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Siemens SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM network device vulnerabilities: services, CVE families, fixed firmware and hardening

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Siemens SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM network devices appear in the titles of 170 Siemens ProductCERT advisories as of 2026-11-20, 33 of them updated during 2026. Most of their CVEs are reached through the management plane: web-based management on TCP 80 and 443, SSH, Telnet, SNMP, and Siemens-specific layer 2 services such as the RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol, plus third-party firewall software on the RUGGEDCOM APE1808. Defending them means installing the fixed firmware Siemens names for each product line, switching off services you do not use, replacing default keys and passwords, and keeping management interfaces inside a protected cell, as Siemens' operational guidelines describe.

Key takeaways

  • Siemens SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM network devices appear in the titles of 170 Siemens ProductCERT advisories as of 2026-11-20, 33 of them updated during 2026.
  • Siemens ships these devices as separate firmware lines, and each advisory gives a fixed version per line, so the first job is to know which line each device runs.
  • The services that Siemens names in its workarounds are the attack surface, and almost all of them are management services rather than the switched traffic itself.
  • The recurring families are web management authentication bypass, memory-safety bugs in network services, hard-coded or weak keys, and command injection that gives an admin a root shell.

Which SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM product lines does this guide cover?

Siemens ships these devices as separate firmware lines, and each advisory gives a fixed version per line, so the first job is to know which line each device runs. The table groups the lines as Siemens' advisories group them.

Product line Device type Firmware line seen in advisories
SCALANCE X-200, X-200IRT, X-200RNA Managed and real-time (IRT) switches; RNA models are HSR/PRP redundancy network access devices X-200 V5.2.x, X-200IRT V5.5.x, X-200RNA V3.2.x
SCALANCE X-300, X408, XR-300 Managed switches V4.1.x
SCALANCE XB-200, XC-200, XP-200, XF-200BA, XR-300WG Managed switches V4.x (older units V3.x)
SCALANCE XM-400, XR-500 Layer 3 switches V6.x
SCALANCE M-800, S615, MUM-800, RUGGEDCOM RM1224 Industrial routers (DSL, cellular) and security module V6.x to V8.x
SCALANCE SC-600 Industrial firewalls V2.x to V3.x
SCALANCE W-700 IEEE 802.11n, W-700 IEEE 802.11ax (WAM/WUM), W1700, W1750D Wi-Fi access points and clients 802.11n V6.x, 802.11ax V2.x to V3.x
RUGGEDCOM ROS (RS, RSG, RST, RMC, i800 and M-series) Rugged switches and serial servers ROS V4.3.x and V5.x
RUGGEDCOM ROX II (RX1400, RX1500, RX5000, MX5000) Rugged routers V2.x
RUGGEDCOM APE1808 Application hosting platform running third-party firewall software Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS or Fortinet FortiGate NGFW versions

The split matters. A RUGGEDCOM switch can run ROS V4.x or V5.x, and Siemens often fixes only the V5.x line. The APE1808 has almost no Siemens code in its advisories at all: of the 170 titles, 28 concern the APE1808, and every one of them covers third-party code: the Insyde BIOS, or the Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet or Nozomi Networks software it hosts. Patch the APE1808 by upgrading the hosted firewall version that Siemens names, through Siemens customer support.

How are SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM devices reached?

The services that Siemens names in its workarounds are the attack surface, and almost all of them are management services rather than the switched traffic itself. Every port in this table comes from the advisory named in the last column.

