Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

Schneider Electric Modicon UMAS protocol security: CVEs, fixed firmware and hardening for M340, M580 and M221

Last updated:

Schneider Electric Modicon UMAS protocol security starts with one fact that Cisco Talos documented in June 2019: UMAS, the engineering protocol of EcoStruxure Control Expert (formerly Unity Pro), runs inside Modbus function code 90 on TCP port 502. Schneider security notifications from 2019 to 2024 describe session brute force, spoofing and replay attacks against it on M340 and M580 controllers. Whoever reaches port 502 on an unprotected controller can try to take its reservation, read or replace the program, or stop it. Defending UMAS means updating firmware and Control Expert to the versions in Schneider's notices, setting an application password, switching on memory protection, closing unused services and segmenting port 502 so only named engineering hosts reach it.

Key takeaways

  • UMAS is the Schneider Electric protocol that Modicon engineering software uses to manage a controller, and it is carried inside ordinary Modbus TCP frames.
  • A UMAS reservation is a lock that lets one client at a time run privileged commands, and the session value that proves you hold it was too small to protect.
  • The UMAS CVE families are reservation and session weaknesses, program and configuration overwrite, man-in-the-middle tampering, and project-file credential issues.
  • The Modicon M221 is a smaller controller programmed with EcoStruxure Machine Expert - Basic (formerly SoMachine Basic), and its programming-protocol CVEs have no fixed firmware.

What is UMAS, and why does it carry engineering functions?

UMAS is the Schneider Electric protocol that Modicon engineering software uses to manage a controller, and it is carried inside ordinary Modbus TCP frames. Cisco Talos describes the M580 as speaking FTP, TFTP, HTTP, SNMP, EtherNet/IP, Modbus "and a management protocol referred to as UMAS", and lays out each request as the Modbus function code 0x5A (decimal 90), a one-byte session value and a UMAS function code. The Wireshark Modbus/TCP dissector labels function code 90 "Unity (Schneider)", after the Unity Pro software that Schneider renamed Control Expert from version 14 (its cybersecurity guide says Unity Pro is the former name for version 13.1 or earlier).

Because UMAS shares port 502 with plain Modbus, the same connection that an HMI uses to read registers can carry program transfers, run and stop requests and reservation commands. Schneider's own cybersecurity guide lists "Modbus TCP/IP or UMAS" as the protocols for HMI and SCADA links to an M580, so UMAS is not only an engineering-laptop protocol. The command names and codes below come from Cisco Talos reports on M580 firmware SV2.70, not from a published Schneider specification:

UMAS code Talos name What it does, per Talos
0x10 TAKE_PLC_RESERVATION Claims the controller for one client; the application password, if set, must be in this request
0x11 RELEASE_PLC_RESERVATION Gives the reservation back, which disconnects the current session
0x30 INITIALIZE_UPLOAD Starts writing a new program ("strategy") to the controller
0x33 / 0x34 INITIALIZE_DOWNLOAD / DOWNLOAD_BLOCK Reads the program back from the controller, block by block

Talos's TALOS-2018-0742 report says writing a new program takes six UMAS commands in order: take the reservation, initialize the transfer, send the first block, send a command with function code 0x6D, send the program in blocks of 0x3F4 bytes, then end the transfer and release the reservation.

How do UMAS reservations and sessions work, and where did they fail?

A UMAS reservation is a lock that lets one client at a time run privileged commands, and the session value that proves you hold it was too small to protect. Talos's TALOS-2018-0741 explains that the M580 used TAKE_PLC_RESERVATION and RELEASE_PLC_RESERVATION to decide who may run privileged commands such as program transfers. When a project has a password, the correct password must be supplied in TAKE_PLC_RESERVATION, and the controller returns a session ID for the following commands.

That session ID was one byte, so there were only 256 possible values. With a legitimate user already holding a reservation, most often Unity Pro, Talos could loop through all 256 values until the controller answered with the success response code 0xFE, and then read the password-protected program without knowing the password. Schneider tracks this as CVE-2018-7842. A sister report, TALOS-2018-0735, used the same brute force with RELEASE_PLC_RESERVATION to disconnect any user holding an elevated session, which Talos warns can leave a controller in a fault state if it happens during a program transfer. Schneider tracks that one as CVE-2018-7846.

