Red Lion's Sixnet RTUs, Sixnet and N-Tron industrial switches and Crimson-programmed HMIs and gateways sit at remote sites and on plant networks, and their main published flaws are authentication bypass, unauthenticated management over SNMP or the Sixnet UDR protocol, hard-coded keys and credentials, recoverable stored passwords and file-parsing memory bugs. The most severe are CVE-2023-42770 and CVE-2023-40151 in SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs (NVD 9.8), and the 2026 N-Tron 700 Series set fixed in firmware 3.11.1. None is in CISA's KEV catalog as of 2026-11-22. Patching, closing UDR over TCP and SNMP, and replacing end-of-life units are the core fixes.
Key takeaways
- Red Lion Controls is now part of HMS Networks.
- Neither Red Lion's advisories nor CISA's give port numbers for SNMP, TFTP or the Crimson download path, so confirm them on the device and in its manual.
- CISA's ICSA-23-320-01, published on 16 November 2023, credits Nitsan Litov of Claroty Research Team82 and says exploitation "could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute commands with high privileges".
- CISA's ICSA-26-281-01 was published on 8 October 2026 and updated on 15 October 2026 (Update A, CVSS v4.0 scores and links).
Where do Red Lion products sit in OT networks?
Red Lion Controls is now part of HMS Networks. HMS's page Red Lion and N-Tron are now part of HMS Networks says both brands are fully integrated after the acquisition, and HMS publishes their security advisories on its cybersecurity advisories page alongside Ewon, Anybus and Intesis. Older advisories were published by Red Lion itself under RLCSIM and RLCSB identifiers, which CISA's advisories still cite.
The product lines named in CISA and HMS advisories fall into four groups:
| Group | Products named in advisories | Typical place in the network |
|---|---|---|
| Sixnet RTUs | SixTRAK ST-IPm-8460 and ST-IPm-6350; VersaTRAK VT-mIPm-135-D, VT-mIPm-245-D, VT-IPm2m-213-D, VT-IPm2m-113-D | Remote telemetry at pump stations, wells and pipeline sites, polled by a SCADA host over IP or radio |
| Industrial switches and wireless | N-Tron 700 Series (700/7000 in the HMS advisory); N-Tron 702-W and 702M12-W wireless; Sixnet-Managed (SLX) industrial switches | Plant-floor and cabinet Ethernet, often managed by web GUI, CLI and SNMP |
| Cellular routers | Sixnet BT-5xxx and BT-6xxx M2M routers | Remote-site WAN link for RTUs and PLCs |
| Crimson software and devices | Crimson 3.0, 3.1 and 3.2 configuration software; DA50N; DA50A and DA70A (named in NVD's configuration for CVE-2023-5719) | Engineering workstation, HMIs and protocol-converting gateways |
HMS's Red Lion brand page describes Red Lion's HMIs and IIoT gateways and features a natural gas utility that used the FlexEdge DA50 to route cellular and satellite traffic to serial RTUs at 75 remote supply stations. That is the typical pattern: one gateway or router in front of several field devices that were never designed to face an untrusted network. CISA lists the deployment sectors per advisory: critical manufacturing for the Sixnet RTUs; commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing and information technology for the N-Tron 700 Series; and commercial facilities, energy, transportation systems and water and wastewater for the N-Tron 702-W.
How are Sixnet RTUs and N-Tron switches managed?
The management paths that advisories name are also the attack paths:
| Path | Products | What the advisories say |
|---|---|---|
| Sixnet UDR protocol, UDP/IP and TCP/IP | SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs | CISA's ICSA-23-320-01 names UDR port 1594 in its firewall workaround; with UDR-A enabled, messages over UDP get an authentication challenge and messages over TCP do not |
| Sixnet I/O Tool Kit | SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs | Used to load station configuration, including a custom rc.firewall file |
| SNMP and TFTP | N-Tron 700 Series | SNMP can retrieve configuration, change accounts and start firmware or bootloader upgrades without authentication; a TFTP transfer can be started through SNMP |
| Web GUI and CLI | N-Tron 700 Series, 702-W, SLX switches, DA50N | Web GUI reboot flaw on the 700 Series; XSS, CSRF and an undocumented root interface on the 702-W; hard-coded HTTPS and SSH keys on SLX switches |
| SSH and Telnet | DA50N | SSH enabled by default on trusted interfaces; Telnet available but CISA advises keeping it disabled |
| Crimson project files and device database | Crimson 3.x and Crimson-based devices | Malicious project files, and a Crimson 3.1 default configuration that allowed database reads and writes without authentication |
Neither Red Lion's advisories nor CISA's give port numbers for SNMP, TFTP or the Crimson download path, so confirm them on the device and in its manual. Whatever the port, the BOD 23-02 guide on internet-exposed management interfaces explains how to confirm exposure from outside rather than trusting the configuration.
