Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

OMRON FINS protocol security: CVEs, INCONTROLLER and how to defend CS/CJ/CP and NJ/NX PLCs

Last updated:

OMRON FINS (Factory Interface Network Service), the message protocol that OMRON SYSMAC CS, CJ, CP, NJ and several NX controllers speak on UDP and TCP port 9600, has no authentication and no encryption by design, as JPCERT/CC and OMRON stated in an April 2023 technical note that assigned the issue CVE-2023-27396. Unless write protection is switched on, anyone who can reach port 9600 can read and write PLC memory, change operating mode or download logic. Defending FINS means restricting who can reach it, turning on the write protection the controllers offer, disabling FINS where it is unused, and keeping CPU firmware at or above the versions named in CISA and OMRON advisories.

Key takeaways

  • FINS is OMRON's own command protocol for reading and writing controller data, and the same commands work over Ethernet, Controller Link and Host Link serial lines.
  • FINS has no authentication because it was built for closed factory networks, where every connected device was trusted.
  • The FINS commands that matter most are the ones that write memory, change operating mode or move logic.
  • Most OMRON FINS CVEs describe the same missing-authentication design from different angles rather than separate coding bugs.

What is FINS, and where does it run?

FINS is OMRON's own command protocol for reading and writing controller data, and the same commands work over Ethernet, Controller Link and Host Link serial lines. OMRON's W342 Communications Commands Reference Manual describes FINS commands as independent of the transmission path. On Ethernet, OMRON's W420 operation manual for the CS1W-ETN21 and CJ1W-ETN21 Ethernet Units gives two transports:

Property FINS/UDP FINS/TCP
Default port UDP 9600 TCP 9600
Port changeable Yes, 1 to 65,535 Yes, 1 to 65,535
Connections Connectionless Up to 16 simultaneous connections
Client IP allowlist No (but dynamic IP-to-node mapping can be locked on Unit Ver. 1.3 or later) Yes, per connection, when the Ethernet Unit is the server

Every FINS message carries a header with source and destination network, node and unit addresses, followed by a two-byte command code and parameters. JVNTA#91513661 lists the affected families as SYSMAC CS-series, CJ-series, CP-series, NJ-series, NX1P-series, NX102-series CPU Units and NX7 Database Connection CPU Units, all versions.

Why does FINS have no authentication?

FINS has no authentication because it was built for closed factory networks, where every connected device was trusted. JPCERT/CC's JVNTA#91513661, written by OMRON and JPCERT/CC and published on 17 April 2023, says FINS was designed on the assumption that the network is closed inside the device, the production line or the factory, and "does not provide any encryption, data verification, nor authentication functions." The note splits the consequences into two issues:

  1. Plaintext communicationFINS messages can be read when intercepted, and changes to them cannot be detected (CWE-319, CWE-345).
  2. No authentication requiredAttacks from malicious devices cannot be detected, which covers spoofing, capture-replay, missing authentication for critical functions, resource exhaustion and externally accessible locks (CWE-290, CWE-294, CWE-306, CWE-400, CWE-412, CWE-799).

Both issues are tracked as CVE-2023-27396, which NVD scores 9.8 (CVSS v3.1, Primary). According to the note, OMRON does not intend to revise the FINS protocol, so there is no firmware update that adds authentication to FINS itself. The protections OMRON offers sit around the protocol: a PLC protection password, FINS write protection, a hardware DIP switch that blocks program changes, IP restrictions, and on newer NJ/NX units the ability to switch FINS off.

Which FINS commands matter to a defender?

The FINS commands that matter most are the ones that write memory, change operating mode or move logic. The W342 manual lists these command codes for CS/CJ/CP CPU Units. On CS1-H, CJ1-H and CJ1M CPU Units, CS1D CPU Units for single CPU systems at unit version 2.0 or later, CP-series CPU Units and NSJ Controllers, the write and control commands are refused with end code 2102 hex when the PLC Setup option "Write Protection from FINS Commands Sent to CPU Units via Networks" is selected.

Code Command Why it matters
01 01 / 01 04 MEMORY AREA READ / MULTIPLE MEMORY AREA READ Normal HMI and SCADA polling; a new reader is reconnaissance
01 02 / 01 03 MEMORY AREA WRITE / FILL Changes process values with no credential check
03 06 / 03 07 / 03 08 PROGRAM AREA READ / WRITE / CLEAR Reads, replaces or erases the user program (UM area)
04 01 / 04 02 RUN / STOP STOP switches the CPU to PROGRAM mode, so the user program stops running
05 01 CPU UNIT DATA READ Returns CPU model and internal system version
0C 02 ACCESS RIGHT FORCED ACQUIRE Takes the access right even if another device holds it
21 40 / 21 41 FINS WRITE ACCESS LOG READ / CLEAR The CPU's own log of FINS write commands; a clear is worth an alert
22 03 / 22 05 SINGLE FILE WRITE / FILE DELETE Writes or deletes files on the CPU's file device
23 01 FORCED SET/RESET Forces I/O bits regardless of the program

The FINS write access log is the closest thing FINS has to an audit trail. Read it after any suspected event, before anything clears it.

