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OT/ICS security

PROFINET protocol security: the DCP weakness behind a decade of CISA advisories

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PROFINET is the Ethernet-based industrial communication protocol PI (PROFIBUS & PROFINET International) maintains for real-time factory-floor control, and its Discovery and Configuration Protocol (DCP) — which has no built-in authentication — sits behind CISA advisories ICSA-21-194-03 and ICSA-18-079-02; together with ICSA-19-283-02, a UDP-flood flaw in the same devices, these three advisories, first published from 2018 to 2021, list 521 affected Siemens product entries in CISA's current files. PI has answered the authentication gap with three hierarchical Security Classes since 2019, but all three CISA findings are packet-handling and resource bugs that sit below that layer — meaning Security Class support, even fully implemented, does not close them; only vendor-patched firmware does.

Security Class descriptions below come from PI's 27 November 2019 press release and its two security pages (profibus.com and profinet.com), not from the member-only specification PDFs. Advisory facts and product counts come from CISA's machine-readable CSAF files, read on 12 November 2026.

Key takeaways

  • Security Class descriptions below come from PI's 27 November 2019 press release and its two security pages (profibus.com and profinet.com), not from the member-only specification PDFs.
  • DCP frames ride directly on Ethernet with EtherType 0x8892, the type IEEE assigned to PROFINET, so they never carry an IP header.
  • PI published its first PROFINET security advisory, PISA-001 "Improper Access Control for DCP Services", on 26 March 2024, and as of 12 November 2026 it is the only entry on PI's security advisories page.
  • Source: cisagov CSAF files (ICSA-21-194-03 JSON and the two siblings), counted by product-name entry, read 12 November 2026.

Why does DCP have no authentication, by design?

PROFINET was built for deterministic, low-latency communication between controllers and field devices on the plant floor — a goal that, like Modbus and DNP3 before it, left authentication out of the original design entirely. The Discovery and Configuration Protocol, the piece of PROFINET that lets an engineering workstation find devices on the network and assign them names and IP addresses, runs at Ethernet Layer 2 with no credential check: any station that can send DCP frames can discover, and in some configurations reconfigure, devices on the segment. PI's own security page acknowledges this is a longstanding, known gap — its PROFINET Security Guideline has existed since November 2013, and PI states the guideline "will be replaced by an updated guideline that considers the PROFINET security concept as well as the requirements of the IEC 62443," rather than a one-time fix layered onto the original protocol.

What does DCP actually do on the wire?

DCP frames ride directly on Ethernet with EtherType 0x8892, the type IEEE assigned to PROFINET, so they never carry an IP header. A two-byte FrameID says which DCP service the frame belongs to. Wireshark's PROFINET dissector (packet-pn-dcp.c) names the four services and the parameters they carry:

FrameID DCP service What it does Why it matters
0xFEFE Identify request Asks every station on the segment, or one by name, to answer Any host on the cell can list every device
0xFEFF Identify response Each device answers with its MAC and IP parameters, NameOfStation and Device ID Gives an attacker the exact names a controller expects
0xFEFD Get / Set Reads or writes one parameter on one device Set can change NameOfStation or the IP parameter, or send "Reset Factory Settings"
0xFEFC Hello A device announces itself during fast start-up Normal at power-up; bursts from an unknown MAC are not

The cyclic I/O data that follows also runs at Layer 2 as PROFINET RT. Connection setup between controller and device uses PROFINET CM, a DCE/RPC protocol on UDP port 34964 that IANA registers as profinet-cm. DCP Set is the risky part. A controller finds its devices by NameOfStation, so a device that loses its name drops out of the application.

What did PI's own advisory, PISA-001, say about DCP Set?

PI published its first PROFINET security advisory, PISA-001 "Improper Access Control for DCP Services", on 26 March 2024, and as of 12 November 2026 it is the only entry on PI's security advisories page. It describes exactly the DCP Set abuse above. An attacker with direct access to the PROFINET network uses "DCP-Set (NameOfStation) or DCP-Set (Reset-to-Factory)" to stop a controller from re-establishing communication with a device, and "Manual intervention by the user is required." PI scored it CVSS v3.1 6.5 (AV:A, adjacent network) with CWE-862 Missing Authorization and CWE-1314 Missing Write Protection for Parametric Data Values, and assigned no CVE.