What did CISA's Sixnet RTU advisory cover?
CISA's ICSA-23-320-01, published on 16 November 2023, credits Nitsan Litov of Claroty Research Team82 and says exploitation "could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute commands with high privileges". It cites Red Lion's advisory RLCSIM-2023-05, titled "Authentication Bypass and Remote Code Execution".
| CVE | Flaw, per CISA | CISA score (CVSS v3.0) | NVD score (CVSS v3.1) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-42770 | CWE-288: with authenticated users enabled (UDR-A), a Sixnet UDR message over TCP/IP is accepted with no authentication challenge, while the same message over UDP/IP is challenged | 10.0 | 9.8 |
| CVE-2023-40151 | CWE-749: when user authentication is not enabled, the shell can execute commands with the highest privileges | 10.0 | 9.8 |
CISA's CSAF lists the ST-IPm-8460 on firmware 6.0.202 and later and the ST-IPm-6350, VT-mIPm-135-D, VT-mIPm-245-D, VT-IPm2m-213-D and VT-IPm2m-113-D on firmware 4.9.114 and later as affected; NVD's configuration names those exact builds. NVD's text for CVE-2023-40151 repeats the UDR-over-TCP sentence after the shell sentence; use CISA's CWE assignments to tell the two apart. The pair needs two separate fixes: authentication must be turned on, and UDR over TCP must be blocked.
The remediation is a set of Red Lion patches, not a new firmware release:
- Patch 1, block all UDR over TCP: 8313_patch1_tcp_udr_all_blocked.tar.gz for the ST-IPm-8460, 855_patch1_tcp_udr_all_blocked.tar.gz for the five other models.
- Patch 2, I/O only: 8313_patch2_io_open.tar.gz or 855_patch2_io_open.tar.gz blocks all Sixnet UDR messages except I/O commands over both TCP/IP and UDP/IP.
- Firewall workaround: in the Sixnet I/O Tool Kit, load a custom rc.firewall file with each station load that drops inbound TCP to port 1594. CISA's text warns that two default rules (INPUT and FORWARD policies set to DROP) must be removed first, because with them the rule set blocks all traffic into the interface.
- Enable user authentication on every RTU.
This is not the first time the UDR protocol has been the problem. CISA's ICSA-13-231-01B covers CVE-2013-2802, where the universal protocol in Sixnet UDR before 2.0 and RTU firmware before 4.8 let remote attackers execute code and read, modify or create files through function opcodes (NVD 10.0, CVSS v2). RTU firmware 4.8 added authentication. Ten years later, the TCP path skipped it.
What did the 2026 N-Tron 700 Series advisory cover?
CISA's ICSA-26-281-01 was published on 8 October 2026 and updated on 15 October 2026 (Update A, CVSS v4.0 scores and links). It credits Gabrianna (Ria) Milloway of Idaho National Laboratory and covers N-Tron 700 Series firmware 3.11.0 and earlier and bootloader 2.0.6.1 and earlier. HMS's matching advisory HMSSAR-2025-06-02-001, initial release 11 October 2026, names "all products in the N-Tron 700/7000 series".
