IEC 62443-3-2:2020, "Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design," is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that tells an asset owner how to actually run the risk assessment that every other system- and component-level part of the series assumes already happened. Per the IEC Webstore's own listing, the standard "establishes requirements for: defining a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control system (IACS); partitioning the SUC into zones and conduits; assessing risk for each zone and conduit; establishing the target security level (SL-T) for each zone and conduit; and documenting the security requirements." Edition 1.0 was published 24 June 2020 by IEC Technical Committee 65, working with ISA99, and carries a stability date of 2027; a CENELEC national (EN) adoption followed on 27 August 2020.
Key takeaways
- Zone — "a grouping of logical or physical assets based upon risk or other criteria, such as criticality of assets, operational function, physical or logical location, required access...
- The "shall" and "should" column follows the preview's wording: ZCR 3.2 and 3.3 are requirements, ZCR 3.4–3.6 are recommendations.
- 5.1 Identify threats that could affect the zone or conduit (MITRE ATT&CK for ICS is a common catalogue; see our ATT&CK for ICS guide).
- ZCR 6 turns the analysis into a document set that procurement and design can use.
What are the seven Zone and Conduit Requirements (ZCR 1-7)?
The standard's clause 4 is built from seven Zone and Conduit Requirements, run roughly in sequence; the table of contents in the catalogue preview of EN IEC 62443-3-2:2020 lists them with their sub-requirements:
| # | Zone and Conduit Requirement (ZCR) | Sub-requirements |
|---|---|---|
| ZCR 1 | Identify the system under consideration (SUC) | 1.1 SUC perimeter and access points |
| ZCR 2 | Perform an initial cyber security risk assessment | 2.1 |
| ZCR 3 | Partition the SUC into zones and conduits | 3.1–3.6 |
| ZCR 4 | Risk comparison | 4.1 initial risk vs tolerable risk |
| ZCR 5 | Perform a detailed cyber security risk assessment | 5.1–5.13 |
| ZCR 6 | Document cyber security requirements, assumptions and constraints | 6.1–6.9 |
| ZCR 7 | Asset owner approval | 7.1 |
The structure is deliberately iterative, not a one-pass checklist: ZCR 2's initial assessment identifies the worst-case unmitigated risk and scopes where the detailed work in ZCR 5 needs to go, and ZCR 4 compares that initial risk with the organization's tolerable risk. Per ZCR 4.1, if the initial risk exceeds the tolerable risk, the organization "shall perform a detailed cyber security risk assessment." ZCR 7 names a specific accountable party: final approval belongs to the asset owner, not to whichever integrator or consultant ran the analysis.
Zones, conduits and SL-T: what vocabulary does everything downstream depend on?
The standard's own definitions, confirmed through a catalogue preview of its text, are the foundation the rest of the series builds on:
- Zone — "a grouping of logical or physical assets based upon risk or other criteria, such as criticality of assets, operational function, physical or logical location, required access... or responsible organization." Every asset in the SUC belongs to at least one zone; there is no "unzoned" leftover category.
- Conduit — "a logical grouping of communication channels... connecting two or more zones" that share a common set of security requirements. In practice, a conduit is where network segmentation controls (firewalls, data diodes, VLAN boundaries) actually get specified.
- SL-T (target security level) — the security level the asset owner decides, through this standard's own risk-assessment process, that a given zone or conduit needs to reach. It is explicitly one of three distinct "security level" concepts in the series: SL-T (target, set here in 3-2), SL-C (capability — what a system or component can natively provide, set in IEC 62443-3-3 for systems and 62443-4-2 for components), and SL-A (achieved — what gets verified once something is actually built and installed).
- Tolerable risk — "level of risk deemed acceptable to an organization" (definition 3.1.22), with a note that legal requirements should be considered when setting it.
Which assets must sit in their own zone (ZCR 3.1–3.6)?
