Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

CISA BOD 23-02: what it requires, and what OT/ICS operators should take from an IT-only directive

Last updated:

CISA's Binding Operational Directive 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, requires only Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to pull specific internet-exposed management interfaces — on routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators, load balancers and out-of-band controllers like iLO or iDRAC — off the public internet within 14 days of discovery, or isolate them behind a Zero Trust policy enforcement point; it says nothing about PLCs, HMIs or any other OT/ICS device, and binds no one outside federal civilian agencies. That narrow legal scope is exactly why OT/ICS operators tend to wave the directive away as somebody else's compliance problem — but CISA's own 2026 advisories against internet-exposed Siemens, Rockwell and Schneider Electric PLCs describe the identical exposure pattern BOD 23-02 was written to fix.

Key takeaways

  • New devices are covered too.
  • No, on both counts.
  • Because your product is the thing being fixed.
  • The pattern for device makers is plain.

What does BOD 23-02 actually require?

BOD 23-02
Bound organizations Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies only
In-scope device classes Routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies, load balancers, out-of-band server management interfaces (e.g. iLO, iDRAC)
In-scope protocols HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SNMP, Telnet, TFTP, RDP, rlogin, RSH, SSH, SMB, VNC, X11
Remediation deadline 14 days from CISA notification or agency discovery
Compliance options Remove the interface from the internet entirely, or front it with a Zero Trust-aligned policy enforcement point separate from the interface itself
Explicitly out of scope Cloud service provider web applications/management portals and their APIs

CISA's own role under the directive is active, not passive: it scans for in-scope interfaces across FCEB networks and reports positive findings to each agency through CyberScope, then reports FCEB-wide compliance status to OMB and DHS within six months and annually thereafter.

Three details from the directive and its implementation guidance shape what a fix looks like:

  • New devices are covered too. The second required action asks agencies to put technical or management controls in place so that management interfaces on "existing and newly added devices" have one of the two protections. A device installed next month has to arrive protectable.
  • Removal means internal only. The first option is making the interface reachable only from an internal enterprise network, and CISA recommends an isolated management network. VLANs, non-routable addresses and firewalls all count.
  • The Zero Trust option is the preferred one, and the policy enforcement point must sit outside the interface. In NIST SP 800-207 terms, a PEP enables, monitors and terminates connections between a subject and a resource; a login page on the device itself is the resource, not the PEP.

Serial ports used for direct command-line access are out of scope unless a console server exposes them on the network.

Does BOD 23-02 apply to OT/ICS devices, or the private sector?

No, on both counts. The directive's own text and CISA's implementation guidance scope it to FCEB agencies, and the device classes it names — enterprise routers, firewalls, proxies, load balancers and server out-of-band management — are IT network infrastructure. Neither document mentions PLCs, HMIs, engineering workstations, SCADA servers, or any OT/ICS-specific protocol. A private-sector device maker or OT asset owner is under no legal obligation created by this directive.

What CISA has done instead is say, publicly, that the underlying problem is not federal-specific. Announcing the directive on 13 June 2023, then-Director Jen Easterly said: "While this Directive only applies to federal civilian agencies, as the threat extends to every sector, we urge all organizations to adopt this guidance." That recommendation is where OT/ICS relevance actually starts.

Why should a device maker care about a directive that binds agencies?

Because your product is the thing being fixed. When CISA's scan finds the web UI of your router, firewall or VPN appliance on the internet at a federal agency, the agency has 14 days to remove or protect it. Whether that takes ten minutes or a forklift upgrade depends on choices you made in firmware: can the management service be bound to one port, can it be switched off on the WAN side, does the device support a separate management VRF or port, does it log access attempts.

The KEV catalog makes the link explicit. For the Cisco IOS XE web UI vulnerability exploited in October 2023, the KEV entry tells agencies to "verify that instances of Cisco IOS XE Web UI are in compliance with BOD 23-02 and apply mitigations per vendor instructions". A management-interface CVE in a widely deployed product turns the directive from a configuration audit into an incident.

What do management-interface CVEs in the KEV catalog show?

