Rockwell Logix controllers (ControlLogix, CompactLogix and GuardLogix) are programmed and monitored over EtherNet/IP and the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) on TCP port 44818, and CISA's advisories show three recurring CVE families: engineering-software authentication that can be bypassed, crafted CIP messages that fault the controller, and flaws in the 1756 communication modules that route traffic into the chassis. As of 2026-11-19, one of them, CVE-2021-22681, is in CISA's KEV catalog. The defence is current firmware, the mode switch in RUN, CIP Security where supported, and segmentation that keeps port 44818 inside the control zone.
Advisory facts in this guide come from CISA's ICS advisories and their machine-readable CSAF files, which republish Rockwell Automation's own security advisories, and from NVD. Rockwell's Trust Center advisories (SD numbers) are named where NVD or CISA references them. Read the vendor advisory for the full product list before acting on any single row.
Key takeaways
- Advisory facts in this guide come from CISA's ICS advisories and their machine-readable CSAF files, which republish Rockwell Automation's own security advisories, and from NVD.
- A Logix controller speaks CIP over EtherNet/IP, either through its own Ethernet port or through a communication module such as a 1756-EN2T or 1756-EN4TR in the same chassis.
- Three advisories describe ways past the trust between Studio 5000 Logix Designer and the controller.
- The table lists the controller and chassis-module CVEs most likely to appear when a Logix system is matched against CISA advisories.
How is a Logix controller reached over the network?
A Logix controller speaks CIP over EtherNet/IP, either through its own Ethernet port or through a communication module such as a 1756-EN2T or 1756-EN4TR in the same chassis. The IANA port registry lists the ports a firewall rule has to cover:
| Port | IANA service name | Use on a Logix system |
|---|---|---|
| TCP 44818 | EtherNet/IP messaging | Explicit CIP messaging; the port CISA's advisory for CVE-2021-22681 says to block from outside the control zone |
| UDP 2222 | EtherNet/IP I/O | Cyclic I/O traffic |
| TCP/UDP 2221 | EtherNet/IP over TLS and DTLS | CIP Security connections |
Logix systems rely on trust mechanisms between the engineering software, the chassis and the controller, such as the verification key behind CVE-2021-22681 and the Trusted Slot setting behind CVE-2024-6242. Our EtherNet/IP and CIP security guide covers the protocol and ODVA's CIP Security profiles in detail. On a ControlLogix chassis, a CIP message can also be routed across the backplane from one module to another, so every Ethernet module in the chassis is a path to the controller.
What authentication problems do Rockwell and CISA describe?
Three advisories describe ways past the trust between Studio 5000 Logix Designer and the controller.
CVE-2021-22681, the verification key. CISA advisory ICSA-21-056-03 says Studio 5000 Logix Designer "uses a key to verify Logix controllers are communicating with the affected Rockwell Automation products" and that "an unauthenticated attacker could bypass this verification mechanism and authenticate with Logix controllers." CISA scores it CVSS v3 10.0; NVD scores it 9.8. The affected software is RSLogix 5000 versions 16 to 20, Studio 5000 Logix Designer version 21 and later, and FactoryTalk Security from FactoryTalk Services Platform 2.10. NVD lists the controllers that trust the key: CompactLogix 1768, 1769, 5370, 5380 and 5480; ControlLogix 5550, 5560, 5570 and 5580; DriveLogix 5560, 5730 and 1794-L34; Compact GuardLogix 5370 and 5380; GuardLogix 5570 and 5580; and SoftLogix 5800. CISA credits researchers from Soonchunhyang University, Kaspersky and Claroty. Rockwell "has determined this vulnerability cannot be mitigated with a patch."
CVE-2022-1161, program code that differs from what runs. The CSAF file for ICSA-22-090-05 says Logix Designer "writes user-readable program code to a separate location than the executed compiled code, allowing an attacker to change one and not the other." An engineer who uploads the project sees the readable code, while the controller runs something else. CISA scores it CVSS v3 10.0 and lists all versions of 17 controller families. The mitigation is to recompile and download the project, then put the mode switch in RUN.
CVE-2024-6242, the Trusted Slot bypass. Trusted Slot makes a ControlLogix controller deny communication through chassis paths that are not trusted. Claroty Team82 showed that a crafted CIP routing path could hop between slots and reach the CPU through a trusted card, because "the CPU can check only the last slot and not the whole slot chain." ICSA-24-214-09 gives CVSS v3.1 8.4 and v4 7.3, and says an attacker could "execute CIP commands that modify user projects and/or device configuration."
