The Purdue Model (formally the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture, or PERA) defines six levels — Level 0 through Level 5, running from the physical process up to enterprise IT — plus a Level 3.5 industrial DMZ wedged between the OT and IT sides, and it's this level-by-level hierarchy that most OT/ICS network diagrams still use to show where a given device or system sits and what it should and shouldn't be allowed to talk to directly. It started life in the early 1990s as a manufacturing-integration framework with no security purpose at all; the cybersecurity community adopted its level vocabulary afterward and added the security-specific pieces, most importantly the industrial DMZ, that make it useful for segmentation planning today.
Sources: the quotes and specifics below come from CISA's 2016 ICS-CERT defense-in-depth recommended practice, NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3, the IEC 62443 abstracts and the Industry IoT Consortium's reference architecture, cross-checked against Wikipedia's summary of Williams' original work and two independent secondary analyses (Fortinet, Claroty) for level naming and the 2024-2026 critique. All of them are listed under Sources at the end of this guide.
Key takeaways
- The model predates ICS cybersecurity as a field.
- A later addition, and this is the detail most short blog-post explainers get wrong.
- Adjacent levels only.
- The Purdue level vocabulary and the IEC 62443 series' zones and conduits vocabulary (see IEC 62443-1-1: concepts and models) describe overlapping but not identical things.
Where did the Purdue Model actually come from?
The model predates ICS cybersecurity as a field. Per Wikipedia's summary of the original work, the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture "is a 1990s reference model for enterprise architecture, developed by Theodore J. Williams and members of the Industry-Purdue University Consortium for Computer Integrated Manufacturing" — built to describe how a factory's business planning systems and shop-floor control systems should exchange data, not to define a security boundary. NIST's OT guide dates the first ISA publication of PERA to 1992 and notes that the ISA-95 enterprise-control integration standard grew from it. The International Society of Automation formalized the same level hierarchy as part of ANSI/ISA-95 (published internationally as IEC 62264), under the name "Purdue Reference Model '95," which is why practitioners sometimes call the whole thing "the ISA-95 model" interchangeably with "the Purdue Model." Only afterward did the ICS security community borrow this existing, already-familiar level vocabulary as a way to talk about network segmentation — CISA's 2016 ICS-CERT defense-in-depth guidance is one of the clearest early examples, listing the "SP-99 (Purdue) Model of Control" as a named element of its recommended secure network architecture.
What do the levels actually mean?
ISA-95's own Purdue Reference Model '95 defines five layers:
| Level | Name | What sits there |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Physical process | The actual equipment, sensors and actuators interacting with the physical world |
| 1 | Intelligent devices / basic control | PLCs, RTUs and other controllers automating individual processes |
| 2 | Control systems | SCADA systems and HMIs supervising and aggregating data from Level 1 controllers |
| 3 | Manufacturing / site operations systems | MES, historians and engineering workstations managing production across a site |
| 4 | Business logistics systems | Plant-level business applications and the connection point to corporate IT |
The version most commonly drawn in OT cybersecurity material today — including CISA's and most vendor glossaries' diagrams, and NIST SP 800-82r3, which refers to Purdue Levels 3, 4 and 5 — extends this by splitting the top layer into a Level 4 (site business/IT) and a Level 5 (enterprise network) for corporate-wide ERP, directory services and other business applications, and by inserting a Level 3.5 industrial DMZ between the OT side (Levels 0-3) and the IT side (Levels 4-5). That DMZ is where firewalls, jump hosts and data-replication servers live specifically so a corporate system never has to open a direct path into the control network — a well-configured DMZ means, per CISA's 2016 guidance, that "no direct communication paths are required from the corporate network to the control network" because each path "effectively ends in the DMZ."
Is the DMZ part of the original model, or a later addition?
A later addition, and this is the detail most short blog-post explainers get wrong. Williams' original 1990s work and ISA-95's formalization of it describe a data-flow hierarchy for manufacturing integration, with no security boundary anywhere in it — there was no Level 3.5 because the model was never meant to define one. The industrial DMZ is a security-community retrofit, introduced as ICS security practice matured and network segmentation became the primary tool for keeping a compromised corporate IT network from reaching production control systems directly. CISA's 2016 defense-in-depth recommended practice is a good anchor point for that retrofit: it explicitly frames the DMZ as a tool to reduce a specific risk — one interface facing the corporate network, one facing the control network, with firewall rules permitting only the narrow traffic a plant actually needs to cross. The residual risk CISA flags is just as important as the pattern itself: if an attacker compromises a DMZ host, the usual next move is to abuse whatever application traffic the firewall already permits from the DMZ into the control network, so DMZ servers need their own hardening, not just a position between two firewalls.