| CVE | Flaw, per CISA and HMS | CISA score (CVSS v3.1 / v4.0) | HMS score (CVSS v3.1) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-32645 | Default factory credentials with administrative access stay enabled after other administrator accounts are configured | 6.0 / 9.2 | 6.1 |
| CVE-2026-39460 | Usernames and passwords, including the defaults, stored in plaintext in the configuration file, which can be exported by TFTP started through unauthenticated SNMP | 8.1 / 9.3 | 8.1 |
| CVE-2026-28745 | Credentials stored in the configuration file with weak encryption | 7.5 / 9.3 | 7.1 |
| CVE-2026-33367 | SNMP can retrieve configuration, modify accounts and settings and start firmware or bootloader upgrades or downgrades without authentication | 8.1 / 9.3 | 8.1 |
| CVE-2026-29797 | No authentication for firmware or bootloader updates; anyone with the same software can find N-Tron devices and push or pull firmware over SNMP and TFTP | 7.1 / 8.4 | 7.1 |
| CVE-2026-39453 | A specific URL on the web server reboots the switch, which can be scripted for continuous reboots | 8.3 / 8.5 | 8.3 |
| CVE-2026-33272 | With physical access, boot from factory settings without authentication, log in with default credentials and persist changes | 4.9 / 6.8 | 4.9 |
As of 2026-11-22, NVD lists all seven as Awaiting Analysis with only CISA's scores, so no NVD score exists yet. CISA's remediation is firmware 3.11.1 or later, configuring or disabling the SNMP communities and disabling access to the web GUI. HMS's PDF is less consistent: it says default factory credentials are disabled in firmware 3.11.0, which it also lists as affected, and names 3.11.1 for the reboot flaw. Plan on 3.11.1 or later, and change the default SNMP v2 public and private communities or disable SNMP regardless, since HMS's own answer to CVE-2026-29797 is that "checksum is used to validate the integrity of the firmware", which is not authentication. The Net-SNMP guide covers why v2c communities are shared secrets.
Which older Red Lion network device flaws still matter?
Several older advisories concern hardware that may still be in service:
| Advisory | Product and CVEs | Affected and fixed | Scores |
|---|---|---|---|
| CISA ICSA-20-240-01 (27 August 2020) | N-Tron 702-W and 702M12-W: CVE-2020-16204 undocumented interface, root commands; CVE-2020-16206 stored XSS; CVE-2020-16208 CSRF; CVE-2020-16210 reflected XSS; CVE-2017-16544 outdated BusyBox | All versions; discontinued in 2018 and cannot be updated | CISA and NVD: 9.8, 9.0, 8.8, 9.0, 8.8 (CVSS v3) |
| CISA ICSA-15-160-01A | N-Tron 702-W: CVE-2012-4716 same SSH and HTTPS private keys across installations | Firmware 2.0.24 lets users upload unique keys and certificates | NVD 8.8 (CVSS v2) |
| CISA ICSA-17-054-02 (23 February 2017) | Sixnet-Managed Industrial Switches 5.0.196 and earlier, AutomationDirect Stride-Managed switches 5.0.190 and earlier: CVE-2016-9335 hard-coded HTTP SSL/SSH keys | SLX firmware 5.3.174 | NVD 10.0 (CVSS v3.0) |
| CISA ICSA-16-147-02 | Sixnet BT-5xxx and BT-6xxx M2M routers: CVE-2016-4521 hard-coded credentials | Before 3.8.21 and 3.9.x before 3.9.8; fixed in 3.8.21 or 3.9.8 | NVD 9.8 (CVSS v3.0) |
The common thread is shared secrets: identical private keys, factory credentials and undocumented interfaces. The guide to hard-coded credentials in embedded firmware explains why one extracted key or password then works on every unit. The 702-W's BusyBox flaw is covered in the BusyBox guide.
What are the Crimson and DA50N vulnerability families?
Crimson is Red Lion's Windows configuration software for its HMIs and gateways. Its CVEs fall into three groups: malicious project files, credential handling, and the runtime protocol converter.