Later research went after the session in other ways. CVE-2021-22779 is a spoofing bypass of the link between engineering software and controller, and CVE-2022-45789 is a capture-replay attack that hijacks an already authenticated Modbus session. Schneider's fixes for these ship in both controller firmware and Control Expert, which is why many notices require updating both together.

Which CVEs and Schneider notices cover UMAS on M340 and M580?

The UMAS CVE families are reservation and session weaknesses, program and configuration overwrite, man-in-the-middle tampering, and project-file credential issues. The table lists the main ones for M340 and M580, with Schneider's own CVSS v3.1 score, NVD's score and the notice that carries the fixed versions. Schneider describes most of them as attacks "over Modbus", which on these controllers is the port 502 channel UMAS uses.

CVE What it allows, per Schneider Fixed in (per notice) Schneider / NVD CVSS v3.1 Notice
CVE-2018-7842 Elevation of privilege by brute force on Modbus parameters sent to the controller M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60, with Control Expert 16.0 and an application password 7.5 / 9.8 SEVD-2019-134-11
CVE-2018-7846 Unauthorized access by brute force on the Modbus protocol M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60 5.3 / 9.8 SEVD-2019-134-11
CVE-2018-7847 Denial of service or code execution by overwriting controller configuration over Modbus M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60 9.8 / 9.8 SEVD-2019-134-11
CVE-2019-6808 Remote code execution by overwriting controller configuration over Modbus M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60 10.0 / 9.8 SEVD-2019-134-11
CVE-2021-22779 Read and write access by spoofing Modbus traffic between engineering software and controller Control Expert 15.1, then M580 SV4.10, M580 CPU Safety SV4.21, M340 3.50 9.8 / 9.1 SEVD-2021-194-01
CVE-2022-45788 Code execution or denial of service when a malicious project file is loaded onto the controller Control Expert 15.3, M580 SV4.10, M340 SV3.51, MC80 SV1.90, Momentum SV2.6 7.5 / 9.8 SEVD-2023-010-05
CVE-2022-45789 Unauthorized Modbus functions by hijacking an authenticated session (capture-replay) Control Expert V16.2 HF003, M580 SV4.20, M580 CPU Safety SV4.21, M340 SV3.70, Momentum SV2.90, MC80 SV2.20 8.1 / 9.8 SEVD-2023-010-06
CVE-2023-6408 Denial of service and loss of confidentiality and integrity through a man-in-the-middle attack Control Expert 16.0, M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60, M580 CPU Safety SV4.21, Momentum SV2.90, MC80 SV2.20 8.1 / 8.1 SEVD-2024-044-01
CVE-2023-6409 Hard-coded credentials expose a project file protected with an application password Control Expert 16.0 7.7 / 7.7 SEVD-2024-044-01
CVE-2024-8936, CVE-2024-8937, CVE-2024-8938 After a man-in-the-middle attack, crafted Modbus calls tamper with controller memory; 8937 and 8938 can lead to code execution M340 SV3.65, MC80 SV2.1, Momentum SV2.80 6.5, 6.5, 8.1 (CVE record) / not scored SEVD-2024-317-03

Three details matter when you read these notices:

  • Scores disagree. NVD often scores higher than Schneider, for example 9.8 against Schneider's 7.5 for CVE-2018-7842, and NVD has not analysed CVE-2024-8936 to CVE-2024-8938 at all (status Deferred). For CVE-2024-8937, the CVE record carries 6.5 while the CSAF files from Schneider and CISA (ICSA-24-326-04) give 8.1. Use the vector and the attack preconditions, not one number.
  • Fixes are two-step. SEVD-2021-194-01 calls Control Expert V15.1 "the first step in a two steps process" for CVE-2021-22779, with controller firmware as the second, and notes that M580 SV4.02 firmware was retracted for quality issues. SEVD-2019-134-11 (version 14, 8 September 2026) lists three steps for CVE-2018-7842: update Control Expert and firmware, set an application password and the new firmware version in the project, then rebuild and transfer the project.
  • Quantum and Premium stay exposed. Schneider lists every Modicon Quantum, Quantum Safety and Premium firmware as affected by the SEVD-2019-134-11 CVEs with no fix, because those controllers are end of life; the advice is to block port 502, configure the access control list and migrate to M580.