The affected scope is broad: "All PROFINET products that do not comply to the PROFINET Security Class 1" and all protocol versions before PROFINET V2.4 MU4. The fix is in the specification, and the advisory notes that "Devices supporting the Security Classes 1 must have DCP Set disabled." For a device maker, that sentence is the test: if your product still accepts DCP Set in operation, it is in PISA-001's scope.

Which CISA advisories show what the gap costs?

Advisory (first published → latest revision) CVE CVSS v3.1 Weakness What happens Affected entries in CISA's file Entries with no fix, mitigation only
ICSA-21-194-03 (2021-07-13 → rev. 12, 2026-04-16) CVE-2020-28400 7.5 CWE-770 A large volume of DCP reset packets causes denial of service 356 9
ICSA-19-283-02 (2019-10-08 → rev. 18, 2024-07-09) CVE-2019-10936 7.5 CWE-400 A flood of specially crafted UDP packets causes denial of service 120 46
ICSA-18-079-02 (2018-03-20 → rev. 12, 2023-05-09) CVE-2018-4843 6.5 (5.3 at publication) CWE-20 A crafted DCP response to a device's own DCP request, sent from the same Ethernet segment, forces a manual restart 45 3

Source: cisagov CSAF files (ICSA-21-194-03 JSON and the two siblings), counted by product-name entry, read 12 November 2026. The Siemens originals are SSA-599968, SSA-473245 and SSA-592007.

Two of the three findings trace to how a device's DCP implementation handles malformed or high-volume protocol traffic, and the third to UDP handling in the same products, not to a credential anyone could have stolen or guessed. That is a structurally different problem than "no authentication": even a device running PI's most advanced Security Class is not automatically protected against a resource-exhaustion bug in its own packet parsing; only a vendor patch closes that specific hole. The lists also keep growing. ICSA-21-194-03 reached revision 12 five years after first publication, and 58 entries across the three files have no fixed version at all, so they depend on the network controls described below. None of the three CVEs is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Do other PROFINET stacks have the same problems?

Yes. Siemens dominates the advisory count, but the same classes of bug appear in other vendors' stacks and products:

Advisory Product CVE CVSS v3.1 Issue
ICSA-17-129-02 (2017) Siemens products with PROFINET DCP CVE-2017-2680, CVE-2017-2681 6.5 Crafted DCP packets on the local Ethernet segment cause denial of service; human interaction needed to recover
ICSA-20-042-04 (2020) Siemens PROFINET-IO (PNIO) stack before V06.00 CVE-2019-13946 7.5 Diagnostic requests to the DCE-RPC interface exhaust memory; mitigation blocks 34964/udp
VDE-2021-006 (2021) Hilscher PROFINET IO Device V3 before V3.14.0.7, in Pepperl+Fuchs products CVE-2021-20986 7.5 Loss of cyclic communication or interruption of acyclic communication
VDE-2025-056 (12 Aug 2026) Phoenix Contact PLCnext firmware CVE-2025-41769 9.8 Buffer overflow in the PROFINET service, in the default configuration; reboot or code execution
CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) Cisco IOS on Industrial Ethernet switches CVE-2017-12235 — PROFINET denial of service, listed as exploited

The Hilscher row shows why device makers should track stacks, not just their own code. One licensed PROFINET stack can sit inside many brands, and the advisory may be published under a customer's name. A firmware SBOM that names the stack and its version is how you find out. See the firmware SBOM guide.

What do PI's three Security Classes actually add?