Service Port or layer Where Siemens names it Siemens' suggested action
Web-based management (WBM) TCP 80 and 443 SSA-187092, SSA-552702, SSA-710008, SSA-170375 Restrict to trusted IP addresses; deactivate the web server if not required
SSH TCP 22 SSA-836527, SSA-083019, SSA-296266 Restrict to trusted addresses; use only trusted client keys (SSA-764417)
Telnet TCP 23 SSA-100232 Disable Telnet and use SSH instead
SNMP UDP 161 SSA-836527 Restrict, and disable SNMP if possible
TFTP (ROS) UDP 69 SSA-256353 Restrict to trusted addresses
TCP Event service (M-800, W-700 802.11ax) TCP 26864 SSA-697140 Leave deactivated (not active by default)
Modbus server (ROS serial devices) TCP 502 SSA-170375 Disable if not required (disabled by default)
PROFINET context manager (DCE-RPC) UDP 34964 SSA-780073 Block from untrusted networks
PROFINET DCP Layer 2 SSA-293562 Requires direct layer 2 access; protect cells
RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol (RCDP) Layer 2, adjacent network SSA-856721 Deactivate after commissioning
STP BPDU passive listening Layer 2 SSA-979775 Deactivate passive listening
OSPF (XM-400, XR-500) Routing protocol SSA-116379 Disable OSPF if unused (off by default), or set MD5 authentication
DNS proxy (M-800, RM1224, S615, SC-600) DNS SSA-646763 Disable the DNS proxy; it is on by default on the RM1224
RADIUS client Network access authentication SSA-723487 Require Message-Authenticator; keep RADIUS on a management VLAN

Two layer 2 entries stand out because a firewall in front of the device does not stop them. CVE-2017-12736 lets an attacker in the adjacent network use RCDP to perform administrative actions after commissioning, and CVE-2021-25667 is a stack overflow in handling STP BPDU frames that Siemens says could cause a denial of service or potentially remote code execution when the passive listening feature is active. PROFINET DCP flaws such as CVE-2017-2680 also need direct layer 2 access; our PROFINET security guide explains why DCP has no authentication.

On redundancy protocols, the X-200RNA devices are sold as HSR and PRP variants, and they appear in advisories through their management services: Siemens lists no remediation for the X204RNA HSR and PRP models against CVE-2019-10942, a denial of service through Telnet on TCP 23. As of 2026-11-20, no title in the Siemens ProductCERT advisory index names HSR, PRP or MRP.

Which CVE families appear in Siemens advisories for SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM?

The recurring families are web management authentication bypass, memory-safety bugs in network services, hard-coded or weak keys, and command injection that gives an admin a root shell. The table lists representative CVEs with the fix Siemens names. Scores are CVSS v3.1 unless marked; "Siemens" is Siemens ProductCERT as the CNA, and NVD's own score is shown where NVD has one.