Which CVEs and CISA advisories cover OMRON FINS PLCs?

Most OMRON FINS CVEs describe the same missing-authentication design from different angles rather than separate coding bugs. The table lists CVEs where FINS or the controller's network service is the attack path, with NVD's CVSS v3.1 score and the CISA ICS advisory that carries the vendor's remediation.

CVE Products (per advisory) What it allows NVD CVSS v3.1 CISA advisory
CVE-2023-27396 CS, CJ, CP, NJ, NX1P, NX102, NX7 Database Connection CPU Units Plaintext, unauthenticated FINS; any command can be executed 9.8 Referenced from JVNTA#91513661
CVE-2022-31207 SYSMAC CS/CJ/CP Logic downloaded over FINS (9600/TCP) is not cryptographically authenticated 9.8 ICSA-22-179-02 (CISA: 5.9)
CVE-2022-31204 CS, CJ, CP UM protection password set and cleared in cleartext FINS commands 7.5 ICSA-22-179-02
CVE-2022-31205 CP1W-CIF41 Ethernet Option Board Web UI password readable from PLC memory over FINS 7.5 ICSA-22-179-02
CVE-2022-45790 CJ2H, CJ2M, CS1H/G, CJ1G, CS1D, CP1E-E/-N No rate limit on memory-protection password guesses over FINS 9.1 ICSA-23-262-05
CVE-2022-45794 CJ2H, CJ2M, CJ1G, CS1H/G, CS1D Read and write files on internal memory and memory card without authentication 7.5 ICSA-23-108-01
CVE-2019-18259 CJ and CS series Spoofed messages or commands 9.8 ICSA-19-346-02 (CISA: 5.6)
CVE-2019-13533 CJ and CS series Replayed requests, which CISA says could open and close industrial valves 8.1 ICSA-19-346-02
CVE-2019-18269 CS and CJ series Unrestricted externally accessible lock 9.8 ICSA-19-346-02 (CISA: 8.6)
CVE-2020-6986 CJ series Burst of packets causes an Ethernet module service error and PLC denial of service 7.5 ICSA-20-063-03
CVE-2023-0811 CJ1M v4.0 and prior PROGRAM AREA WRITE overwrites the UM password 9.1 ICSA-23-073-01
CVE-2023-22357 CP1L-EL20DR-D Active debug code runs a command not specified in FINS, without authentication 9.8 JVNVU#97575890

NVD and CISA often disagree on severity for these records: CISA's ICSA-22-179-02 rates CVE-2022-31207 at 5.9 and describes the attack against a PLC with no protection password set, while NVD's analysis scores it 9.8. Use the vendor and CISA vector to understand the precondition, and do not rank FINS exposure by any single number.

The fix versions CISA published are useful inventory thresholds. ICSA-23-262-05 lists CJ2H-CPU (-EIP) 1.5, CJ2M-CPU 2.1, CS1H/G-CPU H and CJ1G-CPU P 4.1, CS1D-CPU H/P 1.4, CS1D-CPU S 2.1 and CP1E-E/-N 1.3 for CVE-2022-45790. ICSA-22-179-02 names the same CS1 4.1, CJ2M 2.1 and CJ2H 1.5 thresholds, plus CP1E/CP1H 1.30, CP1L 1.10 and CX-Programmer 9.6, as the versions that support OMRON's extended password protection function. For the CVE-2023-0811 UM password overwrite on the CJ1M, see the advisory page for affected versions.

What did INCONTROLLER (PIPEDREAM) do to OMRON PLCs?

INCONTROLLER used FINS to find OMRON controllers and then took them over through their HTTP and Telnet services. The joint advisory AA22-103A, first released by DOE, CISA, NSA and FBI on 13 April 2022 and last revised on 25 May 2022, names OMRON Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs, including (but not limited to) the NEX NX1P2, NX-SL3300, NX-ECC203, NJ501-1300, S8VK and R88D-1SN10F-ECT. Per the advisory, the actors' OMRON tool has modules for:

  • scanning for OMRON devices using FINS;
  • parsing HTTP responses from OMRON devices and retrieving MAC addresses;
  • polling for specific devices connected to the PLC;
  • backing up and restoring arbitrary files to and from the PLC;
  • loading a custom malicious agent that accepts commands, such as file manipulation, packet captures and code execution, over HTTP or HTTPS.