Three well-known KEV entries, with what each vendor told customers to do with the interface:

CVE Product and issue Added to KEV Vendor guidance on the interface
CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet FortiOS / FortiProxy / FortiSwitchManager: authentication bypass in the administrative interface 11 Oct 2022 Workaround: disable the HTTP/HTTPS administrative interface or limit the IP addresses that can reach it
CVE-2023-20198 Cisco IOS XE web UI privilege escalation, CVSS 10.0 16 Oct 2023 (due 20 Oct) Cisco: disable the HTTP Server feature on all internet-facing systems (no ip http server, no ip http secure-server) or restrict it to trusted source addresses
CVE-2024-0012 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS management interface authentication bypass 18 Nov 2024 (due 9 Dec) Palo Alto Networks: restrict access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses

The pattern for device makers is plain. In each case the fastest safe mitigation was the BOD 23-02 one, taking the management interface off untrusted networks, and the vendor had to tell customers how. Products where that is a single documented setting give customers a same-day answer. The KEV and EPSS prioritisation guide explains how KEV due dates work.

Why does the same exposure pattern keep showing up in CISA's OT advisories?

Three 2026 CISA publications make the connection concrete, not hypothetical:

  1. AA26-097A(7 April 2026, updated 22 July 2026), issued jointly by the FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE and US Cyber Command, describes Iranian-affiliated actors exploiting internet-exposed PLCs across US critical infrastructure — Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850, Schneider Electric BMX P34/Modicon M340, and Siemens S7-1200 devices among them — reaching the devices directly over the internet on ports including 502, 2222, 44818, 102 and 22 (the last for cellular modems used as a connection path), then manipulating HMI/SCADA displays and project files. CISA's own top recommendation was to disconnect the PLC from the public internet — the same first remediation option BOD 23-02 gives FCEB agencies.
  2. A 30 July 2026 CISA alertto the water and wastewater sector describes threat actors locking operators out of exposed PLCs by changing passwords and IP addresses, in incidents that led to boil-water notices and sustained manual plant operation.
  3. CISA's Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance(21 August 2026, updated 25 August 2026) was published directly in response to that pattern, and explicitly names industrial IoT, SCADA and ICS assets as part of its scope alongside IT — urging organizations to route OT remote access through a managed gateway rather than a direct connection to a PLC, HMI or RTU, and to routinely run exposure-discovery tools (Shodan, Censys, Thingful, Shadowserver) against their own footprint.

The throughline is the same in both the federal-IT and OT worlds: an administrative interface reachable from the open internet gets found by scanning tools attackers and defenders both use, and "found" becomes "exploited" faster than most asset owners expect. See S7comm protocol security for how this exact mechanism played out against Siemens S7 PLCs specifically in a separate, later 2026 advisory.

AA26-097A also has a section addressed to device manufacturers. It says "it is ultimately the responsibility of the device manufacturer to build products that are secure by design and default", and asks manufacturers to "change the manufacturers' default settings to prevent exposing administrative interfaces to the internet."

Which product design choices make BOD 23-02 easy or hard for customers?

Design choice Makes compliance easy Makes compliance hard
Default listening scope Admin UI and SSH listen on LAN / management port only Admin services bind to all interfaces, including WAN
Separate management plane Dedicated management port or VRF; admin services can be pinned to it Data and management share every interface
Per-service switches HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, SNMP, Telnet each disabled independently One "remote management" toggle, or none
Source restrictions Built-in admin allow-list by IP or subnet Only an external firewall can restrict access
Legacy protocols Telnet, TFTP and SNMPv1/v2c off by default On by default for compatibility
Cloud management Device dials out to the vendor portal; no inbound port needed Vendor support requires an inbound port forward
Logging Admin logins and failures exported via syslog Logs kept only on the device, lost on reboot
Documentation Hardening guide names each port and how to close it Port list scattered across release notes

Every row on the left is also what a customer's policy enforcement point needs: a single, known address and port to protect.

What do device security baselines already require?