CVE Products What it allows Score (scorer) Fix per Siemens
CVE-2012-1803 RuggedCom ROS 3.10.x and earlier Factory account whose password is derived from the MAC address in the login banner 8.5 (NVD, CVSS v2) ROS 3.10.1, 3.9.3, 3.8.5 or 3.7.9 (ICSA-12-146-01A)
CVE-2013-5944 SCALANCE X-200 before V4.5.0, X-200IRT before V5.1.0 Administrative operations through the web server without authentication 9.8 (Siemens); 10.0 (NVD, CVSS v2) V4.5.0 and V5.1.0
CVE-2017-12736 RUGGEDCOM ROS, some SCALANCE X switches RCDP still writable after commissioning (adjacent network) 8.8 (Siemens, NVD) ROS V4.3.4 or V5.0.1, XM-400 V6.1.1; or deactivate RCDP
CVE-2019-13933 SCALANCE X-200RNA, X-300 GET request to a specific URL bypasses access control in WBM 8.8 (Siemens); 8.6 (NVD) X-200RNA V3.2.7, X-300 V4.1.3
CVE-2020-28391 SCALANCE X-200, X-200IRT used with C-PLUG Device keeps the hard-coded RSA key shipped in the firmware after factory reset 9.1 (Siemens); 5.9 (NVD) X-200 V5.2.5, X-200IRT V5.5.0
CVE-2021-25668, CVE-2021-25669 SCALANCE X-200, X-200IRT Heap and stack overflows in web server POST handling; denial of service or code execution 9.8 (Siemens, NVD) X-200 V5.2.5, X-200IRT V5.5.1
CVE-2021-25667 M-800, S615, RM1224, SC-600, XB-200 family, XM-400, XR-500 Stack overflow in STP BPDU handling with passive listening on 8.8 (Siemens, NVD) M-800 V6.4, SC-600 V2.1.3, XB-200 family V4.1, XM-400/XR-500 V6.2
CVE-2021-31895 RUGGEDCOM ROS DHCP client buffer overflow; unauthenticated remote code execution possible 8.1 (Siemens); 9.8 (NVD) ROS V4.3.7 or V5.5.4
CVE-2022-26335 and eight others SCALANCE X-300, X408, XR-300 Unauthenticated crash through HTTP GET URIs, SNMP-triggered reboot, guessable session IDs 9.6 (Siemens); 7.5 (NVD) V4.1.4
CVE-2022-31765 XB-200 family, XM-400, XR-500, W-700, M-800, RM1224, SC-600 Change-password function lets low-privileged users escalate 8.8 (Siemens, NVD) V4.4, V6.6, V6.6.0, V7.1.2, V3.0, V2.0 by line; no fix for W1700
CVE-2022-31766 M-800, RM1224, W-700 802.11ax Malformed packets to the TCP Event service reboot the device 8.6 (Siemens, NVD) M-800 V7.1.2, W-700 802.11ax V3.0.0
CVE-2022-36323, CVE-2023-44373 Same lines as CVE-2022-31765 Admin input field injection that spawns a root shell; 44373 is Siemens' follow-up 9.1 (Siemens); 7.2 (NVD, 36323) 44373: M-800 V8.0, SC-600 V3.0.2, W-700 802.11ax V2.4.0
CVE-2023-24845 RUGGEDCOM ROS with port mirroring Mirror port forwards injected packets into the mirrored network 9.1 (Siemens); 9.8 (NVD) ROS V4.3.8 or V5.8.0; no fix for 38 product entries
CVE-2023-52237 RUGGEDCOM ROS Low-privileged web user reads password hashes and salts of all users 7.5 (Siemens) ROS V4.3.10 or V5.9.0
CVE-2024-39675 RUGGEDCOM ROS serial devices Modbus service wrongly enabled in non-managed VLANs 8.8 (Siemens) ROS V4.3.10 or V5.9.0
CVE-2025-41224 RUGGEDCOM ROS V5.x Interface access restriction not enforced until reboot, so SSH stays open on a non-management interface 8.8 (Siemens) ROS V5.10.0
CVE-2025-32469, CVE-2025-33024, CVE-2025-33025 RUGGEDCOM ROX II Command injection as root through the web ping, tcpdump and traceroute tools (high-privileged account) 9.9 (Siemens) ROX V2.16.5
CVE-2025-40949 RUGGEDCOM ROX Command injection as root in the web Scheduler 9.1 (Siemens) ROX V2.17.1
CVE-2024-3596 Most SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM lines that act as RADIUS clients Blast-RADIUS forgery of Access-Accept responses by an on-path attacker 9.0 (NVD) X-300 V4.1.9, XB-200 family V4.6, ROS V4.3.11 or V5.10.0, M-800 V8.2, ROX V2.17.0 and others

Two cautions apply when reading these records. First, NVD and Siemens disagree widely: NVD rates CVE-2021-31895 at 9.8 where Siemens gives 8.1, and CVE-2020-28391 at 5.9 where Siemens gives 9.1, so read the vector, not one number. Second, several recent Siemens-only CVEs, including CVE-2023-52236, CVE-2023-52237, CVE-2024-39675, CVE-2025-41224 and CVE-2025-32469, had NVD status Deferred and no NVD CPE configuration as of 2026-11-20, so a scanner that matches only on NVD CPE data will miss them.

Third-party code is the other half of the picture. The SCALANCE W-700 802.11ax line fixed 72 CVEs in V3.0.0, including Terrapin, CVE-2023-48795. The W-700 802.11n line fixed the FragAttacks set, including CVE-2020-24588, in V6.6.0 in April 2026. The M-800 routers carried the dnsmasq DNSpooq flaws, including CVE-2020-25685, where SSA-646763 suggests disabling the DNS proxy. Our dnsmasq guide and OpenSSH guide explain those components; for the coding patterns behind the ROX and M-800 injection flaws, see how to fix command injection in embedded firmware.

