ISO 24089:2023, "Road vehicles — Software update engineering," is the engineering-process standard behind every workshop flash and over-the-air (OTA) campaign a vehicle manufacturer runs. Published in February 2023 by ISO/TC 22/SC 32 and amended once in 2024, it does not say which update technology to use; it specifies what an organization, a project, the supporting infrastructure, the vehicle itself, and the update package and campaign each have to get right so that a software update stays safe, secure and traceable. It is the standard most often cited as the practical "how" behind UN Regulation No. 156's legal "what."
Key takeaways
- ISO 24089:2023, "Road vehicles — Software update engineering," is the engineering-process standard behind every workshop flash and over-the-air (OTA) campaign a vehicle manufacturer runs.
- It covers the engineering around an update, not the update's content.
- Each clause sets objectives, requirements and a closing "Work products" list.
- The published-edition preview ends at 3.1.16.
What does ISO 24089 cover, and what does it deliberately leave out?
It covers the engineering around an update, not the update's content. Per Clause 1 (Scope), ISO 24089 "specifies requirements and recommendations for software update engineering for road vehicles on both the organizational and the project level." It applies to "vehicles, vehicle systems, ECUs, infrastructure, and the assembly and deployment of software update packages after the initial development," and to "organizations involved in software update engineering for road vehicles," explicitly naming "vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and their subsidiaries or partners" as in scope — not just OEMs.
Two exclusions matter as much as the inclusions. First: "the development of software for vehicle functions, except for software update engineering, is outside the scope of this document" — that is ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434 territory. Second: "this document does not prescribe specific technologies or solutions for software update engineering." It is solution-neutral by design, covering wired, wireless and hardware-replacement updates alike rather than just OTA. The publisher's preview carries the scope, the normative references and the full table of contents.
What do the six requirement clauses ask for?
Each clause sets objectives, requirements and a closing "Work products" list. The standard's own Introduction summarizes its activities as: implementing organizational-level processes; implementing project-level processes per update project; defining vehicle and infrastructure functions to support those processes; assembling update packages using infrastructure functions; and preparing and executing update campaigns using vehicle and infrastructure functions. That maps onto six requirement clauses:
| Clause | Level | What it requires |
|---|---|---|
| 4 — Organizational level | Organization-wide | Governance, continuous improvement, information sharing, supporting processes (document, configuration, requirements and quality management), and auditing |
| 5 — Project level | Per software-update project | Project management (plan, roles, responsibilities), tailoring and rationale for any deviation, interoperability between infrastructure and vehicle functions, and integrity of software/metadata/packages |
| 6 — Infrastructure level | Organization's systems and tools | Managing cybersecurity and other risk, managing vehicle configuration information, communicating software-update-campaign information, and processing software update packages |
| 7 — Vehicle and vehicle systems level | On-vehicle, in the ECUs | The same four requirement groups as Clause 6, implemented in the vehicle rather than the back-office infrastructure |
| 8 — Software update package | The deliverable artifact | Identifying targets and package contents, assembling the package, verifying and validating it, and approving it for release |
| 9 — Software update campaign | The delivery event | Preparation, execution and completion of a campaign that resolves targets into actual recipients, delivers packages, and documents results |
The standard has no annexes: Clause 9 is followed directly by the bibliography, so any mapping to UN R156 comes from outside the standard.
Which Clause 3 terms should you learn first?
NIST's Suzanne Lightman, reviewing the draft for the Uptane project in 2022, put it plainly: "Print out clause 3 – definitions and keep it with you when reading this document." Later clauses rely on these terms without re-explaining them:
| Term | Definition (ISO 24089:2023, Clause 3) | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Condition (3.1.2) | "criteria required for a software update operation … to be completed successfully" | Preconditions such as compatibility, safe vehicle state and resources |
| In-vehicle resource (3.1.11) | Available properties such as "computational power, network capacity, RAM capacity, storage capacity, or battery capacity" | The battery and storage checks before installation |
| Recipient (3.1.12) | The "individual instance" of a vehicle, vehicle system or ECU that receives a package | Campaign records are per recipient, not per model |
| Safe vehicle state (3.1.13) | An operating mode for update operations "without an unreasonable level of risk"; example: "The motor is off, the parking brake is applied." | The state the vehicle must reach before and after an update |
| Software update campaign (3.1.16) | Identifying targets, resolving recipients, distributing packages, and "monitoring and documenting results" | Clause 9's unit of work |
The published-edition preview ends at 3.1.16. In the final-draft (FDIS) preview, a software update operation is split into receipt, installation and activation, so an image can be written to an ECU without becoming executable until later.