The protocol-level weakness was already on record in 2017. CISA's ICSA-17-101-01 assigned CVE-2017-6034, cleartext Modicon Modbus traffic that lets an attacker replay run, stop, upload and download commands (NVD 9.8), and CVE-2017-6032, a session weakness open to brute force (NVD 5.3). Not every Modicon CVE is UMAS: CVE-2025-6625, a crafted FTP command that can stop an M340 or its X80 Ethernet modules, is a reason to switch FTP off rather than a UMAS issue.

What about the Modicon M221 and EcoStruxure Machine Expert Basic?

The Modicon M221 is a smaller controller programmed with EcoStruxure Machine Expert - Basic (formerly SoMachine Basic), and its programming-protocol CVEs have no fixed firmware. CISA's ICSA-18-324-02 describes CVE-2018-7798 as an improper implementation of the network configuration module "in UMAS protocol" that lets an attacker intercept a PLC's traffic by remotely changing its configuration parameters (CVSS v3 8.2, all M221 versions). ICSA-20-343-04 and Schneider's SEVD-2020-315-05 add CVE-2020-7565, CVE-2020-7566 and CVE-2020-7567: someone who captures traffic between Machine Expert - Basic and an M221 can break its weak encryption keys and then find the password hash. Schneider scores each at 7.1; NVD gives 7.3, 7.3 and 5.7. The notice lists all versions of the Modicon M100, M200 and M221 as affected.

The vendor's mitigations for these M221 CVEs are configuration, not firmware:

  1. Disable all unused protocols in the M221 application, "especially Programming protocol", under "Configuring Ethernet Network" in the Machine Expert - Basic help, which Schneider says prevents unintended remote programming access.
  2. Set a password to protect the project.
  3. Set a password for read access on the controller and a different password for write access.
  4. Block all unauthorized access to port 502/TCP with segmentation and a firewall.

How do you find which Modicon firmware versions you are running?

A Modicon firmware inventory needs the CPU part number, the firmware version (written SVx.yy in Schneider notices) and the Control Expert version for every controller. Every fix threshold above is a firmware or software version, so a model name alone tells you nothing.

  1. Map part numbers to familiesSchneider's notices name the CPUs by part number: BMXP34* for M340, BMEP* and BMEH* for M580, BMEP58S and BMEH58S for M580 CPU Safety, BMKC80 for MC80 and 171CBU* for the Momentum Unity M1E. Record the full reference from the controller label or the project.
  2. Read the project filesA Control Expert project records the controller firmware version it targets; SEVD-2019-134-11 tells users to change that setting to match new firmware before rebuilding. Treat the project value as a lead, not proof, because a controller can be updated without the project being changed.
  3. Confirm on the controller in a maintenance window, from an approved engineering workstation, with the Schneider tools you already use to manage firmware. Schneider's cybersecurity guide names Automation Device Maintenance for M580 firmware updates.
  4. Record Control Expert and Process Expert versions on every engineering workstationCVE-2021-22779, CVE-2022-45789 and CVE-2023-6408 need both sides updated, and later M580 Safety, Momentum and MC80 firmware requires minimum Control Expert versions to connect (for example V16.0 HF001 for M580 CPU Safety SV4.21 and v16.4 for MC80 SV2.20).
  5. Use service fingerprints as a hintSchneider's port tables show M580 firmware up to 4.01 serving firmware updates and data storage over FTP on 21/tcp, while 4.20 and later move them to HTTPS on 443/tcp and keep DPWS on 9867/tcp open; from 4.60 a Modbus Secure (TLS) service listens on 802. An M580 that answers FTP for firmware updates is worth checking first.

How should UMAS be hardened, per Schneider's guidance?

Schneider's hardening for UMAS combines controller settings that stop unauthorized program changes with network controls that keep port 502 away from untrusted hosts. The steps below come from the Modicon Platform Cybersecurity User Guide (EIO0000001999, edition 15, July 2026) and the mitigation sections of the notices above.

