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Beckhoff TwinCAT ADS protocol security: AMS routes, ports, CVEs and hardening

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Beckhoff TwinCAT ADS runs on TCP 48898 and UDP 48899 and gives any host with an AMS route full access to the PLC runtime, and on 11 November 2026 Beckhoff disclosed CVE-2026-18767 to CVE-2026-18769 in TcRouter.sys, fixed in TwinCAT 3.1.4024.79. ADS has no per-request authentication: the route table decides who may talk, and Beckhoff's own advisory 2017-001 says ADS is only designed for protected environments. Securing a TwinCAT controller or IPC means knowing which routes exist, keeping the runtime and Device Manager at Beckhoff's fixed versions, moving remote access to Secure ADS on TCP 8016, and blocking plain ADS and discovery where they are not needed.

Key takeaways

  • ADS (Automation Device Specification) is the Beckhoff protocol every TwinCAT component uses to exchange data and commands, locally and over the network.
  • ADS authenticates nothing per request, because Beckhoff designed it for throughput inside protected networks.
  • TwinCAT advisories fall into four families: ADS design, crafted-packet denial of service, kernel-driver privilege escalation and IPC web management.
  • No Beckhoff TwinCAT CVE is in CISA's KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19.

What is ADS, and how does it reach a TwinCAT PLC runtime?

ADS (Automation Device Specification) is the Beckhoff protocol every TwinCAT component uses to exchange data and commands, locally and over the network. Beckhoff's TwinCAT 3 ADS Basics manual (TE1000, version 2.6.2) describes a message router on every TwinCAT device that manages and distributes all messages in the system and over TCP/IP connections. Engineering (XAE), HMIs, SCADA clients and other controllers all reach the runtime through this router.

Two identifiers address every ADS target:

  • AMS NetId, six octets such as 172.16.17.10.1.1, set per device. Beckhoff says it is purely logical and usually has no relation to the IP address; the first four octets can be freely chosen and it must be unique among communication partners.
  • AMS port, which picks the service inside the router. The manual's assigned ports include 851 for TC3 PLC runtime system 1 (852, 853 and up for further runtimes), 801 for TC2 PLC runtime system 1, 10000 for the system service, 500 for the NC and 1 for the ADS router itself. Client applications such as HMIs get a port from 32768 to 65535.

On TCP, each ADS message is an AMS/TCP packet: a 6-byte AMS/TCP header carrying the length, a 32-byte AMS header with target and source NetId and port, command ID, state flags and an invoke ID, then the ADS data. The command set is small:

Command ID Name What it does on a PLC runtime
0x0001 ADS Read Device Info Returns the device name and version number
0x0002 ADS Read Reads data by index group and offset, including PLC variables
0x0003 ADS Write Writes data, such as process values
0x0004 ADS Read State Reads ADS state and device state
0x0005 ADS Write Control Sets a new ADS state; the ADS-DLL's ADSSTATE values include RUN (5), STOP (6) and RECONFIG (16)
0x0006 to 0x0008 Add, Delete and Device Notification Subscribes to cyclic or on-change data
0x0009 ADS Read Write Writes and reads in one call, used for symbol handles and many services

The network ports are fixed. Beckhoff's Secure ADS manual (TE1000, version 1.2) states that unencrypted ADS uses TCP 48898 (0xBF02), the discovery or Broadcast Search uses UDP 48899 (0xBF03), and incoming Secure ADS uses TCP 8016.

Port Use Default on Windows images Default on TwinCAT/BSD
TCP 48898 Unencrypted ADS Open, incoming and outgoing Blocked ex factory
UDP 48899 ADS discovery (Broadcast Search) and route requests Open, incoming and outgoing Open
TCP 8016 Secure ADS (TLS) Open, incoming and outgoing Open

The Windows column comes from the port table in Beckhoff's IPC Security Guideline for Windows 10 (version 1.9, 6 October 2026). The TwinCAT/BSD column comes from the IPC Security Guideline for TwinCAT/BSD (version 1.6), which says the pf firewall is pre-configured so that "ADS port 48898 is blocked ex factory and only ADS Secure is allowed on port 8016," with SSH, HTTPS and ping also allowed.