| Advisory | CVEs and flaw | Affected and fixed | Scores |
|---|---|---|---|
| CISA ICSA-23-306-01 (2 November 2023), Red Lion RLCSIM-2023-04 | CVE-2023-5719: a password containing % that is downloaded from the Crimson 3.2 tool can be truncated at a NUL, leaving a weaker credential; passwords set through the device's web server are not affected | Crimson 3.2.0053.18 and earlier; fixed in 3.2.0063 or later | CISA 8.8, NVD 9.8 (CVSS v3.1) |
| CISA ICSA-22-321-01 (17 November 2022), Red Lion RLCSB-2022ST31 | CVE-2022-3090: opening a file using a specific path sends the user's password hash to an arbitrary host | Crimson 3.0 707.000 and earlier, 3.1 3126.001 and earlier, 3.2 3.2.0044.0 and earlier; CISA lists 711.00, 3126.02 and "3.0045" | CISA 7.5, NVD 5.3 |
| CISA ICSA-21-005-04 (5 January 2021), reported through Trend Micro ZDI | CVE-2020-27279 NULL pointer dereference in the protocol converter reboots the device; CVE-2020-27285 default configuration allows database reads and writes without authentication; CVE-2020-27283 memory leak | Crimson 3.1 before build 3119.001 | 27279: CISA 7.5, NVD 7.5; 27285: CISA 6.5, NVD 9.1; 27283: CISA 4.3, NVD 5.3 |
| CISA ICSA-19-248-01 (5 September 2019) | CVE-2019-10996 use after free, CVE-2019-10984 pointer mishandling and CVE-2019-10978 out-of-bounds access, all through a malicious file opened by a valid user; CVE-2019-10990 hard-coded password encrypting protected files | Crimson 3.0 and earlier and 3.1 before release 3112.00; migrate to 3.1 release 3112.00 or later | 10996 and 10984: 7.8; 10978: CISA 3.3, NVD 7.8; 10990: 6.5 |
For CVE-2019-10990, CISA notes that the Crimson 3.1 manual now says the database protection mechanism is not designed to be cryptographically secure. Treat Crimson project files as sensitive and open only files from trusted sources, as CISA advises for CVE-2022-3090.
The DA50N is end-of-life, and CISA's ICSA-22-104-03 of 14 April 2022 says Red Lion will not release an update. NVD describes CVE-2022-1039 as weak passwords on the web interface and on Linux accounts reachable through SSH, enabled by default on trusted interfaces, or Telnet, with escalation to root through su (CISA 9.6, NVD 9.8); CVE-2022-26516 as installation of a maliciously modified package file through the web interface (CISA 8.4, NVD 7.8); and CVE-2022-27179 as credentials recoverable from an exported configuration file (CISA 4.6, NVD 6.5). CISA's mitigations include changing the admin, rlcuser and techsup passwords from their defaults, disabling SSH and keeping Telnet disabled, not reusing passwords, and installing images only from Red Lion's website after checking the server's TLS certificate.
HMS's October 2026 advisory HMSSAR-2026-10-29-002 states that Crimson-based HMIs and gateways, SLX switches, N-Tron switches and SixView Manager 3.1 are not affected by CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 in PHP. That statement is useful when a scanner flags those products for the PHP flaws.
Are Red Lion vulnerabilities exploited in the wild?
No Red Lion, Sixnet, N-Tron or Crimson CVE is in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-22 (catalog version 2026.11.20, 1,790 entries). ICSA-23-320-01 and ICSA-26-281-01 both say that no known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA, and the older Crimson and N-Tron advisories say no known public exploits specifically target them.
FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-21, the latest as of 2026-11-22:
| CVE | Product | EPSS | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-16544 | N-Tron 702-W (BusyBox) | 0.06136 | 0.936 |
| CVE-2020-16204 | N-Tron 702-W | 0.05492 | 0.930 |
| CVE-2013-2802 | Sixnet UDR and RTU firmware | 0.03937 | 0.906 |
| CVE-2016-4521 | Sixnet BT routers | 0.02465 | 0.849 |
| CVE-2020-27279 | Crimson 3.1 | 0.01785 | 0.789 |
| CVE-2016-9335 | Sixnet-Managed switches | 0.01545 | 0.756 |
| CVE-2023-40151 | SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs | 0.01474 | 0.745 |
| CVE-2022-1039 | DA50N | 0.01220 | 0.694 |
| CVE-2023-42770 | SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs | 0.01129 | 0.672 |
| CVE-2023-5719 | Crimson 3.2 | 0.00618 | 0.505 |
| CVE-2026-33367 | N-Tron 700 Series | 0.00290 | 0.218 |
| CVE-2026-29797 | N-Tron 700 Series | 0.00157 | 0.049 |
The discontinued 702-W leads, which fits old, public, unfixable flaws. The 2026 N-Tron CVEs score low partly because they are new. An RTU that accepts UDR over TCP from a cellular network is a bigger problem than any of these numbers suggest, so rank by reachability first, as the KEV and EPSS prioritization guide explains.
