Every time another guide on this site mentions a "Security Level," a "zone," a "conduit," or one of the seven "Foundational Requirements," that vocabulary traces back to one document: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, "Industrial communication networks — Network and system security — Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models." It is the foundation stone of the whole IEC 62443 series for industrial automation and control system (IACS) security — published in 2009, still a Technical Specification rather than a full International Standard 16+ years later, and still the document every later part of the series points back to for its own definitions.
Key takeaways
- Per the IEC webstore's own abstract, IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 "is a technical specification which defines the terminology, concepts and models for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) security.
- The scope tests are worth reading before anything else.
- IEC 62443-1-1 is not itself a checklist of technical controls — it is a shared vocabulary and a set of reference models.
- 1-1 names the ideas; it does not, by itself, tell you how to apply them.
What is IEC TS 62443-1-1, and who publishes it?
Per the IEC webstore's own abstract, IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 "is a technical specification which defines the terminology, concepts and models for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) security. It establishes the basis for the remaining standards in the IEC 62443 series." It was published 30 July 2009 as a first-edition Technical Specification (81 pages) by IEC Technical Committee TC 65 (Industrial-process measurement, control and automation), and corresponds to an identically titled document originally developed by the ISA99 committee and published as ISA-62443-1-1-2007 — the series carries dual IEC/ISA lineage throughout. The foreword in the IEC preview puts it as "derived from the corresponding US ANSI/S99.01.01 standard". The IEC webstore lists its stability date as 2027 and its status as current; it has not been withdrawn.
A Technical Specification is a lighter IEC deliverable than a full International Standard, used when the content has not reached the level of consensus a normative IS requires. The foreword says the same: a TS is used where "the subject is still under technical development", and "Technical specifications are subject to review within three years of publication to decide whether they can be transformed into International Standards." That status has stuck. Independent industry commentary on the series describes a second edition of 1-1 as having circulated for committee review at ISA99/IEC TC65 WG10 since around 2021, and the webstore record now shows the next edition at the "Preparation of CC" (committee draft) stage, with no publication date. The 2009 text, not a draft successor, is what you cite today.
What does the document contain, clause by clause?
The preview's contents and introduction show a document organised around six questions, from "What is the general scope of application for IACS security?" to "How can these objectives be established and codified?":
| Clause | Content | Why a device team cares |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Scope | Included functionality, systems and interfaces, an activity-based test (1.4) and an asset-based test (1.5) | Tells you whether your product is an IACS component at all |
| 3 Terms | Definitions, starting with access and access control | The vocabulary customers' requirements are written in |
| 4 The situation | Current systems, trends, potential impact | Background only |
| 5 Concepts | Security objectives, foundational requirements (5.3), defence in depth, threat-risk assessment, security program maturity, policies, zones (5.9), conduits and channels (5.10), security levels (5.11), security level lifecycle (5.12) | The ideas later parts turn into requirements |
| 6 Models | Reference models (6.2), asset models (6.3), reference architecture (6.4), zone and conduit model (6.5), model relationships (6.6) | How an integrator will place your product in a system |
The scope tests are worth reading before anything else. A system is in range if the activity it performs is necessary for any of nine outcomes, including "predictable operation of the process", "process or personnel safety", "product quality" and "regulatory compliance". The asset test adds, among ten criteria, assets "needed for logging security events" and assets "necessary to protect the environment". A data logger that only records process values for quality reporting can therefore fall inside the series' scope, not only PLCs and safety controllers.
Which concepts does the rest of the series build on?
