Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

NERC CIP-005: Electronic Security Perimeter(s), and the CIP-005-8 revision already on the way

Last updated:

NERC CIP-005-7, "Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)," is the mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard that tells utilities and grid operators how to control electronic access to Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems. Per its own Purpose clause it exists "to manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES." CIP-005-7 became effective 10/1/2022 and is still the enforceable version today — but a virtualization-focused successor, CIP-005-8, is already FERC-approved for a 2028 compliance date (see below).

Key takeaways

  • R2's vendor-session parts (2.4 and 2.5) and all of R3 were added specifically "to address directives in FERC Order No.
  • Each Part of CIP-005-7 comes with a Measures column that lists example evidence.
  • CIP-005 binds the utility, not the vendor.
  • Yes, at both ends.

Who must comply with CIP-005-7?

Section 4.1 of CIP-005-7 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types: Balancing Authority, a Distribution Provider that owns specific load-shedding, Remedial Action Scheme, protection or blackstart facilities, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner. The requirements apply to each entity's BES Cyber Systems that CIP-002's separate identification process categorizes as high or medium impact, together with their associated Protected Cyber Assets (PCA), Electronic Access Points (EAP), Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) — the standard gives EACMS examples including "firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems."

Five exemption categories (Section 4.2.3) take Cyber Assets out of scope entirely: facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; communication networks and data links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters; systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; Distribution Provider systems outside the standard's Section 4.2.1 scope; and any Responsible Entity that identifies it has no high- or medium-impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002 at all.

What do R1, R2 and R3 each require?

Requirement Scope (Violation Risk Factor: Medium) Core obligation
R1 — Electronic Security Perimeter (5 parts) Routable-protocol Cyber Assets, EAPs, dial-up connectivity Reside inside a defined ESP; route all external connectivity through an identified EAP; "require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default"; authenticate dial-up where technically feasible; detect malicious inbound/outbound communications
R2 — Remote Access Management (5 parts) Interactive Remote Access (IRA) sessions Route all IRA through an Intermediate System rather than touching a BES Cyber Asset directly; encrypt sessions, terminating at the Intermediate System; require multi-factor authentication; maintain methods to both determine and disable active vendor remote access (interactive or system-to-system)
R3 — Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS (2 parts, new in v7) EACMS and PACS tied to high/medium impact systems Maintain a method to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections to EACMS/PACS, and a method to terminate those connections and control the ability to reconnect

R2's vendor-session parts (2.4 and 2.5) and all of R3 were added specifically "to address directives in FERC Order No. 850," per the standard's own version history — closing a gap where a Responsible Entity could satisfy the rest of CIP-005 without ever being able to see or kill an active third-party remote session. Each applicable entity must retain evidence of every requirement for three calendar years, and the standard carries no Regional Variances.

What evidence does an auditor expect for each Part?

Each Part of CIP-005-7 comes with a Measures column that lists example evidence. Quoted or closely paraphrased from the standard:

Part Requirement in short Example evidence named in the standard
1.1 Routable Cyber Assets sit inside a defined ESP A list of all ESPs with every uniquely identifiable Cyber Asset in each
1.2 External Routable Connectivity goes through an EAP Network diagrams showing all external routable paths and the EAPs
1.3 Inbound and outbound permissions with reasons, deny by default Firewall or ACL rules, each with a documented reason
1.5 Detect known or suspected malicious communications Documentation of an intrusion detection system or application-layer firewall
2.1 IRA through an Intermediate System Network diagrams or architecture documents
2.2 IRA encryption terminates at the Intermediate System Architecture documents showing where encryption starts and ends
2.3 MFA for all IRA Architecture documents listing the authentication factors
2.4 Determine active vendor remote access Connection tables, firewall rule hit counters, user activity monitoring, or vendors calling for a second factor
2.5 Disable active vendor remote access Methods to disable it at the EAP (system-to-system) or the Intermediate System (interactive)

Part 2.3 also spells out the factors: something the individual knows (not including the user ID), has (tokens, digital certificates, smart cards) or is (biometrics).

