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Medical & regulated devices

IMDRF N70: principles and practices for legacy medical device cybersecurity

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A connected infusion pump, imaging workstation or implant programmer does not stop being used just because its manufacturer can no longer reasonably protect it against today's threats. IMDRF N70, "Principles and Practices for the Cybersecurity of Legacy Medical Devices" (IMDRF/CYBER WG/N70FINAL:2023, published 11 April 2023), is the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's guidance for exactly that situation: it defines what "legacy" means in cybersecurity terms and sets out what manufacturers and healthcare providers should each do once a device reaches that status.

Key takeaways

  • A connected infusion pump, imaging workstation or implant programmer does not stop being used just because its manufacturer can no longer reasonably protect it against today's threats.
  • A 10-year-old device that still receives timely security patches and runs on an architecture that supports modern authentication and encryption is not "legacy" under this definition, even though it is old.
  • N70 (§5) splits the cybersecurity life of a device into four stages, and responsibility shifts from the medical device manufacturer (MDM) to the healthcare provider (HCP) as the device moves through them.
  • Maintain a current software inventory (the SBOM concept N73 details) so that when a component-level vulnerability surfaces, the manufacturer can tell quickly which fielded devices are affected.

Where N70 comes from

N70 is a direct follow-on to IMDRF's N60 guidance, "Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity," which introduced the Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) framing and first raised the legacy-device concept without fully operationalising it. Per IMDRF's own published development timeline, N70 and its companion SBOM document N73 both went through public consultation in 2022 and were finalised together in April 2023 — N70 on 11 April and N73 two days later — reflecting that legacy-device risk assessment and software transparency are treated as two parts of the same problem.

What is the cybersecurity-specific definition of "legacy"?

IMDRF's definition is narrower and more specific than everyday usage of "legacy equipment." N70's definitions section (§3.19) calls a legacy medical device one "that cannot be reasonably protected against current cybersecurity threats." This is a statement about whether the device can be secured, not a statement about its age or whether the manufacturer still sells it:

  • A 10-year-old device that still receives timely security patches and runs on an architecture that supports modern authentication and encryption is not "legacy" under this definition, even though it is old.
  • A device still within its advertised support window could in principle meet the definition if its underlying platform — an unsupported operating system version, for example — cannot be reasonably brought up to current security expectations without a redesign.

N70 keeps that idea apart from two dates the manufacturer sets. End of Life (EOL) is the point when the manufacturer no longer sells the product beyond its useful life, after a formal EOL process that includes notifying users (§3.13). End of Support (EOS) is the point when the manufacturer "terminates all service support activities" (§3.14). EOL starts the Limited Support stage and EOS starts the EOS stage, which is where the calendar and legacy status usually meet.

This framing is deliberately about risk management, not end-of-life paperwork: it tells a manufacturer or a hospital that the question to ask is "can this be reasonably protected," not just "is it still sold."

What are N70's four life cycle stages?

N70 (§5) splits the cybersecurity life of a device into four stages, and responsibility shifts from the medical device manufacturer (MDM) to the healthcare provider (HCP) as the device moves through them.

Stage A device is in this stage when Manufacturer Healthcare provider
1. Development It is still pre-market Security by design: risk assessment, threat modelling, security testing, product security documentation Feeds clinical and security needs back to the manufacturer
2. Support It is used for patient care, is on the market, and all major software, firmware and programmable hardware components are supported by their suppliers Full cybersecurity support: patches, software and hardware updates, coordinated vulnerability disclosure Baseline controls, asset inventory, requests the SBOM and EOL/EOS dates
3. Limited Support It has been declared EOL, or it contains unsupported components whose risks are mitigated so it can still be reasonably protected Keeps supporting where possible, for example by applying third-party patches; publishes its support status Adds compensating controls such as network controls; prepares for EOS
4. EOS It has been declared EOS, or unsupported components leave risks unmitigated so it cannot be reasonably protected Public EOS notice, information the provider needs to maintain security alone, decommissioning information Carries the primary cybersecurity responsibility; decommissions or accepts the risk

Source: IMDRF N70 §5.1–5.4 and §6–9, condensed.

