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OT/ICS security

CISA Secure by Demand: 12 priority considerations for OT product buyers

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CISA's Secure by Demand guide — formally "Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products," published 13 January 2025 and marked TLP:CLEAR (distributable without restriction) — tells OT owners and operators what to require from manufacturers before they buy, rather than after a compromise. It was authored by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) together with the NSA, FBI, EPA, TSA, Australia's ASD Cyber Security Centre, Canada's Centre for Cyber Security, the European Commission's DG CONNECT, Germany's BSI, the Netherlands' NCSC-NL, New Zealand's NCSC-NZ and the UK's NCSC-UK. As a U.S. government work distributed TLP:CLEAR, it carries no reuse restriction.

Key takeaways

  • The guide frames these as what buyers should see manufacturers "demonstrate" in design and development — it is written for the procurement conversation, not as a conformity checklist a vendor self-certifies against.
  • Each element in the full guide has "Selection criteria", "Questions to ask" and "Why this matters" blocks.
  • This is the most specific element, and the one closest to firmware engineering.
  • Worked example — synthetic, labelled for illustration.

Why does the guide exist?

The guide's own Summary frames the problem directly: "cyber threat actors, when compromising operational technology (OT) components, target specific OT products rather than specific organizations." It names the recurring weaknesses those actors exploit — "weak authentication, known software vulnerabilities, limited logging, insecure default settings and passwords, and insecure legacy protocols" — and argues that when "security is not prioritized nor incorporated directly into OT products, it is difficult and costly for owners and operators to defend their OT assets against compromise." Its Introduction adds that the cost of industrial cybersecurity "falls disproportionally on OT owners and operators rather than manufacturers."

The guide is CISA's Secure by Demand counterpart to its broader Secure by Design campaign: Secure by Design asks manufacturers to build security in (see our Secure by Design pledge guide); Secure by Demand asks buyers to require it at the procurement stage, using purchasing power to "send a message to manufacturers to stimulate the supply of Secure by Design products." For a PLC, HMI or RTU maker, that makes the document a preview of the RFP questions it will receive.

What are the 12 priority security elements?

The guide's own "Considerations for OT Product Selection" section lists 12 elements and is explicit that "these elements are not in priority order":

# Element What the guide says to look for
1 Configuration Management Products that "backup and deploy system configurations in a secure and simple manner"
2 Logging in the Baseline Product "standardized access and change logs" using open logging formats, in the baseline version
3 Open Standards Support for "open, interoperable standards to facilitate replacing or adding products"
4 Ownership Full operator autonomy, "minimizing dependency on the vendor"
5 Protection of Data Data "treat[ed]...as valuable and protect[ed]...at rest and during transit"
6 Secure by Default No default passwords, insecure legacy protocols (e.g. SNMPv1/2, Telnet, SSL, TLS 1.0/1.1) disabled by default, no unnecessary exposed interfaces
7 Secure Communications Authenticated communication with certificates that "fail loudly" without halting critical processes
8 Secure Controls Resilience to malicious emergency/safety/diagnostic commands and active security scanning
9 Strong Authentication Role-based access control plus "phishing-resistant multifactor authentication," no shared role-based passwords
10 Threat Modeling "An up-to-date threat model that articulates the ways in which it might be compromised"
11 Vulnerability Management A defined support period, free patches, an HBOM/SBOM provided with delivery, and a vulnerability disclosure program
12 Upgrade and Patch Tooling A documented patch/upgrade process, with no-cost migration off an end-of-support OS

The guide frames these as what buyers should see manufacturers "demonstrate" in design and development — it is written for the procurement conversation, not as a conformity checklist a vendor self-certifies against.

What will a buyer ask, and what evidence should a supplier hand over?

Each element in the full guide has "Selection criteria", "Questions to ask" and "Why this matters" blocks. The middle column condenses the guide's own questions; the right column is evidence a manufacturer can attach instead of a yes/no answer.

