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IEC 62443-4-2: the four component types and ISASecure CSA certification, explained

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IEC 62443-4-2:2019, "Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components," is the component-level part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series: a 192-page first edition published 27 February 2019, per the IEC's own standard catalogue entry. Rather than treat "a component" as one undifferentiated thing, the certification scheme built directly on top of it — ISASecure's Component Security Assurance (CSA) program — classifies every component into exactly one of four defined types before any assessment begins: software application, embedded device, host device, or network device. This guide works from IEC's own catalogue scope text and ISASecure's published CSA scope, not a third-party paraphrase of the paywalled clause text.

Key takeaways

  • A product is not limited to one type on its certificate.
  • Four documents fix what "IEC 62443-4-2 compliant" means on a given day, so record the version of each in your technical file and in customer answers.
  • IEC 62443-4-2's own catalogue scope states it "provides detailed technical control system component requirements (CRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs)...
  • Each FR turns into a question an assessor will ask about your component, and the answer is evidence you either already hold or must produce.

The four component types

ISASecure's CSA scheme, which certifies products against IEC 62443-4-2 and IEC 62443-4-1 together, publishes these exact definitions as part of its scope:

Component type Definition (ISASecure CSA scope)
Software Application "One or more software programs and their dependencies that are used to interface with the process or the control system itself."
Embedded Device "Special purpose device running embedded software designed to directly monitor, control or actuate an industrial process."
Host Device "General purpose device running an operating system (for example Microsoft Windows OS or Linux) capable of hosting one or more software applications."
Network Device "Device that facilitates data flow between devices, or restricts the flow of data, but may not directly interact with a control process."

In practice: a PLC or an RTU firmware image is usually an embedded device; a historian or engineering-workstation application running on Windows is a software application running on a host device; a managed Ethernet switch or industrial firewall is a network device. Getting the classification right matters because the detailed component requirements (CRs) that IEC 62443-4-2 applies differ by type — a network device is not expected to meet every requirement written for a general-purpose host, and vice versa.

A product is not limited to one type on its certificate. The CSA scheme page counts a product as a component if it "satisfies one or more of the definitions", and gives certificate wording such as "ISASecure CSA Capability Security Level 2 (Embedded Device, Network Device)". A controller with a built-in managed switch can therefore be assessed against both sets of requirements. Each function is still classified on its own, which is why classification is the first step of any project.

Which documents and dates should a component maker track?

Four documents fix what "IEC 62443-4-2 compliant" means on a given day, so record the version of each in your technical file and in customer answers.

Document Version and date (read 10 November 2026) What it fixes
IEC 62443-4-2 Edition 1.0, published 27 February 2019, 192 pages, August 2022 corrigendum included, catalogue stability date 2027 The CRs, their requirement enhancements and the SL-C definitions
IEC 62443-4-1 Edition 1.0, published 15 January 2018 The development process behind the component
ISASecure CSA Version 1.0.0, effective 28 August 2019; it subsumed the earlier EDSA programme for embedded devices How an accredited certification body tests the component
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI M/606 work programme Version V1, 2 April 2025 Lists EN IEC 62443-4-2:2019/prAA, a European amendment for the Cyber Resilience Act, assigned to CLC/TC 65X WG 3

The same work programme also lists "EN 62443-5-XX" security profiles based on IEC 62443 for several CRA product categories, among them routers, modems and switches, firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems, network management systems and VPN products. For a network-device maker those profiles may become more specific than 4-2 itself; their dates are tracked in our M/606 guide.

Where do the four component types sit in the wider standard?

IEC 62443-4-2's own catalogue scope states it "provides detailed technical control system component requirements (CRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs)... and defines security capability levels for control system components (SL-C)." Those seven FRs — identification and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, and resource availability — are the same seven that organise the system-level standard, IEC 62443-3-3; 4-2 is ISA's own description of how that system-level bar gets mapped down onto an individual component, type by type. The CR text itself, and exactly how many CRs and requirement enhancements (REs) apply to each of the four component types, sits behind the paywalled standard — treat any specific count you see quoted elsewhere as unverified until checked against the purchased document. The process side sits in a separate part, IEC 62443-4-1, and the wider OT security context in our NIST SP 800-82 guide.

