IEC 62351, "Power systems management and associated information exchange — Data and communications security," is the IEC TC 57 series that secures the actual communication protocols power utilities run between control centres, substations and field equipment — IEC 61850 inside substations, IEC 60870-5 and DNP3-family telecontrol protocols, and the TCP/IP transport those and other TC 57 protocols ride on. It is a protocol security series, not a device, network-architecture or organizational-program standard: it defines how to authenticate, sign, encrypt or otherwise protect the messages themselves.
Key takeaways
- For a device maker, Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 carry most of the firmware load in an IED, RTU, gateway or relay; the rest are introductions, guidelines, data models and test specifications.
- a TLS v1.3 profile "applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2," with clauses on session key update and early data.
- Because of timing.
- Its clauses 7 and 8 cover distribution by LDAP pull, RADIUS, and retrieval of a JWT from an identity provider.
What's in scope for securing TC 57's own protocols?
Per IEC TS 62351-1:2007's own scope text, the series' purpose is "the development of standards for security of the communication protocols defined by IEC TC 57, specifically the IEC 60870-5 series, the IEC 60870-6 series, the IEC 61850 series, the IEC 61970 series, and the IEC 61968 series" — covering EMS (Energy Management Systems), SCADA, substation automation, distribution automation and tele-protection. IEC's own current "ALL PARTS" bundle (IEC 62351:2026 SER) lists 20 published documents spanning Technical Specifications, International Standards and Technical Reports published between 2007 and 2026 — the series has been under continuous revision for close to two decades as the underlying protocols and threat landscape evolved.
For a device maker, Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 carry most of the firmware load in an IED, RTU, gateway or relay; the rest are introductions, guidelines, data models and test specifications.
Which parts matter most, part by part?
| Part | Title (per IEC) | Current edition / year | What it secures |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Introduction to security issues | TS, 2007 | Introduces the rest of the series — not a technical control itself |
| 2 | Glossary of terms | TS, 2008 | Shared vocabulary across the series |
| 3 | Communication network and system security — Profiles including TCP/IP | 2023 (Ed. 2.0) | TLS v1.2/v1.3 profile for any TC 57 protocol riding over TCP/IP; per its own scope, excludes "bump-in-the-wire" external security devices |
| 4 | Profiles including MMS | 2018+AMD1:2020 CSV | Security profiles for Manufacturing Message Specification traffic, with a compatibility mode and an end-to-end "native mode" |
| 5 | Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives | 2023 (Ed. 1.0) | Application-layer secure communication mechanism for telecontrol/SCADA protocols derived from IEC 60870-5; explicitly "cancels and replaces" the 2013 Technical Specification |
| 6 | Security for IEC 61850 | 2020 (Ed. 1.0) | Protects substation protocols — MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values — including the 61850-8-1, 61850-8-2, 61850-9-2 and 61850-6 mappings |
| 7 | Network and System Management (NSM) data object models | 2025 (Ed. 2.0) | Security-relevant monitoring data objects for the health of IEDs, RTUs and DER |
| 8 | Role-based access control (RBAC) for power system management | 2026 (Ed. 2.0), replacing 2020 Ed. 1.0 | Mandatory roles and access-token formats for local/remote human and automated-agent access |
| 9 | Cyber security key management for power system equipment | 2023 (Ed. 2.0, 296 pages) | Asymmetric key/certificate management, plus symmetric group-key management (GDOI) for the keys Part 6 relies on |
| 10 | Security architecture guidelines | 2012 (TR) | Informative guidance on essential security controls for a power system architecture |
| 11 | Security for XML documents | 2016 | Confidentiality, signing and access control for XML-based data exchange |
| 12, 13 | Resilience for DER systems; security topics for standards writers | 2016 (TRs) | Informative guidance |
| 90-1 to 90-3 | Technical Reports | 2018-2021 | Guidance on deep packet inspection of encrypted 62351 traffic and integration across parts |
| 100-series | Conformance test specifications | 2018-2023 (TS) | Interoperability/conformance test profiles for the normative parts above |
Edition dates are from the IEC webstore records for each part; the Part 8 record states that the 2026 "second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2020."
What does IEC 62351-3:2023 ask of a TLS stack?