ZCR 3.1 requires the organization to group assets into zones and conduits "as determined by risk", using the initial assessment or criteria such as criticality, function, location, required access or responsible organization. The preview notes that models like the Purdue reference model in IEC 62264-1 are often used as a basis (see our Purdue model guide). Five sub-clauses then name separations:
| ZCR | Rule | Strength | Typical example |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.2 | Separate IACS assets from business or enterprise assets | shall | Office ERP and historian clients outside the control zone |
| 3.3 | Separate safety-related assets; if that is impossible, the whole zone is safety-related | shall | Safety instrumented system in its own zone |
| 3.4 | Separate temporarily connected devices | should | Maintenance laptops, USB devices |
| 3.5 | Separate wireless devices from wired devices | should | Wireless access point modelled as the conduit to the wired zone |
| 3.6 | Separate devices that connect through external networks | should | Vendor and employee remote access as its own zone |
The "shall" and "should" column follows the preview's wording: ZCR 3.2 and 3.3 are requirements, ZCR 3.4–3.6 are recommendations. ZCR 3.4 allows one exception: a hand-held device used only inside one zone, never leaving its physical boundary, may stay in that zone.
How does the detailed risk assessment run (ZCR 5.1–5.13)?
ZCR 5 applies to every zone and conduit, although zones or conduits with similar threats, consequences or assets may be analysed together, and a standardized zone (for example, a replicated reference design) can reuse existing results. Any methodology may be used — the preview names ISO 31000, NIST SP 800-39 and ISO/IEC 27005 — provided the initial and detailed assessments come from the same framework and use a consistent risk ranking scale. The thirteen sub-steps run in this order:
5.1 Identify threatsthat could affect the zone or conduit (MITRE ATT&CK for ICS is a common catalogue; see our ATT&CK for ICS guide). 5.2 Identify vulnerabilitiesin the assets of the zone. 5.3 Determine consequence and impact 5.4 Determine unmitigated likelihood 5.5 Determine unmitigated cyber security risk 5.6 Determine SL-Tfor the zone or conduit. 5.7 Compare unmitigated risk with tolerable risk 5.8 Identify and evaluate existing countermeasures 5.9 Re-evaluate likelihood and impactwith those countermeasures. 5.10 Determine residual risk 5.11 Compare residual risk with tolerable risk 5.12 Identify additional countermeasureswhere residual risk is still too high. 5.13 Document and communicate results
Annex B gives example risk matrices (3 × 3, 3 × 4, 3 × 5 and 5 × 5) with likelihood and consequence scales, and Annex A describes the security levels. NIST makes the same link from the US side: SP 800-82 Rev. 3 §6.1.3 says "ISA 62443-3-2 provides guidance on how to assess cyber risk" where consequences include safety, health and the environment, and stresses an asset inventory with vendor, model, firmware and software versions for finding vulnerabilities (see our SP 800-82 guide).
What goes into the documented output (ZCR 6 and 7)?
ZCR 6 turns the analysis into a document set that procurement and design can use. Its nine sub-clauses are:
- 6.1 the cyber security requirements specification (CRS);
- 6.2 the SUC description and 6.3 zone and conduit drawings;
- 6.4 zone and conduit characteristics;
- 6.5 operating environment assumptions and 6.6 the threat environment;
- 6.7 organizational security policies, 6.8 tolerable risk and 6.9 regulatory requirements.
ZCR 7.1 then requires the asset owner's approval of the result. In practice the CRS and the zone characteristics are what reach integrators and product suppliers in a tender.
How do 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 fit together?
All three "3-x" parts of the series sit in its System category, but they do different jobs. IEC 62443-3-1 is a 2009 Technical Report (not a full, periodically-maintained standard) surveying security technologies applicable to an IACS. IEC 62443-3-2, covered in this guide, is the risk-assessment process: its ZCR 1-7 output — a documented SUC boundary, a zone/conduit partition, and an SL-T per zone and conduit — is exactly the input the next part needs. IEC 62443-3-3 then supplies the detailed technical system requirements (SRs), organized under seven foundational requirements, that a system design is checked against to see whether it can actually deliver the SL-T values that 3-2's risk assessment called for. An asset owner or integrator cannot meaningfully start a 62443-3-3 gap assessment without first having run 62443-3-2 — without an SL-T per zone, there is no target to check the design against.
The standard is published as IEC 62443-3-2 by IEC Technical Committee 65 (see the IEC Webstore listing), and in the US as the identically-titled ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2-2020 through ISA's own standards store; European standards resellers also list a CENELEC national adoption, EN IEC 62443-3-2:2020. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 §4.1.1 names an approach "based on ISA 62443-3-2" as one way, next to FIPS 199, to define OT impact levels.