Why does ADS have no authentication beyond the route table?

ADS authenticates nothing per request, because Beckhoff designed it for throughput inside protected networks. Beckhoff's advisory 2017-001 (version 1.4) says ADS "does not provide security properties," that attackers "can eavesdrop, manipulate and forge arbitrary packets as in any other cleartext protocol," and that a party with ADS access "could make use of various local services." Beckhoff's IPC Security Guideline says the same in its ADS section: ADS was not designed with security in mind and does not include cryptographic operations.

The gate that does exist is the route table. When Rapid7 reported CVE-2019-5636, its write-up described how the ADS router listens on TCP, parses each AMS packet and then "consults a local routing table to determine whether that host is supposed to be able to talk to local PLC components using ADS." If a route exists, the packet goes to the addressed AMS port. From there, every ADS command in the table above is available.

That makes route creation the security-relevant event. Routes are added in the engineering tool, by editing the static route configuration on the target, or remotely. Rapid7 notes that the UDP 48899 handler serves both device discovery and routing-table modification requests. Beckhoff's advisory 2017-002 explains that routes "can be edited remotely via ADS" with a username and password, and that the "Encrypted Password" option for this uses a fixed key an attacker could extract (CVE-2017-16718, CVSS v3.0 5.9 from both Beckhoff and NVD). Beckhoff's fix is to add static routes only locally, so no credentials cross the network, or to block plain ADS and use Secure ADS. An older advisory, 2014-002, adds that ADS lets an attacker "rapidly probe a large number of user/password combinations," which became CVE-2014-5414 in CISA's ICSA-16-278-02.

Secure ADS changes the transport, not the trust model. The Secure ADS manual describes a TLS 1.2 connection from one TwinCAT router to another, available from TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0, and calls it "a transport encryption, but not an end-to-end encryption," because all local applications share the encrypted route. Its limitations section says Secure ADS connections "represent full access for the connected systems as is also described in the Security Advisory 2017-01," and that the direction of access can be limited with unidirectional routes. A host that holds a valid certificate or pre-shared key is therefore as powerful as a plain ADS peer; it is just harder to impersonate or sniff.

The same pattern applies to S7comm on Siemens CPUs and SLMP on Mitsubishi MELSEC: reaching the port is most of the authorization.

Which CVE families affect TwinCAT and ADS?

TwinCAT advisories fall into four families: ADS design, crafted-packet denial of service, kernel-driver privilege escalation and IPC web management. The first covers the protocol itself, the second the discovery port and fieldbus drivers, the third TwinCAT drivers on Windows and the fourth the Beckhoff Device Manager. Beckhoff publishes its own numbered advisories as PDFs, CERT@VDE coordinates the newer ones and publishes CSAF, and CISA has issued four Beckhoff ICS advisories. The table gives Beckhoff's or CERT@VDE's score and NVD's own score where NVD has one.