The advisory stresses that the tools work once the actors already have initial access to the OT network, and it names no OMRON CVE. MITRE ATT&CK for ICS tracks the toolkit as INCONTROLLER (S1045) and maps its OMRON behaviour to techniques including Remote System Discovery (T0846) via FINS, Lateral Tool Transfer (T0867) via Telnet, Change Operating Mode (T0858), Program Download (T0843) and Data Destruction (T0809) through the HTTP service. ATT&CK also records that INCONTROLLER can log in to OMRON PLCs with hard-coded credentials documented in CVE-2022-34151. For the wider technique map, see the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS guide.

The NJ/NX fixes followed in 2022. ICSA-22-314-08 covers CVE-2022-34151 (hard-coded credentials) and CVE-2022-33208 (capture-replay authentication bypass) in NJ and NX1 controllers at 1.48 and earlier and NX7 at 1.28 and earlier, plus Sysmac Studio 1.49 and earlier and NA5 programmable terminal runtime 1.15 and earlier. The fixed versions are NX7 1.29, NX1 1.50, NJ501-1300/-1400/-1500 1.49, other NJ models 1.50, Sysmac Studio 1.50 and NA runtime 1.16. ICSA-22-314-07 adds CVE-2022-33971 for the same controller versions with the same fix thresholds. NVD scores CVE-2022-34151 at 8.1 while CISA's advisory gives 7.5 and JPCERT/CC's JVNVU#97050784 gives 9.4. JVN lists AA22-103A as a reference for these CVEs.

How do you detect FINS misuse on the network?

Detecting FINS misuse starts with decoding the protocol and baselining which hosts talk to each PLC. CISA's ICSNPP Omron FINS parser for Zeek parses FINS over TCP and UDP and writes the header to omron_fins_general.log (addresses, service ID, command and response codes) and request details such as memory area codes and addresses to omron_fins_detail.log. It detects FINS by port, so if an integrator moved FINS off 9600 you must register the extra ports, as its README explains. Alerts worth writing:

  • Any host that is not a known HMI, SCADA server or engineering workstation sending FINS to a PLC.
  • PROGRAM AREA WRITE or CLEAR, RUN or STOP, FILE WRITE or DELETE and FORCED SET/RESET outside a change window.
  • FINS WRITE ACCESS LOG CLEAR, and ACCESS RIGHT FORCED ACQUIRE from a host that has never used it.
  • Repeated program-area or memory-protection password attempts, the brute-force pattern behind CVE-2022-45790.
  • FINS, HTTP or Telnet to an NJ/NX controller from outside the engineering zone; AA22-103A shows the HTTP and Telnet paths matter as much as FINS on those units.
  • Any FINS crossing a zone boundary toward the business network or the internet.

A sudden burst of CPU UNIT DATA READ requests from an unfamiliar host usually means someone is working out which CPU and firmware they face, the same pattern as SZL reads in S7comm.

How should FINS be segmented and hardened?

Treat port 9600 as a management interface that only named engineering and HMI hosts may reach. The recommendations below come from JVNTA#91513661 and the CISA ICS advisories above:

  1. Disable FINS where it is unusedJVN lists the units that can switch it off: NJ-series, NX1P-series and NX102-series CPU Units at version 1.49 or later, and NX7 Database Connection CPU Units at 1.29 or later.
  2. Firewall port 9600Shut unused ports, restrict which hosts can communicate, and limit access to the FINS port, keeping control networks separate from IT networks. CISA's ICSA-19-346-02 says the same in two lines: filter the FINS port and filter by IP address.
  3. Use the Ethernet Unit's own IP controlsOn FINS/TCP, enable protection by IP address so only listed clients can connect; on FINS/UDP, Ethernet Units at Unit Ver. 1.3 or later can block dynamic changes of remote IP addresses, per OMRON's W420 manual.
  4. Turn on FINS write protection and the PLC protection password, and use the hardware DIP switch that blocks program changes on CS/CJ/CP units, the measures OMRON recommends for CVE-2022-31207.
  5. Use VPN and multifactor authentication for remote access, and never expose port 9600 to the internet.
  6. Patch to the fixed versionsin the advisories above, and keep known-good offline backups with hashes of controller configuration files, as AA22-103A recommends.

The zoning itself follows the Purdue model and NIST SP 800-82; the same pattern applies to other unauthenticated protocols such as Modbus.

