On 19 August 2026, the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA issued joint advisory AA26-231A, warning of active reconnaissance and tool-building against internet-exposed Siemens S7 PLCs. S7comm — Siemens' proprietary protocol for programming, monitoring and controlling its S7 family of PLCs (S7-200, S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200 and S7-1500) over TCP port 102 — is why: the protocol was designed for isolated plant networks and carries no authentication for most operations, the same structural gap that keeps DNP3 and Modbus hardware showing up in CISA advisories too, so whatever actually stops an attacker has to come from credentials, patching and network segmentation, not the protocol itself.
Key takeaways
- On 19 August 2026, the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA issued joint advisory AA26-231A, warning of active reconnaissance and tool-building against internet-exposed Siemens S7 PLCs.
- An S7comm message is three layers deep.
- The newer families are not free of protocol-level findings either.
- On the newer CPUs, much of the exposure comes from configuration, not missing patches.
What is S7comm, and why does it have no authentication by default?
S7comm was built for a generation of PLCs installed on networks that were never expected to touch the internet, and the protocol's structure reflects that assumption: most read and write operations carry no credential, session token or message signature, so any device that can reach a PLC's TCP port 102 can issue commands it will accept. Siemens addressed this with S7CommPlus, introduced with firmware updates in 2014 for the S7-1200 and S7-1500 families (firmware version 4.0 and later), adding encryption and authentication. That leaves a real split in the installed base: S7CommPlus-capable hardware running current firmware gets a meaningfully stronger protocol, while the S7-200, S7-300 and S7-400 families — many installed decades ago and still in service — have no equivalent option and communicate in the clear over plain S7comm.
What does an S7comm exchange look like on the wire?
An S7comm message is three layers deep. TCP port 102 carries TPKT framing (RFC 1006), which carries an ISO COTP connection, which carries the S7 header and parameters. The S7 header's ROSCTR field says what kind of message it is: Job (a request), Ack_Data (a response with data) or Userdata (diagnostics and other extended functions). The parameter's function code then says what the request does. Wireshark's S7comm dissector (packet-s7comm.c) names the codes a defender cares about:
| Function code | Wireshark name | What it does | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0xF0 | Setup communication | Opens the S7 session after the COTP connection | Marks every new client; a new source host is worth a look |
| 0x04 | Read Var | Reads memory areas (data blocks, inputs, outputs, markers) | Normal HMI and SCADA traffic |
| 0x05 | Write Var | Writes memory areas | Changes process values with no credential check |
| 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C | Request download, Download block, Download ended | Sends program blocks to the PLC | Changes the logic the PLC runs |
| 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F | Start upload, Upload, End upload | Reads program blocks off the PLC | Program theft or reconnaissance |
| 0x28 | PI-Service | Program-invocation services, including PLC start/stop (P_PROGRAM) and copy RAM to ROM (_MODU) | Changes the CPU's state |
| 0x29 | PLC Stop | Stops the CPU | Stops the process the PLC controls |
Userdata messages also carry SZL (system status list) reads, which return CPU identification and diagnostic data. A burst of SZL reads from a host that has never talked to the PLC usually means someone is finding out exactly which CPU and firmware they are looking at.
What did CISA's August 2026 advisory actually find?
On 19 August 2026, the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA published a joint cybersecurity advisory, AA26-231A, "Defending Against an Active Threat to Siemens S7 Series PLCs," covering the S7-200, S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200 (CPU variants 1211C through 1217C) and S7-1500 families, including F-series safety controllers. The finding at the center of the advisory is about tooling, not a new flaw: threat actors are combining snap7.dll and python-snap7 — open-source libraries built to talk to Siemens PLCs over S7comm — with AI-assisted scripting to produce custom tools that mimic legitimate OT monitoring software, giving read and write access to PLC memory, configuration data and ladder-logic programs. Attackers find targets first using internet-scanning services such as Censys and ZoomEye to identify internet-exposed or insufficiently segmented S7 devices, the same discovery method named in CISA's broader Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance. The EPA's presence among the issuing agencies signals water utilities as a primary intended audience, alongside energy and manufacturing operators also named in the advisory's scope.
Is this a new vulnerability, or a known exposure problem?
CISA's own advisory enumerates no new vulnerabilities — it defers generically to Siemens ProductCERT and existing CISA ICS advisories for specific CVEs — and describes the activity as exploiting known vulnerabilities, weak or default credentials, and unnecessary internet exposure. Siemens' own public statement reinforces this: the company said it had not identified new vulnerabilities or an elevated attack volume in its ICS product line, and that AA26-231A describes methods that may exploit misconfigurations its guidance already addresses, not a newly discovered flaw. In other words, the change is in attacker tradecraft and scale — AI-generated exploitation scripts built on long-available open-source tooling — not in the underlying attack surface. That framing lines up with a pattern that long predates this advisory: CISA's 2011-era ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B documented a hardcoded user name and password giving access to internal diagnostic functions in older S7-300 PLCs, such as those with integrated Profinet interfaces shipped before October 2009, discovered in the wave of post-Stuxnet ICS research — a different, older flaw, but the same underlying lesson that S7-family exposure has been a known, documented risk for well over a decade.