How does it build on functional safety and cybersecurity engineering?
Clause 2 lists exactly three normative references: ISO 26262-6 (software-level product development), ISO 26262-8 (supporting processes), and ISO/SAE 21434 (cybersecurity engineering). ISO 24089 does not duplicate them; several of its own definitions are marked as modified quotations from them. Its "cybersecurity" term is sourced from "ISO/SAE 21434:2021, 3.1.9, modified" to apply to "vehicle systems of road vehicles and infrastructure required to support software update engineering." Per Lightman's summary, requiring all three "should ensure that all code and hardware is developed with proper attention to safety and cybersecurity." See ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering explained.
How does ISO 24089 map to UN R156?
Through UNECE's interpretation guidance, not through the regulation itself. UN R156, the UN vehicle regulation that makes a certified Software Update Management System (SUMS) a type-approval condition, is law; ISO 24089 is a voluntary standard. The R156 legal text does not mention ISO 24089. In 2025, though, the Working Party on Automated/Autonomous and Connected Vehicles (GRVA) adopted an amendment to the R156 Interpretation Document, submitted to WP.29's March 2025 session, that adds a section titled "Link with ISO 24089:2023." It keeps the line that "The standards referenced are intended as examples, not mandatory," and adds that a coherence check "has shown that especially ISO 24089:2023 can be very supportive in implementing the requirements on the SUMS."
A selection from that mapping table:
| UN R156 paragraph | Requirement (short) | ISO 24089 clauses |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1.1.2 | Software versions and integrity validation data uniquely identifiable | 4.3.4.4, 6.3.2.1 |
| 7.1.1.7 | Compatibility with the target configuration confirmed before issue | 8.3.1.3, 8.3.3.2 |
| 7.1.1.11 | Vehicle user able to be informed about updates | 6.3.3.1, 9.3.2.10 |
| 7.1.3.1 | Updates protected against manipulation before the process starts | 5.3.4.1, 6.3.4.6, 8.3.1.7 |
| 7.2.2.1.1 | Restore the previous version, or reach a safe state, after a failed update | 7.3.4.10 |
| 7.2.2.1.2 | Enough power to finish, including recovery | 7.3.4.3 |
| 7.2.2.5 | Preconditions met before execution | 7.3.4.3 |
The table also records gaps. "Securely held" in 7.1.1.1 "is not covered by ISO 24089:2023 and is left to other standards e.g. ISO 27001"; RXSWIN numbering is "out of scope"; and for 7.1.3.3, verification and validation of software functionality and code "is out of scope of ISO 24089:2023." So ISO 24089 conformance alone does not close a SUMS audit. See UN R155, UN R156 and ISO/SAE 21434 explained for the regulation itself.
When does UN R156 apply in the EU?
In the EU, R156 applies through Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2236, which amends the type-approval framework Regulation (EU) 2018/858. Its Article 2 sets the dates: from 6 July 2022, refusal of new vehicle types where the manufacturer executes post-registration updates affecting type-approved characteristics; from 7 July 2024, the same for all new vehicles of that kind and for every new type; from 7 July 2026, all new complete vehicles; and from 7 July 2029, completed multi-stage vehicles. At UNECE level, the 01 series of amendments (ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2025/142) adds a mandatory RXSWIN-assignment process and sets transitional dates of 1 September 2028 and 1 September 2030.
What did the 2024 amendment change?
ISO 24089:2023/Amd 1:2024, published in July 2024, is the one amendment so far. The free iTeh catalogue record summarizes two changes: a new "tool" definition (3.1.27) for devices that enable software update operations, such as laptops or vehicle diagnostic devices in workshops, and enhanced requirements in 5.3.4.1 to preserve the integrity of software, metadata and software update packages during distribution. The amendment text itself is paywalled and remains the authoritative wording. Clause 5.3.4.1 is also the first ISO clause UNECE maps to R156 paragraph 7.1.3.1, so the change lands on an audited requirement.
What mechanisms implement these requirements on an ECU?