CVE What it allows (per vendor or NVD) Affected Score Fix or mitigation
CVE-2017-16726 Forge arbitrary ADS packets when legitimate ADS traffic is observable TwinCAT 2 and 3 (Beckhoff 2017-001) NVD v3.0 9.1 No patch; protected network, Secure ADS from 3.1.4024.0, ADS over IPsec, ADS-over-MQTT or OPC UA
CVE-2019-16871 Remote code execution as SYSTEM via the ADS protocol Embedded Windows PLCs through 3.1.4024.0 and TwinCAT engineering stations on Windows (NVD) NVD v3.1 9.8 Listed by Beckhoff under 2017-001; same measures
CVE-2014-5414 No limit on authentication attempts, so ADS credentials can be brute-forced Embedded PC images before 2014-10-22 and ADS TwinCAT components NVD v3.0 9.1 Restrict ADS to trusted networks (Beckhoff 2014-002, CISA ICSA-16-278-02)
CVE-2017-16718 Credentials of a remote Add Route request encrypted with a fixed key TwinCAT 3 components with ADS remote route creation, except TwinCAT/BSD Beckhoff and NVD v3.0 5.9 Add static routes locally; Secure ADS only
CVE-2011-3486 Crafted request to UDP 48899 triggers an out-of-bounds read and denial of service TwinCAT 2.11.0.2004 and earlier NVD v2 5.0 Patch from Beckhoff; restrict UDP 48899 (CISA ICSA-11-279-04)
CVE-2019-5636 Zero-length UDP packet to the discovery port stops the ADS Discovery Service TwinCAT 2 Build 2304 and earlier, TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0 and earlier NVD v3.1 7.5; Rapid7 5.3 TwinCAT 2 Build 2305, TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.4
CVE-2019-5637 Crafted PROFINET DCP packet crashes the runtime when the PROFINET driver is configured Same versions NVD v3.1 7.5 TwinCAT 2 Build 2305, TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.4
CVE-2020-12494 RT Ethernet driver leaks memory in frame padding ("EtherLeak") TwinCAT 3.1 4024.10 and earlier, 4022.32 and earlier, 2.11 2305 and earlier, with the Intel 8254x/8255x RT driver Beckhoff 5.3 TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.11, TwinCAT 2.11 Build 2306
CVE-2018-7502 Kernel drivers lack pointer validation; local code gets SYSTEM TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4022.4 and earlier, TwinCAT 2.11 R3 2259 and earlier, TC1210/TC1220/TC1300/TC1320 NVD v3.0 7.8 TwinCAT 3.1 4022.14, TwinCAT 2.11 R3 2300; recompile C++ and Matlab modules (CISA ICSA-18-081-02)
CVE-2026-18767, 18768, 18769 Exposed IOCTLs in TcRouter.sys give a local low-privileged user I/O-port and physical-memory access TcRouter.sys before 3.1.0.2365 in TC1000 ADS, XAR and XAE Build 4024 and TwinCAT 3 Build 4026 on Windows CERT@VDE v3.1 7.8, v4.0 8.5 each; NVD Deferred TwinCAT 3.1.4024.79; TwinCAT.XAR.Base 3.18.1; Build 4026 workloads 4026.25.0
CVE-2025-41726 Integer overflow in the Device Manager web service leads to code execution in a privileged process IPC and CX with Device Manager before 2.5.3, MDP.dll before 1.7.0.0, TwinCAT/BSD MDP before 1.7.0.0, RT Linux mdp-bhf before 0.0.5-1 CERT@VDE v3.1 8.8; NVD Deferred Update the components or the whole OS image
CVE-2024-41173 Local users bypass Device Manager authentication on TwinCAT/BSD and act as administrator IPC-Diagnostics package before 2.0.0.1, TwinCAT/BSD image before 14.1.2.0_153968 CERT@VDE v3.1 7.8 Update the TwinCAT/BSD image

Three things stand out. First, the two highest NVD scores, CVE-2019-16871 at 9.8 and CVE-2017-16726 at 9.1, have no patch, because they describe what ADS is: Beckhoff's answer in advisory 2017-001 is a protected network and Secure ADS. Second, the discovery port UDP 48899 has broken twice, in 2011 and 2019, and Rapid7 notes that the zero-byte UDP probes nmap and other scanners send were enough to stop the discovery service before Build 4024.4, so active scanning of TwinCAT networks needs care. Third, the 2026 TcRouter.sys flaws and CVE-2018-7502 are local: they turn any foothold on a TwinCAT engineering PC or IPC into full control, which is why Beckhoff's mitigation is to dedicate the PC to TwinCAT and allow only trustworthy users and software on it.

CERT@VDE's VDE-2026-087 carries the TcRouter.sys details in machine-readable CSAF. For the Device Manager family, VDE-2025-092 and Beckhoff advisory 2025-003 apply to Windows 10 and 11 IoT Enterprise, Windows CE, Windows Embedded Compact 7, TwinCAT/BSD and Beckhoff RT Linux images. TwinCAT runtimes that also host a CODESYS-based or OPC UA stack carry those advisories too; see the CODESYS runtime guide and the OPC UA security guide, and the PROFINET guide for DCP.

Are Beckhoff TwinCAT CVEs exploited in the wild?