Which weaknesses have no firmware fix?

Some flaws stay open after every update Siemens offers, so they need compensating controls or a successor product. Siemens' CSAF files use the remediation category "no fix" or "currently no fix is available" for these:

  1. ROS mirror portsFor CVE-2023-24845, 38 ROS product entries have no fix, including the RS1600 and RS8000 families and fiber-optic F variants such as the RSG2488F. Siemens' workaround is to enable ingress filtering and to disable RSTP, Neighbor Discovery and LLDP on the mirror target ports.
  2. ROS legacy cryptography on V4.xFor CVE-2023-52236 (Siemens 7.0), SSA-083019 lists no fix for the ROS V4.x devices; ROS V5.x is fixed in V5.10.0. Restrict TCP 80, 443 and 22 to trusted addresses and deactivate the web and SSH servers where possible.
  3. ROS L-series and W-seriesFor CVE-2023-52237, Siemens lists no fix for the RS900L, RS910L, RS920L, RS920W, RS930L, RS930W and RS969 families and their NC variants.
  4. SCALANCE W1700The W1748-1 and W1788 access points have no fix for CVE-2022-31765, CVE-2022-36323 and CVE-2024-3596.
  5. XM-400 and XR-500 RADIUSSSA-723487 says no fix is available for CVE-2024-3596 on these switches; Siemens' general mitigation is to require the Message-Authenticator attribute on the RADIUS server and send RADIUS over a management network or dedicated VLAN.
  6. X204RNA HSR and PRPFor CVE-2019-10942, restrict TCP 23 and disable Telnet in favour of SSH.
  7. W-700 Framing FramesFor CVE-2024-30189 to CVE-2024-30191, SSA-457702 lists no fix for the W-700 and W1700 access points and recommends TLS for the traffic, VLAN separation of clients and, for 30191, Wi-Fi management frame protection (802.11w).
  8. M-800 configuration backupsFor CVE-2023-44318 (Siemens 4.9), the M-800, S615 and RM1224 obfuscate exported configuration backups with a hard-coded key and Siemens lists no fix, so treat every exported backup file as a secret.

How should KEV and EPSS weigh on SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM findings?

No CISA KEV entry names SCALANCE or RUGGEDCOM, so the KEV hits on these devices come through third-party software that Siemens has mapped to them. As of 2026-11-20, the KEV catalog data (version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) includes these CVEs that Siemens advisories list for its network devices:

  • RUGGEDCOM APE1808 with PAN-OS: CVE-2024-3400 (added 2024-04-12; SSA-750274 names Virtual NGFW V11.1.2-h3 and notes that GlobalProtect is disabled by default in APE1808 deployments), CVE-2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474 (both added 2024-11-18), and the PHP2Shell pair CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (added 2026-10-26), for which SSA-566512, updated 2026-11-18, tells customers to contact Siemens support for patch information.
  • RUGGEDCOM APE1808 with FortiGate NGFW: CVE-2022-42475, CVE-2023-27997 and CVE-2024-21762, all in SSA-770770, which covers FortiGate NGFW before V7.4.7.
  • RUGGEDCOM ROX: the Linux kernel flaws CVE-2022-0847 (Dirty Pipe) and CVE-2022-0492, fixed in ROX V2.17.0 by SSA-202008.
  • SCALANCE M-800, S615 and RUGGEDCOM RM1224: PwnKit, CVE-2021-4034, fixed in V7.2 by SSA-419740.

FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-19 tell the same story. The PAN-OS flaws score near certainty (CVE-2024-3400 and CVE-2026-109618 at 0.99999). Among Siemens' own CVEs, the 2012 ROS factory account CVE-2012-1803 is highest at 0.48882 (98.9th percentile); the next are far lower: CVE-2013-5944 at 0.03203, CVE-2021-25669 at 0.02361 and CVE-2021-31895 at 0.02195. Every 2023 to 2025 ROS and ROX CVE in the table above scores below 0.014.

