NERC CIP-012-2, "Cyber Security — Communications between Control Centers," is the mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard protecting the data Control Centers exchange with each other — the only CIP standard focused specifically on inter-Control-Center communications rather than a single facility's cyber assets. Per its own Purpose clause, it exists "to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Real-time Assessment and Real-time monitoring data transmitted between Control Centers." CIP-012-2 was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on 12 December 2023 under Project 2020-04 and approved by FERC on 23 May 2024 (Docket No. RD24-3-000); per NERC's own implementation plan, it became effective 1 July 2026, retiring its predecessor, CIP-012-1, in the process — meaning CIP-012-2, not CIP-012-1, is the version currently enforceable as of this guide's publication.
Key takeaways
- Whether a site is a "Control Center" at all comes from the NERC Glossary of Terms.
- CIP-012-2 did not originate from an industry-identified weakness — FERC created the mandate for it the moment it approved the prior version.
- Most plans use one of two encryption patterns plus a diversity design for availability.
- Vendors of ICCP servers, protocol gateways, WAN routers and encryptors feed directly into Parts 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4.
Who must comply with CIP-012-2?
CIP-012 applies to Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, Generator Owners, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators and Transmission Owners — collectively "Responsible Entities" — that own or operate a Control Center. Three exemptions apply: Cyber Assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; systems, structures and components regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; and a Control Center that transmits Real-time Assessment or Real-time monitoring data pertaining only to a generation resource or Transmission station/substation co-located with it.
Whether a site is a "Control Center" at all comes from the NERC Glossary of Terms. The definition enforced today covers "one or more facilities hosting operating personnel that monitor and control the Bulk Electric System (BES) in real-time", including "their associated data centers", for a Reliability Coordinator, a Balancing Authority, or a Transmission Operator or Generator Operator with Facilities at two or more locations. The same glossary lists a revised definition, approved by FERC in March 2026 and enforceable from 1 July 2028, that adds Transmission Owner facilities able to control transmission Facilities at two or more locations in real time over SCADA. A Transmission Owner that has no CIP-012 links today should check that date.
Which data is in scope, and where must the protection sit?
The Technical Rationale for CIP-012-2 (November 2023) narrows the data to "a subset of data that is identified by the RC, BA, and TOP in the TOP-003 and IRO-010 data specification standards, limited to Real-time Assessment data and Real-time monitoring data." So the starting list is the data specification the entity already receives, not every byte on the wire.
| In scope | Out of scope |
|---|---|
| Real-time Assessment and Real-time monitoring data named in TOP-003 / IRO-010 data specifications | Operational Planning Analysis data, weather data, market data (Technical Rationale) |
| Primary-to-backup Control Center exchanges of that data, even where no RC, BA or TOP named it | Data at rest, which "resides within BES Cyber Systems and is explicitly protected by other CIP Standards" |
| Links of any medium: fiber, copper, satellite | Oral communications (excluded by R1 itself) |
| Links between Control Centers of different entities | RTU-style status data from a field asset about itself (exemption 4.2.3) |
On location, the drafting team "did not specify the location where CIP-012 security and availability protections must be applied." The one firm rule: if encryption or decryption happens on equipment outside the Control Center Physical Security Perimeter, for example in a telecom room, "security protections are still required for the data until it crosses into the Control Center PSP." Placing a CIP-012 protection on a device "does not expand the scope of Cyber Assets"; whether that router is a BES Cyber Asset remains a CIP-002 question.
What does Requirement R1's five-part plan require?