Which CVE families appear in Rockwell Logix advisories?
The table lists the controller and chassis-module CVEs most likely to appear when a Logix system is matched against CISA advisories. Scores are CISA's CVSS v3 unless marked; fixed versions are from the CISA advisory.
| CVE | CISA advisory (Rockwell ref.) | Products | Issue | CVSS | Fix or main mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-22681 | ICSA-21-056-03 | Logix Designer, RSLogix 5000 and the Logix controller families | Verification key bypass, CWE-522 | 10.0 | No patch; mode switch in RUN, CIP Security, segmentation |
| CVE-2022-1161 | ICSA-22-090-05 | 17 Logix controller families, all versions | Source and compiled code can differ, CWE-829 | 10.0 | Recompile and download; mode switch in RUN; CIP Security |
| CVE-2022-3157 | ICSA-22-354-02 | CompactLogix 5370, Compact GuardLogix 5370, ControlLogix 5570 (incl. redundancy), GuardLogix 5570 | Malformed CIP request causes a major nonrecoverable fault, CWE-20 | 8.6 | 33.013, 34.011 or later; redundancy 33.052, 34.051 |
| CVE-2023-3595 | ICSA-23-193-01 | 1756-EN2* and 1756-EN3* modules | Crafted CIP messages give remote code execution with persistence, CWE-787 | 9.8 | 11.004 for modules on the 11.x line; 5.029 signed (or 5.009 unsigned) for the 5.x line |
| CVE-2023-3596 | ICSA-23-193-01 | 1756-EN4TR, EN4TRK, EN4TRXT | Crafted CIP messages cause denial of service, CWE-787 | 7.5 | 5.002 or later |
| CVE-2024-6242 | ICSA-24-214-09 (SD1682) | ControlLogix and GuardLogix 5580, 1756-EN2*, EN3TR, EN4TR | Trusted Slot bypass, CWE-420 | 8.4 | V32.016, V33.015, V34.014, V35.011; EN4TR V5.001; EN2/EN3 Series D-generation V12.001 |
| CVE-2024-6077 | ICSA-24-256-18 (SD1963) | ControlLogix and GuardLogix 5580, CompactLogix and Compact GuardLogix 5380, CompactLogix 5480, 1756-EN4 | Crafted packets to the CIP Security object; factory reset needed to recover, CWE-20 | 7.5 | v33.017, v34.014, v35.013, v36.011; 1756-EN4 v6.001 |
| CVE-2025-7353 | ICSA-25-226-28 (SD1732) | 1756-EN2T/D, EN2F/C, EN2TR/C, EN3TR/B, EN2TP/A up to 11.004 | Web-based debugger (WDB) agent enabled by default, CWE-1188 | 9.8 | 12.001 |
| CVE-2026-11317 | ICSA-26-167-03 (SD1772) | CompactLogix 5370, Compact GuardLogix 5370, ControlLogix 5570, GuardLogix 5570 | Crafted CIP message causes a major nonrecoverable fault, CWE-404 | 7.5 | 34.016, 35.015, 36.012 and 37.011 respectively |
| CVE-2026-9636 | ICSA-26-211-05 (SD1788) | ControlLogix and GuardLogix 5580, CompactLogix and Compact GuardLogix 5380 V36 to V37; 1756-EN4TR V6.001, V7.001 | Certificates under a CRL-revoked intermediate are accepted, CWE-299 | 5.9 (v4 8.2) | V38.011; 1756-EN4TR V8.001 |
Denial of service through crafted CIP
CVE-2022-3157 and CVE-2026-11317 need no login and no key: one malformed CIP request drives the controller into a major nonrecoverable fault (MNRF). The ICSA-26-167-03 CSAF file says "devices with less memory are more likely to be affected" and that "a program download is required to recover." CVE-2024-6077 is worse for recovery: the ICSA-24-256-18 CSAF file says the device "will become unavailable and require a factory reset to recover." The mode switch does not stop these, because the message is not a programming command.
The 1756 communication modules
Several of the most severe entries are not in the controller at all but in the Ethernet modules beside it. For CVE-2023-3595, ICSA-23-193-01 says crafted CIP messages give "remote code execution with persistence" on 1756-EN2* and EN3* modules, including "the ability to modify, deny, and exfiltrate data passing through the device." CISA's text adds that "no known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities." CVE-2025-7353, in the ICSA-25-226-28 CSAF file, is a debugger agent that was "enabled by default on released devices" and lets a remote attacker "perform memory dumps, modify memory, and control execution flow." Because modules route CIP to the controller, they belong in the same inventory and patch plan as the controller.