No Beckhoff TwinCAT CVE is in CISA's KEV catalog as of 2026-11-19. The CISA KEV data (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) has no entry with Beckhoff as vendor or product. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-18 rank CVE-2011-3486 highest at 0.4965, far above the rest: CVE-2019-16871 at 0.0530, CVE-2014-5414 at 0.0480, CVE-2014-5415 at 0.0434, CVE-2019-5636 and CVE-2019-5637 at 0.0143 each, and CVE-2020-12494 at 0.0101. The 2026 TcRouter.sys CVEs sit at 0.0014.

No KEV entry does not make an exposed ADS port safe. ADS Write and ADS Write Control are documented functions, and a host with a route uses them without any exploit. Rank findings by who can reach TCP 48898, UDP 48899 and TCP 8016, and by whether the fix can be installed, as the KEV and EPSS prioritization guide explains.

How do you find the TwinCAT and component versions to compare?

Each fix in the table is tied to a TwinCAT build, a file version or an OS image version, so the inventory needs all three per controller and engineering PC:

What to record Example notation in advisories Where Beckhoff points
TwinCAT build 3.1.4024.79, TwinCAT 2.11 Build 2306 The installed TwinCAT version on the IPC or engineering PC
Build 4026 packages and workloads TwinCAT.XAR.Base 3.18.1, workload 4026.25.0 TwinCAT Package Manager (TcPkg)
Driver file version TcRouter.sys 3.1.0.2365, Tcl8254x.sys 3.1.0.3603 File properties of the driver on Windows
TwinCAT/BSD image 14.1.2.0_153968 Command line or Beckhoff Device Manager UI, per Beckhoff advisory 2024-001
Device Manager and MDP Beckhoff.DeviceManager.XAR 2.5.3, MDP 1.7.0.0, mdp-bhf 0.0.5-1 Package lists on the IPC or CX

A practical sequence:

  1. Start from the TwinCAT projects and the route listsRecord each target's AMS NetId, IP address, operating system image and TwinCAT build, and export the static routes on every runtime so you know which hosts may talk ADS to it.
  2. Read versions on the device during an agreed windowADS Read Device Info (0x0001) returns only a device name and version number for the addressed ADS device, so use the OS and package tools for the build and driver versions the advisories name.
  3. Check engineering PCs as carefully as controllersCVE-2018-7502, CVE-2025-41701 and the TcRouter.sys CVEs affect XAE installations; Beckhoff advisory 2025-001 (CVE-2025-41701, CERT@VDE 7.8) covers TwinCAT 3 Engineering opening a manipulated project file.
  4. Note TwinCAT/BSD separatelyIts images ship with plain ADS blocked and Secure ADS allowed; Beckhoff advisory 2017-002 says those defaults "shall not be changed for security reasons." For updates, Beckhoff recommends updating the whole TwinCAT/BSD image, and from major version 12 two consecutive upgrades are needed.

How should TwinCAT controllers and IPCs be hardened?

Treat every ADS route as an administrator account and every ADS port as a management interface. Beckhoff's advisories, the Secure ADS manual and the IPC Security Guidelines give these measures:

  1. Keep ADS inside a protected networkAdvisory 2017-001 recommends using ADS only where no attack is possible, and blocking ADS in the firewall when all ADS applications run on the same system. Zone the cell following the Purdue model and allow 48898, 48899 and 8016 only between named engineering, HMI and SCADA hosts and the controllers.
  2. Use Secure ADS for anything that crosses a zoneSecure ADS is part of TC1000 at no licence cost and needs TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0 or later. Choose the key type deliberately: self-signed certificates are generated at first start with a validity from 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2061, which Beckhoff calls too long and says needs organizational measures; pre-shared keys are stored in files and not hashed; a customer CA with expiring certificates is the managed option.
  3. Close plain ADS and discovery where they are not usedOn Windows, set DisableAdsTcpListening, DisableAdsDiscovery or DisableAdsTlsListening to 1 under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Beckhoff\TwinCAT3\System, or set SecureOnly="True" on RemoteConnections in StaticRoutes.xml. On TwinCAT/BSD, keep the ex-factory pf rules, which can be reviewed with cat /etc/pf.conf.d/bhf.
  4. Add routes locally and remove stale onesAdding static routes on the target means no credentials go over the network (advisory 2017-002). Mark routes from runtime to engineering PC as unidirectional so the runtime cannot send ADS requests back, as the Secure ADS manual describes, and delete routes to laptops and service PCs that are no longer in use.
  5. Patch to the fixed buildsAt minimum, TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.79 or the Build 4026 workloads 4026.25.0 for the TcRouter.sys flaws, Build 4024.11 or later for EtherLeak, and the Device Manager and TwinCAT/BSD image versions in the table. Beckhoff notes that updated images are qualified for real-time performance and that a backup should be made before every update.
  6. Disable services you do not needBeckhoff's Device Manager advisory says the web UI can be blocked in the OS firewall or the web server stopped; the TwinCAT/BSD guideline shows how to stop nginx forwarding to it. Advisory 2021-001 gives the commands to stop the IPC Diagnostics UA server (DevMgrSvr-UA) on Windows.
  7. Change default passwords and lock down the PCBeckhoff advisory 2014-003 lists the documented default accounts of older images (Administrator on Windows 7 and Windows Embedded, guest and webguest on Windows CE, all with password 1), and the IPC Security Guidelines ask for password changes at commissioning and a UEFI/BIOS password. Dedicate TwinCAT PCs to TwinCAT and allow only trusted users and software, the mitigation Beckhoff gives for the local kernel-driver CVEs.