  1. Set an application passwordControl Expert uses it when you open the application and when you connect to the controller, and stores it encrypted in the application. Turn on file encryption for .STU, .STA and .ZEF project files too; SEVD-2021-194-01 delivered part of its fix through that feature. Schneider notes that both are disabled when a controller is managed as part of a system project.
  2. Activate memory protectionSchneider says memory protection "prohibits the transfer of a project into the controller and modifications in online mode, regardless of the communication channel". It is an input bit on M340, M580, MC80, Momentum and Premium, and a physical key switch on Quantum. It cannot be configured on Hot Standby controllers, where Schneider points to IPsec instead.
  3. Restrict remote run and stopM580 and M340 can be set to reject remote run requests and allow run only through a configured input; the M580 can also reject remote stop requests.
  4. Disable unused servicesUse the Ethernet tabs in Control Expert to switch off HTTP, FTP, TFTP, DHCP/BOOTP, SNMP, EtherNet/IP and NTP where unused, before you download the application. The guide notes that the default settings are the maximum security level, and that the ETH_PORT_CTRL function block can disable a service at run time on some products.
  5. Configure the access control listAllow port 502 only from the subnets or hosts that need Modbus or UMAS. Schneider's example authorizes the control-network subnet for port 502 and only the operation network for the web server.
  6. Use the secure engineering link on M580With M580 firmware V4.20 or later and Control Expert Classic V16.0 or later, Control Expert can reach the controller over TLS (HTTPS on port 443) with a login and password. In the default Filtered mode, the controller accepts the non-secure Modbus TCP drivers only in read-only monitoring mode and still accepts Modbus TCP or UMAS from SCADA; Enforced mode refuses Modbus TCP on 502 and UMAS altogether.
  7. Segment and encrypt where firmware can'tEvery notice repeats the same network advice: block unauthorized access to 502/TCP, use IPsec on BMENOC0301/0311 or BMENUA0100 modules, or an external VPN firewall close to the controller, and harden the Control Expert workstation.
  8. Send events to a syslog serverControl Expert and M580 controllers can log cybersecurity events to a remote server over syslog (RFC 5424, over TCP); Control Expert's event list includes starting, stopping or initializing the controller and transferring a project to or from it.

The zone design follows the Purdue model and NIST SP 800-82; the same port-502 controls apply to every Modbus device on the network. Modicon M241, M251 and M262 controllers run a CODESYS-based runtime rather than Control Expert, so they are covered in the CODESYS runtime guide, and Schneider's Triconex safety controllers use a separate protocol covered in the TriStation guide.

How do you detect UMAS misuse on the network?

Detecting UMAS misuse starts with knowing which hosts send Modbus function code 90 to each controller. Plain Modbus monitoring that only logs register reads and writes will not show program transfers, so use a decoder that recognizes function code 90, such as Wireshark's, for packet-level review. Alerts worth writing, all based on the behaviour in the Talos reports and Schneider notices:

  • Function code 90 traffic from any host that is not a known engineering workstation, HMI or SCADA server.
  • Reservation requests (UMAS 0x10) or releases (0x11) from an unfamiliar host, or a burst of them; a loop through session values is the pattern behind CVE-2018-7842 and CVE-2018-7846.
  • Program transfer sequences (0x30 or 0x33 and their block commands) outside a change window.
  • A legitimate engineering session that drops unexpectedly while another host is active on port 502.
  • Port 502 traffic crossing from the business network or the internet to a controller zone.
  • Syslog events from Control Expert or an M580 for project transfers, starts or stops that nobody scheduled.

The technique names in MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, such as Program Download, Change Operating Mode and Brute Force I/O, are a useful way to label these alerts.

Worked example: what does a UMAS review of one water-treatment site find?

Synthetic example, not a real site. The site has two M580 CPUs, three M340 CPUs, one Modicon Premium kept from an older line, a SCADA server and two engineering laptops running Control Expert.

Observation Why it matters Action
One M580 at firmware SV4.10 Below SV4.20 for CVE-2018-7842, CVE-2022-45789 and CVE-2023-6408 Update to SV4.20 or later, then set up the secure engineering link
M340 CPUs at SV3.51 Below SV3.60 and SV3.70 for the session and man-in-the-middle CVEs Update to the latest M340 firmware that covers SV3.70
Engineering laptop at Control Expert V15.3 Below V16.0 and V16.2 HF003 named in the notices Update both laptops before the controllers
No application password in two projects UMAS reservations need no credential Set passwords, rebuild and transfer per SEVD-2019-134-11
Premium CPU reachable on 502 from the office VLAN No fix for the SEVD-2019-134-11 CVEs Firewall 502 to the SCADA server only; plan migration to M580
FTP and HTTP enabled on M340 CPUs, unused Extra attack surface, including CVE-2025-6625 Disable in the Ethernet tab and redeploy

How can a passive capture help with Modicon UMAS exposure?

