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OT/ICS security

TSA Pipeline Security Directives: what covered operators must do

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Two separate TSA Security Directive series, both issued under existing statutory authority rather than new legislation, now govern cybersecurity for US pipeline and LNG operators TSA designates as critical: the Pipeline-2021-01 series sets standing reporting and coordination duties, and the Pipeline-2021-02 series (revised as SD-02D, effective 27 July 2023, and again as SD-02E in July 2024) requires three TSA-approved cybersecurity plans. Both trace directly back to the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, which disrupted fuel supply across the US East Coast and pushed TSA to act within weeks rather than wait for Congress.

Key takeaways

  • Report cybersecurity incidents to CISA.
  • The second directive, Pipeline-2021-02, issued in July 2021, carries the substantive security-program requirements.
  • Security directives are emergency instruments, so TSA reissues them roughly once a year and has each one ratified by the Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB).
  • TSA notifies owner/operators directly when it designates their pipeline or LNG facility as critical; there is no published, self-identifying list.

What does SD-01 require?

TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 on 27 May 2021, effective the next day, setting three standing duties for covered owner/operators:

  1. Report cybersecurity incidents to CISAThe original 12-hour reporting window was extended to 24 hours by amendment SD-01B, ratified 24 June 2022, in line with TSA's other surface transportation and aviation reporting timelines.
  2. Designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator, with a primary or alternate accessible to TSA and CISA 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to coordinate cybersecurity practices and incident response.
  3. Complete a vulnerability assessmentof current cybersecurity practices against TSA's own recommendations, identify gaps, and develop a remediation plan and timeline, reported to TSA and CISA.

SD-01 has been reissued several times since. TSA's November 2024 proposed rule lists ratification dates through SD-01D (28 June 2024), but the three-part structure (report, coordinate, assess) has stayed stable since 2021.

What does the SD-02 series require?

The second directive, Pipeline-2021-02, issued in July 2021, carries the substantive security-program requirements. Industry criticised the original text as too prescriptive for a sector with very different OT environments. TSA revised it as SD-02C, effective 27 July 2022, which in TSA's own words kept the security objectives "but also provide[d] more flexibility by imposing performance-based, rather than prescriptive, security measures." The language draws on frameworks such as NIST CSF, IEC 62443 and ISA-99: see our NIST SP 800-82 OT security and IEC 62443-3-3 guides.

The three required plans

Plan What it covers
Cybersecurity Implementation Plan (CIP) The operator's TSA-approved description of the specific cybersecurity measures it uses to protect its Critical Cyber Systems, and the schedule for reaching TSA's security outcomes
Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan (CIRP) How the operator detects, responds to and recovers from a cybersecurity incident affecting IT or OT systems, with named roles, exercised every year
Cybersecurity Assessment Plan (CAP) How the operator tests and audits its own CIP measures on a recurring schedule, submitted to TSA every year

All three submissions are Sensitive Security Information under 49 CFR part 1520, as TSA's January 2026 information-collection notice restates; that notice also confirms there is "no designated form or format" for the CIP or CAP.

What four outcomes must the CIP reach?

TSA's proposed-rule preamble summarises the outcomes every CIP must show it meets:

Outcome What TSA asks for
Network segmentation Policies and controls so the OT system can keep operating safely if an IT system is compromised, and the reverse
Access control Measures that secure Critical Cyber Systems and prevent unauthorised access
Continuous monitoring and detection Policies and procedures to detect threats and correct anomalies affecting Critical Cyber System operations
Timely patching Reduce exploitation of unpatched systems by applying security patches and updates "for operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware" with a risk-based method

Source: Federal Register 89 FR 88488 (7 November 2024), section on the SD Pipeline-2021-02 series.

The word firmware in the fourth row is where OT suppliers come in: an operator cannot schedule a patch its vendor never published or never told it about.