IEC 62443-1-1 is not itself a checklist of technical controls — it is a shared vocabulary and a set of reference models. Independent summaries of its published content (the full specification text is paywalled, so exact clause numbers and wording below come from those summaries, not the purchased document) describe four concepts that recur throughout the series:
| Concept | What it establishes |
|---|---|
| IACS reference model | A functional hierarchy from Level 0 (physical process equipment) up to Level 5 (enterprise systems), used to say where an automation activity sits by function, not by network topology — two devices on the same VLAN can sit at different reference-model levels |
| Zones and conduits | A zone groups logical or physical assets that share common security requirements; a conduit is the logical grouping of communication channels connecting two or more zones — the vocabulary that IEC 62443-3-2 later applies to actually partition a real system |
| Security Level (SL) | Defined broadly as a measure of confidence that a system is free from vulnerabilities and functions as intended; 1-1 already distinguishes types of security level (5.11.2) and the factors that set SL(achieved) for a zone or conduit (5.11.3), which later parts use as SL-T (Target, from risk assessment), SL-C (Capability, what a component or system can deliver) and SL-A (Achieved, what is actually delivered in operation), on a 0-4 numeric scale formalized in IEC 62443-3-3 |
| Seven Foundational Requirements (FR1-FR7) | Identification and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, and resource availability — high-level security objectives, not controls themselves, that later parts decompose into System Requirements (3-3) and Component Requirements (4-2) |
The specification also defines the IACS boundary itself more broadly than a networking diagram would suggest: an Industrial Automation and Control System covers "a collection of personnel, hardware, software and policies involved in the operation of an industrial process" that can affect its safe, secure and reliable operation — people and policy are explicitly inside the scope, not just controllers and cabling. It further names four principal organizational roles that the rest of the series writes role-specific requirements for: asset owner, product supplier, system integrator, and service provider.
Two further 1-1 concepts get less attention than they deserve. The security level lifecycle (5.12) has three phases — assess, develop and implement, maintain — so a security level is something kept over time, not a one-off rating. And the security program maturity model (5.7, Tables 3 to 7) walks through concept, functional analysis, implementation, operations, and recycle and disposal phases, which is where end-of-life handling of a device first appears in the series.
How do the seven foundational requirements reach a device?
The FR list is fixed in 1-1 and reused unchanged: the IEC 62443-4-2 abstract states "As defined in IEC TS 62443-1-1 there are a total of seven foundational requirements", and the IEC 62443-3-3 abstract ties its system requirements to "the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in IEC 62443-1-1". IEC's Smart Energy systems committee numbers them FR1 to FR7 in that order. What each typically means for a controller, gateway or sensor (this guide's summary; the binding text is in 4-2):
| FR | Name | What it usually asks of a device | Evidence a buyer asks for |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR1 | Identification and authentication control | Unique accounts, no shared default passwords, device-to-device authentication | Account model, password policy, certificate handling |
| FR2 | Use control | Role-based permissions; limits on what each account can change | Role matrix, audit of privileged actions |
| FR3 | System integrity | Signed firmware, secure boot, integrity of messages and configuration | Signing and update process, boot chain description |
| FR4 | Data confidentiality | Encryption of credentials and sensitive data in transit and at rest | Protocol and cipher list, key storage |
| FR5 | Restricted data flow | Ability to sit in a zone and limit traffic to defined conduits | Port and service list, firewall or allow-list options |
| FR6 | Timely response to events | Security logs and a way to get them off the device | Log format, syslog or export support |
| FR7 | Resource availability | Behaviour under load or malformed traffic; backup and restore | Robustness test results, recovery procedure |
Where does each concept get operationalized?
1-1 names the ideas; it does not, by itself, tell you how to apply them. The parts of the series that do:
| If you need to... | The part that specifies it |
|---|---|
| Run an actual security risk assessment and partition a system into zones and conduits | IEC 62443-3-2 — Security risk assessment for system design |
| Set formal Security Levels (SL 0-4) and System Requirements under each Foundational Requirement | IEC 62443-3-3 — System security requirements and security levels |
| Specify what a single PLC, HMI or gateway must technically do under each Foundational Requirement | IEC 62443-4-2 — Component requirements |
| Build the secure development lifecycle a component supplier runs to produce 4-2-conformant products | IEC 62443-4-1 — Secure development lifecycle |
| Run an asset owner's ongoing security program, or set requirements for IACS service providers | IEC 62443-2-1 / IEC 62443-2-4 — asset owner program, service providers |
Related parts of the 1-x sub-series that 1-1 is grouped with — 1-2 (master glossary of terms and abbreviations) and 1-3 (system security conformance metrics) — remain under development at ISA99/IEC TC65 WG10 and are not available as finished IEC deliverables, even though later parts of the series reference them. IEC TS 62443-1-5:2023, a newer addition formalizing a scheme for building sector-specific security profiles on top of the horizontal series, has already been published, and IEC PAS 62443-1-6:2025 (19 December 2025, 35 pages) gives asset owners and service providers guidance on applying the series to the Industrial Internet of Things. That gives a sense of how unevenly the 1-x foundation has matured compared with the better-known 2-x/3-x/4-x parts.