A practical order is: first, any APE1808 firewall with a KEV-listed PAN-OS or FortiOS version, and any SCALANCE or RUGGEDCOM management interface reachable from outside its cell; second, devices still on firmware older than the 2012 and 2013 fixes, which allow login or administration without a real password; third, layer 2 exposure (RCDP, mirror ports, STP passive listening) on ROS and SCALANCE X switches; then the remaining web and SSH fixes. The KEV and EPSS prioritization guide explains how to combine the two signals.

How do you harden SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM devices per Siemens guidance?

Siemens' Operational Guidelines for industrial security (Version 2.2.1, April 2024) and the workarounds in its advisories reduce to six steps:

  1. Segment firstThe guidelines call for strict separation between production and office networks, ideally through a DMZ, and a cell protection concept in which each cell holds only components with the same protection requirements and is reached through a security appliance. Management interfaces of switches and routers belong inside the cell or on a dedicated management network, never on the office LAN or the internet. The Purdue model guide shows where those zones sit, and CISA's BOD 23-02 guide on internet-exposed management interfaces explains why exposed admin consoles are the first thing to remove.
  2. Activate only required servicesThe guidelines say active network services are a potential security risk and that only the services actually required should be activated. In advisory terms: disable Telnet (TCP 23) and use SSH, disable SNMP where possible, keep the TCP Event service (TCP 26864), OSPF and the ROS Modbus server off unless used, deactivate RCDP after commissioning, and disable STP passive listening. Where WBM is not needed, SSA-443566 suggests disabling it and configuring the device over SSH.
  3. Change default passwords and keysThe guidelines state that predefined default passwords must be changed during system commissioning. For SCALANCE X switches, SSA-274900 adds replacing the default self-signed and firmware-embedded X.509 certificates with your own trusted certificates, because some devices keep the key shipped with the firmware after factory reset.
  4. Restrict management to known hostsSiemens' advisories repeatedly suggest ACLs or firewall rules that allow TCP 80, 443 and 22, and UDP 161 and 69, only from trusted IP addresses. On ROS, SSA-764417 adds configuring SSH clients for strong key exchange algorithms and loading only trusted client public keys.
  5. Protect configuration backups and RADIUSTreat exported configurations and C-PLUG modules as secrets (SSA-646841, SSA-180704), and for RADIUS, require Message-Authenticator and keep RADIUS traffic on a management VLAN (SSA-723487).
  6. Update to the fixed line and track itEach fix applies to one firmware line; record the line and version for every device, because the same CVE can have a fix on ROS V5.x and none on V4.x.

For Wi-Fi, the guidelines' WLAN section asks for at least WPA2 with AES, RADIUS authentication per 802.1X, and configuration only over HTTPS and SSH. Our hostapd and wpa_supplicant guide covers the protocol-level Wi-Fi flaws behind several W-700 advisories, and the Net-SNMP guide explains why SNMP v1 and v2c community strings should not cross a shared network.

What does a SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM review of one substation look like? (worked example)

Synthetic example, not a real site. A small substation has two RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V5.X switches on ROS V5.7.0, one RUGGEDCOM RS900G on ROS V4.3.6, a SCALANCE XC208 on V4.3, a SCALANCE M876-4 router on V7.1.0 for remote access, and one SCALANCE X204RNA PRP device on V3.2.6.

Observation Why it matters Action
RSG2288 on ROS V5.7.0 Below V5.8.0 (CVE-2023-24845 mirror port), V5.9.0 (CVE-2023-52237) and V5.10.0 (CVE-2025-41224, CVE-2023-52236) Update to V5.10.1 or later, which also fixes CVE-2025-40935
RS900G on ROS V4.3.6 Below V4.3.7 (CVE-2021-31895 DHCP client) and V4.3.10 (CVE-2023-52237); no V4.x fix for CVE-2023-52236 Update to V4.3.10 or later; restrict TCP 22, 80 and 443 to the engineering workstation
RCDP still enabled on all ROS switches CVE-2017-12736 lets an adjacent host perform administrative actions Deactivate RCDP as the ROS user guide describes
Telnet and HTTP open on the X204RNA CVE-2019-10942 has no remediation for X204RNA PRP; CVE-2019-13933 needs V3.2.7 Update to V3.2.7, disable Telnet, restrict WBM to the engineering workstation
M876-4 on V7.1.0 reachable from the corporate network on TCP 443 Below V7.1.2 (CVE-2022-31765, CVE-2022-36323) and V8.2 (CVE-2024-3596); management exposed outside the cell Update to V8.2 or later; allow WBM only from the management VLAN
XC208 on V4.3 with default self-signed certificate Below V4.4 for CVE-2022-31765 Update to V4.4 or later and install your own certificate

Where does passive monitoring and component matching help?