Worked example: how would a water utility assess a pump-station zone?
Synthetic example: the utility, its sites and every figure below are invented for illustration; the steps follow the ZCR structure, not a real assessment. A small water utility runs twelve pump stations. Each has a PLC, a local HMI panel, a remote terminal unit with a cellular modem, and a chlorine dosing skid whose controller trips the pumps on high dosing.
| Zone or conduit | Assets | Basis (ZCR) | SL-T (synthetic) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Z1 Pump control | PLC, HMI panel | 3.1 function | 2 |
| Z2 Dosing safety | Dosing controller and trip | 3.3 safety | 3 |
| Z3 Remote access | Integrator laptop over VPN | 3.6 external | 2 |
| C1 Telemetry | RTU cellular link to the control centre | 3.6 external | 2 |
| C2 Z1–Z2 | Hard-wired trip plus Modbus status | 3.3 safety | 3 |
ZCR 1.1:the SUC is one pump station plus its telemetry link; the access points are the cellular modem, the VPN and the HMI's USB port. ZCR 2.1:the worst case is a dosing overdose reaching customers, a health consequence that exceeds the utility's tolerable risk, so ZCR 4.1 triggers a detailed assessment. ZCR 3:five zones and conduits as in the table; the maintenance laptop goes in Z3 under ZCR 3.4 and 3.6. ZCR 5:for Z2, threats include unauthorized setpoint writes through C2; the RTU's firmware has published CVEs in its embedded web server (5.2). Existing countermeasures (5.8) are the hard-wired trip; residual risk (5.10) is still above tolerable, so 5.12 adds an allow-list firewall on C2 permitting only Modbus reads. ZCR 6–7:the CRS states SL-T 3 for Z2 and C2 and is signed by the utility's operations manager.
What does a product supplier get asked, and how should it answer?
A device maker rarely runs 62443-3-2, but it receives the output: a CRS with an SL-T per zone and questions about whether its product can meet it. Useful answers are concrete:
- SL-C per component, backed by a 62443-4-2 assessment or a requirement-by-requirement statement rather than a marketing claim.
- A list of required flows (ports, protocols, direction) so the integrator can design the conduit; a MUD file is one machine-readable way to publish it.
- A component list and known vulnerabilities, since ZCR 5.2 asks for vulnerabilities per zone and SP 800-82 points to firmware versions for that purpose.
- Remote-access and wireless behaviour, because ZCR 3.5 and 3.6 will put those interfaces in their own zones.
What is a workable starting point?
Run ZCR 1 before buying any toolingDefine the SUC boundary explicitly — a network diagram plus an asset list — rather than defaulting to "the whole plant" as the scope; an unbounded SUC makes every later step harder than it needs to be. Let ZCR 2's initial assessment do triageIts job is to flag which parts of the SUC need the detailed ZCR 5 treatment first, not to replace it — spending detailed-assessment effort evenly across a plant wastes it on the lowest-risk zones. Don't skip ZCR 4's risk comparisonIt is the standard's built-in check of whether the initial risk is already tolerable or needs the detailed work in ZCR 5. Carry SL-T values forward explicitlyinto any 62443-3-3 or component-level 62443-4-2 gap assessment — a target security level that only exists in a spreadsheet nobody else has seen doesn't constrain a design review. Get ZCR 7 sign-off on paper, from the named asset owner, not implied by a project closing out — it is the standard's own accountability checkpoint.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Mixing risk scales. Using a corporate matrix for ZCR 2 and a different one for ZCR 5 breaks the consistency clause 4.6.1 asks for.
- Zoning by VLAN only. Zones follow risk and function; a VLAN is one way to build a conduit, not the zone definition.
- Forgetting temporary and remote connections. Laptops, USB media and vendor remote access are where many incidents start, and ZCR 3.4 and 3.6 call them out.
- Treating SL-T as a product label. SL-T belongs to a zone in a specific plant; a supplier states SL-C.
- No re-assessment after change. A new remote link or a firmware change can move a zone's risk; ZCR 2.1 allows reusing an earlier assessment only after confirming it still applies.