Device makers selling into Europe or the UK already face most of this as a legal or standard duty:

Baseline Requirement
ETSI EN 303 645 5.6-1 (mandatory) Unused network and logical interfaces disabled. Its example: an administrative UI meant for the LAN "is not accessible from the WAN by default"
ETSI EN 303 645 5.6-2 and 5.6-4A Minimise unauthenticated disclosure of security-relevant information in the initialised state; debug interfaces disabled or protected
NIST IR 8259A "Logical Access to Interfaces" Ability to disable network interfaces not needed for core function, and to restrict each network interface to authorised entities
CRA Annex I Part I (2)(b), (d), (j) Secure by default configuration; protection from unauthorised access; limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces

A device built to these baselines is already one a federal customer can bring into line with BOD 23-02 quickly. The ETSI EN 303 645 guide covers the full provision list, and the Secure by Design pledge guide the voluntary side.

What should an OT/ICS asset owner or device maker actually do?

  1. Run your own exposure scan, the way CISA runs one against FCEB networksCheck your organization's public IP ranges against Shodan, Censys or a similar internet-wide scanning service, and treat a hit on an engineering-software or ICS protocol port (102, 502, 2222, 44818, and standard remote-access ports like RDP/SSH/HTTP) as a finding to act on, not a surprise to be alarmed by later.
  2. Apply BOD 23-02's own two remediation options, even though it doesn't legally bind youEither remove the management or engineering interface from direct internet reachability, or put an actual policy enforcement point — a jump host, firewall, or VPN concentrator you control — in front of it. A device's own login page is not a policy enforcement point.
  3. Treat vendor engineering software as a management interface, even though BOD 23-02's literal device list doesn't name it. TIA Portal/STEP 7 sessions to a Siemens PLC, or Studio 5000 sessions to a Rockwell controller, carry the same administrative capability the directive is built to protect on IT infrastructure.
  4. Build the inventory before the policyA 14-day remediation clock is meaningless against a management interface you don't know exists; an accurate device and remote-access inventory has to come first.

For zone and conduit design around those interfaces, see the Purdue model guide and the cluster pillar on NIST SP 800-82 OT security.

How would a gateway maker check its defaults? A worked example

Synthetic example. "Example Industrial" and its EIG-40 cellular gateway are invented to show the method; they do not describe a real product.

  1. List every listenerOn a factory-reset unit, run ss -tulpn in the firmware shell and an nmap -sV -p- from both the LAN and the WAN (cellular) side. Result: web UI on 80/443, SSH on 22 and Modbus/TCP on 502 are reachable from the WAN.
  2. Map each to a needRemote configuration is done through the vendor cloud portal, which dials out; nothing needs an inbound WAN port.
  3. Change defaultsFirmware 2.1 binds the web UI and SSH to the LAN port only, disables Modbus/TCP forwarding on WAN, and adds an admin allow-list for customers who need inbound access.
  4. LogAdmin logins and failed attempts go to syslog with source address.
  5. DocumentThe hardening guide gets a table of ports, default state and the setting that controls each, and the release notes say that 2.1 changes WAN exposure.
  6. VerifyRepeat step 1 from the WAN side: no open ports.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • "Disabled in the UI" but still listening. Check with a port scan, not with the settings page.
  • Port changes as protection. Moving SSH to 2222 does not remove it from internet-wide scans.
  • Allow-list off by default. A feature customers must discover is a feature few enable.
  • Support back doors. A hidden support port or account defeats the rest of the design.
  • One-off fixes. A firmware update that resets the WAN setting to "on" reopens every customer.

A passive network read is one practical way to get that inventory without taking anything offline: SoftWSP's OT Snapshot service has an engineer record 24 to 72 hours of shop-floor traffic from a mirror port and turns it into a device inventory, a list of what is reachable and how, and an AI-assisted report where every finding cites the traffic that produced it, reviewed by an engineer before it goes out — a pcap-based read of what is actually talking, and to what, rather than a guess at what the network diagram says should be there. On the firmware side, SoftWSP extracts an SBOM from an image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, so a known-exploited flaw in an embedded web server or SSH daemon shows up before the image ships: see device firmware security.

BOD 23-02 and its implementation guidance are fetched directly from CISA's own pages; the device and protocol lists, deadlines, and advisory details above are quoted or closely paraphrased from those primary sources. This guide is general information, not a compliance determination for any specific sector or organization — confirm applicability of any CISA directive or alert against the current published text.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Is CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-02 legally binding on OT/ICS operators or private companies?