Element Buyer question (from the guide) Supplier evidence
Configuration Management Authenticated backup and restore of settings and engineering logic? Tamper prevention or detection? Backup file format spec, restore procedure, tamper-detection description
Logging Are logins, restarts and changes logged, and security and safety events logged by default? Default log list with fields (timestamp, source address and port, account, correlation ID, description)
Open Standards Open, interoperable standards? Alignment with ISA/IEC 62443? Protocol list (e.g. OPC UA, TLS), certificates or assessment reports
Ownership Can operators work without onward vendor dependency? Does the warranty allow added security tools? Warranty text, support-partner policy
Protection of Data Data at rest encrypted? Integrity verifiable? Is data shared or sold? Data-flow diagram, encryption design, data-sharing statement
Secure by Default Default passwords eliminated? Old protocols (SNMPv1/2, Telnet, TFTP) off by default? Factory configuration export, hardening guide
Secure Communications Certificate deployment and renewal simple? No need for cyber experts? Certificate lifecycle procedure, expiry behaviour
Secure Controls Trust for critical commands? Stable during security scans? Command-authentication design, scan-robustness test results
Strong Authentication Shared role-based passwords eliminated? MFA in the baseline version? RBAC role matrix, MFA support at engineering workstation / HMI
Threat Modeling Which attack vectors were considered, and which measures reduce them? Threat model summary, e.g. mapped to MITRE EMB3D
Vulnerability Management SBOM? CSAF advisories? CVD policy? security.txt? SBOM per release, advisory feed, CVD policy URL, security.txt
Upgrade and Patch Tooling Patches tested and authenticated? End-of-life dates published? Patches free? Signed-update design, support-period statement, patch test notes

The guide names MITRE EMB3D for threat modeling and asks buyers to "avoid products that rely entirely on a threat actor never accessing the OT network." Our EMB3D guide shows how a device threat model maps to it.

What does the Vulnerability Management element ask for in detail?

This is the most specific element, and the one closest to firmware engineering. The full guide says a mature process "is based on the CVE Program and established international standards, mainly ISO/IEC 29147 and ISO/IEC 30111", and lists at least these elements:

  • A software bill of materials "in a commonly used and machine-readable format", with vulnerabilities assigned CVE identifiers and published to the CVE Program.
  • Risk-based remediation without delay, including security updates.
  • Public advisories describing the vulnerability, root cause, CWE, affected products, impact, severity and remediation.
  • Machine-processable advisories: "Vendors can use CSAF standard to automate retrieval of security advisory information" (CSAF 2.0, OASIS). It also notes that BSI TR-03191 may serve as a basis for procurement requirements.
  • VEX statements — "not affected" or "under investigation" for widely publicised vulnerabilities — that "should follow the CSAF standard".
  • A coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, following established CVD practice.
  • A reporting contact published "according to RFC 9116 as a security.txt on the manufacturer's website" — our security.txt generator builds one.
  • Secure update distribution and dissemination "without delay", with advisories.

It closes by suggesting that manufacturers with mature processes consider becoming a CVE Numbering Authority. The CSAF and VEX guide for device makers and the CVD process guide cover the mechanics.

How does it connect to IEC 62443 and emerging EU law?

On standards, the guide points buyers toward an existing reference rather than inventing a new one: "buyers should look for manufacturers that demonstrate their adoption of Secure by Design and International Society of Automation (ISA) 62443 standards," noting in its own footnote that "the ISA/IEC 62443 multi-part standard is internationally recognized as defining requirements and processes for implementing and maintaining electronically secure OT products, systems, and development lifecycles" (see ISA's own 62443 series page). It also states that it aligns with NIST SP 800-213A, NIST SP 800-82 and "Security Level 3 of ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 and 62443-3-3" — a useful target level for a component maker. See SoftWSP's guides to IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements, IEC 62443-4-1 secure development lifecycle and the pillar NIST SP 800-82 OT security guide, and IEC 62443-4-2 vs. the CRA for how the two map together.

On regulation, the guide notes that owners and operators "may need to consider regulatory requirements, such as the European Union's (EU's) NIS2 Directive, during digital systems acquisition," and its own footnotes flag the EU's Radio Equipment Directive delegated regulation (applying from 1 August 2025) and the Cyber Resilience Act (in force since 10 December 2024, requiring CE marking for in-scope products placed on the EU market) as examples of jurisdictions "laying down security-by-design in law." None of this makes Secure by Demand itself a legal requirement — it stays a voluntary procurement guide — but it signals that the same 12 elements overlap with obligations buyers may separately owe under EU law. See NIS2 explained and the Cyber Resilience Act for those legal duties directly.

