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NERC CIP-013-2 (Cyber Security — Supply Chain Risk Management), explained

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NERC CIP-013-2, "Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management," is a mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard requiring North American bulk power system operators to build — and keep current — a documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan addressing six specific security concepts, from vendor incident notification to software integrity verification, in how they buy and deploy vendor hardware, software and services. Per its own Purpose statement, the standard exists "to mitigate cyber security risks to the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) by implementing security controls for supply chain risk management of BES Cyber Systems." It is issued by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-certified Electric Reliability Organization for the United States, and is enforced across the US, Canada, and part of Baja California, Mexico.

Key takeaways

  • Vendors are not Responsible Entities.
  • CIP-013-2 is the enforceable version: NERC's CIP-013-2 standard page lists it as "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement" from 1 October 2022, with an inactive date of 30 June 2028.
  • FERC's Order No.
  • A utility turns each R1.2 item into a contract clause, a questionnaire answer or a delivery artifact.

Who has to comply, and for which systems?

CIP-013-2 applies to a named list of "Responsible Entities": Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers (those owning specific load-shedding, Remedial Action Scheme or transmission Protection System facilities), Generator Operators, Generator Owners, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators and Transmission Owners. The requirements cover each entity's high- and medium-impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS). EACMS and PACS arrived in version 2; CIP-013-1 covered BES Cyber Systems alone. Impact levels come from the entity's CIP-002 categorization, so a product's exposure to CIP-013 depends on where the customer installs it, not on the product itself.

Five categories are exempt: Cyber Assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; Cyber Assets tied to communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters; systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; for Distribution Providers, equipment outside the listed facilities; and any entity with no high- or medium-impact BES Cyber Systems.

Vendors are not Responsible Entities. CIP-013 reaches a device maker only through the purchase process and contract terms of the utility that buys from it.

Which version is enforceable today, and what replaces it?

CIP-013-2 is the enforceable version: NERC's CIP-013-2 standard page lists it as "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement" from 1 October 2022, with an inactive date of 30 June 2028. Its successor is already FERC-approved, and FERC has ordered a further revision.

Version Key dates (NERC / FERC) What changes
CIP-013-1 Board 10 Aug 2017; FERC Order No. 850, 18 Oct 2018 First supply chain standard; BES Cyber Systems only
CIP-013-2 Board 5 Nov 2020; FERC 18 Mar 2021 (RD21-2-000); effective 1 Oct 2022 Adds EACMS and PACS
CIP-013-3 Board 9 May 2024; FERC Order No. 919, 19 Mar 2026; effective 1 Jul 2028 Adds Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) for virtualized systems; new exemption for links between Cyber Systems that protect an ESP spanning several locations
Order No. 912 revision FERC directive issued 18 Sep 2025, effective 24 Nov 2025 NERC must file new or modified standards within 18 months

The effective date for CIP-013-3 comes from NERC's CIP-013-3 standard page. The six R1.2 items keep their wording in CIP-013-3; the one textual change in that list is that Part 1.2.5 now reads "all software and patches provided by the vendor" without naming the system type.

FERC Order No. 912 (Docket RM24-4-000) goes further. It directs NERC to address "(A) sufficiency of responsible entities' SCRM plans related to the identification of and response to supply chain risks, and (B) applicability of SCRM Reliability Standards to protected cyber assets (PCA)." FERC asked NERC to set a maximum period for an entity to update its supply chain risk assessment, and to require a process to document, track and respond to identified risks. It declined to require entities to validate data received from vendors, while encouraging the practice. For vendors, the direction is clear: expect questionnaires to be repeated on a fixed cycle, and expect Protected Cyber Assets to join the scope.

What does Requirement R1's six-part supply chain plan require?

Requirement R1 requires each Responsible Entity to "develop one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s)," built from two parts:

  • Part 1.1: process(es) for planning the procurement of BES Cyber Systems (and associated EACMS/PACS) that identify and assess cyber security risk from vendor products or services, covering both "procuring and installing vendor equipment and software" and "transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s)."
  • Part 1.2: procurement process(es) addressing, "as applicable", six concepts:
Part Security concept (verbatim, CIP-013-2)
1.2.1 Notification by the vendor of vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity
1.2.2 Coordination of responses to vendor-identified incidents related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity that pose cyber security risk to the Responsible Entity
1.2.3 Notification by vendors when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to vendor representatives
1.2.4 Disclosure by vendors of known vulnerabilities related to the products or services provided to the Responsible Entity
1.2.5 Verification of software integrity and authenticity of all software and patches provided by the vendor for use in the BES Cyber System and their associated EACMS and PACS
1.2.6 Coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access

FERC's Order No. 850 ties these sub-parts to the four security objectives it set in Order No. 829: software integrity and authenticity (1.2.5), vendor remote access (1.2.3, 1.2.6), information system planning (Part 1.1), and vendor risk management and procurement controls (1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4).