Part 3 is written for product developers: its preview states that "the subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols." It "specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP," and this edition is "self-contained," defining a full TLS profile "without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number." Per the publisher preview, the 2023 edition cancels and replaces the 2014 edition and its 2018 and 2020 amendments, and adds:
- mandatory TLS v1.2 cipher suites to be supported, with session resumption and session renegotiation parameters;
- revocation handling using CRL and OCSP, including OCSP stapling (clauses 7.5.5 and 8.8.10);
- handling of security events;
- a TLS v1.3 profile "applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2," with clauses on session key update and early data.
Telecontrol connections "tend to have longer durations, often 'permanent'," so key update and revocation checks have to work inside a session that may stay up for months. And authentication is "mutual, certificate-based" using X.509 certificates in the handshake, so every device needs its own key pair and certificate, with management "handled in IEC 62351-9." Clause 6.3 also covers non-encrypting cipher suites, referencing RFC 9150 integrity-only suites for TLS 1.3.
How does IEC 62351-5 secure IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3 links?
Part 5 "defines the application profile (A-profile) secure communication mechanism" for "all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5." Its preview lists IEC 60870-5-101, -102, -103, -104 and DNP3 ("defined in IEEE Std 1815") in Table 1, and clause 9 covers how it combines with Part 3 TLS on TCP links. Because it works at the application layer, it also protects serial links where TLS is not possible; the text notes that "links of 1 200 bits per second and lower are still a reality."
The 2023 foreword lists what changed against the 2013 TS, including: security per controlling station/controlled station association, removal of the symmetric Update Key change method, the "Aggressive Mode concept was replaced with the Secure Data message exchange mechanism," "authenticated encryption of application data was added," and "events monitoring and logging was added." For firmware, that means a station-association procedure, Update Key derivation, a session-key change procedure, sequence-number handling and a security event log. DNP3 products that implement Secure Authentication version 5 follow the IEEE 1815 track covered in our DNP3 Secure Authentication guide; note that the IEEE 1815-2012 record shows the standard as "Inactive-Reserved" since 2023-03-30. The IEC 60870-5-104 guide covers the protocol itself.
Why aren't GOOSE and Sampled Values simply encrypted?
Because of timing. Per IEC's catalogue record, Part 6 (2020) "specifies messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from the IEC 61850 series," applying to at least the 61850-8-1 (MMS mapping), 61850-8-2 (XMPP mapping), 61850-9-2 (sampled values) and 61850-6 (configuration description language) protocols. Its clause 4.1, in the publisher preview, states that for Layer 2 GOOSE and SV "requiring 3 ms response times, multicast configurations and low CPU overhead, encryption is not recommended"; confidentiality comes from keeping that traffic inside the substation LAN, and an optional confidentiality mechanism exists "for applications where the 3 ms delivery criterion is not a concern."
What the standard adds instead is integrity and authenticity: an extended PDU carrying a MAC over each Layer 2 GOOSE/SV frame (clause 8), replay protection for both (clauses 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), security for SNTP (clause 7), and SCL extensions for key policy (clause 9). The group keys are not pre-shared by hand: Part 9 uses GDOI to distribute them, and RFC 8052 defines the GDOI payloads, listing HMAC-SHA256-128, HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC-128 and AES-GMAC-256 as authentication algorithms. For MMS over TCP, Part 6 requires the Part 4 profiles. The IEC 61850 protocol security guide covers what recent advisories found in real stacks.
How do RBAC (Part 8) and key management (Part 9) underpin the rest?
Part 8 defines role-based access control across four access patterns IEC's own catalogue record lists explicitly: local wired human access, local automated-agent/HMI access, remote human access, and remote automated-agent access — plus a mandatory-role set and a custom-role exchange format. The 2020 text supports four token formats:
| Profile | Access token | Origin |
|---|---|---|
| A | X.509 public key certificate | Defined in the earlier TS |
| B | X.509 attribute certificate | Defined in the earlier TS |
| C | JSON Web Token (JWT) | New in 2020 |
| D | RADIUS token (vendor-specific attribute) | New in 2020 |
Its clauses 7 and 8 cover distribution by LDAP pull, RADIUS, and retrieval of a JWT from an identity provider.