Because ISO 24089 is solution-neutral, you choose the mechanisms yourself. Public, freely readable specifications cover most of them:
| Requirement area | Mechanism | Public reference |
|---|---|---|
| Package integrity and authenticity (5.3.4, R156 7.2.1.1) | Signed metadata over every image, verified on the vehicle | Uptane Standard 2.1.0: a Director repository and an Image repository, Primary and Secondary ECUs |
| Resilience to a server compromise | Separate keys and roles, so one stolen key is not enough | Uptane threat model: an attacker may compromise "either a Director repository or Image repository server … but not both" |
| Anti-rollback | Monotonic version or sequence counter checked before install | RFC 9124: "manifests MUST contain monotonically increasing sequence numbers" |
| Recovery after a failed update (R156 7.2.2.1.1) | A/B partitions or a recovery image | NIST SP 800-193 protection, detection and recovery principles |
| Configuration information (6.3.2, 7.3.2) | Per-vehicle record of hardware versions, software versions and parameters | An SBOM per image helps identify the software side |
UNECE's interpretation text adds a practical rule: "A safe state should be implemented when it is not possible or desirable to roll-back to a previous version." See also firmware OTA update security and secure boot.
Worked example: what does one update look like for an ECU supplier?
Synthetic example. The supplier, ECU and versions are invented to show the method; they describe no real company or vehicle.
A Tier-1 supplier delivers a telematics control unit (TCU) to a vehicle manufacturer. A CVE in the TCU's TLS library needs a fix, delivered over the air:
Project (Clause 5)The supplier opens an update project, records which ISO 24089 requirements it tailors (it builds packages but the OEM distributes them), and agrees the interface with the OEM's backend. Targets and contents (8.3.1)Using vehicle configuration information, the OEM resolves which TCU hardware revisions and software versions are affected. Two hardware revisions need different images. Assembly and integrity (8.3.2, 5.3.4)Each image is built, its SBOM regenerated, and the image signed with the supplier's key; the OEM adds its own metadata signature. Verification and validation (8.3.3)Bench tests cover install, activation, power loss mid-install, and rollback to the previous slot. Release approval (8.3.4)The OEM checks whether the change affects any type-approved system or RXSWIN. Here it does not. Campaign (Clause 9)The OEM informs vehicle users, checks preconditions on each vehicle (battery level, vehicle parked), installs to the inactive slot and activates on the next ignition cycle. Failed recipients are retried or flagged for a workshop visit. CompletionResults per recipient are stored, and the configuration record for each vehicle shows the new version.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Reading "solution-neutral" as "no technical controls." R156 7.2.x needs real mechanisms: authenticity checks, power checks, recovery.
- Treating ISO 24089 as the whole SUMS. UNECE's own mapping lists secure record-keeping, RXSWIN handling and code verification as outside ISO 24089.
- Suppliers assuming the standard is OEM-only. The scope names suppliers; tailoring has to be documented with a rationale.
- Confusing installation with activation. Logs and user notices should say which step failed.
- Keeping configuration data per model, not per vehicle. Campaigns resolve recipients one vehicle at a time.
Where should you start?
Read Clause 3 before anything else— the terms (condition, recipient, safe vehicle state, in-vehicle resource, software update campaign) are precisely defined and used consistently. Separate organizational process work (Clause 4) from per-project work (Clause 5)— governance, audit cadence and supporting processes exist once; a plan, tailoring rationale and interoperability check happen for every update project. Decide what lives in infrastructure vs. on-vehicle early— Clauses 6 and 7 require the same four capability groups, and many requirements allow either location or both. Treat the package and the campaign as separate work products— Clause 8's verification and release approval happen before Clause 9's campaign preparation starts. Use UNECE's mapping table as your audit index— for each R156 paragraph, file the ISO 24089 work product that answers it, and close the listed gaps with other standards.
SoftWSP can help with one input to Clauses 6 to 8: it extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches the components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report that an engineer reviews. That supports the software-identification and pre-release vulnerability check for a package. It does not verify signatures, manage campaigns or re-match each new release automatically; see Device & Firmware Security and the firmware SBOM guide.
This guide summarises ISO's own published preview text of ISO 24089:2023, its catalogue record, UNECE's R156 interpretation documents and independent secondary analysis of the standard; it is not a substitute for the purchased ISO text and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is ISO 24089?
ISO 24089:2023, "Road vehicles — Software update engineering," is an International Standard published in February 2023 by ISO/TC 22/SC 32 (Road Vehicles, Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects), drafted by working group SC 32/WG 12 on software update. Per its own Clause 1 scope text, it "specifies requirements and recommendations for software update engineering for road vehicles on both the organizational and the project level," applying to "vehicles, vehicle systems, ECUs, infrastructure, and the assembly and deployment of software update packages after the initial development." It is deliberately solution-neutral: the scope text states plainly that "this document does not prescribe specific technologies or solutions for software update engineering," and that developing the vehicle-function software itself, other than the update engineering around it, is out of scope.
What do the standard's clauses actually cover?
