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IEC 62443-3-3: system security requirements and security levels, explained

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IEC 62443-3-3 (published as ANSI/ISA-62443-3-3 in August 2013, and as IEC 62443-3-3 the same year) is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets detailed technical security requirements at the control-system level — distinct from the component-level requirements in 62443-4-2 and the secure-development-process requirements in 62443-4-1. Its own scope clause states it "provides detailed technical control system requirements (SRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in ISA-62443-1-1... including defining the requirements for control system capability security levels, SL-C (control system)." This guide works from that scope text and the standard's own introduction, which ISA publishes as a free preview, rather than from third-party paraphrases.

Key takeaways

  • The single word "level" in IEC 62443 covers three distinct concepts, and the standard is explicit about keeping 62443-3-3's own scope to just one of them.
  • It sets what a control system must be able to do, not how to build it, and it assumes other parts of the series are already in place.
  • Describe the system under consideration and split it into zones and conduits (IEC 62443-3-2).
  • The standard's publicly available scope and introduction clauses don't reproduce the numeric SL1-4 definitions themselves (that detail sits further into the paywalled text).

What are the seven foundational requirements?

62443-3-3's scope clause, in ISA's free preview of the standard, restates the seven FRs from ISA-62443-1-1 verbatim, and every detailed system requirement (SR) in the standard is organized under one of them:

# Foundational requirement Abbreviation
FR1 Identification and authentication control IAC
FR2 Use control UC
FR3 System integrity SI
FR4 Data confidentiality DC
FR5 Restricted data flow RDF
FR6 Timely response to events TRE
FR7 Resource availability RA

The standard's own text frames these as the foundation for control system capability SLs, SL-C(control system) — "defining security capability at the control system level is the goal and objective of this document." The exact count and numbering of individual SRs and requirement enhancements (REs) under each FR sits behind the paywalled clause text; any specific SR/RE count quoted elsewhere (including per-FR totals) is a third-party summary, not a figure from the purchased standard itself.

SL-T, SL-C and SL-A: what are the three different uses of "security level"?

The single word "level" in IEC 62443 covers three distinct concepts, and the standard is explicit about keeping 62443-3-3's own scope to just one of them. Its scope clause states plainly: defining SL-C(control system) "is the goal and objective of this document as opposed to target SLs, SL-T, or achieved SLs, SL-A, which are out of scope."

Term What it measures Where it is defined Applies to
SL-T (Target) The security level an asset owner decides a zone or conduit needs, based on risk assessment ISA-62443-3-2 A zone or conduit
SL-C (Capability) The security level a system or component can natively provide when properly integrated and configured ISA-62443-3-3 (systems) / ISA-62443-4-2 (components) A system or component
SL-A (Achieved) The security level an installed system actually delivers, including any compensating countermeasures Verified during design, certification testing or post-installation audit A deployed zone or conduit

The standard's own clause 1.2 spells out how these interact in practice: "System integrators, product suppliers and service providers will use this document to evaluate whether their products and services can provide the functional security capability to meet the asset owner's target security level (SL-T) requirements," and where a design can't meet an SR natively, "compensating countermeasures can be employed... such that the overall SL-T requirements are met at the control system level," provided that "inclusion of compensating countermeasures during the design phase should be accompanied by comprehensive documentation so that the resulting achieved control system SL, SL-A(control system), fully reflects the intended security capabilities inherent in the design."

What does 62443-3-3 assume, and what does it leave out?

It sets what a control system must be able to do, not how to build it, and it assumes other parts of the series are already in place. Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of the ISA preview say:

  • A security programme exists. The document "assumes that a security program has been established and is being operated in accordance with ISA-62443-2-1," and that patch management follows TR 62443-2-3.
  • Functional requirements only. The standard "strictly adheres to specifying functional requirements, and does not address how these functional requirements should be met."
  • No architecture. "There is insufficient detail in this document to design and build an integrated security architecture"; that is left to system integrators and product suppliers.
  • Not every component meets every SR. "It is not necessary that every component of the proposed control system support every system requirement to the level mandated in this standard."
  • Some SRs allow exceptions where meeting them "will violate fundamental operational requirements of a control system," which may trigger compensating countermeasures.
  • Its inputs. Key input included ISO/IEC 27002 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 3.

The preview also sets the priority: IACS security measures "should not have the potential to cause loss of essential services and functions, including emergency procedures."

Where does 62443-3-3 sit in the series?