CIP Security is a component too
CIP Security closes the transport gap behind CVE-2021-22681, but its own code carries CVEs. CVE-2024-6077 sits in the CIP Security object, and CVE-2026-9636 lets a certificate signed by a revoked intermediate CA still connect, "potentially bypassing CIP Security protections." For CVE-2024-6077, Rockwell's advice to sites that do not use the feature is to disable CIP Security per device.
How do you find the firmware revision on Logix controllers and modules?
Rockwell writes fixes as a major revision and a minor revision, such as 33.017 or 35.011, and often fixes several major revisions in parallel. A controller on 33.016 needs 33.017, not 36.011, so record the full major.minor value.
Ask the deviceEvery EtherNet/IP device answers a CIP List Identity request with its identity. CISA's ICSNPP EtherNet/IP parser for Zeek logs the reply fields, including vendor, device type, product code, revision ("major.minor"), serial number and product name, when a capture contains that exchange. Record each module separatelyA 1756-EN2T has its own firmware line. ICSA-23-193-01 splits fixes by series letter, and Series A to C modules come in unsigned (5.00x) and signed (5.02x) lines. CISA notes that once a module is on signed firmware, "it is not possible to revert to unsigned firmware versions." Check the series against fixes that will never comeICSA-24-214-09 says 1756-EN2T Series A/B/C, EN2F Series A/B, EN2TR Series A/B and EN3TR Series A "do not have a fix available", and that users "can upgrade to Series D".
NVD's CPE data for these CVEs is uneven. As of 2026-11-19, NVD lists CPE configurations for CVE-2022-1161 and CVE-2024-6077, while CVE-2024-6242 and CVE-2025-7353 are Deferred and CVE-2026-9636 and CVE-2026-11317 are Awaiting Analysis, with no CPE data. A CPE-only scanner misses the newer entries, so match against the CISA CSAF product tree as well.
How should KEV and EPSS weigh on Logix findings?
As of 2026-11-19, the CISA KEV catalog (version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) has one Rockwell entry: CVE-2021-22681, added on 2026-03-05. The latest FIRST EPSS scores, dated 2026-11-18, were:
| CVE | EPSS | Percentile |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-22681 | 0.636 | 0.992 |
| CVE-2024-6242 | 0.111 | 0.960 |
| CVE-2023-3595 | 0.055 | 0.930 |
| CVE-2022-1161 | 0.052 | 0.927 |
| CVE-2023-3596 | 0.037 | 0.900 |
| CVE-2022-3157 | 0.015 | 0.752 |
| CVE-2025-7353 | 0.009 | 0.605 |
| CVE-2024-6077 | 0.006 | 0.472 |
| CVE-2026-11317 | 0.003 | 0.233 |
| CVE-2026-9636 | 0.002 | 0.122 |
The KEV entry decides the first action: every controller that trusts the CVE-2021-22681 key and is reachable on TCP 44818 from outside the control zone. After that, rank by reachability and recovery cost. An unauthenticated CIP fault that needs a program download or a factory reset on a running line costs more than its EPSS score suggests. Our KEV and EPSS prioritization guide explains the method.
How do you harden a Logix controller per Rockwell's guidance?
The mitigations below are the ones Rockwell gives in the CISA advisories above, in the order that covers the most CVEs.
Mode switch in RUNICSA-21-056-03, ICSA-22-090-05 and ICSA-24-214-09 all tell users to put the controller's mode switch in the Run position; the 2024 advisory describes this as a way to "limit the allowed CIP commands on controllers". Move it out of Run only for scheduled program changes. Current firmware on controllers and modulesApply the fixed revision for each major revision in the table, and the module firmware for CVE-2023-3595, CVE-2024-6242 and CVE-2025-7353. Plan replacement of 1756-EN2* Series A to C modules, which ICSA-24-214-09 leaves without a fix. See our IEC 62443-2-3 patch management guide for scheduling updates in a running plant. CIP Security where the hardware supports itICSA-21-056-03 says CIP Security "directly addresses" CVE-2021-22681 and names ControlLogix 5580 version 32 and later on the front port, or a 1756-EN4TR module, as the supported paths. ICSA-22-090-05 adds CompactLogix 5380 and Compact GuardLogix 5380 on the on-board port, and tells users of a 1756-EN2T to replace it with a 1756-EN4TR. Keep the certificate chain and CRLs current, and apply V38.011 for CVE-2026-9636. Trusted Slot, with patched firmwareDesignate the slot of the engineering module as trusted so other Ethernet cards cannot reach the CPU with elevated commands, and apply the CVE-2024-6242 fixes, because the feature can be bypassed on older firmware. Disable unused servicesIf CIP Security is not used, Rockwell's guidance for CVE-2024-6077 is to disable it per device. CVE-2025-7353 shows the cost of a debugger agent left enabled; update those modules to 12.001. Segment and restrict TCP 44818ICSA-21-056-03 recommends "restricting or blocking traffic on TCP 44818 from outside of the industrial control system network zone", placing control networks behind firewalls and using a VPN for remote access. The Purdue model guide shows the zone layout, and NIST SP 800-82 covers the wider OT security programme. Detect changesICSA-21-056-03 lists the Controller Log (version 17 and later), Change Detection in Logix Designer (version 20 and later) and FactoryTalk AssetCentre as ways to spot unexpected edits. For CVE-2022-1161, recompile and download the project from a trusted copy.