R1 requires each Responsible Entity to implement, except under CIP Exceptional Circumstances, "one or more documented plan(s) to mitigate the risks posed by unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, and loss of availability, of data used in Real-time Assessment and Real-time monitoring while such data is being transmitted between any applicable Control Centers." The Responsible Entity is not required to include oral communications in its plan. Violation Risk Factor is Medium, with a Time Horizon of Operations Planning.
| Part | Requirement | Example evidence per the standard's own Measures |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Methods mitigating unauthorized disclosure and modification of the data in transit | "data masking, encryption/decryption"; physical access restrictions to unencrypted portions of the network |
| 1.2 | Methods mitigating the risk of losing the ability to communicate the data at all | Alternative communication paths; procedures for alternative systems; carrier service-level agreements with high-availability provisions; equipment uptime reports |
| 1.3 | Methods to initiate recovery of communication links | Standard operating procedures; "applicable sections of CIP-009 recovery plan(s)"; vendor contact procedures to initiate/verify restoration |
| 1.4 | Identification of where Parts 1.1 and 1.2 methods are implemented | Logical diagrams; identification of infrastructure points; third-party agreements where methods are implemented by a third party |
| 1.5 | If Control Centers are owned or operated by different Responsible Entities, identification of each entity's responsibilities for Parts 1.1-1.3 | Contracts, memoranda of understanding, meeting minutes, or other agreements |
Per the Compliance section, Responsible Entities "shall keep data or evidence of each Requirement in this Reliability Standard for three calendar years," and if found non-compliant, must retain non-compliance-related information until mitigation is complete and approved, whichever is longer. The Violation Severity Levels scale with the number of missing parts: one missing part is Moderate, two is High, and no documented plan, or a failure to implement three or more parts, is Severe. There is no Lower VSL.
Why does CIP-012-2 exist, and what gap did FERC find in CIP-012-1?
CIP-012-2 did not originate from an industry-identified weakness — FERC created the mandate for it the moment it approved the prior version. On 23 January 2020, FERC approved CIP-012-1 in Order No. 866 (Docket No. RM18-20-000), but found that the standard "did not address protections for the availability of communications links and data communicated between Control Centers." Per NERC's own implementation plan, FERC's order directed NERC to "develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to require protections regarding the availability of communication links and data communicated between bulk electric system Control Centers." CIP-012-1's Requirement R1 had only three parts — identification of security protection, where it was applied, and cross-entity responsibilities — covering disclosure and modification but not availability at all.
The order itself, also published as 85 FR 7197, gives the practical reasoning. Entities "could enter into service contracts with telecommunication service providers that include an agreed-upon quality of service commitment", and because "redundancy of communication links cannot always be guaranteed", they "should therefore plan for both recovery of compromised communication links and use of backup communication capability". Those two sentences became Parts 1.2 and 1.3.
CIP-012-2 answers that directive: its Purpose clause adds "availability", and R1 grows from three parts to five, inserting Parts 1.2 and 1.3 between the original disclosure/modification part and the two parts that carried over.
When did CIP-012-2 take effect, and what retired?
Per NERC's implementation plan, Reliability Standard CIP-012-2 "shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twenty-four (24) calendar months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority." FERC approved CIP-012-2 on 23 May 2024, and NERC lists the order's effective date as the same day; 24 months later lands on 23 May 2026, so the next calendar-quarter start — 1 July 2026 — is the resulting effective date. NERC's CIP-012-2 standard page lists exactly that effective date, with the status "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement" and no phased implementation.
The same implementation plan specifies that "Reliability Standard CIP-012-1 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of CIP-012-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective" — so as of this guide's publication, CIP-012-1 is retired and CIP-012-2 is the sole enforceable version.
How do entities usually meet Parts 1.1 and 1.2?