SD-02D (2023): more audit rigor, not a new framework

SD-02D, effective 27 July 2023, superseded SD-02C. TSA described it as a minor revision of SD-02C's controls, but it added procedural detail, summarised in Dragos's review of the revision:

  • Rolling three-year audit cycle: at least 30% of the Assessment Plan's policies, procedures, measures and capabilities must be assessed each year, so the full plan is covered every three years, with annual Assessment Plan reports submitted to TSA.
  • Mandatory annual tabletop exercises testing the Incident Response Plan, covering at least two plan objectives, with the named roles who take part documented.
  • Critical Cyber System designation challenge process: if TSA disagrees with an operator's list of in-scope systems, the operator may need to justify exclusions or add systems TSA identifies.
  • A 60-day notification requirement for an operator that determines it has no Critical Cyber Systems, with a duty to reassess after operational changes.

Which revision is current, and how often does it change?

Security directives are emergency instruments, so TSA reissues them roughly once a year and has each one ratified by the Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB). The ratification table in the proposed rule shows the pattern:

Directive TSOB ratification
SD Pipeline-2021-02 17 August 2021
SD Pipeline-2021-02B 13 January 2022
SD Pipeline-2021-02C 19 August 2022
SD Pipeline-2021-02D 24 August 2023
SD Pipeline-2021-02E 23 August 2024

Source: 89 FR 88497–88498, Table 2.

The same document calls the directive "most recently revised in July 2024," which is SD-02E, so the SD-02D content described above is no longer the latest letter. The January 2026 notice refers simply to the "SD Pipeline-2021-02 series" and confirms its CIP, CIRP, CAP and record-keeping duties continue. Directive texts carry SSI markings in places, so a covered operator should confirm the letter in force with TSA directly.

Who is covered, and how well-implemented is it?

TSA notifies owner/operators directly when it designates their pipeline or LNG facility as critical; there is no published, self-identifying list. In its 2024 proposal TSA estimated its rule would apply to 115 of the approximately 2,105 pipeline facilities and systems regulated by PHMSA. Operators notified before 26 July 2022 are covered under the SD-02D baseline; TSA can add others later, each on their own timeline from the date of notification.

A DHS Office of Inspector General audit (OIG-23-57, September 2023) found implementation uneven in the first two years: some designated operators had not met one or more SD-02 requirements, and TSA had issued warning notices for violations. Covered operators should expect active TSA follow-up, not passive filing.

What will a covered operator ask its OT suppliers for?

The directives bind operators, not vendors. But each CIP outcome depends on facts only the PLC, RTU, flow computer or SCADA vendor holds, so those questions land in procurement and support contracts:

CIP outcome or plan Typical question to the supplier Evidence that answers it
Segmentation Which ports, protocols and remote-access paths does the product need? A network-requirements sheet per product and firmware version
Access control Are there default or hard-coded accounts, and can every account be changed or disabled? Account list, hardening guide
Monitoring What security events can the device log or export? Log format documentation
Patching (firmware) Which third-party components ship in this firmware, and which known vulnerabilities affect them? A firmware SBOM and a vulnerability list tied to that version
Patching (firmware) Which of those are on CISA's KEV catalog, and when is a fix due? Advisory or bulletin with fixed versions
CIRP How fast will you tell us about an incident or a confirmed vulnerability in your product? A contract clause and a published disclosure policy

The KEV question is likely to sharpen. Under the proposed rule's patching section, a patch strategy would have to include "prioritization of all security patches and updates on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog." See our KEV and EPSS prioritisation guide and the IEC 62443-2-3 patch management guide.

What would TSA's proposed rule change?