N70 §4.1 describes Limited Support as a transitional period for the two parties to prepare, and EOS as "the time point where the responsibility for cybersecurity of a medical device is primarily transferred to the HCP." It also accepts that the clinical life of a device often outlasts its supportability.

When does one unsupported component change the stage?

Not automatically. N70's trigger framework for sudden component EOL/EOS declarations (§5.5) asks for a risk assessment first:

  1. A component reaches EOL or EOSThat triggers a risk assessment of whether patient safety risks arise.
  2. No safety impact:the device stays in its current stage, and users are told the component has reached EOL/EOS.
  3. Safety impact, device in Support:mitigate with an update or design change that replaces the component. If the device can then be reasonably protected without unsupported components, it stays in Support. If the mitigation still relies on unsupported components, the device moves to Limited Support and the move is communicated publicly; N70 calls that kind of mitigation a last resort.
  4. Safety impact, device in Limited Support:mitigate with a design change or a compensating control. If the device can still be reasonably protected it stays; if not, it moves to EOS, again with a public notice.

When a component's support end is known at design time, N70 expects the plan to be in the design already, and it notes that the component's EOS date may be recorded in the SBOM.

What N70 asks manufacturers to do

Per IMDRF's TPLC structure, N70's manufacturer-facing recommendations run across the device life cycle rather than treating legacy status as a problem only at end of life:

  • Plan for eventual legacy status during design, not after a device is already unsupportable — architecture choices made at the premarket stage determine how long a device can realistically stay "not legacy."
  • Maintain a current software inventory (the SBOM concept N73 details) so that when a component-level vulnerability surfaces, the manufacturer can tell quickly which fielded devices are affected.
  • Communicate transition plans clearly to healthcare providers and regulators as a device approaches legacy status, rather than leaving users to discover the fact when a report goes unanswered.
  • Coordinate disclosure and compensating controls for devices already past the point of a code-level fix, since a legacy device by definition cannot simply be patched back into a secure state.

What should a manufacturer communicate, and when?

Early, and actively. N70 §4.2 asks that information be pushed to the other party, or that the other party be actively told it is available; making documents passively available without notification "should be avoided where possible."

Moment What N70 recommends the manufacturer provide N70 section
Procurement and installation MDS2, SBOM, security test summaries or third-party certifications, customer security documentation, and EOL/EOS dates if available 7.1.1
Lead time Life cycle milestones as far in advance as possible; current practice is at least 2 years, and the transfer of responsibility starts about 2–3 years before EOS 7.1.1, 7.3.1
A third-party component loses support Track component support status, assess the new risk, communicate risks and mitigations 7.1.1
Approaching EOL (entering Limited Support) A customer notification plus a permanently available public notice of support status; updated documentation of compensating controls such as firewalls, VPNs and network isolation 8.1.1
Entering EOS The responsibilities the provider takes over, support available beyond EOS, the upgrade path, decommissioning information, and a public EOS notice 9.1.1

For each life cycle notice, N70 lists what to name: the affected device, its operating system(s), the deployed version, the software components, the expected date of service changes, the extent of maintenance after those changes, and additional compensating controls. The MDS2 form and an SBOM cover much of the procurement-stage list.

What N70 asks healthcare providers to do

The healthcare-provider side of N70 assumes the hospital or clinic did not design the device and cannot fix its underlying architecture, so its recommendations focus on risk management around a legacy device rather than remediation of it:

  • Inventory which fielded devices are in legacy status, which depends on the manufacturer's own transparency about which products meet the definition.
  • Apply compensating controls — network segmentation, access restriction, monitoring — around devices that cannot themselves be secured further.
  • Factor legacy status into procurement and replacement planning, treating a device's realistic security lifespan as a purchasing criterion, not only its clinical function or purchase price.
  • Coordinate with the manufacturer on any available mitigations rather than assuming a lack of a patch means no action is possible.