Most plans use one of two encryption patterns plus a diversity design for availability. NERC's CIP-012-2 Implementation Guidance describes both. Treat it as a reference model: NERC lists it as proposed guidance pending ERO Enterprise endorsement, while the CIP-012-1 guidance is the endorsed version.
| Method | Where it sits | Evidence the guidance names |
|---|---|---|
| IPsec VPN with encryption | "on the external Ethernet interface on the WAN router", possibly outside the PSP, with protected cabling into it | "An export of the configuration of a firewall showing the configuration of a VPN tunnel" |
| Application-layer encryption | On the ICCP or data-exchange server, "by using SSL/TLS or other application layer encryption methods" | "An export of the configuration of a transport level device that demonstrates encryption is enabled", or the application's own settings |
| Key management | Agreed between both entities | "a 30-character pre-shared key for IPsec authentication", or digital certificates with an agreed party running the certificate authority |
| Availability (Part 1.2) | Across carriers and paths | Diversity ("using heterogeneity to minimize common mode failures") and redundancy, for example "multiple circuit types (e.g., fiber optic and radio)" |
For the application-layer path, the IEC standards behind "secure ICCP" are IEC 62351-3, which specifies TLS (1.2 and 1.3) for TCP/IP-based power-system protocols, and IEC 62351-4, which adds integrity and authentication for MMS-based protocols such as ICCP. The IEC 62351 guide and the ICCP/TASE.2 guide cover the protocol detail. The Technical Rationale adds a reminder for Part 1.2: new data-exchange infrastructure must keep meeting TOP-001 and IRO-002, which already require redundant and diversely routed data exchange.
What should vendors of control-center link equipment expect?
Vendors of ICCP servers, protocol gateways, WAN routers and encryptors feed directly into Parts 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4. Four requests come straight from the evidence lists above:
Exportable configurationThe guidance's evidence is a configuration export showing that a tunnel or TLS session is on. A product that cannot export its crypto settings in readable form makes every audit harder. Standard crypto with both key optionsIPsec with pre-shared keys or certificates, TLS 1.2 or 1.3 per IEC 62351-3, and a documented way to rotate keys that two entities can agree on. Clear demarcationPart 1.5 asks who owns what, and the guidance suggests documenting "the point of demarcation where responsibility of the communications link transfers". Products that sit at that point should say in their manuals which side terminates encryption. A clean vulnerability recordThese devices also fall under CIP-013 supply-chain procurement questions. Public ICCP-stack flaws are implementation bugs: CVE-2022-2277 is a denial of service in Hitachi Energy MicroSCADA X SYS600 10.2 to 10.3.1 when ICCP forwards updates with timestamps too far in the future (CVSS 3.1 7.5), and CVE-2015-6574 is a crafted-packet CPU-exhaustion flaw in SISCO's MMS-EASE and AX-S4 ICCP (CVSS 3.0 7.5). An availability bug in a link device is a Part 1.2 problem as much as a patching one.
What does a CIP-012-2 plan look like for one link pair?
Worked example, synthetic and labelled: "TOP-A" is a Transmission Operator with a primary and a backup Control Center; "RC-B" is its Reliability Coordinator. Names, sites and circuits are invented.
| Part | TOP-A's plan entry | Evidence kept for three calendar years |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | ICCP to RC-B runs inside an IPsec tunnel between two WAN routers; the TOP-A router sits in the Control Center PSP | Router configuration exports showing the tunnel and cipher settings |
| 1.2 | Second path over a different carrier and medium (licensed microwave), with automatic failover; carrier SLA with high-availability terms | Network diagram, SLA, monthly availability reports |
| 1.3 | Section 4 of the CIP-009 recovery plan covers link recovery; carrier escalation numbers listed | CIP-009 plan extract, carrier contact procedure |
| 1.4 | Diagram marks both tunnel endpoints and the microwave terminal | Logical diagram, versioned |
| 1.5 | MOU with RC-B: TOP-A manages its router, RC-B manages its own, both agree key rotation every 12 months | Signed MOU, key-rotation record |
TOP-A's primary-to-backup link carries the same data, so it gets its own rows.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Encrypting to the building, not to the PSP. The tunnel ends in a telecom room outside the PSP and the last cable run is unprotected and undocumented.
- Forgetting the backup Control Center link. The Technical Rationale puts primary-to-backup data in scope even when no peer specified it.