On 7 November 2024 TSA published the "Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management" proposed rule, which would turn the directive requirements into permanent regulation (a new 49 CFR part 1586 for pipelines), with comments due 5 February 2025. As of 11 November 2026, the Federal Register shows no final rule. For pipeline operators and their suppliers, the proposal would:

  • Replace the CIP with a Cybersecurity Operational Implementation Plan (COIP), plus an annual cybersecurity evaluation and a plan of action and milestones capped at three years for any gaps.
  • Add supply chain risk management (proposed §1586.215), not covered in the directives: contracts signed or updated after the final rule's effective date would require vendors to notify the operator of cybersecurity incidents and of "confirmed security vulnerabilities affecting the goods, services, or capabilities provided," within a set timeframe.
  • Require an evaluation of the vendor's cybersecurity measures for anything "connected to, installed on, or used by" a Critical Cyber System, and a preference for the more secure of two similar offerings.
  • Require KEV-first patching of operating systems, applications, drivers and firmware, with a documented explanation and extra mitigations where an OT patch would severely degrade operations.

TSA also asked whether new software should have to meet CISA's Secure-by-Design principles. The supply chain items draw on CISA's Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals.

Worked example: how does a supplier answer an operator's firmware questionnaire?

Synthetic example for illustration; the company, product and figures are invented.

A maker of gas flow computers receives a questionnaire from a pipeline customer preparing its annual Assessment Plan.

  1. Pin the scopeThe customer runs firmware 4.2.1 on 40 units. The vendor answers for that version only, not "the product."
  2. Produce the component listThe vendor extracts an SBOM from the 4.2.1 image: an RTOS, a TLS library, a Modbus stack and a web server.
  3. Match known vulnerabilitiesMatching against NVD finds 11 CVEs; one, in the web server, is on CISA's KEV catalog.
  4. Triage with an engineerEngineers confirm the web server is enabled by default. The KEV item becomes the priority; three CVEs sit in code the build excludes, and the vendor records why.
  5. Answer with datesThe reply gives the fixed version (4.2.3), a release date, an interim mitigation (disable the web server and block TCP 80/443 at the zone boundary), and the vendor's incident-notification contact.
  6. Keep it currentThe customer will re-ask next year, and CISA adds entries to the KEV catalog often, so the vendor schedules a fresh match for each release.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Citing SD-02D as current. The record shows SD-02E from July 2024; check the letter in force.
  • Answering for the product, not the version. Operators patch per firmware version; so must the evidence.
  • Promising patches without a mitigation. OT patch windows are rare; give an interim control with every fix date.
  • Treating the questionnaire as one-off. The CAP cycle repeats yearly and covers 30% or more of measures each time.
  • Ignoring SSI handling. Information shared with an operator about its Critical Cyber Systems may be SSI; agree handling rules first.

How does this fit alongside other OT/ICS obligations?

TSA's directive authority covers pipeline and LNG transportation only, so an operator with other critical assets may face overlapping rules. Compare NERC CIP and its supply chain standard CIP-013 for bulk electric system assets, or Australia's SOCI Act and CISA's CIRCIA for the closest non-US and general US analogues. Unlike CIRCIA, which as of November 2026 has no binding reporting rule in force, TSA's pipeline directives have been operational, audited and enforced since 2021.

Where should an operator or supplier start?

  1. Confirm your designation status directly with TSA, not by inference; the compliance clock starts from TSA's notification.
  2. Build the Cybersecurity Coordinator and 24-hour reporting path before an incidentSD-01's 24/7 availability requirement assumes it exists.
  3. Keep the CIP, assessment evidence and tabletop records in syncSD-02D's 30%-per-year audit cycle only works if they match.
  4. Run the annual tabletop against named roles, testing two or more Incident Response Plan objectives.
  5. Suppliers: prepare per-version answers nowAn SBOM, a KEV-aware vulnerability list and a notification clause cover most of what an operator's CIP and the proposed rule ask for.

SoftWSP's OT Snapshot analyses a passive traffic recording from a mirror port and returns a device inventory, known vulnerabilities and a remote-access map, which helps with the segmentation and access-control evidence a CIP expects. For suppliers, SoftWSP's firmware security service extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report for an engineer to review. Deciding which matches apply to a build stays with the engineer.