Which Siemens advisories matter for S7-1200 and S7-1500?
The newer families are not free of protocol-level findings either. Three Siemens ProductCERT advisories cover the issues that reach the S7 communication path on TCP port 102 or the keys protecting it:
| Advisory | CVE | Issue (Siemens wording, shortened) | Fixed firmware (CPU family) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSA-232418 | CVE-2019-10929 | Integrity-protection weakness lets a man-in-the-middle modify traffic on 102/tcp (CVSS 3.7) | S7-1200 V4.4.0; S7-1500 V2.8.1 |
| SSA-232418 | CVE-2019-10943 | User program can be modified so the running code differs from the stored source (CVSS 5.3) | S7-1200 V4.4.0; S7-1500 V2.8.1; S7-1500 Software Controller V20.8. As of 2026-11-19, V1.4 (9 August 2022) lists no fix for firmware at or above those versions; Siemens recommends password protection for S7 communication |
| SSA-434534 | CVE-2020-15782 | Memory protection bypass: remote unauthenticated attacker on 102/tcp could write data and code to protected memory (CVSS 8.1) | S7-1200 V4.5.0; S7-1500 V2.9.2 |
| SSA-568427 | CVE-2022-38465 | Built-in global private key insufficiently protected; affects legacy PG/PC and HMI communication (CVSS 9.3) | S7-1200 V4.5.0; S7-1500 V2.9.2, plus project migration |
Both SSA-232418 findings were reported by researchers from the Technion and Tel Aviv University; CVE-2020-15782 and CVE-2022-38465 were both disclosed by Claroty. The last row needs more than a firmware update, as the next section shows.
Does this connect to a broader exposure pattern?
Yes — CISA's separate AA26-097A advisory (7 April 2026, updated 22 July 2026), on Iranian-affiliated actors exploiting internet-exposed PLCs across US critical infrastructure, explicitly named Siemens S7-1200 devices alongside Rockwell and Schneider Electric hardware as targets reached directly over the internet, including via cellular-modem connections. See CISA BOD 23-02: what it requires, and what OT/ICS operators should take from it for how this same internet-exposed-management-interface pattern plays out in CISA's federal IT guidance, and why the agency keeps repeating the same remediation advice across both worlds.
Which settings close the most exposure on S7-1200 and S7-1500?
On the newer CPUs, much of the exposure comes from configuration, not missing patches. Work through these in the TIA Portal project:
Leave PUT/GET off unless a partner needs itThe setting is under Properties > Protection & Security > Connection mechanisms, "Permit access with PUT/GET communication from remote partner." The python-snap7 project, one of the libraries named in AA26-231A, documents that this classic S7 path "has no authentication, which is why Siemens disables it by default" (PLC support matrix), and warns that the setting "allows any network client to read and write PLC memory without authentication" (TIA Portal configuration). Set an access-protection password for S7 communicationIt is the mitigation Siemens lists in both SSA-232418 and SSA-434534. Block remote clients entirely where none are needed, using the ENDIS_PW instruction or the S7-1500 display's access protection. SSA-434534 notes these block remote client connections "even when the client can provide the correct password." Move to TIA Portal V17 or later and select "Only allow secure PG/PC and HMI communication."Siemens bulletin SSB-898115 explains that this protects PG/PC and HMI traffic with TLS 1.3 and replaces the global key with an individual password per device for confidential configuration data. It also warns that a firmware update alone is not enough: the project's hardware configuration must be updated and downloaded too. For S7-300 and S7-400, rely on the networkThese families have no equivalent settings, so place them in their own zone with port 102 reachable only from named engineering and HMI hosts, as described in the Purdue model guide and Siemens' operational guidelines for industrial security.
How do you monitor S7comm passively?
CISA's open-source Zeek parser, ICSNPP-S7COMM, decodes S7comm, S7comm-plus and COTP from a network tap or SPAN port and writes five logs: cotp.log, s7comm.log (one line per message, with ROSCTR and function code and name), s7comm_read_szl.log, s7comm_upload_download.log and s7comm_plus.log. Nothing is sent to the PLC. Rules that catch the AA26-231A tradecraft without drowning the team:
- Any new client on TCP/102, and any Setup communication from a host outside the HMI and engineering allowlist.