ISA's own series diagram, reproduced in 62443-3-3's introduction, groups the series into four layers:

Group Parts
General 1-1 Terminology, concepts and models · 1-2 Master glossary of terms and abbreviations (TR) · 1-3 System security compliance metrics · 1-4 IACS security lifecycle and use-case (TR)
Policies & procedures 2-1 Requirements for an IACS security management system · 2-2 Implementation guidance for an IACS security management system (TR) · 2-3 Patch management in the IACS environment (TR) · 2-4 Installation and maintenance requirements for IACS suppliers
System 3-1 Security technologies for IACS (TR) · 3-2 Security levels for zones and conduits · 3-3 System security requirements and security levels
Component 4-1 Product development requirements · 4-2 Technical security requirements for IACS components

The standard's own clause 1.3 describes how the adjacent parts consume it: ISA-62443-3-2 "uses the SRs and REs as a checklist" — after a system under consideration is divided into zones and conduits with assigned target SLs, the SRs and REs from 62443-3-3 "are used to compile a list of requirements which the control system design needs to meet," and a completed design "can then be checked for completeness, thereby providing the SL-As." ISA-62443-4-1 "addresses the overall requirements during the development of products," deriving its product security requirements "from the list of baseline requirements and REs specified in" 62443-3-3. ISA-62443-4-2 "contains sets of derived requirements that provide a detailed mapping of the SRs specified in" 62443-3-3 "to subsystems and components of the SuC" — embedded devices, host devices, network devices and applications. See IEC 62443-4-2 vs the Cyber Resilience Act and EN 18031 for how that component-level mapping plays against EU device law, and IEC 62443-4-1: secure development lifecycle for the process side. The 2013 diagram names part 2-4 and the 3-2 title as they stood then; the ISA series page lists current titles, such as ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2-2020 "Security risk assessment for system design."

How does a project move from 3-2 to 3-3 to SL-A?

Following clause 1.3 of the preview, a typical project runs in five steps:

  1. Describe the system under considerationand split it into zones and conduits (IEC 62443-3-2).
  2. Assign a target level (SL-T)to each zone and conduit from the asset owner's risk assessment. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 §4.1.1 also points to ISA 62443-3-2 for example OT impact definitions (NIST PDF).
  3. Compile the requirement listfrom the 3-3 SRs and REs mapped to that level.
  4. Check the design for completeness, component by component, using SL-C claims (4-2 certificates where they exist) and compensating countermeasures where a component falls short.
  5. Record the achieved level (SL-A)per zone, with the documentation the standard asks for, and re-check after changes.

What are the four security levels, in general terms?

The standard's publicly available scope and introduction clauses don't reproduce the numeric SL1-4 definitions themselves (that detail sits further into the paywalled text). Independent technical overviews of the standard, including a Cisco engineering white paper on ISA/IEC 62443-3-3, describe the four capability levels consistently as a progression in attacker sophistication and resourcing:

Level General description (per Cisco's public 62443-3-3 overview)
SL 1 Protection against casual or coincidental misuse
SL 2 Protection against intentional misuse "using simple means, low resources, generic skills, and low motivation"
SL 3 Protection against intentional misuse "using sophisticated means, moderate resources, specific skills, and moderate motivation"
SL 4 Protection against intentional misuse "using sophisticated means, extensive resources, specific skills, and high motivation"

The exact wording of these four levels above is a secondary-source paraphrase, not a verbatim standard quote; the purchased ISA-62443-3-3 or IEC 62443-3-3 document carries the official text.

What evidence does each foundational requirement need?

The SR text is paywalled, but the seven FR names already tell a supplier which evidence to collect. The questions below are an index of our own, not the standard's wording; check each against the purchased SRs.

FR Question a reviewer asks of the system Typical evidence
FR1 IAC Are all human users, software processes and devices identified and authenticated? Account model, default-credential handling, authentication test results
FR2 UC Can each identified user only do what their role allows? Role matrix, authorization tests, session and lockout settings
FR3 SI Can tampering with software, firmware and data be prevented or detected? Signed update process, integrity checks, known-vulnerability status of components
FR4 DC Is sensitive data protected in transit and at rest? Protocol and cipher list, key handling description
FR5 RDF Is traffic limited between zones and conduits? Zone and conduit drawing, firewall rule sets, allowed protocol list
FR6 TRE Are security events logged and reported in time? Event list, log forwarding, incident response hand-over
FR7 RA Does the system keep running under load or attack? Robustness test results, backup and restore procedure, redundancy

How does ISASecure SSA certify a system?