How should Red Lion devices be hardened?
The steps below come from CISA's advisories and Red Lion and HMS recommendations:
Patch the RTUs and turn on authenticationInstall the Red Lion patch for your SixTRAK or VersaTRAK model, or the rc.firewall rule that drops TCP 1594, and enable user authentication. Move N-Tron 700 Series switches to firmware 3.11.1 or laterThen change or disable the SNMP communities and disable the web GUI where it is not needed, as CISA lists. Update CrimsonAt least 3.2.0063 for CVE-2023-5719 and, on older lines, 3.1 build 3126.02 or 3.0 build 711.00 for CVE-2022-3090. Avoid % in passwords set on older 3.2 builds, and reset any that contain it. Replace end-of-life unitsThe N-Tron 702-W and 702M12-W cannot be updated, and the DA50N will not be; Red Lion points DA50N users to the DA50A and DA70A. Remove shared and default secretsUpdate SLX switches to 5.3.174 or later and Sixnet BT routers to 3.8.21 or 3.9.8, upload unique keys to 702-W units still on site, and change every default account, including admin, rlcuser and techsup on the DA50N. Restrict file handlingOpen Crimson projects only from trusted sources, store project and configuration exports securely, and install firmware only from the vendor. Segment and firewallCISA asks owners to keep control system devices off the internet, put them behind firewalls isolated from business networks and use VPNs for remote access. Zone RTUs and switches with the Purdue model.
If the RTUs reach the SCADA host through an Ewon or other remote-access gateway, that gateway needs the same version tracking; the HMS Ewon Flexy and Cosy guide covers it. Switches from other vendors in the same cabinets are covered in the Hirschmann and Belden switch guide and the Moxa EDS and EDR guide.
How do you check which firmware a Red Lion device runs?
Fixes come per product line, so record each device in detail:
Record the exact modelST-IPm-8460 patches start with 8313 and the other five RTU models use 855; the N-Tron 700 fix does not apply to the 702-W. Record the firmware and, for N-Tron 700, the bootloaderCISA lists bootloader 2.0.6.1 and earlier as affected separately from firmware 3.11.0 and earlier. Record whether the RTU patch is installedAn RTU on 4.9.114 or 6.0.202 or later is only remediated if the patch or firewall rule is in place, so the firmware number alone does not tell you. Record the Crimson build on every engineering workstation,not only on the devices, since several Crimson flaws trigger when a project file is opened. Do not rely on CPE matching aloneNVD's 2026 N-Tron records have no NVD analysis yet, and for CVE-2023-40151 NVD's configuration lists specific firmware builds rather than ranges. Read the advisory, as the IEC 62443-2-3 patch management guide describes for vendor-tracked patching.
How do you monitor Sixnet RTUs and N-Tron switches?
Start with a baseline of who talks to each device on which ports, then alert on changes:
- TCP connections to port 1594 on an RTU, especially from outside the SCADA host's subnet, since the RTU patches exist to stop exactly that path.
- SNMP or TFTP traffic to N-Tron switches from hosts other than the network management station, which fits CVE-2026-33367 and CVE-2026-29797.
- Repeated web requests followed by a switch reboot, which fits CVE-2026-39453.
- SSH or Telnet sessions to a DA50N from hosts other than the engineering workstation.
Flow records show who connected to which port and when, not which UDR function or SNMP object was used. Map alerts to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS techniques. If the RTUs also carry Modbus, the Modbus protocol security guide covers that traffic.
Worked example: what does a review of a water district find?