What will a utility ask a device or firmware vendor for?

A utility turns each R1.2 item into a contract clause, a questionnaire answer or a delivery artifact. Many US utilities use the NATF Supply Chain Security Criteria and the Energy Sector Supply Chain Risk Questionnaire (both v7.0 on NATF's page) as the questionnaire. The table maps each item to what a vendor of relays, RTUs, gateways or HMI software is usually asked for.

Part Typical ask from the utility What the vendor can ship
1.1 Supplier risk questionnaire before selection Completed questionnaire, secure development summary, third-party component list
1.2.1 Notify us of incidents affecting our products or services Named contact, notification time in the contract, a published advisory channel
1.2.2 Coordinate the response with us A PSIRT process with a named owner and escalation path
1.2.3 Tell us when your staff should lose access Same-day staff-change notice for anyone with site or remote access
1.2.4 Disclose known vulnerabilities Security advisories (CSAF where possible), a component list or SBOM, fixed-version statements
1.2.5 Let us verify integrity and authenticity of software and patches Signed firmware, published SHA-256 hashes on a separate channel, signing-key and certificate details
1.2.6 Coordinate controls for your remote access Remote support only through the utility's Intermediate System, MFA, session logging, no hidden vendor accounts

Part 1.2.5 matters most for firmware makers, because it pairs with CIP-010-4 Part 1.6. That Part requires the utility, before a baseline change, to verify "the identity of the software source" and "the integrity of the software obtained from the software source", but only "when the method to do so is available to the Responsible Entity from the software source." A vendor that publishes signatures or hashes makes the check mandatory for its customer and easy to evidence; a vendor that does not pushes the customer into a documented exception. Remote access items connect to CIP-005 R2, and vulnerability disclosure feeds the 35-day patch evaluation in CIP-007 R2. For the component list itself, see firmware SBOM and CSAF and VEX for device makers.

What do Requirements R2 and R3 require?

Requirement R2 requires each Responsible Entity to "implement its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1." Its Note narrows that: "Implementation of the plan does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts (including amendments to master agreements and purchase orders)," and "(1) the actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract; and (2) vendor performance and adherence to a contract" are outside R2's scope. NERC told FERC, as recorded in Order No. 850, that any obligation a vendor accepts "is a contractual matter" between the vendor and the entity.

Requirement R3 requires the plan to be reviewed and approved by the CIP Senior Manager or a delegate "at least once every 15 calendar months." The Violation Severity Levels escalate the longer that review slips:

Time since last review Violation Severity Level
15-16 months Lower
16-17 months Moderate
17-18 months High
Beyond 18 months Severe

For R1 and R2, a plan missing one of Parts 1.2.1-1.2.6 is a Lower VSL, and two or more is Moderate. Evidence for every requirement is kept for three calendar years.

Where did CIP-013 come from, and why is there a "-2"?

In July 2016, FERC's Order No. 829 directed NERC to develop a "forward-looking, objective-based Reliability Standard" for supply chain risk management of industrial control system hardware, software and services, while stating NERC "need not impose any specific controls or 'one-size-fits-all' requirements." NERC's Board approved CIP-013-1 on 10 August 2017. FERC approved it with CIP-005-6 and CIP-010-3 in Order No. 850 (Docket RM17-13-000) on 18 October 2018, accepting NERC's 18-month implementation period instead of the 12 months its proposed rule had suggested.

The same order found a gap: CIP-013-1 excluded EACMS. FERC stated that "EACMS represent the most likely route an attacker would take to access a BES Cyber System or PCA within an ESP" and directed NERC to close the gap within 24 months. NERC's Board approved CIP-013-2 on 5 November 2020, adding both EACMS and PACS, and FERC approved it on 18 March 2021 (Docket RD21-2-000). Protected Cyber Assets stayed outside CIP-013, which is the gap Order No. 912 now targets.

Worked example: how does a relay vendor answer a CIP-013 questionnaire?

Synthetic example. The company, product and dates are invented for illustration.

A fictional maker, "Northgate Relays", sells a protection relay with an Ethernet port and a web configuration interface to a Transmission Owner that will install it in a medium-impact substation.