What does a Logix triage of one machine line look like? (worked example)
Synthetic example. The line, firmware revisions and findings are invented for illustration; the CVEs and fixed versions come from the CISA advisories above.
A packaging line has a ControlLogix 5580 on firmware 33.011 with a 1756-EN2T Series C module on signed firmware 5.028, and a CompactLogix 5370 on firmware 33.011 in a separate cell. Neither controller's mode switch is in Run.
| Device | Finding | Action |
|---|---|---|
| ControlLogix 5580, 33.011 | CVE-2021-22681 (KEV) applies; below 33.015 (CVE-2024-6242) and 33.017 (CVE-2024-6077) | Switch to RUN; update to 33.017 or a later fixed revision; plan CIP Security on the front port |
| 1756-EN2T Series C, 5.028 | Below 5.029 (CVE-2023-3595); Series C has no CVE-2024-6242 fix | Update to 5.029 now; replace with a Series D module |
| CompactLogix 5370, 33.011 | Below 33.013 (CVE-2022-3157) and 34.016 (CVE-2026-11317); CVE-2021-22681 applies | Update to 34.016 or later; switch to RUN; allow TCP 44818 only from the engineering PC and HMI |
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating the KEV entry as patched. CVE-2021-22681 has no patch; a current firmware revision does not close it.
- Leaving the mode switch out of Run. The Run position is the mitigation Rockwell names first for CVE-2021-22681, CVE-2022-1161 and CVE-2024-6242.
- Inventorying controllers but not modules. The EN2, EN3 and EN4 modules carry their own CVEs and route CIP to the CPU.
- Matching on major revision only. A fix in 33.017 does not cover 33.011, and a fix in 36.011 does not mean 33.x is unaffected.
- Assuming CIP Security ends the work. It closes CVE-2021-22681, but its own object and certificate handling had CVE-2024-6077 and CVE-2026-9636.
For other controller families, see the CODESYS runtime guide and the S7comm guide, and map attacker techniques with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS.
AI-assisted analysis: what SoftWSP actually runs
SoftWSP identifies components and versions from a firmware image or a component list, and matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories with deterministic code. AI then writes the plain-language summary, citing the component, version and record behind each finding, and an engineer reviews every report before it is sent.
For a Logix system, the useful input is each controller catalog number and firmware revision, and each communication module with its series and firmware. The OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port capture at connection level: which hosts talk EtherNet/IP to which controllers, on which ports, and which remote-access sessions exist. It does not read controller firmware, mode switch position or project contents, so those come from the asset list and are judged in the engineer review. For a whole machine line, see the machine builder report.
This guide draws on CISA ICS advisories ICSA-21-056-03, ICSA-22-090-05, ICSA-22-354-02, ICSA-23-193-01, ICSA-24-214-09, ICSA-24-256-18, ICSA-25-226-28, ICSA-26-167-03 and ICSA-26-211-05 and their CSAF files, Claroty Team82's Trusted Slot research, NVD records, CISA's ICSNPP EtherNet/IP parser documentation, the IANA port registry, CISA's KEV catalog version 2026.11.18 and FIRST EPSS data dated 2026-11-18, all read on 2026-11-19.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Is any Rockwell Logix vulnerability in CISA's KEV catalog?
Yes, one. As of 2026-11-19, CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) lists CVE-2021-22681, the Studio 5000 Logix Designer and RSLogix 5000 verification-key bypass, under the name "Rockwell Multiple Products Insufficient Protected Credentials Vulnerability". CISA added it on 2026-03-05, five years after its ICS advisory ICSA-21-056-03, with a federal due date of 2026-03-26. It is the only KEV entry naming Rockwell. Its FIRST EPSS score, dated 2026-11-18, is 0.636, in the 99th percentile. Rockwell's position, quoted by CISA, is that the flaw "cannot be mitigated with a patch", so the controls are the mode switch in RUN, CIP Security and network segmentation.
