IMDRF/CYBER WG/N60FINAL:2020, "Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity," is the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's main cybersecurity guidance document — dated 18 March 2020 internally and published on IMDRF's site on 20 April 2020. IMDRF itself is not a regulator: it is a voluntary forum of national medical device regulatory authorities (the US FDA, the European Commission, Health Canada, Japan's PMDA, Australia's TGA and others) that writes non-binding guidance aimed at converging how those regulators each already write their own binding rules. N60's central idea is a Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) approach that treats premarket design and postmarket vulnerability handling as one continuous security risk management process, rather than two separate problems.
Key takeaways
- The International Medical Device Regulators Forum was established in 2011 as the successor to the Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF), a 1992 initiative among the US, EU, Japan, Canada and Australia.
- The N60 final text has two halves.
- Section 5.5.2 lists what the technical documentation for installers and operators should include.
- N70 (legacy devices, final 2023) turns N60's legacy concept into four TPLC stages.
What is IMDRF, actually?
The International Medical Device Regulators Forum was established in 2011 as the successor to the Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF), a 1992 initiative among the US, EU, Japan, Canada and Australia. Per TGA's own description, IMDRF is "a voluntary group of medical device regulators from around the world" — it does not approve or reject any product, and its Management Committee membership spans Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and the US, with the World Health Organization as an official observer. Its working groups produce technical guidance on adverse-event coding, unique device identification, software and, since 2019, cybersecurity. None of that guidance has legal force on its own; it matters to the extent a regulator cites, adopts or aligns its own rules with it.
What does N60 say, and how is its Total Product Life Cycle structured?
Per IMDRF's stated purpose, N60 provides general principles and best practices "to facilitate international regulatory convergence on medical device cybersecurity," covering devices that contain or are composed of software, not only connected ones. Its four general principles are global harmonization, the Total Product Life Cycle, shared responsibility and information sharing. Under the TPLC, one security risk management process runs from device conception through end of support, instead of a premarket gate followed by a separate postmarket obligation.
The N60 final text has two halves. The premarket half (Section 5) is aimed at manufacturers: security requirements and architecture design, risk management, security testing, a TPLC cybersecurity management plan, labelling and customer security documentation, and what to put in a regulatory submission. The postmarket half (Section 6) addresses manufacturers, healthcare providers and regulators together: operating devices in their use environment, information sharing, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, vulnerability remediation, incident response and legacy devices. Section 6.6 defines those as "medical devices that cannot be reasonably protected (via updates, and/or compensating controls) against current cybersecurity threats", and adds that age alone does not decide it: a five-year-old device can be legacy and a 15-year-old one need not be.
Which design principles does N60 ask manufacturers to build in?
Section 5.1's Table 1 lists "select design principles for consideration in medical device design." It is not exhaustive, but every row maps to firmware work:
| N60 design principle | What N60 asks | Firmware reading |
|---|---|---|
| Secure communications | Decide how devices authenticate each other, whether encryption is required, how replay of earlier commands is prevented | Mutual TLS or signed messages; replay counters on control commands |
| Data protection | Encrypt safety-related data where needed; store passwords as cryptographically secure hashes; protect keying material | Encrypted storage, salted password hashes, keys outside the image |
| Device integrity | Guard against unauthorized modification of device software; consider audit logging and anti-malware | Secure boot and signed updates |
| User authentication | Role-based access and emergency access; "the same credentials should not be shared across devices and customers" | Unique per-device credentials, no fleet-wide default password |
| Software maintenance | A communicated process for regular updates, including OS, third-party and open source software, authenticated by code signing | An update channel that works for the whole support period |
| Physical access | Prevent unauthorized physical access, e.g. restrict ports or require authentication for cable access | Debug ports locked in production |
| Reliability and availability | Detect, resist, respond to and recover from attacks to maintain essential performance | Watchdogs, safe states, rate limits |
Section 5.3 then asks for security testing at verification and validation: static and dynamic analysis, robustness testing, vulnerability scanning, software composition analysis, penetration testing and fuzzing, followed by a vulnerability assessment.
What must the customer security documentation contain?