  1. Week 0The utility's procurement team sends the NATF questionnaire and a draft contract schedule listing R1.2.1-R1.2.6. Northgate assigns one owner for the response.
  2. Week 1For 1.2.4, Northgate generates an SBOM of firmware 5.3 and lists the open-source components, their versions and any known CVEs it has assessed. It names the advisory page where future vulnerabilities will appear.
  3. Week 1For 1.2.5, it documents how firmware images are signed, where SHA-256 hashes are published, and how a utility engineer checks both before loading the image, which is the evidence the utility will reuse for CIP-010-4 Part 1.6.
  4. Week 2For 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, the contract schedule sets a notification window for confirmed incidents and names Northgate's PSIRT contact; for 1.2.3, Northgate commits to same-day notice when a field engineer leaves or changes role.
  5. Week 2For 1.2.6, Northgate confirms remote support runs only through the utility's Intermediate System with MFA and that the relay has no undocumented service account.
  6. Week 3The utility records the answers as its Part 1.1 risk assessment and files them as R2 evidence.

The output is a short evidence pack the utility can audit, not a promise that Northgate is "CIP-compliant", which no vendor can be.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Claiming CIP-013 compliance as a vendor. The standard binds Responsible Entities. A vendor can support its customers' plans, but not hold compliance.
  • Hashes on the same page as the download. If an attacker can replace the file, they can replace the hash. Publish hashes or signatures through a separate, authenticated channel.
  • No staff-change process. Part 1.2.3 needs the vendor to tell the utility when access should end; without an HR trigger, the notice never leaves the company.
  • Disclosure that stops at "contact sales". Part 1.2.4 asks for known vulnerabilities; a public advisory page and component list answer it far better than ad hoc emails.
  • Ignoring EACMS and PACS products. Firewalls, jump hosts, badge controllers and their software are in scope since CIP-013-2.
  • Planning only for CIP-013-2. CIP-013-3 adds SCI from 1 July 2028, and Order No. 912 will add Protected Cyber Assets.

How does CIP-013 relate to NIST SP 800-161?

CIP-013-2 is a mandatory reliability standard for the North American bulk power system. NIST SP 800-161 is a voluntary, cross-sector guide to cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM). Both cover vendor vulnerability disclosure, software integrity and vendor access, but only CIP-013-2 carries FERC-backed enforcement and the violation severity levels above. A vendor that already answers 800-161-style questionnaires can reuse much of that material for CIP-013 customers.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Scope the plan to the right asset classes firstHigh- and medium-impact BES Cyber Systems plus their EACMS and PACS; confirm the CIP-002 categorization before drafting R1 processes.
  2. Build R1.2's six sub-parts as separate, checkable processes, not one paragraph of intent. Auditors and the VSLs look at each of 1.2.1 through 1.2.6.
  3. Don't retrofit existing contractsR2's Note confirms the standard does not require renegotiation; focus on new and renewing procurement.
  4. Put the 15-month CIP Senior Manager review on a calendar with margin, since the VSL table starts counting at month 15.
  5. Write vendor commitments into contractsCIP-013-2 cannot bind vendors directly, so contract language is the mechanism that gets incident notice, disclosure and remote-access coordination.
  6. For vendors: prepare the evidence pack onceA current SBOM, advisory channel, signing and hash procedure, PSIRT contact and remote-access statement answer most of R1.2.

SoftWSP's device firmware security assessment extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and produces an AI-drafted report with a citation for each finding, reviewed by an engineer. That supports the known-vulnerability disclosure in Part 1.2.4 and the risk identification in Part 1.1; it does not verify signatures or write VEX statements. You can inspect a CycloneDX file in the SBOM viewer. For utilities, the OT Snapshot builds an asset inventory from captured traffic and flags ssh, telnet, RDP and VNC sessions that cross the site boundary, a useful check on vendor remote access.

This guide quotes NERC's published text of CIP-013-2, CIP-013-3 and CIP-010-4, and FERC Orders No. 850 and No. 912; it is not a substitute for the full standards, NERC's Implementation Plans and Technical Rationale documents, and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is NERC CIP-013-2, and who must comply?

CIP-013-2, "Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management," is a mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) — the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) for the United States (certified 20 July 2006 under the Energy Policy Act of 2005), with Reliability Standards also applied across Canada and part of Baja California, Mexico. Per the standard's own text, its purpose is "to mitigate cyber security risks to the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) by implementing security controls for supply chain risk management of BES Cyber Systems." It applies to a defined list of "Responsible Entities" — Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operators and Owners, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners — specifically for their high- and medium-impact BES Cyber Systems and the associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS). Five categories are explicitly exempted, including Cyber Assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54.

What must a CIP-013-2 supply chain risk management plan actually include (Requirement R1)?