The IEC 62443-3-3 system requirements give the zone-and-conduit language for documenting these controls. If the controllers drive an EtherCAT segment, the EtherCAT guide covers the fieldbus side.

How do you monitor ADS traffic on a plant network?

Monitoring starts with a baseline of which hosts talk to which TwinCAT ports. Useful flow-level signals:

  • A new host opening TCP 48898 or 8016 to a runtime, especially from outside the engineering or SCADA zone.
  • Any UDP 48899 traffic from a host that is not an engineering station, since that port carries discovery and route requests.
  • Plain TCP 48898 sessions crossing a zone boundary where Secure ADS should be in use.
  • Bursts of short connections or empty UDP datagrams toward 48899, the pattern behind CVE-2019-5636.
  • TCP 443 sessions to IPCs from hosts other than administrators, given the Device Manager CVEs.

To see which ADS command a session carried, such as ADS Write Control to an AMS port 851 runtime or an Add Route request, you need a parser that decodes AMS/ADS; flow records only show who connected to which port and when, and Secure ADS on 8016 is encrypted anyway. Map alerts to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS techniques such as Change Operating Mode and Program Download.

Worked example: what does an ADS review of one packaging line find?

Synthetic example, not a real plant. A line has two CX controllers on Windows 10 IoT Enterprise, one C6030 IPC on TwinCAT/BSD, an HMI PC and two engineering laptops.

Observation Why it matters Action
Both CX controllers at TwinCAT 3.1.4024.62 Below 4024.79, so TcRouter.sys is in the CVE-2026-18767 to 18769 range Update to 4024.79 or later after a backup
TCP 48898 on the CX controllers reachable from the office VLAN Any host with a route has full ADS access in cleartext (CVE-2017-16726) Firewall to the HMI and engineering laptops; Secure ADS for remote work
Six static routes on each CX, three to laptops no longer in use Stale routes are standing access grants Delete them; make engineering routes unidirectional
C6030 TwinCAT/BSD image 14.0.x Below 14.1.2.0_153968 for CVE-2024-41173 Update the whole image
HMI uses plain ADS to the TwinCAT/BSD IPC after someone opened 48898 in pf Undoes the ex-factory default advisory 2017-002 says to keep Move the HMI route to Secure ADS and restore the pf rules
Device Manager on 443 reachable from every VLAN CVE-2025-41726 turns any Device Manager login into code execution in a privileged process Restrict 443 to administrators' hosts; update to Device Manager 2.5.3

Where does passive monitoring fit in a TwinCAT review?