How do you inventory OMRON firmware versions?

An OMRON firmware inventory combines project files, engineering software and a read-only query of the controller. Every fix threshold above is a unit version, so an inventory needs model and version per CPU and per Ethernet Unit.

  1. Collect what you already haveCX-Programmer and Sysmac Studio projects, the controller list from the integrator, and maintenance records. Record the exact CPU model (for example CJ2M-CPU or NJ501-1300), not just the family.
  2. Query CS/CJ/CP CPUs with CPU UNIT DATA READ (05 01)Per W342, the response holds the CPU Unit model and the CPU Unit internal system version, each up to 20 ASCII characters, and the command works in RUN, MONITOR and PROGRAM mode. Run it only from an approved engineering host, during an agreed window.
  3. Map the reported version to advisory thresholdsJVN notes that OMRON directs users to each product's manual for how to check the model and version, because the place and format differ between families.
  4. Record the Ethernet Unit and option boards separatelyIP protection features depend on the Ethernet Unit version, and CVE-2022-31205 is in the CP1W-CIF41 option board, not the CPU.
  5. Track NJ/NX, Sysmac Studio and NA terminals togetherThe 2022 advisories list fixed versions for all three, so a controller update alone does not close them.

Worked example: what does a FINS review of one packaging line find?

Synthetic example, not a real plant. A line has four CJ2M CPUs with CJ1W-ETN21 units, one NJ501-1300 controller, two HMIs and one engineering laptop.

Observation Why it matters Action
Two CJ2M CPUs report unit version 2.0 Below the 2.1 threshold in ICSA-23-262-05 and ICSA-22-179-02 Schedule firmware update; enable extended password protection
FINS/UDP 9600 reachable from the office VLAN Unauthenticated control from a business network Firewall to HMIs and engineering host only
FINS write protection off on all CPUs Writes and RUN/STOP accepted from any FINS client Enable it; keep writes to the engineering host
NJ501-1300 at 1.48 with FINS enabled, but nothing uses FINS In the AA22-103A model list; ICSA-22-314-08 range Update to 1.49 or later, then disable FINS
Engineering laptop uses Sysmac Studio 1.49 Affected by CVE-2022-34151 and CVE-2022-33208 Update to 1.50 or later via AutoUpdate

How can SoftWSP help with OMRON FINS exposure?

A passive capture is a practical way to see who talks to port 9600 without touching a running controller. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port recording and builds a host-by-port inventory, including hosts talking on port 9600, and lists remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. It has no FINS decoder, so FINS shows at connection level, without command codes. For a component or controller list, Device & Firmware Security matches models and versions against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Assuming a PLC protection password secures FINS; it is set and cleared in plaintext FINS (CVE-2022-31204).
  • Firewalling only TCP 9600 and forgetting FINS/UDP on the same port number.
  • Monitoring only port 9600 when FINS has been moved to a custom port.
  • Updating NJ/NX controllers but leaving Sysmac Studio and NA terminals at affected versions.
  • Treating absence from KEV as a reason to wait; FINS needs no exploit to misuse.

This guide draws on JPCERT/CC's JVNTA#91513661 and JVNVU#97050784, joint advisory AA22-103A, CISA ICS advisories ICSA-19-346-02, ICSA-20-063-03, ICSA-22-179-02, ICSA-22-314-07, ICSA-22-314-08, ICSA-23-108-01 and ICSA-23-262-05, OMRON's W420 and W342 manuals, MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, NVD records and the CISA ICSNPP FINS parser. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-18. It is general information, not a substitute for OMRON's product-specific security guidance or a current CISA ICS advisory search for your exact hardware and firmware version.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Does OMRON FINS have authentication or encryption?

No. JPCERT/CC's technical note JVNTA#91513661, written with OMRON and published on 17 April 2023, says FINS was designed on the assumption that the network is closed inside the device, the production line or the factory, and that it does not provide any encryption, data verification or authentication. Messages travel in plaintext, so an interceptor can read them and alterations cannot be detected, and any device that can send a FINS message can execute commands or read system information on the target. OMRON tracks this protocol-level issue as CVE-2023-27396 (NVD CVSS v3.1 9.8) and has told JPCERT/CC it does not intend to revise the FINS protocol, so the controls are network restriction, write protection and disabling FINS where it is unused.

Which ports does FINS use?