What does CIP-005 mean for device makers selling into utilities?

CIP-005 binds the utility, not the vendor. But a relay, RTU, gateway or EMS that sits inside an ESP has to make the utility's evidence possible, and the neighbouring CIP standards say what the utility will ask for.

Utility asks the vendor for Requirement behind it What to ship
The list of listening ports and why each is needed CIP-005-7 Part 1.3; CIP-007-6 Part 1.1 ("enable only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed") A port and service list per release, with a way to disable unused services
Remote support that works through a jump host with MFA CIP-005-7 Parts 2.1 to 2.3 Support procedures that never need a direct inbound connection to the device
A way to see and end vendor sessions CIP-005-7 Parts 2.4, 2.5 and R3 Session logs and a documented cut-off method
Baseline data: firmware version, installed software, ports, patches CIP-010-4 Part 1.1 Release notes listing these items; an SBOM
Proof that a patch is genuine CIP-010-4 Part 1.6; CIP-013-2 Part 1.2.5 Signed images and published hashes
Vulnerability disclosure and incident notice CIP-013-2 Parts 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.4 A PSIRT contact and advisory feed
Coordination of vendor-initiated remote access CIP-013-2 Part 1.2.6 A written remote-access model the utility can put into its plan

Patch evaluation also has a clock. CIP-007-6 Part 2.2 has the utility evaluate released security patches at least once every 35 calendar days, and Part 2.3 gives it 35 days after that to apply them or record a mitigation plan. A vendor whose advisories name affected versions and fixes makes those dates easy to meet. See the CIP-013 guide for the procurement side.

Do CIP-003-9 and CIP-015-1 change the perimeter picture?

Yes, at both ends. CIP-003-9, approved by FERC on 16 March 2023 (Docket No. RD23-3-000), adds Section 6, "Vendor Electronic Remote Access Security Controls," to the plan for low-impact assets. Where vendor remote access exists, the entity needs methods to determine it, disable it, and detect "known or suspected inbound and outbound malicious communications" on it. Remote-support design that works for medium-impact sites now matters at low-impact sites too.

Inside the perimeter, CIP-015-1, approved by FERC on 26 June 2025 (Docket No. RM24-7-000), requires internal network security monitoring of networks protected by the ESPs of high-impact systems and of medium-impact systems with External Routable Connectivity. Part 1.1 calls for "network data feed(s) to monitor network activity; including connections, devices, and network communications." Devices that use documented, predictable protocols are easier to baseline. See the CIP-015 guide.

Is CIP-005-8 already approved, and when does it apply?

CIP-005-7 is the standard enforced today, but it will not be the last word for long. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), approving 11 revised CIP standards including CIP-005-8 as part of NERC's broader virtualization package — published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 at 91 FR 13957, with the order itself stating "this action is effective May 26, 2026." CIP-005-8 introduces Parts that did not exist in CIP-005-7: protecting ESP and Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) configurations by limiting network accessibility to Management Interfaces, protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data traversing links that span a single ESP between Physical Security Perimeters, and preventing an Intermediate System from sharing CPU or memory resources with a high- or medium-impact BES Cyber System. It also replaces most "where technically feasible" language with a new "per system capability" standard — a change FERC's order approved but paired with a directive that NERC build reporting and documentation guardrails around it.

Per NERC's own implementation plan, quoted directly in the FERC order, the revised standards "will become effective on the later of April 1, 2026, or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order" — which, from the 26 May 2026 order effective date, computes to 1 July 2028. Responsible entities may elect early adoption at 6, 12 or 18 months after the order's effective date instead of waiting for the mandatory date. Until then, CIP-005-7 — not CIP-005-8 — is what an auditor will test against.