Per PI's 27 November 2019 announcement, which draws on PI's white paper "Security Extensions for PROFINET" (itself based on IEC 62443), PI "defined three security classes: robustness, integrity and authenticity, and confidentiality":

  1. Security Class 1 (Robustness)— the measures PI named in 2019 are signing of GSD (device description) files, access controls for SNMP network management, and "a read-only function for configuration information such as the device name." It narrows what an attacker already on the network can change with DCP and GSD; it does not authenticate who is sending traffic.
  2. Security Class 2 (Integrity and Authenticity)— a cryptographically secured digital identity (e.g., certificates) for PROFINET nodes, plus cryptographic checksums so tampering with messages in transit can be detected. PI's profinet.com page adds that "The handling of certificates is required in Security Class 2 and 3," covering initial provisioning, renewal and revocation.
  3. Security Class 3 (Confidentiality)— adds encryption on top of Class 2's integrity and authenticity, including, as an optional function, confidentiality of cyclic data.

PI also co-founded a Joint Working Group with ODVA, the OPC Foundation and FieldComm Group — the bodies behind EtherNet/IP, OPC UA and HART/FOUNDATION Fieldbus. Its Industrial Security Harmonization Group (ISHG) published an FAQ paper on PKI and certificate management and two 2025 white papers, but PI's security page now says "The group is currently on hiatus." Treat it as a source of guidance papers, not of a shared specification.

What changes for device makers with PROFINET V2.5?

PROFINET specification V2.5, whose documents PI posted on 14 July 2026, is the version that, in PI's words, "introduces comprehensive security mechanisms" into the specification itself. PI's specification download page summarizes the changes:

  • A fourth document. A Security Profile (CD/IEC 61784-6-3) joins the service, protocol and profile documents.
  • Secure replacements for old protocols. CLRPC and RSI, which have no secure variant, give way to SXP over Layer 2 and Layer 3, with Secure SXP over TCP for protected communication.
  • Secure provisioning. Devices are onboarded with IDevID device identities and certificates.
  • A new Conformance Class CC-E alongside the existing classes.
  • Less legacy. SNMP becomes optional or removable, and "legacy functionality, including FactoryReset" is removed.

IANA registered two new ports for this on 10 March 2026: 34965 profinet-cm-sec ("secure connection management and key provisioning") and 34966/udp profinet-rt-sec (secure real-time data over UDP). Two documents matter on the test side. The netload robustness test, renamed "PROFINET Netload Robustness for Security" (Order No. 7.302), is part of the PROFINET test specification. PI's new "PROFINET Design Guideline Security" (Order No. 7.362) covers planning, commissioning and operation, with checklists for each.

How do you watch PROFINET traffic passively?

Start with Layer 2, because that is where DCP lives. Flow tools built on IP five-tuples, including Zeek's conn.log, never record DCP or PROFINET RT frames, since those frames carry no IP addresses. Wireshark decodes them with the pn_dcp and pn_rt dissectors. CISA's ICSNPP-PROFINET-IO-CM Zeek parser covers the IP side: it logs PROFINET CM DCE/RPC on 34964/udp to profinet_io_cm.log, though its README says "Roughly 10% of the defined protocol specification is covered." Rules worth setting on a mirror port:

  • Any DCP Set (FrameID 0xFEFD with a Set service) from a MAC that is not an engineering station. This is the PISA-001 path.
  • Any "Reset Factory Settings" Set, from anyone, outside a change window.
  • Identify requests from new MACs, or many Identify requests in a short time: someone is mapping the cell.
  • Floods of DCP frames to one device, the CVE-2020-28400 pattern.
  • New hosts talking PROFINET CM on 34964/udp, and any 34964/udp crossing a zone boundary.

What should a PROFINET device maker or plant check first?