This guide summarises TSA's published security directive text, Federal Register notices and the November 2024 proposed rule, a DHS Office of Inspector General audit report, and independent industry analysis current as of November 2026. TSA security directives are Sensitive Security Information in places and subject to revision; this is general information, not legal or compliance advice. Confirm your specific obligations directly with TSA before relying on this guide for a compliance decision.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What triggered TSA's pipeline cybersecurity directives, and when were they issued?

The May 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, which disrupted fuel supply across the US East Coast, led TSA to issue Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 on 27 May 2021 (effective 28 May 2021) under its existing statutory security-directive authority over pipeline transportation, rather than through new legislation. A second, more substantive directive series, Pipeline-2021-02, followed on 20 July 2021 (effective 26 July 2021).

What does the SD Pipeline-2021-01 series require?

The original SD-01, per TSA's own directive text and secondary legal summaries, set three standing duties for covered owner/operators: report cybersecurity incidents to CISA (the original 12-hour window was extended to 24 hours by amendment SD-01B, ratified 24 June 2022); designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator, with a primary or alternate accessible to TSA and CISA 24 hours a day, seven days a week; and complete a vulnerability assessment of current cybersecurity practices against TSA's recommendations, identifying gaps and a remediation plan and timeline.

What does the SD Pipeline-2021-02 series (02C, 02D) require, and how is it different from SD-01?

Where SD-01 set standing reporting and coordination duties, the 02 series carries the substantive security-program requirements. The original SD-02 (July 2021) was criticized by industry as overly prescriptive; TSA's revision, SD-02C (2022), shifted to a performance-based model requiring covered owner/operators to develop and get TSA approval for a Cybersecurity Implementation Plan (CIP), alongside a Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan and a Cybersecurity Assessment Plan — rather than mandating specific technical controls by a fixed date. SD-02D, effective 27 July 2023, supersedes SD-02C without a major overhaul: it keeps the same three-plan structure but adds audit specificity (at least 30% of the Assessment Plan's measures tested each year, so all of it is covered over a rolling three-year cycle), mandatory annual tabletop exercises testing at least two Incident Response Plan objectives with named-role participants, and a process for TSA to challenge an operator's Critical Cyber System designations. TSA revised the directive again as SD-02E in July 2024 (ratified 23 August 2024), so check which letter is in force.

Who is covered by these directives?

TSA-designated owner/operators of 'critical' pipeline and, as of the SD-02 series' later revisions, liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities — entities TSA notifies directly rather than a published, self-identifying list. Owner/operators notified of critical status before 26 July 2022 are covered under the SD-02D baseline, carried into SD-02E (July 2024); TSA can and has added additional owner/operators subsequently, each with their own compliance deadline once notified. A DHS Office of Inspector General audit found implementation uneven in the directives' first two years, with some critical operators not meeting one or more SD-02 requirements and TSA issuing warning notices for violations.

Sources

  1. TSA: Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C (SD02C), 21 July 2022
  2. TSA: Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D
  3. Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 183 (24 September 2021): notice referencing Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 issuance and ratification
  4. Federal Register (6 June 2023): TSA pipeline/LNG cybersecurity notice
  5. DHS Office of Inspector General: Better TSA Tracking and Follow-up Needed for the 2021 Pipeline Cybersecurity Requirements (OIG-23-57, September 2023)
  6. Davis Wright Tremaine: TSA Updates Cybersecurity Requirements for 'Critical' Pipelines and LNG Facilities (SD-02D analysis)
  7. Dragos: TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02D Reinforces Requirement for Tabletop Exercises and Rigor in Plan Auditing
  8. CISA: Pipeline Cybersecurity (Transportation Systems Sector)
  9. Federal Register (7 November 2024): TSA proposed rule, Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management (89 FR 88488), incl. SD ratification table and proposed 49 CFR part 1586
  10. govinfo: 89 FR 88488 full text (FR Doc. 2024-24704)
  11. Federal Register (2 January 2026): TSA 30-day notice, Pipeline Corporate Security Reviews and TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series (OMB 1652-0056)
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TSA Pipeline Security Directives: what covered operators must do