- Two circuits, one conduit. Part 1.2 evidence shows redundancy but not diversity; one backhoe takes out both.
- Plans written against CIP-012-1. Parts 1.2 and 1.3 are missing because the old standard had no availability part.
- No owner for the demarcation point. Neither entity's MOU says who restores the link or rotates keys.
What is a workable starting point?
Treat Parts 1.2 and 1.3 as new obligations, not refinementsIf a Responsible Entity's CIP-012 plan was built against CIP-012-1, it almost certainly addresses disclosure and modification (today's Part 1.1) but has no documented method for loss-of-availability mitigation or recovery initiation — gaps an auditor checking against CIP-012-2 will look for directly. Reuse CIP-009 recovery plan content for Part 1.3 where it already covers the relevant linksThe standard's own Measures name "applicable sections of CIP-009 recovery plan(s)" as acceptable evidence, so a CIP-009 recovery plan that already addresses the communication links in question may not need a separate CIP-012 artifact. Document cross-entity responsibilities (Part 1.5) explicitly wherever Control Centers are owned or operated by different Responsible Entities— a gap here is one of the more straightforward compliance findings, since the standard requires a clear allocation in writing, not an assumption that "someone" handles it. Confirm which standard your evidence was built againstGiven the 1 July 2026 effective date, any CIP-012 documentation that predates mid-2026 should be reviewed against CIP-012-2's five-part structure rather than assumed compliant under the retired three-part CIP-012-1 structure. Map each in-scope data flow to a pathStart from the TOP-003 and IRO-010 data specifications, list each Control Center pair, and mark where encryption starts and ends relative to each PSP and to the CIP-005 perimeter.
SoftWSP can support two parts of this work; neither is a compliance finding. OT Snapshot turns Zeek connection logs from a passive capture into a host-by-port inventory and lists interactive remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC), which shows which hosts exchange traffic on TCP 102 (the IANA-registered ISO-TSAP port that ICCP's ISO stack runs over) and which other paths cross the segment. It does not decode ICCP. For vendors and buyers of gateway or router firmware, Device & Firmware Security extracts a firmware SBOM, matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, and delivers a cited draft report that an engineer reviews.
This guide quotes NERC's own published text of CIP-012-2, CIP-012-1, NERC's Project 2020-04 implementation plan, Technical Rationale and Implementation Guidance; it is not a substitute for the full standard, NERC's implementation plan, or compliance/legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NERC CIP-012-2, and who must comply?
CIP-012, "Cyber Security — Communications between Control Centers," is the mandatory, FERC-approved NERC Reliability Standard protecting the data Control Centers exchange with each other. Per its own Purpose clause, the currently enforceable version, CIP-012-2, exists "to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Real-time Assessment and Real-time monitoring data transmitted between Control Centers." It applies to Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, Generator Owners, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators and Transmission Owners — collectively "Responsible Entities" — that own or operate a Control Center. Three exemptions apply: Cyber Assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; systems regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; and a Control Center that transmits data pertaining only to a generation resource or Transmission station/substation co-located with it. CIP-012-2 was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on 12 December 2023 under Project 2020-04 and approved by FERC on 23 May 2024 (Docket No. RD24-3-000); per NERC's own implementation plan, it became effective 1 July 2026, at which point its predecessor, CIP-012-1, retired.
What does Requirement R1's five-part plan actually require?