  1. Treat every PROFINET network as if DCP has zero authentication, because by design it does notSecurity Class 1 narrows exposure; it does not add a credential check where none exists in the base protocol.
  2. Patch to the versions named in CISA's advisories firstThe CVEs above are implementation bugs in DCP and UDP packet handling. No Security Class configuration substitutes for the vendor-fixed firmware version that actually closes them, and for the 58 entries with no fix, record the compensating control you rely on.
  3. Segment before anything elseKeep PROFINET traffic inside the control network, behind an industrial DMZ, with no path from business IT or the internet. See the Purdue Model for OT/ICS network architecture for the pattern. CISA's ICSA-18-079-02 mitigation adds VPNs between cells.
  4. Restrict DCP specificallyBlock incoming DCP (EtherType 0x8892, FrameID 0xFEFE) from untrusted networks, as SSA-599968 recommends, limit DCP to the engineering workstations that need it, and disable PROFINET in products where it is optional and not used.
  5. For device makers: ship DCP Set disabled in operation, sign your GSD file, and plan certification against V2.4 MU4 or laterCheck which version of which licensed stack your firmware carries, and map the work to IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements.
  6. Check Security Class support per device, not per vendor claimPrefer Class 2 or 3 devices for new cells; for the installed base that lacks them, the network-layer controls above remain the real security model, not an interim measure.

PROFINET's DCP weakness is not a bug any one Security Class configuration can retroactively fix in deployed hardware; it is why NIST SP 800-82's OT security guidance and IEC 62443-3-3's system security requirements both treat network-level compensating controls as the baseline for legacy field protocols, PROFINET included, alongside PROFIBUS, Modbus, DNP3 and BACnet.

A passive capture is a practical way to start on steps 3 and 4 without touching a running line. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a recorded segment and lists which hosts talk to which, on which ports — PROFINET CM shows up as 34964/udp flows — plus remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. Its parsers do not decode DCP or PROFINET RT, and a capture does not show a device's order number or firmware. Once you have those from the engineering project or a component list, SoftWSP matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories, and a watchlist can alert on a Siemens product or a specific CVE. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.

This guide draws on PI's security pages, press release, PISA-001 advisory and specification download page; CISA's CSAF advisory files; Siemens ProductCERT and CERT@VDE advisories; the Wireshark PROFINET dissector; the IANA port registry; and CISA's ICSNPP parser. It is not a substitute for PI's own PROFINET Security Guideline, CISA's or Siemens' own advisories, or an engineer's assessment of a specific network.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Does PROFINET have built-in authentication or encryption?

Not by default. PROFINET — the Ethernet-based industrial communication protocol maintained by PI (PROFIBUS & PROFINET International) — was designed for real-time determinism on the factory floor, and its base specification, including the Discovery and Configuration Protocol (DCP) used to find and configure devices on the network, carries no field for a credential, a session key or a signature. Per PI's own security page, this gap is why PI has published security guidance since 2013: the original PROFINET Security Guideline (Order Nos. 7.001, 7.002, first published November 2013) covers manufacturer- and user-side technical and procedural measures, and PI states that guideline "will be replaced by an updated guideline that considers the PROFINET security concept as well as the requirements of the IEC 62443" — confirming the base protocol itself was not designed to secure itself.

What are PROFINET's three Security Classes?

Per PI's 27 November 2019 announcement, PI defined three hierarchical Security Classes for PROFINET components, drawing on IEC 62443 in a white paper titled "Security Extensions for PROFINET." Security Class 1 (Robustness) introduces access controls for network management (SNMP), "a read-only function for configuration information such as the device name", and the signing of GSD device description files; none of those measures encrypts or signs the PROFINET traffic itself. Security Class 2 (Integrity and Authenticity) adds a cryptographically secured digital identity for PROFINET nodes (e.g., certificates) and cryptographic checksums so the authenticity and integrity of communication can be verified. Security Class 3 adds confidentiality on top of Class 2's integrity and authenticity. PI's PROFINET security page states that "The handling of certificates is required in Security Class 2 and 3."

What do real, documented PROFINET security failures actually look like?