Section 5.5.2 lists what the technical documentation for installers and operators should include. A checklist version:
- infrastructure requirements the device needs to operate as intended;
- how the device is, or can be, hardened with a secure configuration;
- instructions for secure network deployment and servicing, and what to do on detecting a vulnerability or incident;
- how the device notifies users of security events, where feasible;
- how an authenticated privileged user retains and recovers the configuration;
- how authorized users download and install manufacturer updates;
- cybersecurity end-of-support information, if known;
- a Software Bill of Materials listing each software component "by its name, origin, version and build", shared through trusted channels.
The labelling list in Section 5.5.1 adds the network ports and interfaces the device uses and their direction, noting that "unused ports should be disabled." In practice much of this lands in an MDS2 form.
How do N70 and N73 extend N60?
N70 (legacy devices, final 2023) turns N60's legacy concept into four TPLC stages. Per the N70 final text:
| Stage | Trigger | Manufacturer support |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Development | Premarket | Security by design, risk assessment, testing |
| 2. Support | On the market, all major software and hardware components supported by their suppliers | Full support: patches and updates |
| 3. Limited Support | End of Life (EOL) declared, or unsupported components whose risks are mitigated | Support "when possible"; more compensating controls |
| 4. End of Support (EOS) | EOS declared, or unsupported components whose risks are not mitigated | None; risk sits with the healthcare provider |
N70 says current practice is to give life cycle milestones "at least 2 years in advance", and that the transfer of responsibility to healthcare providers "begins approximately 2-3 years before the EOS." Our N70 guide covers the stage criteria in detail.
N73 (SBOM, final 2023) covers collecting, generating, distributing and maintaining SBOM content. Per the N73 final text hosted by Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, a baseline SBOM follows the NTIA minimum elements: author name, timestamp, component supplier, component name, version, unique identifier and relationship. It names CycloneDX, SPDX and SWID as formats, recommends a component hash and suggests a component end-of-support date as supplemental information, and states that "any event which causes the device software to change should result in a new SBOM." An SBOM does not say whether a component is vulnerable; N73 points to VEX for that. See our N73 guide.
How does IMDRF relate to FDA's premarket and postmarket guidance?
FDA was one of the two agencies, with Health Canada, whose staff led the N60 working group, and its premarket guidance cites N60 by name. The current version, issued 3 February 2026, says its recommendations "generally align with or expand upon the recommendations in the Pre-Market Considerations for Medical Device Cybersecurity section" of N60, and takes its definition of a software "update" from N60. It goes further than N73 on SBOM content: for each component FDA asks for the level of support from the component maker and the component's end-of-support date, and for all known vulnerabilities, including those in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.
See FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices for the Section 524B duties — SBOM, vulnerability-monitoring plan, patch process — and FDA postmarket cybersecurity for medical devices for the postmarket guidance that N60's Section 6 parallels. IMDRF alignment does not change what FDA requires in a 510(k) or PMA submission; it explains why FDA's vocabulary looks the way it does.
How does IMDRF relate to the EU's MDCG 2019-16?
The relationship on the EU side is more indirect. MDCG 2019-16, the EU's non-binding cybersecurity guidance under MDR/IVDR, does not cite N60 by name. It does use a separate, older IMDRF output, the Adverse Event Terminology, routing cybersecurity vigilance reports through device-problem code A110502 ("Computer System Security Problem") and root-cause code C1007 ("Software Security Vulnerability"). That is a reporting-taxonomy link rather than an endorsement of N60's TPLC framework. The EU's binding cybersecurity text remains MDR Annex I, interpreted through MDCG 2019-16.
Which documents are binding, and which are guidance?
| Document | What it is | Binding? |
|---|---|---|
| EU MDR Annex I (Regulation (EU) 2017/745) | Statutory text | Yes, in the EU |
| FDA Section 524B (FD&C Act) | Statutory text | Yes, in the US |
| MDCG 2019-16 | EU interpretive guidance on MDR/IVDR Annex I | No |
| FDA premarket/postmarket cybersecurity guidance | US interpretive guidance on Section 524B and QMSR duties | No (but backed by refuse-to-accept policy) |
| Health Canada pre-market cybersecurity guidance (June 2019) | National guidance | No |
| HSA Singapore GL-10 R1 (August 2026) | National best-practices guide | No |
| IMDRF N60 (and N70, N73) | Multi-regulator harmonization guidance | No, anywhere |
National guidance increasingly reuses IMDRF's structure directly. Singapore's HSA Best Practices Guide for Medical Device Cybersecurity, Revision 1 (August 2026) splits the post-market period into the same Support, Limited Support and End of Support stages and takes many of its definitions from N60 and N70.