What does the April 2025 fact sheet add?

Three months after the full guide, CISA published a shorter companion: the Secure by Demand Fact Sheet: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Purchasing Digital Products (dated "as of April 2025," also TLP:CLEAR). It names PLCs, HMIs and RTUs as the target products, states that CISA "has based this list on the joint guidance" from January and "is providing it without ranking or priority", and puts each element into a two-column "Why This Matters" / "Questions I Should Ask" table on two pages. Two labels differ from the full guide: "Secure Communication" and "Vulnerability Handling". Its vulnerability questions keep three items: an SBOM, CSAF-retrievable advisories and a CVD policy.

What does a Secure by Demand answer look like for one PLC?

Worked example — synthetic, labelled for illustration. The product, versions and findings are made up.

A maker of a compact PLC receives a water utility's RFP with a Secure by Demand section.

  1. Map the questionsThe team builds a 12-row sheet from the fact sheet, one row per element, with an owner for each.
  2. Gather evidence firstFor Secure by Default, it exports the factory configuration and finds Telnet off but TFTP on for legacy firmware loading. It ships a release that disables TFTP by default and documents how to enable it.
  3. Vulnerability ManagementIt generates a CycloneDX SBOM from the shipped firmware image and checks the components against NVD and CISA KEV. One bundled web server version has a KEV-listed CVE; the team ships a patched release and publishes a CSAF advisory before the RFP deadline.
  4. Fill the gaps truthfullyMFA exists only at the engineering-software level, not on the PLC web page; the answer says so and states the compensating control.
  5. Publish contact pointssecurity.txt and the CVD policy go live on the company site, and the RFP answer links them.
  6. Submit evidence, not adjectivesEach row cites a document, a test result or a URL.

Where should a buyer start, and which mistakes should both sides avoid?

  1. Build the 12 elements into RFPs and scoring criteria, not just a post-purchase checklist — the guide's own framing is about procurement leverage.
  2. Use the April 2025 fact sheet's "Questions I Should Ask" column as a vendor-call script, since it was built from the same 12 elements.
  3. Cross-reference Vulnerability Management and Upgrade/Patch Tooling against your SBOM practice— the guide ties both to a bill of materials and a defined, free-patch support period, which lines up with SoftWSP's firmware SBOM guidance.
  4. Don't treat the 12 elements as ranked— weight them to your own OT environment (safety-critical controllers vs. monitoring-only sensors, for instance).
  5. Track the EU regulatory footnotes separately from the voluntary guide itself— NIS2, the RED delegated regulation and the CRA are legal obligations with their own deadlines.

Common mistakes on both sides:

  • Yes/no answers. "Supports secure communications" says nothing; certificate renewal steps do.
  • An SBOM of the application only. The guide asks about components "contained in operational technology", which includes the OS, bootloader and third-party libraries in the firmware.
  • Security features as paid add-ons. The guide says logging "should not be an add-on or paid feature" and wants security functions at no extra cost.
  • Fragile devices. A controller that crashes under a vulnerability scan fails the Secure Controls element on its own.
  • Unclear support periods. Without published end-of-life dates, a buyer cannot plan replacement.

Where does SoftWSP fit in a Secure by Demand evaluation?

SoftWSP covers the evidence side of one element. It extracts components from a firmware image into a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM, matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report — which components, which known vulnerabilities, which are KEV-listed — for an engineer to review before it goes to a buyer. It does not score the other 11 elements, write CSAF advisories or VEX, or judge a manufacturer's process; a person still asks those questions and weighs the answers. For installed sites, OT Snapshot inventories assets from network captures; for a product's firmware, see device & firmware security.

This guide quotes CISA's own published text of the January 2025 Secure by Demand guide and its April 2025 fact sheet; it is not a substitute for the full documents or procurement/legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is the CISA Secure by Demand guide, and who published it?

"Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products" is a joint guide published 13 January 2025 by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) with the U.S. National Security Agency, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Transportation Security Administration, Australia's ASD Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), Germany's BSI, the Netherlands' NCSC-NL, New Zealand's NCSC-NZ and the UK's NCSC-UK. It is marked TLP:CLEAR, meaning "disclosure is not limited" and, "subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be distributed without restriction" — as a U.S. government work it carries no copyright restriction domestically. Per its own Summary, the guide "describes how OT owners and operators should integrate security into their procurement process when purchasing industrial automation and control systems as well as other OT products," because threat actors "target specific OT products rather than specific organizations" when many of those products "are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles."

What are the 12 priority security elements OT buyers should look for?

Listed under the guide's own "Considerations for OT Product Selection" heading, with the guide stating explicitly "these elements are not in priority order": (1) Configuration Management — "supports controlling and tracking modifications to configuration settings and engineering logic"; (2) Logging in the Baseline Product — logs "all actions...in the baseline versions using open standard logging formats"; (3) Open Standards — "uses open standards to support secure functions and services"; (4) Ownership — "gives owners and operators full autonomy over said product"; (5) Protection of Data — "protects the integrity and confidentiality of data, services, and functions"; (6) Secure by Default — "delivered secure out of the box," eliminating default passwords and disabling insecure legacy protocols by default; (7) Secure Communications — "authenticated communication with digital certificates deployed that fail loudly"; (8) Secure Controls — "resilient to threat actors sending malicious emergency, safety, or diagnostic commands"; (9) Strong Authentication — role-based access control and "phishing-resistant multifactor authentication"; (10) Threat Modeling — "a full and detailed threat model"; (11) Vulnerability Management — "rigorously tested to help ensure they contain no known exploitable vulnerabilities," with a defined support period and free patches; (12) Upgrade and Patch Tooling — "a well-documented and easy to follow patch and upgrade process."

Does the guide reference IEC 62443 or any EU regulation?

Yes, both. On standards, the guide tells buyers to "look for manufacturers that demonstrate their adoption of Secure by Design and International Society of Automation (ISA) 62443 standards," adding in its own footnote that "the ISA/IEC 62443 multi-part standard is internationally recognized as defining requirements and processes for implementing and maintaining electronically secure OT products, systems, and development lifecycles" — see SoftWSP's [IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/) guide for that standard's own device-level detail. On regulation, the guide notes owners and operators "may need to consider regulatory requirements, such as the European Union's (EU's) NIS2 Directive," and its own footnotes cite the EU's Radio Equipment Directive delegated regulation (applying from 1 August 2025) and the Cyber Resilience Act (in force since 10 December 2024) as examples of regions "laying down security-by-design in law," noting the CRA's CE marking requirement for products with digital elements placed on the EU market.

Is there a shorter companion document, and has Secure by Demand been updated since January 2025?

Yes — in April 2025 CISA published a companion "Secure by Demand Fact Sheet: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Purchasing Digital Products." The fact sheet itself states it "has based this list on the joint guidance" from January 2025 "and is providing it without ranking or priority," reformatting the same 12 elements into a table of "Why This Matters" and "Questions I Should Ask" for each element, aimed at a quicker procurement-conversation reference than the full 22-page guide. This guide found no indication of a further substantive revision to the 12-element list since; confirm against CISA's own Secure by Design resource page before citing a newer version.

Sources

  1. CISA, NSA, FBI, EPA, TSA, ASD's ACSC, CCCS, DG CONNECT, BSI, NCSC-NL, NCSC-NZ, NCSC-UK: Secure by Demand — Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products (PDF, 13 January 2025, TLP:CLEAR) — full text: Summary, 12 priority elements, ISA/IEC 62443 and regulatory footnotes, Resources, Disclaimer
  2. CISA: Secure by Demand — Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products (resource page)
  3. CISA: Secure by Demand Fact Sheet — Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Purchasing Digital Products (PDF, as of April 2025, TLP:CLEAR)
  4. CISA: Secure by Design (campaign hub, three core principles referenced by the Secure by Demand guide)
  5. ISA: ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards (official overview)
  6. OASIS: Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) Version 2.0, OASIS Standard
  7. RFC Editor: RFC 9116, A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure (security.txt)
  8. MITRE: EMB3D threat model for embedded devices (named in the guide's Threat Modeling element)
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CISA Secure by Demand: 12 priority considerations for OT product buyers