What does each foundational requirement ask a component to show?

Each FR turns into a question an assessor will ask about your component, and the answer is evidence you either already hold or must produce. The table is our practical reading at FR level, written with embedded and network devices in mind; it is not the CR text, for which you need the purchased standard.

Foundational requirement Question for the component Example evidence
FR 1 Identification and authentication control Can every human user, software process and device that talks to it be identified and authenticated? Account model, handling of default credentials, password or certificate settings, test results
FR 2 Use control Once authenticated, is each user limited to what they are allowed to do? Role and permission matrix, session lock, audit of privileged actions
FR 3 System integrity Can it detect or prevent tampering with its software, configuration and data? Signed firmware and update verification, boot integrity design, input validation tests
FR 4 Data confidentiality Is sensitive data protected at rest and in transit? Protocols and cipher suites in use, key storage design, secure erase on decommissioning
FR 5 Restricted data flow Can it support zone and conduit separation? Interface list, services that can be disabled, filtering functions on network devices
FR 6 Timely response to events Does it record security events and make them available? Audit log content and export (for example syslog), log storage limits
FR 7 Resource availability Does it keep its essential function under load or partial failure? Rate-limiting behaviour, robustness test results, backup and restore procedure

Two things change the picture per type. First, an embedded device or a network device will answer some questions with "handled by the surrounding system" or "not applicable", and whether that answer is acceptable depends on the requirement text for that component type in the purchased standard. Second, almost every row also produces CRA evidence: Annex I Part I, point (2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 asks for protection from unauthorised access (d), confidentiality (e) and integrity (f) of data, protection of essential functions including against denial-of-service attacks (h), and recording of relevant internal activity (l). The side-by-side view is in IEC 62443-4-2 vs the CRA.

How ISASecure CSA actually certifies a component

CSA is a named, accredited certification scheme — IEC 62443-4-2 is not self-certifying. Per the scheme's own published scope, CSA runs four distinct assessment elements:

Element Full name What it checks
SDLPA-C Security Development Lifecycle Process Assessment for components The supplier's development process against IEC 62443-4-1
SDA-C Security Development Artifacts for components The documentation the SDLPA-C process produced
FSA-C Functional Security Assessment for components The component's actual technical security capabilities against IEC 62443-4-2's CRs
VIT-C Vulnerability Identification Testing for components Known vulnerabilities in the component as submitted

CSA "defines four certification levels for a component, offering increasing levels of security assurance," covering capability security levels 1 through 4 — higher levels demand more rigorous functional security requirements under FSA-C. A certificate states the component type (one of the four above) and the capability security level achieved; it is evidence of what the component can natively provide, not a guarantee of how it performs once integrated into a specific zone with its own target security level (SL-T). See IEC 62443-3-3 for the SL-T/SL-C/SL-A distinction, which carries over unchanged from system to component level.

What changes between capability security levels 1 and 4?

Only the functional assessment grows with the level; the process checks stay the same. The CSA scheme page states:

  • SDLPA-C has no level. The development process is assessed against IEC 62443-4-1 and the result is an SDLA process certification, which can be reused for later products.
  • SDA-C and VIT-C are the same at every level, "with the exception of allowable residual risk for known security issues."
  • FSA-C "incorporates more requirements at higher levels", following the requirements IEC 62443-4-2 assigns to each capability security level. The FSA-C test specification is ISASecure document CSA-311.
  • Level n includes the process standard. Certification at level n means meeting the 4-2 requirements for that level, "which includes a requirement for compliance to ISA/IEC 62443-4-1."
  • The process certificate must cover future updates. Per the SDLA page, a supplier needs an SDLA certification of a process "that applies to development of product updates going forward" to hold a product certificate.