The 2026 edition removes the mapping of roles to protocol objects from the core text ("mapping is delegated to separate documents"), adds an "operationSet" for finer permissions, adds a profile for fetching RBAC information from LDAP, and defines security events.
Part 9 (2023, Edition 2.0) supplies the key management both Part 8's access tokens and Parts 3/5/6's session protections depend on: per its own scope, it covers asymmetric key and certificate management generally, and symmetric group-key management for the keys Part 6 uses to protect GOOSE and SV traffic, using GDOI (an IETF-specified group key management protocol) extended to carry the security parameters for "GOOSE, SV, and PTP." Its preview shows SCEP and EST enrolment examples, CRL and OCSP revocation, and the GDOI GROUPKEY-PULL exchange — so a device needs an enrolment client, a revocation checker and, for GOOSE/SV publishers or subscribers, a GDOI client.
Which part applies to which device interface?
| Device interface | Part(s) | Firmware work it implies |
|---|---|---|
| IEC 60870-5-104 or DNP3 over TCP | 3 + 5 | TLS 1.2/1.3 profile, plus A-profile association and session keys |
| IEC 60870-5-101 or DNP3 over serial | 5 | A-profile only; timing on slow links |
| IEC 61850 MMS client/server | 3 + 4 + 6 | TLS, plus end-to-end MMS security in native mode |
| GOOSE / Sampled Values publisher or subscriber | 6 + 9 | MAC on extended PDU, replay counters, GDOI key pull |
| ICCP / TASE.2 between control centres | 3 + 4 | TLS and MMS profiles (Part 4 names ICCP compatibility) |
| Local HMI, web or engineering access | 8 + 9 | Role checks, token validation, certificate enrolment |
| Device health monitoring | 7 | NSM data objects, mapped to SNMP MIBs |
Worked example: an RTU maker adding IEC 62351 to a 104 gateway
Synthetic example, not a real product. A vendor ships an RTU that speaks IEC 60870-5-104 to a control centre and DNP3 over serial to field devices. A utility tender asks for "IEC 62351-3 and -5 conformance."
Inventory interfacesTCP 104 upstream (Parts 3 and 5), serial DNP3 downstream (Part 5 only), a web HMI (Part 8). TLSThe team checks its TLS library supports the TLS 1.2 suites and TLS 1.3 profile of the 2023 edition, OCSP stapling and long-lived key update, and fixes a bug where revocation is only checked at boot. CertificatesIt adds an EST client (Part 9) so each RTU enrols its own certificate instead of sharing one factory key. Application layerIt implements the Part 5 Secure Data exchange and security event logging; field tests confirm the serial link timing still meets the utility's polling cycle. AccessThe web HMI moves from one shared admin password to Part 8 roles, using X.509 certificates (Profile A). EvidenceIt fills the Part 3 conformance statement (clause 10, PICS) before the tender. Supply chainIt produces a firmware SBOM so the utility can track CVEs in the TLS library.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Citing "IEC 62351" without part and edition. Part 3:2023 and Part 8:2026 differ materially from their predecessors.
- One certificate for the whole fleet. Mutual authentication only works with per-device keys.
- Checking revocation once. "Permanent" connections need revocation and key-update handling inside the session.
- Encrypting GOOSE by default. Part 6 does not recommend it under the 3 ms criterion; get authentication and replay protection right first.
- Hand-loaded group keys. Part 9 expects GDOI distribution; static keys never rotate.
- Forgetting the security event log. Parts 3, 5, 8 and 9 all define security events.
- Treating a bump-in-the-wire box as compliance. Part 3 places external security devices out of scope.
How does IEC 62351 relate to IEC 62443 and NERC CIP-013?
These three sit at different layers and carry different legal force:
- NERC CIP-013-2 — mandatory, FERC-enforced reliability standard for North American bulk power system entities, governing supply chain risk management processes (vendor incident notification, software integrity verification, remote-access coordination). It does not specify protocol-level cryptography.
- IEC 62443 — voluntary, cross-sector industrial automation and control systems security series covering organizational programs (62443-2-x), system requirements (62443-3-x) and component requirements (62443-4-x) generically, across every OT sector, not just power. A component certified to IEC 62443-4-2 still needs IEC 62351 for the power-protocol layer.