A mirror-port capture shows who manages these devices without logging in to any of them. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from such a capture and builds a host-by-port inventory at connection level, including hosts talking to switches and routers on TCP 22, 23, 80, 443, 502 and 26864 and UDP 161, and it lists remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. It has no RCDP, STP, HSR or PRP decoder and does not read firmware versions or configuration from traffic, so layer 2 exposure and firmware lines come from the asset list. For that list, Device & Firmware Security identifies components and versions and matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. AI drafts a cited summary, and an engineer reviews it before delivery. For the controllers behind these switches, see our S7-1200 and S7-1500 guide, and for serial gateways from another vendor, the Moxa NPort guide.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Matching ROS firmware without the V4.x or V5.x line: several fixes exist only on V5.x, so "ROS 4.3" is not a complete inventory entry.
  • Patching the APE1808 by searching Siemens CVEs only; its KEV exposure comes from the hosted PAN-OS or FortiOS version, which Siemens advisories list as Palo Alto Networks or Fortinet CVE IDs.
  • Leaving RCDP, Telnet and SNMP on after commissioning because the switch "only forwards traffic".
  • Firewalling the management VLAN but ignoring layer 2: RCDP, STP passive listening and PROFINET DCP flaws are reached from inside the same segment.
  • Relying on NVD CPE matching for Siemens CVEs from 2023 onward, many of which are Deferred with no CPE configuration.
  • Restoring old configuration backups or C-PLUG modules without treating them as secrets, since CVE-2019-6567 lets an attacker with a backup reconstruct passwords, and SCALANCE X-200 devices used with C-PLUG kept the firmware's hard-coded key (CVE-2020-28391).

This guide draws on Siemens ProductCERT advisories SSA-019200, SSA-081142, SSA-083019, SSA-100232, SSA-116379, SSA-170375, SSA-176087, SSA-180704, SSA-187092, SSA-202008, SSA-256353, SSA-274900, SSA-293562, SSA-296266, SSA-301229, SSA-354112, SSA-373591, SSA-419740, SSA-443566, SSA-457702, SSA-552702, SSA-566512, SSA-646763, SSA-646841, SSA-697140, SSA-710008, SSA-723487, SSA-750274, SSA-764417, SSA-769027, SSA-770770, SSA-780073, SSA-836527, SSA-856721, SSA-908185 and SSA-979775, Siemens' Operational Guidelines Version 2.2.1, CISA ICS advisories ICSA-12-146-01A, ICSA-17-271-01B, ICSA-22-104-09, ICSA-24-193-06 and ICSA-25-135-17, and NVD records. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-20. It is general information, not a substitute for Siemens' product-specific security guidance or a current advisory search for your exact hardware and firmware version.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Are SCALANCE or RUGGEDCOM vulnerabilities in the CISA KEV catalog?

No KEV entry names SCALANCE or RUGGEDCOM as the product as of 2026-11-20 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries); the two Siemens-named entries are CVE-2016-8562 (SIMATIC CP) and CVE-2026-110936 (Software Center). Third-party KEV CVEs do reach these devices, according to Siemens' own advisories. On the RUGGEDCOM APE1808 they arrive through the Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet firewall software it hosts: CVE-2024-3400, CVE-2024-0012, CVE-2024-9474 and the PHP2Shell pair CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (PAN-OS), and CVE-2022-42475, CVE-2023-27997 and CVE-2024-21762 (FortiOS). RUGGEDCOM ROX before V2.17.0 carries the Linux kernel KEV entries CVE-2022-0847 (Dirty Pipe) and CVE-2022-0492, and SCALANCE M-800 and RUGGEDCOM RM1224 before V7.2 carry PwnKit, CVE-2021-4034.