- Write Var (0x05) from anything except the HMI or SCADA servers that normally write.
- Download, PI-Service or PLC Stop (0x1A–0x1C, 0x28, 0x29) outside a change window. These map to ATT&CK for ICS techniques such as T0843 Program Download; see the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS guide.
- Upload sequences (0x1D–0x1F) from an unknown host, which match T0845 Program Upload.
- Classic S7comm to an S7-1200 or S7-1500. The python-snap7 docs note these CPUs natively speak S7CommPlus and only serve classic S7 as a compatibility feature through PUT/GET. Plain
s7comm.loglines for one of them mean PUT/GET is enabled and a non-TIA client is talking.
What does an S7comm traffic review look like? (worked example)
Synthetic example. The plant, addresses and counts are invented for illustration.
A machine builder records 24 hours of traffic on a packaging-line cell before handing it over, then runs the capture through Zeek with ICSNPP. The cell has one S7-1500 PLC (10.20.1.100), one HMI (10.20.1.10) and one engineering workstation (10.20.1.50). The summary shows three clients on port 102:
| Client | Log | Messages (24 h) | Functions seen | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10.20.1.10 (HMI) | s7comm_plus.log |
86,400 | S7CommPlus reads and writes | Expected |
| 10.20.1.50 (engineering) | s7comm_plus.log |
412 | S7CommPlus session during the 14:00 change window | Expected, matches change ticket |
| 10.20.9.33 (unknown) | s7comm.log, s7comm_read_szl.log |
237 | Setup communication, 14 SZL reads, 220 Read Var, 3 Write Var | Investigate |
The third row trips three rules at once: a new client, classic S7comm on an S7-1500, and writes from outside the allowlist. The team finds a commissioning laptop running a Python data logger, removes it, clears PUT/GET in the project, downloads the change and compares the online and offline programs. Finally, it limits port 102 on the cell switch to the HMI and the engineering workstation.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Assuming an S7-1500 means S7CommPlus everywhere. PUT/GET reopens classic, unauthenticated S7comm on the same CPU.
- Updating CPU firmware but not the TIA Portal project, which leaves the SSA-568427 legacy communication path in place (SSB-898115).
- Trusting traffic because it looks like monitoring software. AA26-231A describes tools built to mimic exactly that.
- Alerting on port 102 alone. Without function codes, every HMI poll looks like an attack, or nothing does.
- Forgetting cellular modems and remote-access boxes, the exposure path AA26-097A describes.
- Expecting S7-300 and S7-400 to be patched into safety. Their protection is the network around them.
What should a Siemens S7 asset owner check first?
In the order CISA's own advisories weight them:
Inventory every S7 device and engineering workstation, with model and firmware version — you cannot assess exposure or patch status for hardware you haven't listed. Confirm none are reachable from the public internetBoth AA26-231A and AA26-097A put removing or restricting internet exposure first, and both describe attackers finding targets via the same public scanning services (Censys, Shodan, ZoomEye) a defender can use against their own footprint first. Apply current patchesreferenced in Siemens ProductCERT advisories (such as SSA-568427's weak-key-protection fix for S7-1200/S7-1500 CPU families) and the corresponding CISA ICS advisories for the specific models in use. Replace default or weak credentials and restrict engineering-software access(TIA Portal, STEP 7) to allowlisted, hardened workstations — AA26-231A names weak and default credentials as one of the three conditions attackers are actively exploiting. Watch for AA26-231A's specific hunt indicators: anomalous S7comm activity on port 102 outside scheduled change windows, sequential network scanning behavior, and Python processes importing the snap7 library on engineering workstations.
A passive capture is a practical way to start on steps 1 and 2 without touching a running PLC. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a recorded segment and lists which hosts speak S7comm, which side of each session they sit on, and which remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) cross from outside the private address range. A capture does not show a CPU's order number or firmware. Once you have those from the TIA Portal project or a component list, SoftWSP matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's ICS advisories, and a watchlist can alert on a Siemens product or a specific CVE. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.
Dates, affected product lists and technical details above are drawn directly from CISA's AA26-231A and AA26-097A advisory pages, CISA's 2011 ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B, Siemens ProductCERT documents SSA-232418, SSA-434534, SSA-568427 and SSB-898115, the Wireshark S7comm dissector, CISA's ICSNPP-S7COMM parser and the python-snap7 documentation. This guide is general information, not a substitute for Siemens' own product-specific security guidance or a current CISA ICS advisory search for your exact hardware and firmware version.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Does S7comm have built-in authentication or encryption?