No. BOD 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, is a binding operational directive issued under 44 U.S.C. § 3552(b)(1) and § 3553(b)(2), and CISA's own directive scopes it to Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies only. It creates no legal obligation for OT/ICS asset owners, device makers, or any private-sector organization. CISA's implementation guidance for the directive contains no OT/ICS-specific language at all — the devices it names (routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies, load balancers, and out-of-band server management interfaces such as iLO and iDRAC) are enterprise IT network infrastructure, not PLCs, HMIs, or other industrial control devices. CISA has, however, publicly and repeatedly encouraged every sector to adopt the same practice voluntarily.

What exactly counts as a 'management interface' under BOD 23-02?

Per the directive and its implementation guidance, a covered management interface is a dedicated device interface, accessible over a network protocol, meant exclusively for authorized users to perform administrative activities on a device, a group of devices, or the network itself. The guidance lists the in-scope network protocols by name: HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SNMP, Telnet, TFTP, RDP, rlogin, RSH, SSH, SMB, VNC, and X11. Web applications and interfaces used to manage cloud service provider offerings, including APIs and cloud management portals, are explicitly out of scope.

What does an FCEB agency actually have to do, and by when?

Within 14 days of CISA notifying an agency of an exposed interface, or of the agency discovering one itself, the agency must take at least one of two actions: remove the management interface from the public internet entirely (physical removal, VLAN segmentation, internal non-routable addressing, or a firewall), or protect it with Zero Trust-aligned capabilities that enforce access control through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface itself. CISA scans for in-scope devices and reports findings to agencies through CyberScope; agencies that cannot meet a deadline must notify CISA and submit a remediation plan.

Does CISA have separate guidance for internet-exposed OT, ICS or SCADA assets?

Yes, and it is more directly useful to an OT/ICS operator than BOD 23-02 itself. CISA's Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance, published 21 August 2026 and updated 25 August 2026, extends the same reduce-and-secure-remote-access logic to IT and OT/ICS/SCADA/IIoT assets together, and explicitly tells critical infrastructure organizations to route all necessary remote access through a secure gateway, firewall, VPN, or other centrally managed access solution rather than connecting directly to a PLC, HMI, or remote terminal unit (RTU). It also recommends routinely running exposure-discovery tools such as Shodan, Censys, Thingful, and Shadowserver against an organization's own IT and OT footprint — the same discovery method CISA uses against federal networks under BOD 23-02.

What should an OT/ICS operator do if no directive legally applies to them?

Treat BOD 23-02's own remediation options — remove the interface from the internet, or put a real policy enforcement point in front of it — as the practical baseline anyway, and confirm it against your own exposure rather than assuming it. CISA's 2026 advisories against internet-exposed Siemens, Rockwell and Schneider Electric PLCs describe attackers using the same public scanning services (Censys, Shodan, ZoomEye) CISA itself uses to find exposed federal interfaces. An asset owner that has never checked what its own IP ranges look like from Shodan or Censys is, in practice, relying on nobody having looked yet — not on being out of scope.

Sources

  1. CISA: BOD 23-02 — Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces (directive text)
  2. CISA: BOD 23-02 Implementation Guidance for Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces
  3. CISA: Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance (resources-tools)
  4. CISA/FBI/NSA/EPA/DOE/US Cyber Command Advisory AA26-097A: Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure (7 April 2026, updated 22 July 2026)
  5. CISA Alert: CISA Urges Water and Wastewater Systems Sector to Protect OT Against Activity Targeting PLCs (30 July 2026)
  6. NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture (final publication)
  7. CISA press release: CISA Directs Federal Agencies to Secure Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces (13 June 2023, govdelivery copy)
  8. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (cisagov/kev-data JSON)
  9. Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS XE Software Web UI Feature (cisco-sa-iosxe-webui-privesc-j22SaA4z)
  10. Palo Alto Networks: CVE-2024-0012 PAN-OS Authentication Bypass in the Management Web Interface
  11. ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3, Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements
  12. NIST IR 8259A: IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline (May 2020)
  13. FBI/CISA/NSA/EPA/DOE/CNMF joint advisory AA26-097A (IC3 PDF)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

CISA BOD 23-02: what it requires, and what OT/ICS operators should take from an IT-only directive