- IEC 62351 — narrower and protocol-specific: it secures the bits on the wire for the power-sector protocol families TC 57 maintains. It does not by itself secure a device, a network architecture, or an organization's processes.
A utility's full security posture typically draws on all three together: CIP-013 or 62443-2-x for program and process obligations, 62443-3-x/4-x for system- and component-level requirements, and IEC 62351 layered on top to secure the actual SCADA and substation protocol traffic those systems and components exchange. The NIST SP 800-82 OT security guide covers the surrounding network architecture.
Where do you start?
Start with Part 1 as orientation, not Part 3 as a checklistKnow which TC 57 protocol families (61850, 60870-5, 60870-6, 61970, 61968) are in use before picking parts. Map your protocol inventory to specific parts before procuring anythingUse the interface table above; a single device commonly needs several parts at once. Treat Part 9 as a prerequisite, not an afterthoughtParts 3, 5 and 6 all depend on key material Part 9 defines how to manage. Don't expect IEC 62351 to replace a supply chain or component security programPair it with NERC CIP-013 (where applicable) or IEC 62443. Verify edition currency before specifying compliance in a contract, especially for Parts 3, 7 and 8, which have been re-edited since 2023; cite the exact year/edition, not just "IEC 62351."
A passive capture is a practical start for step 2 on a live site. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot turns a recorded capture into a list of IP hosts, the ports and directions they talk on, and remote-access sessions such as SSH, RDP or VNC, with an engineer reviewing every finding. DNP3 hosts are identified from its DNP3 parser; IEC 60870-5-104 and MMS appear only as TCP flows on their ports, GOOSE and SV are Layer 2 frames outside that view, and TLS or IEC 62351 security state is not decoded. For device makers, SoftWSP extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image (see the firmware SBOM guide) and matches components such as the TLS library or an IEC 61850 stack against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report that an engineer reviews.
This guide summarises IEC's own catalogue records and publisher previews for the IEC 62351 series' published parts, plus RFC 8052; it is not a substitute for the purchased IEC text of each part and does not constitute compliance or engineering advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC 62351?
IEC 62351, "Power systems management and associated information exchange — Data and communications security," is a multi-part series from IEC Technical Committee 57 (TC 57). Per IEC TS 62351-1:2007's own scope, the series' primary objective is "the development of standards for security of the communication protocols defined by IEC TC 57," specifically the IEC 60870-5 series, IEC 60870-6 series, IEC 61850 series, IEC 61970 series and IEC 61968 series — the protocol families used for SCADA, substation automation, energy management systems and distribution automation. IEC's bundled "ALL PARTS" catalogue listing (IEC 62351:2026 SER) counts 20 individually published parts, spanning Technical Specifications, International Standards and Technical Reports, published between 2007 and 2026.
Which specific protocols does each main part secure?
Per IEC's own catalogue records: Part 3 (Edition 2.0, 2023) specifies Transport Layer Security (TLS v1.2/v1.3) profiles for protocols running over TCP/IP. Part 4 covers security profiles including MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification). Part 5 (2023) specifies an application-layer secure communication mechanism for "all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5" — telecontrol/SCADA protocols — and per its own text "cancels and replaces" the 2013 Technical Specification as a technical revision. Part 6 (2020) specifies messages, procedures and algorithms for securing protocols "based on or derived from the IEC 61850 series," applying to at least IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS mapping), 61850-8-2 (XMPP mapping), 61850-9-2 (sampled values) and 61850-6 (configuration description language) — this is the part that covers GOOSE and Sampled Value (SV) message protection inside a substation.
Does IEC 62351-6 require encrypting GOOSE and Sampled Value messages?
No. Per clause 4.1 of IEC 62351-6:2020 (publisher preview), for Layer 2 GOOSE and Sampled Value (SV) traffic "requiring 3 ms response times, multicast configurations and low CPU overhead, encryption is not recommended"; the standard does define an optional confidentiality mechanism for applications where "the 3 ms delivery criterion is not a concern." Instead, it relies on message authentication — a MAC such as HMAC-SHA256 or AES-GMAC, the algorithm identifiers RFC 8052 lists — to protect integrity and authenticity, with the group keys distributed by GDOI as specified in IEC 62351-9 rather than configured by hand. The purchased Part 6 text remains the authoritative source for the mandatory algorithm before any implementation decision.