The CSA page also lists an annual registration fee of USD 1,200 per component or USD 1,500 per product family (read 10 November 2026); the assessment itself is carried out by an ISO/IEC 17065 accredited certification body. Choose the level from the target levels (SL-T) your customers set for the zones the component goes into, not from the highest level you could reach.

Worked example: how would a synthetic industrial gateway be scoped?

Synthetic example: "GW-200" is not a real product or customer. GW-200 is a DIN-rail gateway running embedded Linux. It reads Modbus RTU from field devices, publishes data over OPC UA and MQTT to the plant network, and has a web configuration page and a two-port managed switch. Two integrator customers ask for SL-C 2.

  1. Classify each functionProtocol conversion and switching move data between devices without controlling the process, which fits the network device definition. GW-200 runs no customer applications, so it is not a host device. If a later model added a soft PLC that drives outputs, embedded device would be added to the scope.
  2. Set the level from customer demandThe integrators' zone risk assessments set SL-T 2 for the conduit GW-200 sits on, so the maker targets SL-C 2 and records that reasoning.
  3. Build the evidence index by CSA elementSDLPA-C and SDA-C: the documented development process and its outputs for this product (threat model, security requirements, test reports). FSA-C: the FR table above, answered against the network-device requirements. VIT-C: the maker's own known-vulnerability results.
  4. Run a known-vulnerability pass before the lab doesGenerate a firmware SBOM from the shipped image and match each component against NVD, CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS (how to rank the results). In this synthetic case an old BusyBox and an old OpenSSL build carry published CVEs; they are upgraded, or their exposure is documented, before submission.
  5. Check the CRA class in parallelUnder CRA Article 7(1), a product is "important" if it has the core functionality of an Annex III category. The maker records whether switching is GW-200's core functionality; if it were, class I point 12 ("routers, modems intended for the connection to the internet, and switches") would apply. See CRA Annex III and IV.

Takeaway. The CSA certificate and CRA conformity are separate outcomes built from largely the same evidence. Keep one evidence index and reference it from both files.

Practical steps for component makers

  1. Classify your product firstDecide whether it is a software application, embedded device, host device, or network device before scoping any gap assessment — the applicable CRs differ by type, and most of the confusion in self-assessments comes from skipping this step.
  2. Use CSA's four assessment elements as your evidence index, even if you are not pursuing certification: SDLPA-C and SDA-C map to your development-process paperwork, FSA-C to your component's actual technical controls, and VIT-C to your own vulnerability-scanning results.
  3. Don't assume a capability level claim without a certificate or the purchased standard behind itA vendor datasheet stating "SL-C 2" is only as credible as the evidence or accredited certification backing it.
  4. Treat IEC 62443-4-2 as engineering evidence for the CRA and EN 18031, not a substitute for themSee IEC 62443-4-2 vs the Cyber Resilience Act and EN 18031 for where the mechanisms overlap and where EU law still demands separate process work (SBOM, disclosure policy, 24-hour reporting).

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Classifying by marketing name. "Smart edge gateway" is not a component type; the four definitions are.
  • One SL-C number for the whole product. Capability levels are defined per FR, so a single figure on a datasheet hides where the gaps are. State the FRs and the certificate or assessment behind each claim.
  • Treating VIT-C as a one-off. A component that passed two years ago now has newer published CVEs in the same libraries; the certificate does not monitor them for you.
  • Leaving 4-1 to the end. CSA needs SDLPA-C, and an SDLA certifier wants artifacts from products already built under the documented process.
  • Assuming the IEC text is the EU text. The prAA amendment in the M/606 programme exists because the European version for the CRA may differ from IEC 62443-4-2:2019.
  • Mixing component and system claims. The IEC abstract puts SL-T and SL-A out of scope of 4-2, so a component certificate says nothing about a customer's zone.