A passive capture shows which hosts reach port 502 on each controller without sending anything to a running PLC. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port recording, flags hosts on the server side of Modbus sessions as likely PLCs, builds a host-by-port inventory and lists remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. It keeps connection-level facts only: it does not report Modbus function codes, so it cannot tell UMAS from plain Modbus or show reservations and program transfers. For a controller and software list, Device & Firmware Security matches models and versions against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Treating port 502 as "just Modbus" in firewall rules; it also carries UMAS program transfers and run and stop commands.
  • Updating controller firmware but leaving Control Expert at an older version, or the reverse, when the notice needs both.
  • Assuming the application password alone is enough; several CVEs bypassed or recovered it.
  • Leaving Quantum and Premium CPUs on flat networks because no firmware fix exists.
  • Ranking Modicon CVEs by NVD score alone, or treating absence from KEV as a reason to wait.

This guide draws on Schneider Electric security notifications SEVD-2019-134-11, SEVD-2020-315-05, SEVD-2021-194-01, SEVD-2023-010-05, SEVD-2023-010-06, SEVD-2024-044-01 and SEVD-2024-317-03, Schneider's Modicon Platform Cybersecurity User Guide, CISA ICS advisories ICSA-17-101-01, ICSA-18-324-02, ICSA-20-343-04, ICSA-21-194-02, ICSA-23-227-01, ICSA-24-326-04 and ICSA-25-114-01, Cisco Talos reports TALOS-2018-0735, TALOS-2018-0741 and TALOS-2018-0742, the Wireshark Modbus/TCP dissector and NVD records. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-19. It is general information, not a substitute for Schneider Electric's current notices or an engineer's assessment of your exact controllers and firmware.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is UMAS, and how does it relate to Modbus?

UMAS is the Schneider Electric management protocol that EcoStruxure Control Expert (formerly Unity Pro) and other Schneider tools use to program and operate Modicon controllers. It travels inside ordinary Modbus TCP frames on port 502 under Modbus function code 90 (0x5A), which the Wireshark Modbus/TCP dissector labels 'Unity (Schneider)'. Cisco Talos describes the M580 as speaking FTP, TFTP, HTTP, SNMP, EtherNet/IP, Modbus 'and a management protocol referred to as UMAS', and shows each UMAS request as the Modbus function code 0x5A, a one-byte session value and a UMAS function code. Schneider's own Modicon Platform Cybersecurity User Guide names UMAS next to Modbus TCP as a protocol SCADA and HMI links may use. Because it shares port 502 with plain Modbus, a firewall rule that allows Modbus to a Modicon CPU also allows UMAS engineering commands unless the controller itself restricts them.

Can an attacker take over a Modicon session without the password?

On unpatched firmware, research and Schneider notices say yes. Cisco Talos report TALOS-2018-0741 found that the M580 (BMEP582040, firmware SV2.70) used a one-byte UMAS session ID, so once a legitimate user held a reservation an attacker could try all 256 values and send privileged commands such as a program read without knowing the application password. Schneider tracks this as CVE-2018-7842 in SEVD-2019-134-11 (Schneider CVSS v3.1 7.5, NVD 9.8) and lists M580 firmware SV4.20 and M340 SV3.60, used with Control Expert 16.0 and an application password, as the fix. Later issues, CVE-2021-22779 (spoofing the engineering-software link) and CVE-2022-45789 (replaying a captured authenticated session), were fixed in further firmware and Control Expert releases. Modicon Quantum and Premium controllers are end of life and get no fix, so segmentation is the only control there.

Are any Modicon UMAS CVEs in the CISA KEV catalog?

No. As of 2026-11-19, the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) contains one Schneider Electric entry, CVE-2018-7841 in U.motion Builder, and no Modicon controller or Control Expert CVE. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-18 put CVE-2018-7842 at 0.350 (98.5th percentile) and CVE-2018-7846 at 0.296, far above the other CVEs in this guide, most of which sit between about 0.002 and 0.08. Absence from KEV does not make UMAS exposure safe: anyone who can reach port 502 on an unprotected controller can use the protocol's own engineering commands without an exploit.

Which Modicon firmware versions fix the main UMAS authentication issues?