No. S7comm is Siemens' proprietary protocol for communication with S7-200, S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200 and S7-1500 PLCs, running over TCP port 102, and it was designed for an era of isolated plant networks rather than internet connectivity. The base protocol has no native authentication or encryption for most read and write operations, and as a proprietary (not openly published) protocol it also lacks the kind of public documentation that lets independent researchers and defenders fully assess it the way an open standard like Modbus or DNP3 can be. Siemens introduced an authenticated, encrypted successor, S7CommPlus, starting with firmware updates in 2014 for the S7-1200 and S7-1500 families.
What did CISA's August 2026 advisory on Siemens S7 PLCs actually find?
On 19 August 2026, the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA issued a joint cybersecurity advisory, AA26-231A, titled 'Defending Against an Active Threat to Siemens S7 Series PLCs,' covering the full S7-200, S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200 (1211C through 1217C CPU variants) and S7-1500 (including F-series safety controllers) product families. The advisory describes threat actors pairing open-source industrial automation libraries — specifically snap7.dll and python-snap7 — with AI-assisted scripting to build custom tools that mimic legitimate OT monitoring software, giving read and write access to PLC memory, configuration data and ladder logic over the S7comm protocol on TCP port 102. Attackers use internet-scanning services such as Censys and ZoomEye to find internet-exposed or insufficiently segmented S7 devices first.
Is AA26-231A describing a new vulnerability in Siemens S7 PLCs?
No — the advisory itself enumerates no new vulnerabilities, deferring to Siemens ProductCERT and existing CISA ICS advisories for specific CVEs, and describes exploitation of known weaknesses (weak or default credentials, unnecessary internet exposure) rather than a previously undisclosed flaw. Siemens has stated it has not identified new vulnerabilities or an elevated attack volume in its product line, framing AA26-231A as describing a change in attacker tradecraft and scale — AI-assisted tooling built on existing open-source libraries — rather than a new hole in the protocol or the hardware.
Does S7CommPlus fix the authentication problem?
Partially, and only where it is actually running. S7CommPlus adds encryption and authentication and is implemented in S7-1200 and S7-1500 PLCs running firmware version 4.0 or later, a real improvement over plain S7comm. It does not reach the large installed base of S7-200, S7-300 and S7-400 devices AA26-231A explicitly covers — those older families, many installed decades ago, communicate over plain S7comm with no equivalent available. Even on S7-1200/S7-1500 hardware capable of S7CommPlus, Siemens' own ProductCERT advisory SSA-568427 describes a separate weak-key-protection issue in how those CPU families protect a built-in global private key, which is a cryptographic implementation weakness distinct from whether S7CommPlus is enabled at all.
What should an asset owner running Siemens S7 PLCs check first?
In the order CISA's own advisories recommend: inventory every Siemens S7 device and engineering workstation on the network, including model and firmware version; confirm none are reachable from the public internet (AA26-097A's Iranian-PLC advisory and AA26-231A both start their mitigation lists with removing or restricting internet exposure); apply current firmware and engineering-software patches referenced in Siemens ProductCERT and CISA ICS advisories for the specific models in use; replace default or weak credentials and restrict TIA Portal/STEP 7 access to allowlisted engineering workstations; and watch for the specific AA26-231A hunt indicators — anomalous S7comm activity on port 102 outside change windows, sequential network scanning, and Python processes importing the snap7 library on engineering workstations.
Sources
- CISA/NSA/FBI/DOE/EPA Advisory AA26-231A: Defending Against an Active Threat to Siemens S7 Series PLCs (19 August 2026)
- CISA/FBI/NSA/EPA/DOE/US Cyber Command Advisory AA26-097A: Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure (7 April 2026, updated 22 July 2026)
- CISA ICS Alert ICS-ALERT-11-204-01B: Siemens S7-300/S7-400 Hardcoded Credentials, Update B
- Siemens ProductCERT SSA-568427: Weak Key Protection Vulnerability in SIMATIC S7-1200 and S7-1500 CPU Families
- CISA: Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance (resources-tools)
- Siemens ProductCERT SSA-232418: Vulnerabilities in SIMATIC S7-1200 and SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU Families (V1.4, 9 August 2022)
- Siemens ProductCERT SSA-434534: Memory Protection Bypass Vulnerability in SIMATIC S7-1200 and S7-1500 CPU Families (V1.1, 14 September 2021)
- Siemens ProductCERT SSB-898115: Remarks Regarding SSA-568427 (11 October 2022)
- Wireshark S7comm dissector source (packet-s7comm.c): ROSCTR and function-code tables
- CISA ICSNPP-S7COMM: Zeek parser for S7comm, S7comm-plus and COTP
- python-snap7 documentation: PLC Support Matrix (PUT/GET and S7CommPlus)
- python-snap7 documentation: TIA Portal Configuration (PUT/GET setting)
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