What does IEC 62351-8 (RBAC) actually require?
Per IEC's own catalogue record for IEC 62351-8:2020, the part facilitates **role-based access control** for power system management, covering four access scenarios: local (direct wired) access by a human user; local automated-agent or built-in HMI/panel access; remote (dial-up or wireless) access by a human user; and remote access by an automated agent. It defines a set of mandatory roles plus an exchange format for vendor-defined custom roles. Explicitly out of scope: administrative or organizational tasks not directly tied to defining roles and access tokens. A newer edition, IEC 62351-8:2026, is listed in IEC's current "ALL PARTS" bundle; that 2026 text sits behind IEC's paywall, which remains the authoritative source for any specific 2026 changes.
How does IEC 62351 relate to NERC CIP-013 and IEC 62443?
They operate at different layers and have different legal force. [NERC CIP-013-2](/guides/nerc-cip-013-supply-chain-risk-management/) is a mandatory, FERC-enforced reliability standard governing supply chain risk management processes for North American bulk power system entities — it does not specify communication protocol security mechanisms. [IEC 62443](/guides/iec-62443-1-1-concepts-and-models/) is a voluntary, cross-sector industrial automation and control systems security series covering organizational programs, system requirements and component requirements generically across all OT sectors. IEC 62351 is narrower and protocol-specific: it secures the actual bits on the wire for the power-sector protocol families TC 57 maintains (IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5 and related), and does not by itself secure a device, a network architecture, or an organization's processes the way IEC 62443 or CIP-013 do. A power utility's full security posture typically draws on all three: CIP-013 or 62443-2-x for program/process, 62443-3-x/4-x for system and component requirements, and IEC 62351 for the protocol-level cryptography layered onto SCADA and substation traffic itself.
Sources
- IEC: IEC 62351:2026 SER — Power systems management and associated information exchange — Data and communications security — ALL PARTS (bundled catalogue record listing all 20 published parts with edition/year)
- IEC: IEC TS 62351-1:2007 — Part 1: Communication network and system security — Introduction to security issues (catalogue record and scope, Edition 1.0, 35 pages, stability date 2026)
- IEC: IEC 62351-3:2023 — Part 3: Communication network and system security — Profiles including TCP/IP (catalogue record and scope, Edition 2.0, published 2023-06-06)
- IEC: IEC 62351-5:2023 — Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives (catalogue record and scope, Edition 1.0, published 2023-01-13, cancels and replaces the 2013 Technical Specification)
- IEC: IEC 62351-6:2020 — Part 6: Security for IEC 61850 (catalogue record and scope, Edition 1.0, published 2020-10-20, 33 pages, TC 57)
- IEC: IEC 62351-8:2020 — Part 8: Role-based access control for power system management (catalogue record and scope, Edition 1.0, published 2020-04-28, TC 57)
- IEC: IEC 62351-9:2023 — Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment (catalogue record and scope, Edition 2.0, 296 pages, supersedes the 2017 edition)
- IETF RFC 6407: The Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)
- IEC: IEC 62351-8:2026 — Part 8: Role-based access control for power system management (Edition 2.0, published 2026-07-22, cancels and replaces the 2020 edition)
- IEC: IEC 62351-4:2018+AMD1:2020 CSV — Part 4: Profiles including MMS and derivatives (Edition 1.1)
- IEC: IEC 62351-7:2025 — Part 7: Network and System Management (NSM) data object models (Edition 2.0)
- IEC 62351-3:2023 publisher preview (foreword change list, scope, contents)
- IEC 62351-5:2023 publisher preview (foreword change list, scope, Table 1 protocols)
- IEC 62351-6:2020 publisher preview (clause 4.1 operational issues, contents)
- SIST EN IEC 62351-8:2020 preview (access token profiles A–D)
- IEC 62351-9:2023 publisher preview (SCEP / EST enrolment, CRL / OCSP, GDOI contents)
- IETF RFC 8052: Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) Protocol Support for IEC 62351 Security Services (June 2017)
- IEEE 1815-2012 (DNP3) standard record: status Inactive-Reserved
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