UDP 9600 for FINS/UDP and TCP 9600 for FINS/TCP by default. OMRON's W420 operation manual for the CS1W-ETN21 and CJ1W-ETN21 Ethernet Units lists 9600 as the default local port for both methods, user-changeable in a range of 1 to 65,535, and says FINS/TCP allows up to 16 simultaneous connections. Because the port can be changed, a firewall rule or a capture filter on 9600 alone can miss a FINS service that an integrator moved to another port; CISA's ICSNPP FINS parser for Zeek lets you register extra TCP and UDP ports for that reason.

Was OMRON part of the PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLER toolkit?

Yes. The joint DOE, CISA, NSA and FBI advisory AA22-103A, first released on 13 April 2022 and last revised on 25 May 2022, names OMRON Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs, including the NEX NX1P2, NX-SL3300, NX-ECC203, NJ501-1300, S8VK and R88D-1SN10F-ECT, among the devices the actors' custom tools could target after they had initial access to an OT network. The OMRON tool's modules scan for devices over FINS, parse HTTP responses, retrieve MAC addresses, poll for connected devices, back up and restore files, and load a custom malicious agent that accepts commands over HTTP or HTTPS. MITRE ATT&CK for ICS tracks the toolkit as INCONTROLLER (S1045) and links its hard-coded-credential login on OMRON PLCs to CVE-2022-34151.

Is any OMRON FINS CVE in the CISA KEV catalog?

No. As of 2026-11-18, the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.13, 1,781 entries) contains no OMRON entry, including none of the FINS and NJ/NX CVEs in this guide. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-17 for those CVEs range from about 0.005 to 0.021, with CVE-2019-18259 the highest at 0.0211. Absence from KEV is not evidence of safety for FINS: the core weakness is the missing authentication by design, which an attacker on the control network needs no exploit to use.

How do I find which OMRON PLC firmware versions I am running?

Start from the project files and the engineering software, then confirm on the controller. For CS, CJ and CP CPU Units, the FINS command 05 01 CPU UNIT DATA READ returns the CPU Unit model and the CPU Unit internal system version as up to 20 ASCII characters each, according to OMRON's W342 Communications Commands Reference Manual, and it is a read command that works in RUN, MONITOR and PROGRAM mode. Match the result against the unit versions named in advisories, such as CJ2M below 2.1, CJ2H below 1.5, CS1 below 4.1 or NJ and NX1 at 1.48 and earlier. JVN notes that OMRON points users to each product's manual for how to check the model and version, so use the manual for the exact place the unit version is shown.

Sources

  1. JPCERT/CC JVNTA#91513661: Security Issues in FINS protocol (published 17 April 2023, updated 19 September 2023; CVE-2023-27396)
  2. DOE/CISA/NSA/FBI Cybersecurity Advisory AA22-103A: APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices (13 April 2022, last revised 25 May 2022)
  3. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-179-02: Omron SYSMAC CS/CJ/CP Series and NJ/NX Series (28 June 2022; CVE-2022-31204 to CVE-2022-31207)
  4. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-19-346-02: Omron PLC CJ and CS Series (12 December 2019; CVE-2019-18259, CVE-2019-13533, CVE-2019-18269)
  5. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-23-262-05: Omron CJ/CS/CP Series (19 September 2023; CVE-2022-45790)
  6. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-314-08: Omron NJ/NX-series Machine Automation Controllers (10 November 2022; CVE-2022-34151, CVE-2022-33208)
  7. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-314-07: Omron NJ/NX-series Machine Automation Controllers (10 November 2022; CVE-2022-33971)
  8. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-23-108-01: Omron CS/CJ Series (20 April 2023; CVE-2022-45794)
  9. JPCERT/CC JVNVU#97050784: Multiple vulnerabilities in OMRON products (NJ/NX, Sysmac Studio, NA series; updated 8 November 2022)
  10. OMRON W420-E1-06: SYSMAC CS and CJ Series Ethernet Units, Construction of Networks, Operation Manual (PDF)
  11. OMRON W342-E1-18: SYSMAC CS/CJ/CP Series Communications Commands Reference Manual (PDF)
  12. MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: INCONTROLLER (S1045)
  13. CISA ICSNPP: Zeek Omron FINS parser (GitHub)
  14. NVD: CVE-2023-27396 (FINS plaintext communication and no authentication)
  15. NVD: CVE-2022-31207 (SYSMAC CS/CJ/CP logic download not cryptographically authenticated)
  16. NVD: CVE-2022-45790 (FINS memory-protection password brute force)
  17. NVD: CVE-2022-34151 (NJ/NX hard-coded credentials)
  18. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (data mirror on GitHub)
  19. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

OMRON FINS protocol security: CVEs, INCONTROLLER and how to defend CS/CJ/CP and NJ/NX PLCs