Before running a device past EOS, N70 §8.2.2 gives providers a question list, including whether the device can operate beneficially without a network connection, what the risk to patients would be if it or the organisation were compromised through it, and whether the provider has the tools, money and expertise to keep it secure.

How this lines up with FDA's own framework

FDA's postmarket cybersecurity guidance addresses legacy devices directly, and secondary analysis of FDA's guidance footnotes describes FDA as sourcing its own legacy-device definition from IMDRF's work — FDA and Health Canada co-chaired the IMDRF working group that produced N60 and N70. That said, FDA continues to publish its own separate premarket and postmarket guidance documents under Section 524B rather than incorporating N70 by reference, so a US submission should still be checked against FDA's own current guidance text, with IMDRF's N70 as the shared conceptual background rather than a substitute citation.

Which FDA and EU MDR documents carry N70's expectations?

N70 binds no one on its own; its expectations reach a manufacturer through each regulator's documents. The FDA premarket guidance of February 2026 and the EU MDR cover most of them:

N70 expectation FDA premarket guidance (February 2026) EU MDR and MDCG guidance
Know each component's support status V.A.4: for every SBOM component, its level of support and its end-of-support date Annex I 17.2: software developed to the state of the art, including risk management and information security
Announce EOS and transfer risk in an orderly way VI.A: labeling with end-of-support and end-of-life information and "a pre-established and pre-communicated process for transferring the risks" Annex I 23.4(ab): instructions for use state the minimum IT security measures needed to run the software
Transfer risk only with full information V.A: risk transfer only when all relevant risk information is known, assessed and communicated, including at end of support Annex I Section 4: inform users of any residual risks
Avoid unsupported components in the field V.A.4: consider source code access in purchasing controls if a supplier's support ends before the device's MDCG 2019-16 rev. 1: avoid end-of-life third-party components in the operating environment, or isolate them
Decommission securely VI.A: information on sanitising the device of sensitive data and software Annex I Section 3: risk management over the entire lifecycle

The FDA premarket cybersecurity guide and the EU MDR Annex I guide cover the rest of each file.

Worked example: what happens when an embedded OS reaches end of support?

Synthetic example: the product, versions and dates are invented to show the N70 steps.

A manufacturer sells a ward gateway that forwards alarm and vital-sign data from bedside monitors to a central station. It launched in 2024 with an announced EOS of 2034. In March 2027, the vendor of its embedded Linux distribution announces that the release the gateway uses loses support in March 2028.

  1. Find the affected unitsThe SBOM for each firmware version shows the release in firmware 2.x and 3.0; firmware 3.1 already uses a supported release.
  2. Assess the safety impact (§5.5)Unpatched network services on a device that carries alarm data could delay alarms, so a patient safety impact cannot be ruled out.
  3. Mitigate while in SupportFirmware 3.2 moves every unit with hardware revision B to the supported release. Those units stay in Support.
  4. Handle what cannot moveHardware revision A has too little flash for the new release. Its mitigation relies on the unsupported OS plus network isolation, so revision A moves to Limited Support. The manufacturer publishes a support-status notice and sends customers the N70 notice items: device, OS, deployed version, components, date of service change, maintenance after it, and compensating controls (an allow-list of ports, a dedicated VLAN).
  5. Set the end date earlyRevision A gets an EOS date more than 2 years out, and the transfer-of-responsibility talks start at once.
  6. Update the regulatory fileThe SBOM level-of-support and EOS fields, the labeling or instructions for use, and the risk management file are updated for both markets.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Treating EOS, age or "no longer sold" as the same as legacy. The test is whether the device can still be reasonably protected.
  • Passive communication. A notice that sits on a portal without any outreach is what N70 asks manufacturers to avoid.
  • Relying only on firewalls and segmentation. N70 §7.2.1 says the manufacturer should avoid relying solely on them, because doing so may affect patient care and clinical integrations.
  • Tracking the device's dates but not its components'. Component EOL/EOS dates are rarely in sync with the device's (§5.5).
  • Forgetting the second-hand market. N70's public notices exist partly so resellers and second-hand buyers can see a device's support status.
  • Assuming all duties end at EOS. N70 §9.2.1 notes that post-market duties set by each jurisdiction still apply after EOS.