What traffic rules does NIST SP 800-82r3 attach to the levels?
NIST SP 800-82r3, section 5.2.3.1, lets an organisation organise its segmentation with the Purdue model, ISA-95 levels, the three-tier IIoT architecture or a combination of them, and then gives concrete rules:
- Adjacent levels only. Firewall rulesets "should be established to only permit connections between adjacent levels, tiers, or zones"; with a Purdue architecture, rules should "prevent Level 4 devices from directly communicating with Level 2, 1, or 0 devices."
- Outbound as strict as inbound. Outbound connections from lower levels "could represent a significant risk if unmanaged", so outbound rules should be as stringent as inbound ones.
- One-way where possible. A unidirectional gateway or data diode between Levels 2 and 3 can protect Levels 0-2 from an event at Levels 3, 4 or 5.
- Passive monitoring first. Network monitoring in OT typically uses SPAN ports or passive taps, and running it in a listen-only mode is often the first step.
- Level 0 has no authentication. Many Level 0 field devices and protocols "cannot be authenticated", which leaves room to replay, modify or spoof data (section 5.3.6).
How do Purdue levels map to IEC 62443 zones and conduits?
The Purdue level vocabulary and the IEC 62443 series' zones and conduits vocabulary (see IEC 62443-1-1: concepts and models) describe overlapping but not identical things. Purdue levels are a fixed, named hierarchy; zones are groups of assets an asset owner defines for its own system, and conduits are the communication paths between them. IEC 62443-3-2:2020 sets the process:
- Define the system under consideration (SUC).
- Partition it into zones and conduits.
- Assess risk for each zone and conduit.
- Set a target security level (SL-T) for each.
- Document the resulting security requirements.
IEC 62443-3-3 then supplies the system requirements and capability levels (SL-C) that are compared with those targets. A common first sketch, which the standard does not require:
| Purdue element | Typical first-cut zone | What changes after the risk assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Levels 0-1 of one line or cell | One control zone per line or cell | Safety controllers often split into their own zone |
| Level 2 | Supervisory zone (HMI, SCADA) | Can merge with the cell zone if risk is the same |
| Level 3 | Site operations zone | Engineering workstations often split out |
| Level 3.5 DMZ | Its own zone | Remote-access hosts often get a separate zone |
| Firewall rule between levels | Conduit | Each conduit gets its own SL-T and allowed flows |
Our IEC 62443-3-2 guide covers the risk-assessment steps in detail.
Do CISA and NIST still recommend it, or has zero trust replaced it?
Both bodies still use the level hierarchy as their working vocabulary for OT network architecture — it has not been withdrawn or formally replaced. NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3, "Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security" (published September 2023), continues to frame network architecture and segmentation recommendations around Purdue-style levels and zones, and CISA's 2016 defense-in-depth practice remains listed among CISA's current ICS recommended practices rather than withdrawn. On zero trust, NIST is specific: some PLCs, controllers and HMIs "may not support the technologies or protocols required" for a zero trust architecture, so it suggests applying ZTA to devices at "Purdue model Levels 3, 4, 5, and the OT DMZ." What has changed is the 2024-2026 industry conversation about the model's limits: secondary analysis — Claroty's June 2025 write-up is a representative example — argues that cloud analytics connections sending operational data off-site, third-party remote access for contractors and vendors, and centralized security-monitoring tools that pull data from multiple levels at once all create legitimate exceptions to a clean level-by-level boundary, and that those exceptions can "inadvertently create pathways that compromise the strict segmentation the Purdue Model advocates" if they aren't managed deliberately. The recommended response in that discussion is not to discard the Purdue levels but to add microsegmentation and context-aware access controls around individual assets or small groups of them, so that a single approved cloud or remote-access exception doesn't become a blanket hole through an entire level.
Where do IIoT, cloud and remote access break the hierarchy?
NIST's IIoT section (5.3.7) says IIoT "may require altering boundaries or exposing more interfaces and services." The reason is structural. The Industry IoT Consortium's Industrial Internet Reference Architecture v1.9 (June 2019) has three tiers — edge, platform and enterprise — and its enterprise tier "issues control commands to the platform tier and edge tier." In Purdue terms, that is Level 4 or 5 reaching Level 1 through a cloud platform: exactly the path the adjacent-level rule forbids.
| Exception | Level boundary it crosses | Mitigation in the sources above |
|---|---|---|
| Edge gateway sending sensor data to a cloud platform | Level 1 or 2 straight to the internet | Outbound-only rule to named endpoints, or a data diode where no commands are needed |
| Cloud application writing setpoints back | Enterprise to Level 1 | Treat as its own conduit with an SL-T; route through the DMZ |
| Vendor remote access (VPN, remote-desktop tools) | Internet to Level 2 or 3 | Jump host in the DMZ; see ATT&CK T0822 External Remote Services |
| Device exposed directly to the internet | Any level | Remove the exposure; T0883 Internet Accessible Device describes the risk |
| Central security monitoring | Reads from several levels | Passive taps and one-way collection |
Worked example: where does a cloud-connected condition-monitoring gateway go?
