Security Advisory

CVE-2019-5637: TwinCAT PROFINET DCP Crash DoS

Last updated:
  • CVE-2019-5637

CVE-2019-5637 is a denial-of-service flaw in Beckhoff TwinCAT: when the PROFINET driver is configured, one crafted PROFINET DCP packet triggers a divide-by-zero that crashes the runtime and halts the controlled process. NVD and Rapid7 both score it 7.5. Beckhoff fixes it in TwinCAT 2 Build 2305 and TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.4.

Vulnerability summary

CVSS base score

7.5

High severity

EPSS score (FIRST)

1.4%

Probability of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days

CISA KEV catalog

No

Not listed

Published

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2019-5637 · Source: NVD

Affected components

ComponentCPEVersion range
Beckhoff TwinCAT 2 runtime with PROFINET driver configured—Build 2304 and earlier; fixed in Build 2305 (Beckhoff advisory 2019-007); not in NVD's CPE configuration
Beckhoff TwinCAT 3.1 runtime with PROFINET driver configuredcpe:2.3:o:beckhoff:twincat:3.1.4022.30:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Build 4024.0 and earlier; fixed in Build 4024.4 (Beckhoff advisory 2019-007). NVD CPE lists only 3.1.4022.29 and 3.1.4022.30

What does this mean for affected devices?

NVD's description reads: "When Beckhoff TwinCAT is configured to use the Profinet driver, a denial of service of the controller could be reached by sending a malformed UDP packet to the device." NVD's Primary score is CVSS v3.1 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H), the same as Rapid7's CNA score, and both class it CWE-369 (divide by zero). The record was published on 2019-11-21 (NVD, CVE record).

What does the crafted packet do?

Beckhoff advisory 2019-007 (V1.1, 4 August 2020, VDE-2019-019) describes the trigger as a specially crafted PROFINET DCP packet sent to a TwinCAT device that has PROFINET connections configured; operation resumes after a restart. Rapid7's R7-2019-32 write-up gives the detail: a DCP "Ident Request" with its ResponseDelay field set to 0 raises a divide-by-zero exception on every Beckhoff PLC that has a PROFINET controller or device bound to the receiving network card. The complete PLC runtime crashes, all PLC programs and fieldbus activity stop, and the runtime restarts in CONFIG mode until someone switches it back to RUN, unless the device was configured to boot straight into RUN.

Rapid7 describes the Ident Request as an Ethernet broadcast frame to the PROFINET multicast address 01:0e:cf:00:00:00, so the attacker needs a foothold on the same Layer 2 segment, not only an IP route. NVD's "malformed UDP packet" wording and its network attack vector are broader than what the vendor and the researcher describe.

Which versions are affected and how do you fix it?

Product Affected Fixed
TwinCAT 2 with PROFINET driver Build 2304 and earlier Build 2305 or newer
TwinCAT 3.1 with PROFINET driver Build 4024.0 and earlier Build 4024.4 or newer

NVD's CPE lists only TwinCAT 3.1.4022.29 and 3.1.4022.30, the builds Rapid7 tested on Beckhoff CX2030 and CX5140 embedded PCs under Windows 10 LTSC and Windows CE, so a CPE match misses the rest of the affected range. A runtime without a configured PROFINET driver is not exposed. Where you cannot update, Beckhoff recommends configuring the perimeter firewall to block PROFINET DCP packets from untrusted networks to the device.

Our Beckhoff TwinCAT ADS protocol guide lists this CVE among the TwinCAT runtime flaws, and the PROFINET protocol security guide explains DCP and how to keep it inside the cell. Rapid7 reported it together with CVE-2019-5636. Siemens DCP denial-of-service flaws of the same kind are CVE-2017-2680, CVE-2017-2681 and CVE-2018-4843.

CVE-2019-5637 is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-11-20 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries). FIRST EPSS gives it 0.01427, the 73.5th percentile, in the 2026-11-19 dataset (CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS).

How to fix this class of issueNo dedicated SoftWSP guide covers this weakness class; the fix is usually the vendor patch or firmware update referenced above. Our related guide explains how to plan and verify it: NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4: enterprise patch management planning, explained.

Evidence

  • NVD (read 2026-11-20): status Modified; published 2019-11-21; NVD Primary CVSS v3.1 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, v2 5.0; Rapid7 Secondary CVSS v3.1 7.5; CWE-369; CPE twincat 3.1.4022.30 and 3.1.4022.29 with CX2030/CX5140 hardware; references Rapid7 blog and Beckhoff advisory 2019-007. — NVD
  • Beckhoff Security Advisory 2019-007 V1.1 (published 2019-10-07, updated 2020-08-04), VDE-2019-019, read 2026-11-20: with the PROFINET driver configured, a specially crafted PROFINET DCP packet leads to denial of service; operation resumes after restart; affected TwinCAT 2 Build 2304 and TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0 and below; update to 2305 or 4024.4 or newer; mitigation: block PROFINET DCP packets from untrusted networks at the perimeter firewall. — Beckhoff advisory 2019-007
  • Rapid7 R7-2019-32 (2019-10-08), read 2026-11-20: DCP Ident Request (Ethernet broadcast frame to 01:0e:cf:00:00:00) with ResponseDelay 0 raises divide-by-zero on PLCs with a PROFINET controller or device configured; runtime crash stops PLC programs and fieldbus activity; restarts into CONFIG mode; CVSSv3 7.5, CWE-369; tested 3.1.4022.30 (CX2030, CX5140, Windows 10 LTSC) and 3.1.4022.29 (CX5140, Windows CE). — Rapid7
  • CVE record (checked 2026-11-20): state PUBLISHED, CNA Rapid7, published 2019-11-21; CNA CVSS v3.1 7.5, CWE-369. — CVE.org
  • Not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.18 (1,786 entries, released 2026-11-18), checked 2026-11-20. — CISA KEV
  • EPSS 0.01427, percentile 0.73538, dataset 2026-11-19, read 2026-11-20. — FIRST EPSS

Related advisories

Sources

  1. NVD
  2. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2019-007: Denial-of-Service on TwinCAT using Profinet protocol (PDF)
  3. Rapid7 R7-2019-32: Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Beckhoff TwinCAT PLC Environment
  4. CVE.org record CVE-2019-5637 (CNA: Rapid7)
  5. CISA KEV
  6. FIRST EPSS

Frequently asked questions

Is every TwinCAT controller exposed to CVE-2019-5637?

No. Beckhoff advisory 2019-007 limits it to TwinCAT systems configured to use the PROFINET driver, as a PROFINET controller or device. A runtime with no PROFINET configuration is not affected by this flaw.

What does the crash do to the machine?

Rapid7 reports that the whole PLC runtime crashes, stopping all PLC programs and fieldbus activity, so the controlled process halts. The runtime restarts in CONFIG mode and needs a manual switch back to RUN unless it was configured to boot into RUN.

Which TwinCAT builds fix it?

TwinCAT 2 Build 2305 or newer and TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.4 or newer, per Beckhoff advisory 2019-007. TwinCAT 2 Build 2304 and TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0 and earlier are affected when the PROFINET driver is configured.

How do I reduce the risk before updating?

Block PROFINET DCP packets from untrusted networks at the firewall, as Beckhoff recommends, and keep the PROFINET segment inside the machine cell. Rapid7 describes the trigger as a Layer 2 broadcast frame, so limiting who can attach to that segment matters most.