SoftWSP maps a component's existing security evidence against IEC 62443-4-2's four component types and the CSA assessment elements, and flags gaps before a certification submission or CRA conformity assessment: see machine builders. For the known-vulnerability step, SoftWSP extracts a firmware SBOM as CycloneDX JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a report that cites each source for an engineer to review: see device firmware security.

This guide quotes the IEC's publicly available standard catalogue entry and ISASecure's published CSA certification scope; it is not a substitute for the purchased standard and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What does IEC 62443-4-2 cover?

IEC 62443-4-2:2019, officially titled "Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components," sets technical component requirements (CRs) organised under the ISA/IEC 62443 series' seven foundational requirements, and defines component-level capability security levels (SL-C). It was published 27 February 2019 as a 192-page first edition, per the IEC's own standard catalogue entry, and sits in the "Component" group of the series alongside 62443-4-1 (the secure product-development process standard).

What are the four component types IEC 62443-4-2 defines?

Per the ISASecure Component Security Assurance (CSA) certification scheme's own scope, which certifies directly against IEC 62443-4-2: a Software Application ("one or more software programs and their dependencies that are used to interface with the process or the control system itself"); an Embedded Device ("special purpose device running embedded software designed to directly monitor, control or actuate an industrial process"); a Host Device ("general purpose device running an operating system (for example Microsoft Windows OS or Linux) capable of hosting one or more software applications"); and a Network Device ("device that facilitates data flow between devices, or restricts the flow of data, but may not directly interact with a control process"). Every certified component is classified as exactly one of these four before assessment starts.

What is ISASecure CSA certification and how does it test a component?

CSA (Component Security Assurance) is the ISASecure certification scheme built specifically on IEC 62443-4-2 and IEC 62443-4-1. Per the scheme's own published scope, it runs four assessment elements: SDLPA-C (Security Development Lifecycle Process Assessment for components, checking the development process against 62443-4-1), SDA-C (Security Development Artifacts for components, checking the documentation produced by that process), FSA-C (Functional Security Assessment for components, checking the component's actual technical security capabilities against 62443-4-2's CRs), and VIT-C (Vulnerability Identification Testing for components, checking for known vulnerabilities). The scheme "defines four certification levels for a component, offering increasing levels of security assurance," covering capability security levels 1 through 4.

What are capability security levels (SL-C) in IEC 62443-4-2?

SL-C is the security level a component can natively provide, as distinct from SL-T (the target level an asset owner's risk assessment sets for a zone, defined in ISA-62443-3-2) and SL-A (what a deployed system actually achieves). See our [IEC 62443-3-3 guide](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/) for the full SL-T/SL-C/SL-A distinction, which applies the same way at component level. ISASecure's CSA scheme certifies a component at one of four capability security levels (1-4), with higher levels requiring more rigorous functional security requirements; the exact clause-by-clause CR text and requirement enhancement (RE) counts per level sit behind the paywalled IEC 62443-4-2 standard itself, so a vendor's own level claim should be checked against the purchased document or an ISASecure certificate, not a summary.

How does IEC 62443-4-2 relate to the CRA and EN 18031?

IEC 62443-4-2 is a voluntary IACS component standard, not an EU legal instrument, and it does not currently give presumption of conformity with either the Cyber Resilience Act or EN 18031 under the RED delegated act. See [IEC 62443-4-2 vs the Cyber Resilience Act and EN 18031](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-vs-cra/) for the mechanism-by-mechanism comparison and what each EU instrument still requires on top of it.

Sources

  1. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Security for industrial automation and control systems, Part 4-2
  2. ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
  3. ISASecure: IEC 62443 Component Security Assurance (CSA) Certification — scope, component types, assessment elements
  4. ISASecure: IEC 62443 SDLA Certification — scope and link to product certification
  5. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-4-1:2018 — Secure product development lifecycle requirements
  6. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI: M/606 work programme for the Cyber Resilience Act, version V1, 2 April 2025
  7. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), EUR-Lex
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IEC 62443-4-2: the four component types and ISASecure CSA certification, explained