This is a hypothetical example, not a customer case. A packaging line has a PLC (Level 1), an HMI (Level 2) and a site historian (Level 3). A machine builder adds a vibration-monitoring gateway that reads the PLC over Modbus/TCP and sends data to the builder's cloud service.
Default placementPlugged into the line switch with its own cellular uplink, the gateway turns Level 1 into an internet-facing zone and bypasses the DMZ entirely. Zone itPut the gateway in its own zone with a conduit to the PLC that allows only Modbus/TCP from the gateway's address, limited to read function codes where the firewall can inspect Modbus. Route the uplinkSend its cloud traffic through the DMZ, outbound only, to the builder's documented endpoints; remove the cellular modem. Separate remote supportRemote maintenance goes through the site's DMZ jump host, not the gateway's own tunnel. VerifyA passive capture after commissioning should show only the expected flows: gateway to PLC on Modbus and gateway to DMZ proxy.
What should a device maker document for a Purdue-style network?
Integrators place products in zones from what the manufacturer publishes. Useful documentation lists every listening port and protocol, every outbound connection and its destination, whether the product works through a proxy in the DMZ, which level it is designed for, and how remote support connects. CISA Secure by Demand for OT Products lists the questions asset owners ask, and IEC 62443-4-2 sets the component capabilities a zone design relies on.
See NIST SP 800-82: OT Security for the broader security-control framework this architecture sits inside, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS for how adversary behavior is mapped against exactly this kind of layered environment.
What is a workable starting point?
Use the Purdue levels as shared vocabulary, not a literal network diagram you must match exactlyThe value is in everyone — engineers, IT, auditors — agreeing on what "Level 2" or "the DMZ" means, not in forcing every device into a textbook position. Treat the Level 3.5 DMZ as the single highest-leverage segmentation investment if you don't already have oneA site with no buffer between corporate IT and control systems is the scenario CISA's guidance was written to prevent. Audit every exception to the hierarchy you already have, especially cloud-connected historians, remote-access tools for contractors, and centralized monitoring agents that reach into Level 1 or 2 — these are exactly the connections 2024-2026 analysis flags as the model's real-world weak points. Don't assume Purdue levels and IEC 62443 zones/conduits are the same thingMap your own zones deliberately; borrowing the Purdue diagram as a starting sketch is fine, but your actual zone boundaries should reflect your own asset grouping and risk, not just redrawn Purdue levels. Know what's actually on each level before arguing about where to put the firewallA passive network capture answers that question factually rather than from an as-built diagram that may be years out of date.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Allowing Level 4 to reach Level 2 "just for the historian". NIST's adjacent-level rule exists for exactly this case; replicate the data into the DMZ instead.
- Inbound rules only. Unmanaged outbound traffic from Levels 1-3 is how many cloud and remote-access tools get out.
- A DMZ that is a pass-through. A firewall rule that forwards straight from Level 4 to Level 3 through the DMZ is not a DMZ.
- Counting Level 0 as protected by position. Field devices that cannot authenticate need monitoring or physical controls.
- Treating one approved exception as a level-wide rule. Scope each cloud or vendor connection to named hosts and ports.
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot works from a passive capture of a shop-floor mirror port. It lists which hosts talked, over which ports and protocols and in which direction, flags SSH, Telnet, RDP and VNC sessions where an external address reaches an internal one, and labels the server side of Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP and BACnet sessions. It does not assign Purdue levels or zones; an engineer compares the observed flows with the intended design. See OT Snapshot.
This guide draws on CISA's and NIST's published OT/ICS security materials, the IEC 62443 abstracts and the IIC reference architecture, cross-checked against Wikipedia's summary of the model's original academic source and independent secondary analysis (Fortinet, Claroty) for details not found with the same specificity in the primary documents. This guide is not a substitute for CISA's or NIST's own publications, or for an engineer's assessment of a specific plant's network.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the Purdue Model, and where does it actually come from?