Does putting the controller key switch in RUN protect a Logix controller?
It is the first mitigation Rockwell gives for the most serious Logix CVEs, but not for all of them. In CISA advisories ICSA-21-056-03 (CVE-2021-22681), ICSA-22-090-05 (CVE-2022-1161) and ICSA-24-214-09 (CVE-2024-6242), Rockwell tells users to put the controller mode switch in the Run position, which, in the words of the 2024 advisory, limits the allowed CIP commands on the controller. That stops online edits and program downloads from a rogue workstation. It does not stop the denial-of-service CVEs, such as CVE-2022-3157 and CVE-2026-11317, where a single crafted CIP message causes a major nonrecoverable fault; only the fixed firmware closes those.
How do I find the firmware revision of a ControlLogix or CompactLogix controller?
Read the revision the controller reports and record it as major.minor, because that is how Rockwell's fixes are written: CISA's advisory for CVE-2024-6077 lists ControlLogix 5580 fixes as v33.017, v34.014, v35.013 and v36.011. Every EtherNet/IP device answers a CIP List Identity request with its vendor, device type, product code, revision, serial number and product name; CISA's open-source ICSNPP EtherNet/IP parser for Zeek logs these fields, including revision as major.minor, when a capture contains that exchange. Record the communication modules in the chassis separately, because a 1756-EN2T or 1756-EN4TR has its own firmware line, and for EN2-series modules note the series letter and whether the firmware is signed (5.02x) or unsigned (5.00x).
What is the Trusted Slot feature and how was it bypassed?
Trusted Slot is a ControlLogix setting that makes the controller deny communication through chassis paths that are not trusted, so that only a designated communication module can send elevated operations such as a program download to the CPU. Claroty Team82 found that a crafted CIP routing path could hop between slots in the 1756 chassis and arrive at the CPU through a trusted card, because the CPU checked only the last slot in the chain. CISA published this as CVE-2024-6242 in ICSA-24-214-09 on 1 August 2024, CVSS v3.1 8.4. The fix is ControlLogix and GuardLogix 5580 firmware V32.016, V33.015, V34.014 or V35.011 and later, plus updated communication module firmware; 1756-EN2T, EN2F, EN2TR and EN3TR modules of the older series have no fix and need replacing with a later series.
Can SoftWSP tell me whether my Logix controllers are affected?
SoftWSP matches the components and versions it is given against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories, and AI writes a summary that cites the record behind each finding; an engineer reviews it before delivery. For a Logix system the useful input is each controller catalog number and firmware revision, and each communication module with its series and firmware. Its passive OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs at connection level, which shows which hosts reach the controllers on EtherNet/IP; it does not read the controller's firmware or project, so the revision comes from the asset list or the engineering software.
Sources
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-21-056-03 (Update A): Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers, CVE-2021-22681
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-21-056-03 Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers (Update A)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-22-090-05 Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers, CVE-2022-1161
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-22-354-02 Rockwell Automation GuardLogix and ControlLogix controllers, CVE-2022-3157
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-23-193-01: Rockwell Automation Select Communication Modules, CVE-2023-3595 and CVE-2023-3596
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-24-214-09: Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers, CVE-2024-6242
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-24-256-18 Rockwell Automation ControlLogix/GuardLogix 5580 and CompactLogix/Compact GuardLogix 5380, CVE-2024-6077
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-25-226-28 Rockwell Automation ControlLogix Ethernet Modules, CVE-2025-7353
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-26-167-03 Rockwell Automation Logix 5370 and 5570 Controllers, CVE-2026-11317
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-26-211-05 Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5380, ControlLogix 5580 and 1756-EN4TR, CVE-2026-9636
- Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1682 (CVE-2024-6242)
- Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1963 (CVE-2024-6077)
- Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1732 (CVE-2025-7353)
- Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1772 (CVE-2026-11317)
- Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1788 (CVE-2026-9636)
- Claroty Team82: Bypassing Rockwell Automation Logix controllers' local chassis security protection (1 August 2024)
- NVD: CVE-2021-22681
- NVD: CVE-2022-1161
- NVD: CVE-2024-6077
- NVD: CVE-2025-7353
- NVD: CVE-2026-9636
- CISA ICSNPP EtherNet/IP and CIP parser for Zeek (enip_list_identity.log fields)
- IANA: Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
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