What does vendor remote support look like under CIP-005? (worked example)

Synthetic example. The utility, vendor and products are invented for illustration.

A protection-relay maker supports relays at a medium-impact substation with External Routable Connectivity. A firmware question needs a remote session:

  1. The utility's support desk opens a ticket and enables the vendor's account on the Intermediate System for four hours (Parts 2.1 and 2.4).
  2. The engineer connects over an encrypted session that terminates at the Intermediate System, with a password and a hardware token (Parts 2.2 and 2.3).
  3. From the Intermediate System, the engineer reaches the relay's engineering port. The EAP rule that allows this names the ticket as its reason (Part 1.3).
  4. The session is logged. The utility can see it as active and ends it from the Intermediate System when the window closes (Parts 2.4 and 2.5).
  5. The relay maker sends the signed firmware with its hash. The utility verifies it before the change (CIP-010-4 Part 1.6) and updates the baseline (Part 1.1).

The vendor's part is small but specific: no direct inbound path, no shared accounts, and a firmware package the utility can verify.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Counting employee remote access only. Parts 2.4 and 2.5 cover vendor sessions, including system-to-system ones.
  • Rules without reasons. Part 1.3 asks for the reason for each permission, not just a rule list.
  • Vendor tools that phone home. An outbound connection from inside the ESP is still access that needs a documented reason.
  • Forgetting EACMS and PACS. R3 brings vendor access to these systems into scope.
  • Ignoring low-impact sites. CIP-003-9 Section 6 adds vendor remote access controls there.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Confirm which BES Cyber Systems are in scope todayby starting from the separate CIP-002 categorization — CIP-005 only reaches high- and medium-impact systems and their associated PCA/EAP/PACS/EACMS.
  2. Map every Electronic Access Point and confirm default-denyR1.3 requires documenting the reason for every permitted inbound and outbound rule, not just blocking the rest.
  3. Verify vendor remote access visibility exists today, separate from employee Interactive Remote Access — R2.4/2.5 and R3 require the ability to both see and kill an active vendor session, which many access-logging setups built for employees don't cover by default.
  4. Track CIP-005-8 now, ahead of its mandatory dateWith a FERC-approved 1 July 2028 compliance date already on the calendar, entities adopting virtualized or shared infrastructure for BES Cyber Systems should evaluate the new SCI and Management Interface requirements now rather than retrofitting after the fact.
  5. Keep the evidence trail for three calendar years, per the standard's own Compliance section — including the documented reasons behind EAP rules, not just the rule list itself.

SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek logs from a passive capture and produces an asset inventory of the hosts and services seen. It also flags SSH, Telnet, RDP and VNC sessions that cross from an external to an internal address. That gives an engineer a factual starting point for checking remote-access paths against the diagrams Parts 1.2 and 2.1 call for. It does not test firewall rules or produce compliance evidence. For vendors, device firmware security extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA's CSAF ICS advisories. An engineer reviews the AI-drafted, cited report. For a control-centre view, see the ICCP guide.

This guide quotes NERC's own published text of CIP-005-7, the CIP-005-8 final draft, CIP-003-9, CIP-007-6, CIP-010-4, CIP-013-2 and CIP-015-1, and the Federal Register text of FERC Order No. 919; it is not a substitute for the full standards, NERC's Implementation Plan, or compliance/legal advice. CIP-005-7 remains the enforceable standard as of this guide's publication — CIP-005-8 is approved and becomes mandatory at a later effective date.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is NERC CIP-005-7, and what is it trying to achieve?

CIP-005, "Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)," is a mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Per its own Purpose statement, the currently effective version, CIP-005-7, exists "to manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES." CIP-005-7 was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on 11/05/2020, approved by FERC on 3/18/2021 (Docket No. RD21-2-000), and — per its own version-history table — became effective 10/1/2022, which is still its current status as of this guide.

Who has to comply with CIP-005-7, and are there exemptions?