It is a reference architecture for organizing a plant's computing and control systems into hierarchical levels, originally built for manufacturing integration, not cybersecurity. Per Wikipedia's summary (itself drawn from Theodore J. Williams' own published work), the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) "is a 1990s reference model for enterprise architecture, developed by Theodore J. Williams and members of the Industry-Purdue University Consortium for Computer Integrated Manufacturing" — aimed at planning how a factory's business and control systems should exchange data, years before IT/OT network security was a distinct discipline. The International Society of Automation later folded the same hierarchy into its ANSI/ISA-95 standard, which is why the model is also sometimes called the ISA-95 model. The security community adopted and extended it afterward, most visibly in CISA's 2016 ICS-CERT defense-in-depth guidance, which lists the "SP-99 (Purdue) Model of Control" as a core element of recommended secure network architecture.
What do the Purdue Model's levels actually mean?
They describe a progression from physical equipment up to corporate IT, with a security-only buffer zone inserted partway up. ISA-95's own formalization, the Purdue Reference Model '95, defines five layers: Level 0 (physical process), Level 1 (intelligent devices/basic control, i.e. sensors, actuators, PLCs and RTUs), Level 2 (control systems — SCADA and HMIs supervising those controllers), Level 3 (manufacturing/site operations systems — MES, historians, engineering workstations), and Level 4 (business logistics systems). The version most commonly cited in OT cybersecurity material today, including CISA's and vendor glossaries' versions, splits that top layer into Level 4 (site business/IT) and Level 5 (enterprise network — ERP, directory services, corporate-wide business applications), and inserts a **Level 3.5 industrial DMZ** between the OT levels (0-3) and the IT levels (4-5) to hold firewalls, jump hosts and data replication servers so the two sides never connect directly.
Is the Level 3.5 industrial DMZ part of the original Purdue Model?
No — this is a detail most short explainers get wrong. The original 1990s Williams/ISA-95 reference architecture has no DMZ layer at all; it describes a manufacturing data-flow hierarchy, not a security boundary. The industrial DMZ was a later addition by the ICS security community to address a problem the original model's authors were not trying to solve. CISA's 2016 defense-in-depth recommended practice is one of the clearest statements of this addition: it describes placing corporate-accessible components in a DMZ specifically so that "no direct communication paths are required from the corporate network to the control network" and each path "effectively ends in the DMZ," with firewall rules restricting what can cross it. In other words, what most people call "the Purdue Model" in a security context is really the original PERA/ISA-95 level hierarchy plus a security-community retrofit, not a single document written all at once.
Do CISA and NIST still recommend the Purdue Model in 2026, or has zero trust replaced it?
Both bodies still reference the level hierarchy, but the 2024-2026 industry discussion treats zero trust as a layer added on top of it rather than a replacement. NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3, "Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security" (published September 2023), continues to use Purdue-style levels and zones to frame its network architecture and segmentation recommendations, and CISA's 2016 defense-in-depth practice — still listed among CISA's current ICS recommended practices — remains a standard reference for the DMZ pattern. Current secondary analysis (for example, Claroty's June 2025 write-up) argues the strict hierarchy is strained by cloud analytics connections, third-party remote access and centralized security-monitoring tools that all create exceptions to clean level-by-level segmentation, and recommends adding microsegmentation and context-aware access controls around individual assets rather than relying on broad level boundaries alone. The emerging consensus is to keep the Purdue levels as the shared vocabulary for describing where things sit, while tightening what is actually allowed to cross each boundary — not to tear the model down.
Sources
- Wikipedia: Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (origin, Theodore J. Williams, ISA-95 Purdue Reference Model '95 levels)
- CISA / NCCIC ICS-CERT: Recommended Practice — Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (2016; SP-99/Purdue Model of Control, industrial DMZ pattern)
- NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (September 2023)
- Fortinet Cyberglossary: What Is the Purdue Model for ICS Security? (level definitions, modern IIoT/cloud challenges)
- Claroty: Beyond the Purdue Model — ICS Security in Modern, Complex Network Architectures (30 June 2025)
- NIST SP 800-82r3 full text (PDF): §5.2.3.1 network architecture, §5.2.3.4 zero trust, §5.3.6 Level 0, §5.3.7 IIoT, Appendix D.1.5.1 ISA-95/PERA
- IEC 62443-3-2:2020 Security risk assessment for system design — IEC webstore abstract (SUC, zones and conduits, SL-T)
- IEC 62443-3-3:2013 System security requirements and security levels — IEC webstore abstract
- Industry IoT Consortium: Industrial Internet Reference Architecture v1.9 (19 June 2019), §7.1.1 three-tier architecture pattern
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: T0822 External Remote Services
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: T0883 Internet Accessible Device
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