Synthetic example, not a real site. A water district has twelve well and tank sites, each with a VersaTRAK RTU behind a cellular router, and N-Tron 700 Series switches at the treatment plant.
| Observation | Why it matters | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Nine VT-mIPm-135-D RTUs on 4.9.114 without the 855 patch, UDR-A enabled | UDR over TCP bypasses the authentication challenge (CVE-2023-42770) | Install 855_patch1 or the rc.firewall rule for TCP 1594 |
| Three RTUs with user authentication disabled | Shell commands with the highest privileges (CVE-2023-40151) | Enable user authentication, then patch |
| Four N-Tron 700 switches on 3.10 firmware, SNMP v2 public and private communities unchanged | Unauthenticated configuration export and firmware push (CVE-2026-33367, CVE-2026-29797) | Update to 3.11.1 or later and change or disable SNMP communities |
| One N-Tron 702-W wireless link between buildings | Discontinued, cannot be updated, undocumented root interface (CVE-2020-16204) | Replace; until then isolate it on a secure local network |
| Crimson 3.2.0050 on the HMI workstation | Below 3.2.0063 for CVE-2023-5719 | Update Crimson and reset passwords that contain % |
Where does passive monitoring fit in a Red Lion review?
A passive capture shows who talks to RTUs and switches without logging in to anything. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port recording and builds a host-by-port inventory at connection level, including hosts using TCP 1594 and the SNMP, TFTP, SSH and Telnet ports, and lists remote-access sessions that cross from outside the private address range. It does not decode Sixnet UDR messages or read firmware versions from traffic, so those come from the asset list. For that list, Device & Firmware Security identifies components and versions and matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating the Sixnet RTU fix as a firmware upgrade; it is a patch file or firewall rule on top of the affected firmware.
- Enabling UDR-A and assuming the RTU is protected, when TCP messages skip the challenge until patched.
- Reading HMS's "disabled in 3.11.0" as fixed, when CISA names 3.11.1 or later.
- Leaving SNMP v2 communities at their defaults on N-Tron switches after the firmware update.
- Keeping a 702-W or DA50N in service because it still works.
- Updating Crimson on devices but not on the engineering workstation that opens project files.
This guide draws on CISA ICS advisories ICSA-23-320-01, ICSA-26-281-01, ICSA-23-306-01, ICSA-22-321-01, ICSA-22-104-03, ICSA-21-005-04, ICSA-20-240-01, ICSA-19-248-01, ICSA-17-054-02, ICSA-16-147-02, ICSA-15-160-01A and ICSA-13-231-01B and their CSAF records; HMS Networks advisories HMSSAR-2025-06-02-001 and HMSSAR-2026-10-29-002 and HMS's Red Lion pages; NVD records; the CISA KEV catalog; and FIRST EPSS data. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-22. It is general information, not a substitute for Red Lion and HMS model-specific advisories or a check of your exact model and firmware.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is the Sixnet RTU authentication bypass?
CISA's ICSA-23-320-01 of 16 November 2023 covers two flaws in Red Lion SixTRAK and VersaTRAK RTUs, reported by Nitsan Litov of Claroty Team82. With authenticated users enabled (UDR-A), a Sixnet UDR message over UDP/IP meets an authentication challenge, but the same message over TCP/IP is accepted with no challenge (CVE-2023-42770). When user authentication is not enabled, the shell can execute commands with the highest privileges (CVE-2023-40151). CISA scores both 10.0 (CVSS v3.0) and NVD scores both 9.8 (CVSS v3.1). The affected models are the ST-IPm-8460 on firmware 6.0.202 and the ST-IPm-6350, VT-mIPm-135-D, VT-mIPm-245-D, VT-IPm2m-213-D and VT-IPm2m-113-D on firmware 4.9.114.
How do you fix the Sixnet UDR over TCP flaw?
CISA lists Red Lion patches rather than a new firmware number. Patch 1 blocks all Sixnet UDR messages over TCP/IP: 8313_patch1_tcp_udr_all_blocked.tar.gz for the ST-IPm-8460 and 855_patch1_tcp_udr_all_blocked.tar.gz for the other five models. Patch 2 (8313_patch2_io_open or 855_patch2_io_open) blocks all UDR messages except I/O commands over both TCP/IP and UDP/IP. Red Lion also asks users to enable user authentication. Without the patch, a custom rc.firewall loaded through the Sixnet I/O Tool Kit can drop all inbound TCP traffic to UDR port 1594.