Per the published table of contents, after Clause 3 (terms and definitions), the normative content runs: Clause 4, Organizational level (governance, continuous improvement, information sharing, supporting processes such as document/configuration/requirements/quality management, and auditing); Clause 5, Project level (project management, tailoring and rationale, interoperability, integrity); Clause 6, Infrastructure level (managing risk, vehicle configuration information, communicating campaign information, processing update packages); Clause 7, Vehicle and vehicle systems level (the same four requirement groups as Clause 6, applied on-vehicle); Clause 8, Software update package (identifying targets and contents, assembling, verifying/validating, and approving the package for release); and Clause 9, Software update campaign (preparation, execution and completion). Each clause ends with a "Work products" subclause listing the records that clause expects an organization to produce.
How does ISO 24089 relate to UN Regulation No. 156 (UN R156)?
UN R156 is the binding type-approval law: it requires a certified Software Update Management System (SUMS) but, as a regulation, does not spell out engineering-level process steps. ISO 24089's own Introduction frames the gap it fills: in-vehicle software is now updated both in a workshop and automatically over-the-air, and "the establishment and application of software update engineering is important to ensure software quality, cybersecurity, and safety" as update frequency increases. In practice, manufacturers use ISO 24089 as one way to build and evidence the SUMS processes that a UN R156 type-approval audit checks, in the same relationship ISO/SAE 21434 has to UN R155's CSMS. See [UN R155, UN R156 and ISO/SAE 21434 explained](/guides/automotive-cybersecurity-un-r155-r156/) for the regulation's own legal text and EU mandatory dates; no independently confirmed formal citation of ISO 24089 inside the UN R156 legal text itself was found in the sources checked for this guide, so your type-approval authority is the authoritative source to confirm any claim of automatic legal equivalence.
Which other standards does ISO 24089 depend on?
Clause 2 (Normative references) lists exactly three: ISO 26262-6 (Road vehicles — Functional safety — Part 6: Product development at the software level), ISO 26262-8 (Road vehicles — Functional safety — Part 8: Supporting processes), and ISO/SAE 21434 (Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering). Several of ISO 24089's own term definitions are explicitly sourced from these documents — for example, its "cybersecurity" and "cybersecurity risk" definitions are marked as modified from ISO/SAE 21434:2021, and its "functional safety" and "functional safety risk" definitions as modified from ISO 26262-1:2018. A presentation by NIST's Suzanne Lightman at an October 2022 UPTANE working session (reviewing the then-draft text) summarized the organizational-level intent as: the combination of these three normative standards "should ensure that all code and hardware is developed with proper attention to safety and cybersecurity" before any update engineering work begins.
What changed in the 2024 amendment, and is the base standard still current?
ISO 24089:2023/Amd 1:2024 is the one published amendment to date, per the ISO catalogue. Public summaries describe two changes: a new definition for "tool" (devices that enable software update operations, such as a laptop or vehicle diagnostic device used in a workshop) added to the terminology clause, and a strengthened integrity requirement in clause 5.3.4 calling for organizations to establish, implement and maintain processes that preserve the integrity of software, metadata and update packages during distribution. This guide describes the amendment from secondary summaries rather than the amendment's own purchased text; the amendment document itself is the authoritative source for the exact clause wording. The base 2023 edition plus its 2024 amendment remain the current, in-force text — no second edition has been announced.
Sources
- ISO: ISO 24089:2023 — Road vehicles — Software update engineering (catalogue record: first edition, ISO/TC 22/SC 32)
- ISO 24089:2023 — Document Preview (foreword, introduction, scope, normative references, table of contents; iTeh Standards sample PDF, reproduced here under ISO's short-quotation allowance)
- ISO: ISO 24089:2023/Amd 1:2024 — Amendment 1 (catalogue record)
- Suzanne Lightman (NIST): "ISO 24089 (and a Little Bit of SAE/ISO 21434)", presented to the UPTANE project, October 2022
- UN Regulation No. 156 (software update and software updates management system), as incorporated in EU law, EUR-Lex
- ISO/SAE 21434:2021, Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering, ISO standard catalogue
- UNECE (GRVA): Proposal for amendments to the Interpretation Document for UN Regulation No. 156, ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2025/45 (adds section 6, Link with ISO 24089:2023)
- UNECE: Proposal for the 01 series of amendments to UN Regulation No. 156, ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2025/142
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2236 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/858 as regards software update, EUR-Lex
- iTeh Standards catalogue: ISO 24089:2023/Amd 1:2024 (publication date, summary of changes)
- Uptane Standard for Design and Implementation 2.1.0
- IETF RFC 9124: A Manifest Information Model for Firmware Updates in Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
- NIST SP 800-193: Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines
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