CISA's ICS advisory archive shows a recurring pattern around the Discovery and Configuration Protocol: CVE-2020-28400 (CISA ICSA-21-194-03, CVSS v3 7.5, CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) lets an unauthenticated remote attacker send a large volume of DCP reset packets to trigger denial-of-service; CISA's current advisory file lists 356 affected Siemens product entries. CVE-2019-10936 (CISA ICSA-19-283-02, CVSS v3 7.5, CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) lets an attacker flood a device with specially crafted UDP packets for the same effect, across 120 listed Siemens product entries. CVE-2018-4843 (CISA ICSA-18-079-02, CWE-20 Improper Input Validation; CVSS v3 5.3 at publication, 6.5 under CVSS v3.1) is exploitable from the same Ethernet segment: a crafted DCP response to a device's own DCP request forces a manual restart. Two of the three sit in how devices parse and respond to DCP traffic and the third in how the same devices handle UDP floods, not in any one product's otherwise-unrelated code.

Is Security Class support actually deployed, and does it stop the DCP advisories above?

PI does not publish data on how broadly Security Class 1, 2 or 3 support is actually implemented across the installed base of PROFINET devices — treat a vendor's claim of Security Class support as something to verify against that specific product's own documentation and firmware version, the same caveat that applies to Modbus Security and DNP3 Secure Authentication adoption. What is clear from the CISA advisories themselves: the DCP denial-of-service findings above are implementation-layer parsing and resource-handling bugs, not failures of cryptographic authentication — so even a device that fully implements Security Class 1's read-only DCP mode or Class 2's node authentication still needs the vendor's own patched firmware to close these specific CVEs; Security Classes compensate for a different gap (identity and integrity) than a resource-exhaustion bug in DCP packet handling.

What actually reduces PROFINET risk today?

The same compensating-control model NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3 and CISA's recommended practices apply to every unauthenticated legacy OT protocol: segment PROFINET traffic behind an industrial DMZ so it is never reachable from business IT or the internet, patch to the vendor-fixed firmware versions named in each CISA advisory, and where a switch or gateway can filter protocol traffic, block or rate-limit DCP and restrict it to the engineering workstations that actually need it. Siemens' own advisories additionally recommend blocking inbound PROFINET Discovery and Configuration Protocol traffic from untrusted networks and disabling PROFINET in products where it is optional and not used.

Sources

  1. PI (PROFIBUS & PROFINET International): PI Security — PROFINET Security Guideline, Security Classes, IEC 62443 alignment, Joint Working Group
  2. PI: Press release — "PROFINET enhanced with further security measures" (27 November 2019): Security Classes 1/2/3 and the "Security Extensions for PROFINET" white paper
  3. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-21-194-03: Siemens PROFINET Devices (Update D) — CVE-2020-28400
  4. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-19-283-02: Siemens PROFINET Devices (Update L) — CVE-2019-10936
  5. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-18-079-02: Siemens SIMATIC, SINUMERIK, and PROFINET IO (Update D) — CVE-2018-4843
  6. NIST Special Publication 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (September 2023)
  7. CISA: Recommended Practices (control systems network segmentation, defense-in-depth, minimizing network exposure)
  8. PI: PROFINET security concept, Security Classes and certificate handling (profinet.com)
  9. PI: Security advisories page — PISA-001, Improper Access Control for DCP Services (26 March 2024)
  10. PI: PROFINET specification downloads (V2.5 service, protocol, profile and Security Profile documents)
  11. cisagov CSAF: ICSA-21-194-03 machine-readable advisory (revision 12, 16 April 2026)
  12. Siemens ProductCERT SSA-599968: Denial of Service Vulnerability in Profinet Devices (CVE-2020-28400)
  13. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-17-129-02: Siemens PROFINET DCP — CVE-2017-2680, CVE-2017-2681
  14. CERT@VDE VDE-2025-056: Phoenix Contact PLCnext firmware — CVE-2025-41769 (12 August 2026)
  15. Wireshark PROFINET DCP dissector source (packet-pn-dcp.c)
  16. cisagov ICSNPP-PROFINET-IO-CM Zeek parser
  17. IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry (profinet-cm, profinet-cm-sec, profinet-rt-sec)
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PROFINET protocol security: the DCP weakness behind a decade of CISA advisories