Which N-Tron firmware fixes the 2026 700 Series vulnerabilities?
CISA's ICSA-26-281-01 (Update A, 15 October 2026) lists seven CVEs in N-Tron 700 Series firmware 3.11.0 and earlier and bootloader 2.0.6.1 and earlier, and says Red Lion recommends firmware 3.11.1 or later, configuring or disabling the SNMP communities and disabling access to the web GUI. The HMS advisory HMSSAR-2025-06-02-001 names the 700/7000 series, says default factory credentials are disabled in firmware 3.11.0 and names 3.11.1 for the reboot flaw CVE-2026-39453. Use 3.11.1 or later as the target.
Are any Red Lion vulnerabilities in the CISA KEV catalog?
No. As of 2026-11-22, CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.20, 1,790 entries) has no entry for Red Lion, Sixnet, N-Tron or Crimson. CISA's 2023 Sixnet RTU advisory and its 2026 N-Tron 700 Series advisory both say no known public exploitation targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA. The highest FIRST EPSS score among the CVEs in this guide is 0.06136 for CVE-2017-16544, the BusyBox flaw in the discontinued N-Tron 702-W.
Can the N-Tron 702-W or the DA50N still be patched?
No. CISA's ICSA-20-240-01 says Red Lion's 702-W series was discontinued in 2018 and cannot be updated, and Red Lion recommends using it only locally within a secure network. CISA's ICSA-22-104-03 says the DA50N is end-of-life and Red Lion does not intend to release a software update; it recommends workarounds or an upgrade to the DA50A or DA70A. Both belong on a replacement plan.
Sources
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-23-320-01 Red Lion Sixnet RTUs
- CISA: ICSA-23-320-01 Red Lion Sixnet RTUs (web page)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-26-281-01 Red Lion Controls N-Tron 700 Series (Update A)
- CISA: ICSA-26-281-01 Red Lion Controls N-Tron 700 Series (web page)
- HMS Networks: Security Advisory HMSSAR-2025-06-02-001, 700/7000 Series Switches Vulnerabilities
- HMS Networks: Security Advisory HMSSAR-2026-10-29-002, Red Lion PHP Vulnerabilities
- HMS Networks: Cybersecurity advisories
- HMS Networks: Red Lion and N-Tron are now part of HMS Networks
- HMS Networks: Red Lion brand page
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-20-240-01 Red Lion N-Tron 702-W, 702M12-W
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-15-160-01A N-Tron 702W Hard-Coded SSH and HTTPS Encryption Keys
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-17-054-02 Red Lion Controls Sixnet-Managed Industrial Switches, AutomationDirect STRIDE-Managed Ethernet Switches
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-16-147-02 Sixnet BT Series Hard-coded Credentials Vulnerability
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-13-231-01B Sixnet Universal Protocol Undocumented Function Codes
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-23-306-01 Red Lion Crimson
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-22-321-01 Red Lion Crimson
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-21-005-04 Red Lion Crimson 3.1
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-19-248-01 Red Lion Controls Crimson
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-22-104-03 Red Lion DA50N
- NVD: CVE-2023-42770 (Sixnet UDR accepted over TCP without authentication challenge)
- NVD: CVE-2023-40151 (Sixnet RTU shell commands without user authentication)
- NVD: CVE-2013-2802 (Sixnet universal protocol function opcodes)
- NVD: CVE-2026-33367 (N-Tron 700 Series SNMP administrative actions without authentication)
- NVD: CVE-2020-16204 (N-Tron 702-W undocumented interface)
- NVD: CVE-2016-9335 (Sixnet-Managed switch hard-coded SSL/SSH keys)
- NVD: CVE-2016-4521 (Sixnet BT series hard-coded credentials)
- NVD: CVE-2023-5719 (Crimson 3.2 percent character password truncation)
- NVD: CVE-2022-3090 (Crimson path traversal sends password hash)
- NVD: CVE-2020-27285 (Crimson 3.1 database read and modify without authentication)
- NVD: CVE-2022-1039 (DA50N weak passwords)
- NVD: CVE-2022-27179 (DA50N credentials in exported configuration file)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
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