Worked example: what does N60-aligned evidence look like for one infusion pump?
Synthetic example, for illustration only. A maker of a Wi-Fi infusion pump sells into the US, EU and Singapore and builds one evidence set:
Design fileOne page per N60 Table 1 principle, with the control and its test: mutual TLS to the drug-library server, signed firmware, unique per-unit service credentials, a locked JTAG port. TestingSoftware composition analysis on each release image, fuzzing of the pump's network commands, and an external penetration test before submission. Customer security documentationHardening guide, port list (one outbound TLS port, nothing inbound), update procedure, a CycloneDX SBOM per release and a stated cybersecurity EOL date. Life cycle datesThe embedded OS vendor's support ends in year 7, so the pump's EOL is set for year 6 and announced at launch, leaving more than N70's 2-year minimum. PostmarketA CVD policy following ISO/IEC 29147 and a vulnerability-monitoring routine against the SBOM. PackagingThe same evidence becomes the FDA premarket submission, the EU technical documentation under MDR Annex I and the documentation an HSA-registered distributor asks for.
What should a manufacturer do first?
Don't submit against IMDRF N60 itselfNo regulator accepts "IMDRF-compliant" as a conformity claim; submit against each market's binding law and guidance — MDR Annex I and MDCG 2019-16 for the EU, FDA's premarket and postmarket guidance for the US. Use N60's TPLC framing as your internal process modelA single security risk management process spanning design through end of support maps onto both FDA's and the EU's expectations. Build one legacy-device plan and one SBOM process, then route them into each market's paperworkSee firmware SBOM for building the artifact once. Run coordinated vulnerability disclosure as routineN60 asks manufacturers to adopt a policy based on ISO/IEC 29147 and acknowledge reports within a stated time; see our CVD process guide. Treat IMDRF coding as a reporting detailIf you sell into the EU, pre-map incidents to codes A110502 and C1007. Check each regulator's current guidance before citing a title or dateFDA, MDCG and national regulators have revised their texts several times since 2020; FDA's premarket guidance alone was reissued in June 2025 and February 2026.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Reading "legacy" as "old". N60 ties legacy status to whether a device can be reasonably protected, not to its age.
- Picking components without checking their support life. N60 asks manufacturers to consider that third-party support may end inside the device's use life.
- One SBOM for the product, not one per release. N73 expects a new SBOM whenever device software changes.
- Announcing end of support late. N70's practice is at least 2 years' notice; hospitals budget replacements years ahead.
- Shared credentials across a fleet, which N60's user-authentication row rules out.
Where does SoftWSP fit?
SoftWSP extracts a firmware SBOM to CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report that an engineer reviews; watchlist alerts fire on a CVE id or vendor/product. That covers the SBOM and known-vulnerability parts of an N60 or FDA submission. It does not write VEX, judge reachability, record component support dates or re-match every release SBOM automatically; those stay with the manufacturer's process, built alongside IEC 62304 and ANSI/AAMI SW96 practices. See Device & Firmware Security.
This guide is based on the final texts of IMDRF N60, N70 and N73 (read from copies of the IMDRF PDFs hosted by Japan's MHLW and ECA Academy), FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance of 3 February 2026 and HSA's GL-10 Revision 1. It is not a substitute for those documents, any national regulator's binding law or guidance, or regulatory/legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What exactly is the IMDRF cybersecurity document, and is it legally binding?
It is IMDRF/CYBER WG/N60FINAL:2020, "Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity," finalized by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's Medical Device Cybersecurity Working Group — internally dated 18 March 2020 and published on IMDRF's site on 20 April 2020. It is not legally binding anywhere. IMDRF itself is a voluntary forum of national medical device regulators (not a regulator itself and not able to approve or reject products), so its documents are, by design, non-binding guidance meant to converge how member regulators already write and interpret their own binding rules — not a replacement for any of them.