What manufacturers and providers should do now

  1. Apply IMDRF's cybersecurity-specific "legacy" test, not an age or support-window proxy, to each fielded product line: can it still be reasonably protected against current threats, or not.
  2. Plan the transition communication before a device is forced into legacy status, not after a researcher reports a vulnerability the manufacturer cannot fix.
  3. Healthcare providers should treat legacy status as a procurement input, not only a security-operations problem, since the realistic security lifespan of a device affects total cost of ownership.

SoftWSP's platform extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, which gives the vulnerability input to the §5.5 risk assessment; component support status and EOS dates still come from your own supplier records. A provider can open a received SBOM in the free SBOM viewer. For the assessment work itself, see Device & Firmware Security.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is IMDRF N70?

IMDRF/CYBER WG/N70FINAL:2023, 'Principles and Practices for the Cybersecurity of Legacy Medical Devices,' is a final guidance document published by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum's Cybersecurity Working Group on 11 April 2023. It operationalises the legacy-device concept IMDRF's earlier N60 guidance introduced, with detailed recommendations for both medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers.

What counts as a 'legacy device' under IMDRF's cybersecurity definition?

IMDRF defines a legacy device, for cybersecurity purposes specifically, as a medical device that cannot be reasonably protected against current and future cybersecurity threats. This is a cybersecurity-specific definition, not a general end-of-support or old-equipment label — a device can be old without being 'legacy' in this sense if it can still be reasonably protected, and a comparatively new device could in principle meet the definition if its architecture cannot be reasonably secured.

Does N70 apply to manufacturers only, or to healthcare providers too?

Both. N70 follows N60's structure of addressing manufacturers, regulators and healthcare providers together rather than manufacturers alone. Recommendations split between what a manufacturer should do across a device's total product life cycle (TPLC) — including planning for eventual legacy status before a device ships — and what a healthcare provider operating a device already in legacy status should do to manage the resulting risk.

Did FDA adopt IMDRF's legacy-device definition?

FDA's own postmarket cybersecurity guidance cites IMDRF's N60/N70 framing directly, and secondary analysis of FDA's guidance footnotes describes FDA as sourcing its own legacy-device definition from IMDRF's work. FDA continues to publish its own separate premarket and postmarket guidance documents rather than adopting N70 verbatim, so always check FDA's current guidance text for the US-specific wording a submission must match; see FDA's postmarket cybersecurity guide for that framework.

How does N70 relate to IMDRF's SBOM guidance, N73?

N70 and N73 were developed and finalised together — both completed their public consultation in 2022 and were published as final documents on consecutive days in April 2023. N70's legacy-device risk assessment depends on knowing what software a device actually runs, which is exactly what N73's SBOM guidance addresses; see our dedicated guide to N73 for the SBOM side of this pair.

Sources

  1. IMDRF: Principles and Practices for the Cybersecurity of Legacy Medical Devices (N70, document page)
  2. IMDRF/CYBER WG/N70FINAL:2023 — full PDF
  3. IMDRF: Medical Device Cybersecurity Working Group — Strategic Plan progress report (N78), legacy/SBOM document timeline
  4. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices — Frequently Asked Questions (Section 524B)
  5. FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices — Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (guidance, February 2026), Sections V.A, V.A.4 and VI.A
  6. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices (EU MDR), Annex I Sections 3, 4, 17.2 and 23.4(ab)
  7. MDCG 2019-16 rev. 1: Guidance on Cybersecurity for medical devices (July 2020), operating-environment measures
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IMDRF N70: principles and practices for legacy medical device cybersecurity