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot works from Zeek logs of a site's own traffic capture, without installing anything on control-system equipment. It lists each host with the ports and services it was seen serving, which hosts speak Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP or BACnet, and interactive remote-access sessions crossing the boundary: evidence for ZCR 1.1 access points and ZCR 3 zoning that an engineer reviews. It does not assign zones, SL-T or risk. For ZCR 5.2 vulnerability input on a device, Device & Firmware Security extracts a firmware SBOM as CycloneDX JSON and matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories in a cited draft report.
This guide summarises standards-catalogue descriptions of IEC 62443-3-2:2020; it is not a substitute for the purchased standard and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC 62443-3-2?
The part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets the risk-assessment process an asset owner (or an integrator working on their behalf) runs to decide how an industrial automation and control system (IACS) should actually be segmented and secured. Per the IEC Webstore's own listing, IEC 62443-3-2:2020 'establishes requirements for: defining a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control system (IACS); partitioning the SUC into zones and conduits; assessing risk for each zone and conduit; establishing the target security level (SL-T) for each zone and conduit; and documenting the security requirements.' Edition 1.0 was published 24 June 2020 by IEC Technical Committee 65, in collaboration with ISA99, and carries a stability date of 2027.
What are the seven Zone and Conduit Requirements (ZCR 1-7)?
Per a standards-catalogue preview of the standard's own clause structure (iteh.ai's EN/CENELEC adoption listing), the normative content is organized into seven Zone and Conduit Requirements: ZCR 1, identify the SUC; ZCR 2, perform an initial cyber security risk assessment; ZCR 3, partition the SUC into zones and conduits; ZCR 4, risk comparison; ZCR 5, perform a detailed cyber security risk assessment; ZCR 6, document cyber security requirements, assumptions and constraints; and ZCR 7, asset owner approval. The sequence runs from scoping (ZCR 1-2) through the actual zone/conduit partition and detailed risk work (ZCR 3-6) to a final sign-off step (ZCR 7) that the standard assigns specifically to the asset owner, not the integrator doing the analysis.
What is a zone, what is a conduit, and what is SL-T?
Per the preview text of the standard itself: a zone is 'a grouping of logical or physical assets based upon risk or other criteria, such as criticality of assets, operational function, physical or logical location, required access ... or responsible organization,' and every asset within the system under consideration (SUC) belongs to at least one zone. A conduit is 'a logical grouping of communication channels... connecting two or more zones' that share common security requirements. SL-T (target security level) is the security level the asset owner decides, through this standard's risk-assessment process, that a given zone or conduit needs to reach — distinct from SL-C (capability, what a system or component can provide, set in IEC 62443-3-3/4-2) and SL-A (achieved, what gets verified once built). See our [IEC 62443-3-3 guide](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/) for the full SL-T/SL-C/SL-A breakdown.
How does 62443-3-2 relate to 62443-3-1 and 62443-3-3, and who publishes it?
All three sit in the 'System' group of the ISA/IEC 62443 series. IEC 62443-3-1 (a 2009 Technical Report, not a full standard) surveys security technologies applicable to an IACS; IEC 62443-3-2 is the risk-assessment process covered in this guide, producing the zones, conduits and SL-T values; and IEC 62443-3-3 (covered in our separate guide) supplies the detailed technical system requirements (SRs), organized under seven foundational requirements, that a design is then checked against to see whether it can actually deliver the SL-T that 3-2's risk assessment called for. The standard is published jointly as IEC 62443-3-2 by IEC Technical Committee 65 and, in the US, as the identically titled ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2-2020 through ISA's own standards store; a CENELEC national adoption (EN IEC 62443-3-2:2020) is also listed by European standards resellers.
Sources
- IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-3-2:2020 — Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 3-2 (official listing)
- iTeh Standards: EN IEC 62443-3-2:2020 — catalogue listing (ZCR 1-7, zone/conduit definitions, edition, pages, ICS codes)
- ISA: ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2-2020 — official product page
- ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
- Wikipedia: IEC 62443 — series structure, zones/conduits, security levels
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, §4.1.1 and §6.1.3 (PDF, September 2023)
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: matrix
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