What is the RUGGEDCOM ROS factory account, CVE-2012-1803?

NVD describes CVE-2012-1803 as a factory account in RuggedCom Rugged Operating System (ROS) 3.10.x and earlier whose password is derived from the MAC address shown in the login banner, so anyone who sees the banner can calculate it and log in over Telnet, rsh or the serial console. CISA's ICSA-12-146-01A lists ROS 3.10.1, 3.9.3, 3.8.5 and 3.7.9 as the versions that remove the factory account, and says the same releases disable insecure communication services by default and remove device information from the login banner. FIRST EPSS on 2026-11-19 scores it at 0.48882, the highest of any Siemens-native CVE in this guide.

Which SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM weaknesses have no firmware fix?

Siemens' CSAF files list several. CVE-2023-24845, mirror-port injection in RUGGEDCOM ROS, has no fix for 38 product entries, including the RS1600 and RS8000 families and fiber-optic F variants. CVE-2023-52236, legacy cryptographic algorithms in ROS, has no fix for the ROS V4.x devices (V5.x is fixed in V5.10.0). SCALANCE W1748-1 and W1788 access points (the W1700 family) have no fix for CVE-2022-31765, CVE-2022-36323 or the RADIUS flaw CVE-2024-3596, and the SCALANCE X204RNA HSR and PRP devices have no remediation for the Telnet denial of service CVE-2019-10942. For these, Siemens points to network restrictions, disabling the service or migrating to a successor product.

What is RCDP and should it be switched off?

RCDP is the RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol, a layer 2 protocol that RUGGEDCOM tools use to find and configure devices. Siemens advisory SSA-856721 says that after commissioning, RCDP could still write to ROS devices and some SCALANCE X switches, so an attacker in the same adjacent network could perform administrative actions (CVE-2017-12736, Siemens CVSS 3.1 8.8). Fixed versions include ROS V4.3.4 and V5.0.1 and SCALANCE XM-400 V6.1.1, and Siemens says that manually deactivating RCDP as the user guide describes completely mitigates the flaw. Once the device is commissioned, there is no reason to leave it on.

Do SCALANCE M-800 and RUGGEDCOM RM1224 share firmware fixes?

Yes, in practice. Siemens lists the RUGGEDCOM RM1224 LTE(4G) EU and NAM routers inside its SCALANCE M-800 family advisories, alongside the M804PB, M812, M816, M826, M874, M876, MUM853, MUM856 and S615, with the same fixed versions: V7.1.2 for CVE-2022-31765 and CVE-2022-36323, V7.2 for the third-party flaws in SSA-419740, V8.0 for CVE-2023-44373, V8.1 for CVE-2024-41976 and V8.2 for the SSA-354112 set and the RADIUS flaw CVE-2024-3596. Treat an RM1224 as an M-800 when you match firmware to advisories.