R1 requires each Responsible Entity to implement, except under CIP Exceptional Circumstances, "one or more documented plan(s) to mitigate the risks posed by unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, and loss of availability, of data used in Real-time Assessment and Real-time monitoring while such data is being transmitted between any applicable Control Centers" — oral communications are explicitly excluded. The plan must include five parts: Part 1.1, identification of methods mitigating unauthorized disclosure and modification (the standard's own Measures cite examples such as "data masking, encryption/decryption" and physical access restrictions to unencrypted network segments); Part 1.2, identification of methods mitigating the risk of losing the ability to communicate the data at all — an availability control with no equivalent in the prior version; Part 1.3, identification of methods to "initiate the recovery of communication links," for which the standard's Measures explicitly point to applicable sections of a [CIP-009](/guides/nerc-cip-009-recovery-plans/) recovery plan as acceptable evidence; Part 1.4, identification of where the Part 1.1/1.2 methods are implemented; and Part 1.5, where Control Centers are owned or operated by different Responsible Entities, identification of each entity's responsibilities for Parts 1.1-1.3. Violation Risk Factor is Medium, and per the Compliance section, Responsible Entities "shall keep data or evidence of each Requirement in this Reliability Standard for three calendar years."
How is CIP-012-2 different from CIP-012-1, and why did it change?
CIP-012-1's Purpose was narrower — "to protect the confidentiality and integrity" only — and its Requirement R1 had just three parts covering disclosure/modification protection, where it was applied, and cross-entity responsibilities, with no availability obligation. FERC itself created the gap that CIP-012-2 closes: in approving CIP-012-1 on 23 January 2020 (Order No. 866, Docket No. RM18-20-000), FERC found that the standard "did not address protections for the availability of communications links and data communicated between Control Centers" and, per NERC's own implementation plan, directed NERC to "develop modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to require protections regarding the availability of communication links and data communicated between bulk electric system Control Centers." CIP-012-2 directly answers that directive by adding the word "availability" to the Purpose clause and adding Parts 1.2 and 1.3 (loss-of-communication mitigation and recovery-initiation methods) to Requirement R1. Per NERC's implementation plan, CIP-012-2 became effective "on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twenty-four (24) calendar months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard" — 23 May 2024 plus 24 months lands in late May 2026, so the next calendar-quarter start is 1 July 2026, the effective date NERC's own CIP-012-2 standard page lists. The same implementation plan retires CIP-012-1 "immediately prior to the effective date of CIP-012-2" in each jurisdiction.
Sources
- NERC: CIP-012-2 — Cyber Security – Communications between Control Centers (currently effective standard, full text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirement R1 with Parts 1.1-1.5 and Measures, Compliance, Version History)
- NERC: CIP-012-1 — Cyber Security – Communications between Control Centers (retired predecessor standard, full text, for comparison)
- NERC: Implementation Plan, Project 2020-04 Modifications to CIP-012-2 (November 2023) — FERC Order No. 866 background/directive quote, effective-date formula, CIP-012-1 retirement clause
- Federal Register: Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard CIP-012-1 — Cyber Security — Communications Between Control Centers (FERC Order No. 866, Docket No. RM18-20-000, 85 FR 8161, 13 February 2020)
- NERC: Technical Rationale for Reliability Standard CIP-012-2 (November 2023) — data scope, location of protections, PSP and ownership guidance
- NERC: CIP-012-2 Implementation Guidance (November 2023; listed by NERC as proposed, pending ERO Enterprise endorsement) — IPsec/TLS reference model, key management, diversity and redundancy
- NERC: CIP-012-2 standard page (status Mandatory Subject to Enforcement; FERC order 05/23/2024; effective date 07/01/2026)
- NERC: Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (Control Center, current and 1 July 2028 definitions; Real-time Assessment)
- Federal Register: FERC Order No. 866, CIP-012-1 (85 FR 7197, 7 February 2020)
- IEC 62351-3:2023 — Profiles including TCP/IP (TLS for power-system protocols)
- IEC 62351-4:2018 — Profiles including MMS (secure ICCP and IEC 61850 MMS)
- NVD: CVE-2022-2277 (Hitachi Energy MicroSCADA X SYS600 ICCP denial of service)
- NVD: CVE-2015-6574 (SISCO MMS-EASE and AX-S4 ICCP denial of service)
- IANA: Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry (TCP 102, iso-tsap)
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