What does the IMDRF guidance actually say, and what is the Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) framing?
Per IMDRF's own stated purpose, the document provides general principles and best practices to support international regulatory convergence on medical device cybersecurity, covering devices that contain or are composed of software (not only internet-connected devices). Its core structural idea is the Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC): rather than treating premarket design review and postmarket vulnerability handling as separate problems, N60 sets out a single security risk management process meant to run from initial device conception through end of support, and explicitly combines premarket recommendations (security requirements and design, risk management, security testing, labelling, and regulatory submission content) with postmarket recommendations (information sharing, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, patching and update management, and handling of legacy devices) inside one document — a structural choice several analyses note as distinct from FDA's own separate premarket and postmarket guidance documents.
How does the IMDRF guidance relate to the EU's MDCG 2019-16 and FDA's premarket/postmarket cybersecurity guidance?
They are three distinct document types that overlap heavily in substance but not in legal weight. FDA's premarket cybersecurity guidance cites IMDRF's N60 directly — its current version (3 February 2026) takes its definition of a software "update" from N60 and states that its recommendations "generally align with or expand upon" N60's pre-market section; see [FDA premarket cybersecurity for medical devices](/guides/fda-premarket-cybersecurity-medical-devices/) and [FDA postmarket cybersecurity for medical devices](/guides/fda-postmarket-cybersecurity-medical-devices/) for FDA's own binding-adjacent guidance. On the EU side, [MDCG 2019-16](/guides/mdcg-2019-16-medical-device-cybersecurity-guidance/) does not cite IMDRF's N60 cybersecurity-principles document by name, but it does route vigilance reporting through a separate, older IMDRF framework — the IMDRF Adverse Event Terminology codes A110502 ("Computer System Security Problem") and C1007 ("Software Security Vulnerability") — showing IMDRF's broader presence in EU practice even where N60 itself isn't the direct citation. Health Canada's own pre-market cybersecurity guidance (June 2019) is listed as a direct source reference inside IMDRF's N60 document, and the N60 working group itself was led by FDA and Health Canada officials. None of this makes IMDRF binding in any jurisdiction; it makes it the common reference point multiple binding national frameworks each draw from or echo independently.
Does IMDRF guidance ever substitute for a jurisdiction's own binding law or guidance?
No, and this is the most common misreading of "harmonization." A manufacturer cannot cite IMDRF N60 compliance in place of meeting MDR Annex I's binding text, FDA's Section 524B statutory duties, or Health Canada's own pre-market cybersecurity guidance — each jurisdiction's own instrument remains the one a regulator actually checks a submission against. IMDRF's value is as a shared vocabulary and structural template (the TPLC framing, the legacy-device definition, the SBOM concept later detailed in IMDRF's follow-on N73 document) that each national regulator can choose to adopt, cite, or diverge from in its own binding or guidance text — not a single harmonized rulebook that supersedes any of them.
Sources
- IMDRF: Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity, IMDRF/CYBER WG/N60FINAL:2020 (dated 18 March 2020, published 20 April 2020)
- IMDRF: Documents landing page for Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity
- RAPS: IMDRF guidances address cybersecurity, personalized devices and surveillance
- MedTech Dive: IMDRF cybersecurity guidance favors total product life cycle approach
- ECA Academy / gmp-compliance.org: IMDRF publishes Guidance Document on Medical Device Cybersecurity
- TGA (Australia): International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) — About page
- IMDRF/CYBER WG/N70FINAL:2023, Principles and Practices for the Cybersecurity of Legacy Medical Devices (copy of the final PDF hosted by ECA Academy)
- IMDRF/CYBER WG/N73FINAL:2023, Principles and Practices for Software Bill of Materials for Medical Device Cybersecurity (copy hosted by Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
- IMDRF/CYBER WG/N60FINAL:2020 final PDF (copy hosted by ECA Academy)
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (3 February 2026)
- HSA Singapore: Best Practices Guide for Medical Device Cybersecurity, GL-10 Revision 1 (August 2026)
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