Sources

  1. Siemens ProductCERT: security advisories (advisory index)
  2. Siemens: Cybersecurity for Industry, Operational Guidelines, Version 2.2.1 (April 2024)
  3. Siemens SSA-176087: Unauthenticated access to critical services in SCALANCE X-200 switch family (CVE-2013-5944)
  4. Siemens SSA-187092: Several buffer-overflow vulnerabilities in web server of SCALANCE X-200 (CVE-2021-25668, CVE-2021-25669)
  5. Siemens SSA-443566: Authentication bypass in SCALANCE X switches families (CVE-2019-13933)
  6. Siemens SSA-274900: Use of hardcoded key in SCALANCE X devices under certain conditions (CVE-2020-28391, CVE-2020-28395)
  7. Siemens SSA-836527: Multiple vulnerabilities in SCALANCE X-300 switch family devices
  8. Siemens SSA-100232: Denial-of-service vulnerability in SCALANCE X switches (CVE-2019-10942)
  9. Siemens SSA-856721: Vulnerability in RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol (RCDP) of industrial communication devices (CVE-2017-12736)
  10. Siemens SSA-979775: Stack overflow vulnerability in SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM devices (CVE-2021-25667)
  11. Siemens SSA-293562: Denial of service vulnerabilities in PROFINET DCP implementation of industrial products (CVE-2017-2680, CVE-2017-2681)
  12. Siemens SSA-780073: Denial of service vulnerability in PROFINET devices via DCE-RPC packets (CVE-2019-13946)
  13. Siemens SSA-552702: Privilege escalation vulnerability in the web interface of SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM products (CVE-2022-31765)
  14. Siemens SSA-697140: Denial of service vulnerability in the TCP Event service of SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM products (CVE-2022-31766)
  15. Siemens SSA-710008: Multiple web vulnerabilities in SCALANCE products (CVE-2022-36323 to CVE-2022-36325)
  16. Siemens SSA-180704: Multiple vulnerabilities in SCALANCE M-800 family before V8.0
  17. Siemens SSA-354112: Multiple vulnerabilities in SCALANCE M-800 family before V8.2
  18. Siemens SSA-419740: Multiple third-party component vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM and SCALANCE products before V7.2
  19. Siemens SSA-723487: RADIUS protocol susceptible to forgery attacks (CVE-2024-3596), impact to SCALANCE, RUGGEDCOM and related products
  20. Siemens SSA-646763: DNSpooq, dnsmasq vulnerabilities in SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM devices
  21. Siemens SSA-019200: Multiple vulnerabilities in SCALANCE W-700 IEEE 802.11n devices before V6.6.0
  22. Siemens SSA-769027: Multiple vulnerabilities fixed in SCALANCE W700 IEEE 802.11ax devices before V3.0.0
  23. Siemens SSA-457702: Wi-Fi encryption bypass vulnerabilities in SCALANCE W700 product family (CVE-2024-30189 to CVE-2024-30191)
  24. Siemens SSA-908185: Mirror port isolation vulnerability in RUGGEDCOM ROS devices (CVE-2023-24845)
  25. Siemens SSA-764417: Weak encryption vulnerability in RUGGEDCOM ROS devices (CVE-2021-37209)
  26. Siemens SSA-373591: Buffer overflow vulnerability in RUGGEDCOM ROS devices (CVE-2021-31895)
  27. Siemens SSA-256353: Third-party component vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM ROS
  28. Siemens SSA-170375: Multiple vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM ROS before V5.9
  29. Siemens SSA-083019: Multiple vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM ROS devices
  30. Siemens SSA-301229: Client-side enforcement of server-side security vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM ROX II
  31. Siemens SSA-202008: Multiple vulnerabilities in RUGGEDCOM ROX before V2.17.0
  32. Siemens SSA-081142: Arbitrary code execution vulnerability in RUGGEDCOM ROX before 2.17.1 (CVE-2025-40949)
  33. Siemens SSA-750274: Impact of CVE-2024-3400 on RUGGEDCOM APE1808 devices configured with Palo Alto Networks Virtual NGFW
  34. Siemens SSA-566512: PHP2Shell vulnerabilities in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS on RUGGEDCOM APE1808 devices
  35. Siemens SSA-770770: Multiple vulnerabilities in Fortigate NGFW before V7.4.7 on RUGGEDCOM APE1808 devices
  36. CISA CSAF: ICSA-12-146-01A RuggedCom weak cryptography for password vulnerability (CVE-2012-1803)
  37. CISA CSAF: ICSA-17-271-01B Siemens Ruggedcom ROS, SCALANCE (CVE-2017-12736)
  38. CISA CSAF: ICSA-22-104-09 Siemens SCALANCE X-300 switches
  39. CISA CSAF: ICSA-24-193-06 Siemens RUGGEDCOM (CVE-2023-52237, CVE-2024-39675)
  40. CISA CSAF: ICSA-25-135-17 Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX II
  41. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog data (kev-data)
  42. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) data
  43. NVD: CVE-2012-1803 (RuggedCom ROS factory account)
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Siemens SCALANCE and RUGGEDCOM network device vulnerabilities: services, CVE families, fixed firmware and hardening