IEC 62443-3-3 is not self-certifying; an accredited body has to test and attest to it. The ISA Security Compliance Institute's System Security Assurance (SSA) program (version 4.0.0, effective 28 August 2019) states its "FSA-S requirements for certification include all requirements in ISA/IEC 62443-3-3" together with the process requirements of ISA/IEC 62443-4-1, and that "the capability security levels for the FSA-S evaluation of a security zone within a system align with the ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 capability security levels and associated requirements." The SSA page lists four assessment elements:

Element What it checks Level-dependent?
SDLPA-S The supplier's development process against 62443-4-1 (results in an SDLA process certification) No level
SDA-S The artifacts that process produced for this system Same at all levels, except allowable residual risk
FSA-S The system's security capabilities, per zone, against 62443-3-3 Yes, per zone
VIT-S Known vulnerabilities in all components of the system Same at all levels, except allowable residual risk

Eligibility is narrow: the system must contain more than one component, be supplied and supported as a whole by a single supplier, and be under configuration control and version management. A system is submitted as one or more security zones with a declared capability level per zone; the certificate names the zones and their certified levels — it does not, by itself, prove the SL-T an asset owner needs has been met across a whole installed plant. Components inside the system are certified separately under ISASecure CSA against IEC 62443-4-2.

Which edition is current?

Edition 1.0. The IEC catalogue entry for IEC 62443-3-3:2013 shows a publication date of 2013-08-07, 80 pages, the April 2014 corrigendum included and a stability date of 2027. The ISA edition is ISA-62443-3-3-2013; ISA states its editions and the IEC ones are identical in content.

Worked example: how would a machine builder scope a packaging line?

Synthetic example: "PL-3" and its builder are invented for illustration. PL-3 is a packaging line with a PLC, an HMI panel, a safety controller, a managed switch and a remote-service router. The customer's risk assessment sets SL-T 2 for the line's control zone and SL-T 3 for the remote-access conduit.

  1. Draw zones and conduitsControl zone: PLC, HMI, switch. Safety zone: safety controller, kept separate. Conduit: the remote-service router to the builder's support centre.
  2. List the SRs for each levelfrom the purchased standard, then mark each as met natively, met by another component, or met by a compensating countermeasure.
  3. Check the component claimsThe PLC carries a 4-2 certificate at SL-C 2; the HMI panel has no certificate, so its account handling and logging are tested and documented directly.
  4. Handle the gapThe router's remote session meets FR1 at level 2 but the conduit needs 3. The builder adds a customer-side approval step and session recording at the customer's firewall, documented as a compensating countermeasure, as clause 1.2 expects.
  5. Collect FR3 evidenceFirmware SBOMs for the PLC, HMI and router, matched against public vulnerability data, show which known CVEs remain and which updates the builder will deliver.
  6. Hand over the SL-A record: per zone and conduit, what is met, how, and what the customer must operate (approval step, log review).

Takeaway. The SL-A record is a document the customer can audit. Most of its content comes from evidence the builder already produces for the Machinery Regulation and the CRA.

What should machine and system builders do in practice?

  1. Don't conflate SL-C with SL-TA product supplier can legitimately claim SL-C 2 for a component; that says nothing about whether SL-T 2 is actually the right target for the zone it will sit in — that call belongs to the asset owner's own risk assessment under 62443-3-2.
  2. Use the seven FRs as your evidence index, not a checklist to tick once. Organize what you already have under these seven headings before buying a gap assessment.
  3. Expect compensating countermeasures to need paperworkIf a control system can't meet an SR natively, the standard explicitly expects documented compensating measures, not a silent gap, to get from SL-C to a credible SL-A.
  4. Treat SR/RE counts and clause-level text from blogs and vendor pages as unverified secondary summaries, not the standard's own textThis guide states only what ISA's own free preview and series overview confirm.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • One level for the whole plant. SL-T is set per zone and conduit; a single number hides the zones that need more.
  • Assuming certified components make a certified system. SSA evaluates the integrated system; CSA certificates on parts are inputs.
  • Forgetting the operator's share. Compensating countermeasures that rely on customer procedures must be handed over and documented.
  • Skipping 2-1 and patch management. 3-3 assumes both exist.
  • Freezing the evidence. Known vulnerabilities in components change after delivery, so FR3 evidence needs updating; threat behaviour can be described with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS.