A passive capture shows who talks to TwinCAT ports without touching a running controller. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port recording and builds a host-by-port inventory, including hosts using TCP 48898, UDP 48899 or TCP 8016, and lists remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. It has no ADS or AMS decoder, so this traffic shows at connection level only, without NetIds, AMS ports or commands. For a controller and PC list with TwinCAT builds and image versions, Device & Firmware Security identifies components and versions and matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Treating Secure ADS as access control; it encrypts the transport, but a connected peer still has full access.
  • Firewalling TCP 48898 and leaving UDP 48899 open to the plant, where discovery and remote route requests arrive.
  • Reopening plain ADS on TwinCAT/BSD for an old HMI instead of moving the HMI to Secure ADS.
  • Patching controllers and leaving engineering PCs on old builds, where CVE-2018-7502, CVE-2025-41701 and the TcRouter.sys flaws live.
  • Running active scans against TwinCAT runtimes below Build 4024.4, where a zero-byte UDP probe stops discovery.
  • Never reviewing the route lists, so former laptops and contractors keep ADS access.

This guide draws on Beckhoff Security Advisories 2014-001 to 2014-003, 2017-001, 2017-002, 2018-001, 2019-004, 2019-007, 2020-002, 2021-001, 2024-001 to 2024-004, 2025-001, 2025-003 and 2026-001; CERT@VDE advisories VDE-2024-045, VDE-2025-092 and VDE-2026-087; Beckhoff's Secure ADS and TwinCAT 3 ADS Basics manuals and IPC Security Guidelines for Windows 10 and TwinCAT/BSD; CISA ICS advisories ICSA-11-279-04, ICSA-16-278-02 and ICSA-18-081-02; Rapid7's R7-2019-32 disclosure; and NVD records. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-19. It is general information, not a substitute for Beckhoff's product-specific advisories or a current check of your exact TwinCAT build and image version.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Does Beckhoff ADS have authentication?

Not per request. Beckhoff's advisory 2017-001 says ADS is only designed for protected environments, does not provide security properties, and that attackers can eavesdrop on, manipulate and forge ADS packets as with any cleartext protocol. The ADS router accepts a packet when the sending host matches an entry in its route table, as Rapid7 described when reporting CVE-2019-5636; there is no per-command credential after that. The only credential exchange is when a route is added remotely with a username and password, and Beckhoff advisory 2017-002 (CVE-2017-16718) says the encryption of those credentials uses a fixed key. Secure ADS, available from TwinCAT 3.1 Build 4024.0, wraps ADS in TLS 1.2 between routers, but Beckhoff's Secure ADS manual states that a Secure ADS connection still represents full access for the connected systems.

Which ports does TwinCAT ADS use?

Unencrypted ADS uses TCP 48898 (0xBF02), the discovery or Broadcast Search uses UDP 48899 (0xBF03), and Secure ADS uses TCP 8016, per Beckhoff's Secure ADS manual (TE1000, version 1.2). Beckhoff's IPC Security Guideline for Windows 10 (version 1.9, 6 October 2026) lists all three as incoming ports opened in the delivered images. On TwinCAT/BSD, the IPC Security Guideline for TwinCAT/BSD (version 1.6) says ADS port 48898 is blocked ex factory and only Secure ADS on 8016 is allowed, with UDP 48899 open. Inside ADS, AMS ports address the target service: 851 is TC3 PLC runtime system 1, 801 is TC2 PLC runtime system 1 and 10000 is the system service.

Is any Beckhoff TwinCAT CVE in the CISA KEV catalog?

No. As of 2026-11-19, CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries) has no entry with Beckhoff as vendor or product. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-18 are highest for CVE-2011-3486 (0.4965), the UDP 48899 out-of-bounds read in TwinCAT 2.11.0.2004 and earlier, followed by CVE-2019-16871 (0.0530) and CVE-2014-5414 (0.0480). The ADS design weakness does not need an exploit: a host with a route can read, write and change the runtime state with documented commands.

Which TwinCAT version fixes the TcRouter.sys vulnerabilities?

Beckhoff advisory 2026-001 and CERT@VDE VDE-2026-087 (11 November 2026) cover CVE-2026-18767, CVE-2026-18768 and CVE-2026-18769, exposed IOCTLs in TcRouter.sys that let a local low-privileged user reach I/O ports and physical memory. Fixed versions are TcRouter.sys 3.1.0.2365, TwinCAT 3.1.4024.79 for TC1000 ADS, XAR and XAE Build 4024, TcPkg package TwinCAT.XAR.Base 3.18.1, and the TwinCAT Standard Runtime and Standard Engineering workloads 4026.25.0 for Build 4026. CERT@VDE scores each 7.8 (CVSS v3.1) and 8.5 (CVSS v4.0); NVD lists the records as Deferred with no NVD score as of 2026-11-19.

