-strategy spreadA selection that is all PRA leaves an organization blind to compromises it could not prevent.
  5. Scope with segmentationIsolating critical-program or HVA CUI in its own security domain avoids applying 103 requirements across an entire environment.
  6. If you supply devices, prepare the product evidence first:boot-integrity design, authentication method, credential handling and SBOM, matched to the device table above. The SBOM viewer shows what a customer sees when they open yours.
  7. Plan for SP 800-172A separatelyAssessment is a distinct effort from implementation.

SoftWSP covers one narrow part of this: it extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report an engineer reviews. That is software-composition evidence toward 03.17.05E and input to vulnerability monitoring. It is not boot-firmware, attestation or penetration-test evidence. See Device & Firmware Security.

This guide summarises NIST SP 800-172 Revision 3 (PDF, May 2026), the February 2021 edition and 32 CFR 170.14, read on 12 November 2026. It is not a substitute for the full text and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is NIST SP 800-172?

"Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information" — a NIST publication, written as a direct supplement to NIST SP 800-171, that gives federal agencies an additional set of security requirements to apply when Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is associated with a 'critical program' or a 'high value asset (HVA).' Per the publication's own abstract, it is 'designed as a supplement to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-171 to protect against advanced persistent threats (APTs).' Revision 3 was approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 27 April 2026 and published in May 2026, authored by Victoria Pillitteri and Ron Ross, superseding the original edition of 2 February 2021.

How many enhanced security requirements does Rev. 3 contain, and how are they organized?

Rev. 3 organizes its requirements into the same **17 families** used by SP 800-171 (Access Control, Awareness and Training, Audit and Accountability, Configuration Management, Identification and Authentication, Incident Response, Maintenance, Media Protection, Personnel Security, Physical Protection, Risk Assessment, Security Assessment and Monitoring, System and Communications Protection, System and Information Integrity, Planning, System and Services Acquisition, and Supply Chain Risk Management), per the publication's own Table 1. Appendix C's summary table assigns identifiers from 03.01.01E through 03.17.05E; counting those identifiers directly in the final PDF gives **115** numbered slots, of which **12 are marked 'Withdrawn'** (superseded, merged into other requirements, or folded into SP 800-171 itself) — leaving **103 active enhanced security requirements**.

What do the 'E', 'T' and 'S' labels on each requirement mean?

Per Appendix C's own key, each enhanced requirement is tagged with one of three types: **'E'** means the requirement directly enhances a named requirement already in SP 800-171 (e.g., 03.01.01E Dual Authorization enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.01.02); **'T'** means it is sourced to a security control that was tailored out of the SP 800-53B moderate baseline when SP 800-171 was built, so it reappears here instead; and **'S'** means it does not enhance any specific SP 800-171 requirement but is included, sourced directly from an SP 800-53 control, to further strengthen protection of CUI tied to a critical program or HVA. All three types carry a reference back to the originating SP 800-53 control.

What is the multidimensional protection strategy (PRA/DLO/CRS), and how does this relate to SP 800-171 and CMMC?

Each enhanced requirement is mapped to one or more of three protection-strategy elements the publication defines in Section 2.2 as a defense-in-depth approach built specifically for the advanced persistent threat: **Penetration-Resistant Architecture (PRA)**, limiting an adversary's opportunity to compromise and persist in a system; **Damage-Limiting Operations (DLO)**, procedural/operational measures that help detect compromises and limit their effect; and **Cyber Resiliency (CRS)**, the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from and adapt to attacks, cross-referenced to SP 800-160 Volume 2. SP 800-172 requirements are explicitly additive to SP 800-171 — the publication states they are 'implemented in addition to security requirements in SP 800-171, since those requirements are not designed to address the APT' — and federal agencies select a subset rather than mandating all of them. A companion assessment publication, **SP 800-172A** (also revised to Rev. 3 alongside this document), supplies the procedures for assessing these requirements. See our [SP 800-171 / CMMC 2.0 guide](/guides/nist-sp-800-171-cmmc-2-0/) for how the DoD's CMMC Level 3 selects a defined subset of SP 800-172 requirements on top of its SP 800-171-based Level 2 baseline.

Sources

  1. NIST: SP 800-172 Rev. 3, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (May 2026) — publication page
  2. NIST SP 800-172r3 (Pillitteri, Ross), full text PDF
  3. NIST: SP 800-172A Rev. 3, Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information — publication page
  4. NIST: SP 800-171 Rev. 3, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations — publication page
  5. NIST SP 800-172 (February 2021), Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information: A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171, full text PDF
  6. eCFR: 32 CFR 170.14, CMMC Model (Table 1 to paragraph (c)(4), CMMC Level 3 security requirements)
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