It depends on the CVE, so plan to the highest threshold that applies to your controller. From Schneider's notices: for CVE-2022-45789, M580 SV4.20, M580 CPU Safety SV4.21, M340 SV3.70, Momentum Unity M1E SV2.90, MC80 SV2.20 and Control Expert V16.2 HF003; for CVE-2023-6408, M580 SV4.20, M340 SV3.60, Control Expert 16.0; for CVE-2024-8937 and CVE-2024-8938, M340 SV3.65, MC80 SV2.1 and Momentum SV2.80. The Modicon M221 has no fixed firmware for CVE-2018-7798 or CVE-2020-7565 to CVE-2020-7567; Schneider and CISA tell users to disable the programming protocol on Ethernet and set read and write passwords instead.

Does an application password protect a Modicon controller on its own?

No. Schneider's cybersecurity guide says the application password is used when you open the application and when you connect to the controller, and that it is stored encrypted in the application. That makes it the gate on UMAS reservations, and Schneider's notices list it as the first mitigation. But several CVEs in this guide were about getting around it: brute-forcing or replaying the session that follows a successful login (CVE-2018-7842, CVE-2022-45789) or recovering it from a project file (CVE-2023-6409). Pair it with memory protection, which Schneider says blocks project transfer and online changes regardless of the communication channel, with an access control list on port 502, and with the TLS-based secure engineering link on M580 firmware 4.20 or later.

Sources

  1. Schneider Electric SEVD-2019-134-11: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Modicon Controller Products (first published 14 May 2019, version 14, 8 September 2026; PDF)
  2. Schneider Electric SEVD-2021-194-01: EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert, SCADAPack RemoteConnect x70, Modicon M580 and M340 (13 July 2021, updated 13 August 2024; PDF)
  3. Schneider Electric SEVD-2023-010-05: EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert and Modicon PLCs and PACs (CVE-2022-45788; PDF)
  4. Schneider Electric SEVD-2023-010-06: EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert and Modicon M340, M580 and M580 CPU Safety (CVE-2022-45789; PDF)
  5. Schneider Electric SEVD-2024-044-01: EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert and Modicon M340, M580 and M580 Safety PLCs (CVE-2023-6408, CVE-2023-6409, CVE-2023-27975; PDF)
  6. Schneider Electric SEVD-2024-317-03: Modicon Controllers M340 / Momentum / MC80 (CVE-2024-8936 to CVE-2024-8938; PDF)
  7. Schneider Electric SEVD-2020-315-05: Modicon M100/M200/M221 Programmable Logic Controller (CVE-2020-7565 to CVE-2020-7568, CVE-2020-28214; PDF)
  8. Schneider Electric: Modicon Platform Cybersecurity User Guide (EIO0000001999)
  9. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-114-01: Schneider Electric Modicon Controllers (Update A; republication of SEVD-2019-134-11; CSAF)
  10. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-21-194-02: Schneider Electric Modicon Controllers and Software (Update A; CSAF)
  11. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-23-227-01: Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert, Modicon M340, M580 and M580 CPU (Update A; CSAF)
  12. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-24-326-04: Schneider Electric Modicon M340, MC80, and Momentum Unity M1E (Update B; CSAF)
  13. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-18-324-02: Schneider Electric Modicon M221 (20 November 2018; CVE-2018-7798; CSAF)
  14. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-20-343-04: Schneider Electric Modicon M221 Programmable Logic Controller (8 December 2020; CSAF)
  15. Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0741: Schneider Electric Modicon M580 UMAS PLC reservation improper authentication (CVE-2018-7842)
  16. Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0735: Schneider Electric Modicon M580 UMAS Release PLC Reservation denial of service (CVE-2018-7846)
  17. Cisco Talos TALOS-2018-0742: Schneider Electric Modicon M580 UMAS strategy programming unauthenticated file write (CVE-2018-7847)
  18. Wireshark source: Modbus/TCP dissector header, function code 90 'Unity (Schneider)'
  19. NVD: CVE-2018-7842 (Modicon authentication bypass by spoofing)
  20. NVD: CVE-2021-22779 (Control Expert and Modicon authentication bypass by spoofing)
  21. NVD: CVE-2022-45789 (Modicon authentication bypass by capture-replay)
  22. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (data mirror on GitHub)
  23. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

Schneider Electric Modicon UMAS protocol security: CVEs, fixed firmware and hardening for M340, M580 and M221