Section 4.1 names seven "Responsible Entity" functional types: Balancing Authority, a Distribution Provider that owns specific load-shedding/protection/blackstart facilities, Generator Operator, Generator Owner, Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator and Transmission Owner. The standard applies to a Responsible Entity's BES Cyber Systems categorized as high or medium impact under the separate CIP-002 identification process, plus their associated Protected Cyber Assets, Electronic Access Points, Physical Access Control Systems and Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS). Section 4.2.3 lists five exemption categories: Cyber Assets at facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission; communication networks and data links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters; systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54; Distribution Provider systems outside the standard's defined scope; and any Responsible Entity that identifies it has no high- or medium-impact BES Cyber Systems at all under CIP-002.

What do Requirements R1, R2 and R3 each require?

R1 (Electronic Security Perimeter, 5 parts, Violation Risk Factor Medium) requires every applicable Cyber Asset connected via a routable protocol to sit inside a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP); all external routable connectivity to route through an identified Electronic Access Point (EAP); EAPs to "require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default"; authentication on dial-up connectivity where technically feasible; and detection methods for malicious inbound/outbound communications. R2 (Remote Access Management, 5 parts, also Medium VRF) requires all Interactive Remote Access to route through an Intermediate System rather than touching a BES Cyber Asset directly, encryption terminating at that Intermediate System, multi-factor authentication for Interactive Remote Access sessions, and — added to address FERC Order No. 850 — one or more methods to both determine and disable active vendor remote access sessions, interactive or system-to-system. R3 (Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS, 2 parts, Medium VRF) is new in CIP-005-7 and requires methods to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections to Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems and Physical Access Control Systems, and methods to terminate those connections and control reconnection.

Is CIP-005-7 already being replaced, and by when do entities need to comply with the next version?

Yes — a successor, CIP-005-8, is already FERC-approved, though CIP-005-7 remains the enforceable standard today. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), approving 11 revised CIP standards including "CIP-005-8 (Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s))" as part of NERC's virtualization package — published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 (91 FR 13957) with the order "effective May 26, 2026." CIP-005-8 adds new Parts covering Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) and Management Interfaces, replaces most "where technically feasible" language with "per system capability," and adds requirements to protect data traversing links that span a single ESP between Physical Security Perimeters and to prevent an Intermediate System from sharing CPU/memory resources with a BES Cyber System. Per NERC's own implementation plan (quoted in the order), the new standards become effective "on the later of April 1, 2026, or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order" — which computes to 1 July 2028 given the 26 May 2026 order effective date, with early-adoption windows at 6, 12 or 18 months after that date for entities that opt in.

Sources

  1. NERC: CIP-005-7 — Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) (currently effective standard, full text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R3, Compliance, Version History)
  2. NERC: CIP-005-8 — Final Draft (April 2024), Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) (virtualization revision text, Standard Development Timeline, redline vs. CIP-005-7)
  3. Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards, 91 FR 13957-13965 (FERC, Docket No. RM24-8-000, issued 2026-03-19, published 2026-03-24, effective 2026-05-26)
  4. NERC: CIP-007-6 — Cyber Security – Systems Security Management (Part 1.1 needed ports; R2 patch evaluation every 35 calendar days)
  5. NERC: CIP-010-4 — Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (Part 1.1 baseline; Part 1.6 software source and integrity)
  6. NERC: CIP-013-2 — Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management (R1.2.1-1.2.6 procurement items, including vendor-initiated remote access)
  7. NERC: CIP-003-9 — Cyber Security – Security Management Controls (Attachment 1 Section 6, vendor electronic remote access for low impact; FERC approval 2023-03-16, Docket No. RD23-3-000)
  8. NERC: CIP-015-1 — Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring (FERC approval 2025-06-26, Docket No. RM24-7-000)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

NERC CIP-005: Electronic Security Perimeter(s), and the CIP-005-8 revision already on the way