SoftWSP does not assess FRs or score security levels. For the known-vulnerability part of FR3 and SSA's VIT-S element, it extracts a firmware SBOM as CycloneDX JSON, matches components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, adds an indicative table of possibly relevant Machinery Regulation, CRA and IEC 62443-4-2 clauses (marked as not a conformity assessment), and drafts a cited report for engineer review: see device firmware security and machine builders. The wider OT context is in the NIST SP 800-82 guide.

This guide quotes ISA's publicly available preview of ISA-62443-3-3 and ISA-62443-1-1; it is not a substitute for the purchased standard and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What does IEC 62443-3-3 actually specify?

Its own scope clause states it "provides detailed technical control system requirements (SRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in ISA-62443-1-1 (99.01.01)... including defining the requirements for control system capability security levels, SL-C (control system)." In plain terms: it is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets technical requirements for an industrial control system as a whole (not a single component), organized under seven requirement categories, and graded into four capability levels.

What are the seven foundational requirements (FRs)?

As defined in ISA-62443-1-1 and restated verbatim in 62443-3-3's own scope clause: (1) Identification and authentication control (IAC), (2) Use control (UC), (3) System integrity (SI), (4) Data confidentiality (DC), (5) Restricted data flow (RDF), (6) Timely response to events (TRE), and (7) Resource availability (RA). Every detailed system requirement (SR) and requirement enhancement (RE) in the standard is filed under one of these seven.

What is the difference between SL-T, SL-C and SL-A?

They are three distinct uses of "security level" that the standard is careful to keep separate. The standard's own scope clause states that defining SL-C (control system) "is the goal and objective of this document as opposed to target SLs, SL-T, or achieved SLs, SL-A, which are out of scope" for 62443-3-3 itself. SL-T (target) is the level an asset owner decides a zone or conduit needs, set through the risk-assessment process in a separate part, ISA-62443-3-2. SL-C (capability) is what a system can provide natively, which is what 62443-3-3 defines. SL-A (achieved) is what a specific installed system actually delivers once built, including any compensating countermeasures — per the standard's own text, inclusion of compensating countermeasures "should be accompanied by comprehensive documentation so that the resulting achieved control system SL, SL-A(control system), fully reflects the intended security capabilities inherent in the design."

How does 62443-3-3 relate to 62443-4-1 and 62443-4-2?

62443-3-3 sits in the "System" group of the series; 62443-4-1 and 62443-4-2 sit in the "Component" group below it. The standard's own introduction states that 62443-4-1 "addresses the overall requirements during the development of products" and that its product security requirements "are derived from the list of baseline requirements and REs specified in" 62443-3-3, while 62443-4-2 "contains sets of derived requirements that provide a detailed mapping of the SRs specified in" 62443-3-3 "to subsystems and components" such as embedded devices, host devices, network devices and applications. In short: 3-3 sets the system-level bar; 4-1 and 4-2 break that bar down into what a single product-development process and a single component must deliver. See our [IEC 62443-4-2 vs CRA guide](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-vs-cra/) for the component-level detail.

Does meeting IEC 62443-3-3 give you a certification?

Only through a separate, named certification scheme — the standard itself is not self-certifying. The ISA Security Compliance Institute's System Security Assurance (SSA) program states that its "FSA-S requirements for certification include all requirements in ISA/IEC 62443-3-3" plus the process requirements of ISA/IEC 62443-4-1, and that "the capability security levels for the FSA-S evaluation of a security zone within a system align with the ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 capability security levels." A system can be submitted to an accredited certification body, such as under the ISASecure SSA scheme, with a certificate stating the SL-C achieved per zone — but the clause-by-clause requirement text itself is paywalled, so a manufacturer's own completeness claim should be confirmed against the purchased standard, not a summary.

Sources

  1. ISA: ISA-62443-3-3 (99.03.03)-2013 — official preview (Introduction, Scope clause 2, Normative references)
  2. ISA: ISA-62443-1-1 (99.01.01)-2007 — official preview (Introduction, Scope clause 1)
  3. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-3-3:2013 — Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-3
  4. ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
  5. ISASecure: IEC 62443 System Security Assurance (SSA) Certification
  6. Cisco: ISA/IEC-62443-3-3 overview white paper (Security Level 1-4 descriptions)
  7. ISASecure: IEC 62443 Component Security Assurance (CSA) Certification
  8. NIST: SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (PDF), §4.1.1
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IEC 62443-3-3: system security requirements and security levels, explained