How do I turn off unencrypted ADS on a Windows TwinCAT system?

Beckhoff's Secure ADS manual lists three DWORD values under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Beckhoff\TwinCAT3\System: DisableAdsTcpListening = 1 stops TCP 48898 from opening, DisableAdsTlsListening = 1 stops TCP 8016, and DisableAdsDiscovery = 1 stops UDP 48899. As an alternative, the attribute SecureOnly="True" on RemoteConnections in StaticRoutes.xml keeps 48898 open but allows no further ADS communication through it. Check first which HMIs, SCADA clients and engineering stations still use plain ADS routes, because they will lose access.

Sources

  1. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2017-001: ADS is only designed for use in protected environments (V1.4, 3 December 2019; CVE-2017-16726, CVE-2019-16871)
  2. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2017-002: Add Route using Encrypted Password bases on fixed key (V1.3, 18 December 2023; CVE-2017-16718)
  3. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2014-002: ADS communication port allows password bruteforce (V1.1, 24 February 2015)
  4. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2019-004: ADS Discovery Service Shutdown by special UDP packet (V1.1, 30 July 2020; CVE-2019-5636)
  5. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2019-007: Denial-of-Service on TwinCAT using Profinet protocol (V1.1, 4 August 2020; CVE-2019-5637)
  6. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2018-001: TwinCAT 2 and 3.1 Kernel Driver Privilege Escalation (V1.1, 6 April 2018; CVE-2018-7502)
  7. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2020-002: EtherLeak in TwinCAT RT network driver (V1.1, 10 November 2020; CVE-2020-12494)
  8. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2024-001: Local authentication bypass in TwinCAT/BSD package IPC-Diagnostics (27 August 2024; CVE-2024-41173)
  9. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2025-003: Vulnerabilities in Beckhoff Device Manager (27 January 2026; CVE-2025-41726 to CVE-2025-41728)
  10. Beckhoff Security Advisory 2026-001: Exposed IOCTLs with insufficient access control in TcRouter.sys (11 November 2026; CVE-2026-18767 to CVE-2026-18769)
  11. CERT@VDE VDE-2026-087: Beckhoff exposed IOCTLs with insufficient access control in TcRouter.sys
  12. CERT@VDE VDE-2025-092: Beckhoff privilege escalation and information leak via Beckhoff Device Manager
  13. CERT@VDE: Beckhoff advisory list
  14. Beckhoff: Secure ADS manual, TE1000, version 1.2 (PDF)
  15. Beckhoff: TwinCAT 3 ADS Basics manual, TE1000, version 2.6.2, 4 May 2026 (PDF)
  16. Beckhoff: IPC Security Guideline for Windows 10, version 1.9, 6 October 2026 (PDF)
  17. Beckhoff: IPC Security Guideline for TwinCAT/BSD, version 1.6, 6 October 2026 (PDF)
  18. Rapid7: R7-2019-32, denial of service vulnerabilities in Beckhoff TwinCAT PLC environment (CVE-2019-5636, CVE-2019-5637)
  19. CISA CSAF: ICSA-11-279-04 Beckhoff TwinCAT Read Access Violation (CVE-2011-3486)
  20. CISA CSAF: ICSA-16-278-02 Beckhoff Embedded PC Images and TwinCAT Components Vulnerabilities (CVE-2014-5414, CVE-2014-5415)
  21. CISA CSAF: ICSA-18-081-02 Beckhoff TwinCAT (CVE-2018-7502)
  22. NVD: CVE-2019-16871 (Beckhoff ADS remote code execution as SYSTEM)
  23. NVD: CVE-2017-16726 (Beckhoff ADS packet forgery)
  24. NVD: CVE-2011-3486 (TwinCAT UDP 48899 out-of-bounds read)
  25. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (data mirror on GitHub)
  26. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
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Beckhoff TwinCAT ADS protocol security: AMS routes, ports, CVEs and hardening