Why does this still matter for the CRA and EN 18031?
None of IEC 62443-1-1's vocabulary carries legal weight on its own: it is a voluntary IEC/ISA technical specification, not an EU harmonised standard, and it predates both the Cyber Resilience Act and EN 18031 by well over a decade. Its practical relevance today is that regulators, auditors and buyers increasingly expect the same terms — zones, conduits, Security Levels, Foundational Requirements — to appear in a manufacturer's own risk documentation, because so much of the rest of the 62443 series, and a fair amount of adjacent OT guidance, assumes this vocabulary as a baseline. See IEC 62443-4-2 vs the Cyber Resilience Act and EN 18031 for where the technical mechanisms line up with current EU law, and NIST SP 800-82 OT security for how a similarly structured zone/conduit model appears in NIST's own OT guidance.
Worked example: how would a gateway maker apply 1-1's vocabulary?
Synthetic example, labelled: the product and figures are invented to show the method.
A company makes an edge gateway that reads Modbus TCP from PLCs and publishes values to a plant historian over MQTT with TLS. It does not own any plant, so it cannot draw the zones; it can describe how the product fits them.
ScopeThe gateway supports "predictable operation of the process" and "product quality" reporting, so it passes the 1.4 activity test. Reference modelFunctionally it sits between basic control (the PLCs) and site operations (the historian); the manual says so in those terms. A Purdue model guide helps map this to customers' own diagrams. Zones and conduitsThe documentation lists two conduits: Modbus TCP toward the control zone (plain, no authentication in the protocol) and MQTT over TLS toward the operations zone, with every listening port named. Security levelsThe datasheet states an SL-C per FR, for example SL-C 2 for FR1, FR3 and FR5 and SL-C 1 for FR4, because the Modbus side cannot be encrypted. The asset owner compares those against the SL-T from its own 3-2 assessment. Gap handlingWhere SL-T exceeds SL-C on the Modbus conduit, the manual tells the integrator which compensating measure the product supports (an allow-list of PLC addresses), rather than claiming a higher level.
What is a workable starting point?
Treat 1-1's terms as the dictionary, not the requirements— if you're writing a risk assessment or a technical file, the enforceable requirements sit in 3-2, 3-3 and 4-2; 1-1 just fixes what the words in those documents mean. Use the reference model (Levels 0-5) to scope a conversation before a tool— deciding whether a given asset is a Level 1 control device or a Level 3 operations-management system changes which part of the series applies to it, before any zone/conduit diagram gets drawn. Don't conflate SL-T, SL-C and SL-A— a component's SL-C (what the datasheet claims it can do) is not the same as the SL-A a specific deployment actually achieves once it's integrated, configured and operated; buyers conflating the two is a common source of disputed security claims. Expect the second edition eventually, but don't wait for it— the webstore shows it at committee-draft preparation with no publication date; build your program on the current 2009 text and its stability date of 2027 rather than planning around an unpublished draft. Pair the vocabulary with an actual OT asset inventory— the zone/conduit model is only useful once you know what is actually on the network and at what reference-model level it sits.
What are the common pitfalls?
- One security level for the whole product. Levels are stated per FR; a single "SL 2" claim hides the FRs where the product is weaker.
- Treating a VLAN as a zone. A zone is defined by shared security requirements, not by a switch configuration.
- Forgetting the people and policy part. 1-1's IACS includes personnel and policies; a product manual that ignores who configures the device leaves FR1 and FR2 half-answered.
- Citing 1-1 for requirements. It has none to test against; cite 3-3 or 4-2 instead.
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot service turns a network capture into the inventory that 1-1's zone and conduit vocabulary describes: which hosts talk to which, over which ports, which of five industrial protocols (Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP, BACnet) appear, and which remote-access sessions come from outside addresses. Drawing the zones and assigning security levels stays with your engineers. See OT Snapshot.
This guide summarises publicly available descriptions of IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009's scope and structure, cross-checked against the IEC webstore's own catalogue record and the IEC preview pages; it is not a substitute for the purchased ISA/IEC text, where exact clause numbers and definitions should be confirmed, and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC 62443-1-1?
IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, "Industrial communication networks — Network and system security — Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models," is the foundational document of the IEC 62443 series for Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) security. Per its own abstract on the IEC webstore, it "is a technical specification which defines the terminology, concepts and models for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) security" and "establishes the basis for the remaining standards in the IEC 62443 series." It was published 30 July 2009 as a first-edition Technical Specification, 81 pages, developed by IEC Technical Committee TC 65, and adopted internationally from ISA's own ISA-62443-1-1-2007 (ISA99 committee) document.
Why is it still a "Technical Specification" rather than a full International Standard, and is it still current?
A Technical Specification (TS) is a lighter-weight IEC deliverable than a full International Standard (IS), used when full consensus on normative requirements has not been reached; parts of the 62443-1 sub-series, including 1-1, were published this way and have stayed there. Per the IEC webstore, IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 carries a stability date of 2027 and is listed as current, not withdrawn. Independent industry commentary describes a second edition as having been in committee review at ISA99/IEC TC65 WG10 since around 2021, intended to refine definitions and align terminology more tightly with the rest of the series, but no publication date for that second edition has been confirmed; the 2009 text remains the one you would buy and cite today.
What are the main concepts IEC 62443-1-1 introduces that the rest of the series depends on?
Per secondary analyses of the published text (the full specification itself is paywalled; the purchased IEC/ISA document itself remains the authoritative source for exact clause wording): an IACS reference model describing a functional hierarchy from Level 0 (physical process) up to Level 5 (enterprise systems), used to say where a given automation activity sits regardless of network topology; the zone and conduit vocabulary, where a security zone groups assets sharing common security requirements and a conduit is the logical grouping of communication channels connecting zones; the Security Level concept, which 1-1 itself already divides into types (subclause 5.11.2, "Types of security levels"; 5.11.3 covers SL(achieved) of a zone or conduit) and which later parts use as Target (SL-T, from risk assessment), Capability (SL-C, what a component can deliver) and Achieved (SL-A, what the deployed system actually delivers); and the seven Foundational Requirements (FR1-FR7) that later parts decompose into System Requirements (IEC 62443-3-3) and Component Requirements (IEC 62443-4-2).
How does IEC 62443-1-1 differ from IEC 62443-3-2, 3-3 and 4-2, which also use these terms?
1-1 defines the vocabulary and concepts once; the system- and component-level parts operationalize them with testable requirements. IEC 62443-3-2 (Security risk assessment for system design) is where the zone-and-conduit model is actually applied to partition a real system and assign target security levels through risk assessment. IEC 62443-3-3 (System security requirements and security levels) is where the four-point Security Level scale (SL 0-4) and the System Requirements under each of the seven Foundational Requirements are formally specified. IEC 62443-4-2 (Technical security requirements for IACS components) takes the same seven Foundational Requirements down to the level of a single PLC, HMI or gateway as Component Requirements. See [IEC 62443-3-2](/guides/iec-62443-3-2-security-risk-assessment/), [IEC 62443-3-3](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/) and [IEC 62443-4-2](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/) for each one's own detail.
Is IEC 62443-1-1 free to read, and who should read it first?
No — unlike some open specifications covered elsewhere on this site, IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 is a paid IEC publication (CHF 380 for the electronic edition, per the IEC webstore), with an identically numbered ISA edition (ISA-62443-1-1-2007) sold separately through ISA. There is no free, authoritative full-text mirror. In practice, most asset owners, system integrators and component makers read 1-1's concepts secondhand — through the vocabulary used in 2-1, 2-4, 3-2, 3-3 and 4-2 — rather than buying 1-1 itself first; this guide is written for that audience, as an orientation to terms you will meet throughout the rest of the series, not a substitute for the purchased text where exact wording matters.
Sources
- IEC: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 — Industrial communication networks — Network and system security — Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models (webstore record: edition 1.0, 81 pages, TC 65, stability date 2027)
- ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards (series overview, including Part 1-1 "Terminology, concepts, and models")
- Wikipedia: IEC 62443 (series structure, part-by-part summary; cross-checked against the IEC and ISA pages above for this guide)
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 4-2, IEC Webstore
- IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 preview pages (foreword, introduction, scope 1.1-1.5, table of contents; IEC preview PDF hosted by VDE Verlag)
- IEC 62443-3-3:2013, System security requirements and security levels, IEC Webstore
- IEC PAS 62443-1-6:2025, Application of the 62443 series to the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), IEC Webstore
- IEC SyC Smart Energy: IEC 62443 (series overview, FR1-FR7)
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