Requirement R1 states each Responsible Entity "shall develop one or more documented supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s)" covering two parts. Part 1.1 requires "one or more process(es) used in planning for the procurement of BES Cyber Systems... to identify and assess cyber security risk(s)" from vendor products/services, including risks from "procuring and installing vendor equipment and software" and "transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s)." Part 1.2 requires procurement processes that address, verbatim: "1.2.1. Notification by the vendor of vendor-identified incidents... that pose cyber security risk; 1.2.2. Coordination of responses to vendor-identified incidents...; 1.2.3. Notification by vendors when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to vendor representatives; 1.2.4. Disclosure by vendors of known vulnerabilities related to the products or services provided...; 1.2.5. Verification of software integrity and authenticity of all software and patches provided by the vendor...; and 1.2.6. Coordination of controls for vendor-initiated remote access." These six sub-parts map directly to FERC Order No. 829's four original security objectives: software integrity and authenticity, vendor remote access, information system planning, and vendor risk management/procurement controls.

What do Requirements R2 and R3 require, and what's the compliance timeline?

Requirement R2 states each Responsible Entity "shall implement its supply chain cyber security risk management plan(s) specified in Requirement R1," with an explicit carve-out: "implementation of the plan does not require the Responsible Entity to renegotiate or abrogate existing contracts," and the "actual terms and conditions of a procurement contract" and "vendor performance and adherence to a contract" are both outside R2's scope. Requirement R3 requires the plan to be reviewed and approved by the CIP Senior Manager or a delegate "at least once every 15 calendar months" — the standard's Violation Severity Levels escalate at 16, 17 and 18 months past the prior review, with anything beyond 18 months rated a Severe violation. Evidence of compliance with every requirement must be retained for three calendar years. FERC's Order No. 850 (18 October 2018, Docket RM17-13-000) approved an 18-month implementation period after a Commission order's effective date, rejecting its own earlier proposal (in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) to shorten that to 12 months, after commenters showed the standard would require real technology upgrades, not just paperwork.

Why version "2" — what changed from CIP-013-1, and where did the requirement come from?

In July 2016, FERC's Order No. 829 (156 FERC ¶ 61,050) directed NERC to develop a forward-looking, objective-based Reliability Standard covering four supply chain security objectives, while stating NERC "need not impose any specific controls or 'one-size-fits-all' requirements." NERC's Board of Trustees approved the resulting CIP-013-1 on 10 August 2017; FERC approved it via Order No. 850 on 18 October 2018, alongside companion standards CIP-005-6 and CIP-010-3. That same Order No. 850 found a gap: CIP-013-1 excluded Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) — firewalls, authentication servers, intrusion detection systems and similar access-control/monitoring assets — even though, per the order, "EACMS represent the most likely route an attacker would take to access a BES Cyber System" within an Electronic Security Perimeter. FERC gave NERC 24 months to close that gap; NERC's Board approved the revised CIP-013-2, extending scope to EACMS, on 5 November 2020, and FERC approved CIP-013-2 on 18 March 2021 (Docket RD21-2-000).

Sources

  1. NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-013-2 — Cyber Security - Supply Chain Risk Management (official standard text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R3, Violation Severity Levels, Version History)
  2. FERC: Order No. 850, Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standards, 165 FERC ¶ 61,020, Docket No. RM17-13-000 (issued 18 October 2018) — approves CIP-013-1/CIP-005-6/CIP-010-3, directs the EACMS scope expansion that became CIP-013-2, and recounts the Order No. 829 background
  3. NERC: Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (definitions of BES Cyber System, EACMS, PACS, ESP as cited in Order No. 850)
  4. Wikipedia: North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC's legal status, FERC certification under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and US/Canada/Mexico jurisdiction; cross-checked against FERC Order No. 850's own recitation of NERC's ERO status)
  5. NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-013-3 — Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management (Project 2016-02 virtualization revision; adds Shared Cyber Infrastructure and a new exemption 4.2.3.3)
  6. NERC: CIP-013-2 standard page — status "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement", effective 10/01/2022, inactive 06/30/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
  7. NERC: CIP-013-3 standard page — status "Subject to Future Enforcement", FERC order 03/19/2026, effective 07/01/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
  8. Federal Register: FERC Order No. 912, Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standards Revisions, Docket RM24-4-000 (issued 18 September 2025, effective 24 November 2025)
  9. NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-010-4 — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (Part 1.6 software source identity and integrity)
  10. NATF: Supply Chain Industry Coordination — Supply Chain Security Criteria v7.0 and Energy Sector Supply Chain Risk Questionnaire v7.0 (read 2026-11-13)
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NERC CIP-013-2 (Cyber Security — Supply Chain Risk Management), explained