NERC CIP-015-1, "Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring," is the Bulk Electric System's first mandatory Reliability Standard requiring utilities to monitor network activity inside their Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) — not just at the perimeter. Per its own Purpose clause, it exists "to improve the probability of detecting anomalous or unauthorized network activity in order to facilitate improved response and recovery from an attack." Older CIP standards such as CIP-005 focus on controlling what crosses the ESP boundary (north-south traffic); CIP-015-1 instead targets east-west traffic between systems that are already inside that boundary, on the premise that a sufficiently capable adversary will eventually get past the perimeter and the next line of defense needs to be internal visibility.
Key takeaways
- CIP-015-1 traces to FERC Order No.
- Source: NERC CIP-015-1 standard text, read 2026-11-12.
- systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R.
- CIP-015-1's effective-date formula (first day of the first calendar quarter 36 months after the FERC order's effective date) resolves to 1 October 2028, the date NERC's CIP-015-1 page lists.
Where did CIP-015 come from?
CIP-015-1 traces to FERC Order No. 887, issued 19 January 2023 and published at 88 FR 8354 (182 FERC ¶ 61,021). It directed NERC to develop internal network security monitoring (INSM) requirements for all high impact BES Cyber Systems, with or without External Routable Connectivity (ERC), and medium impact BES Cyber Systems with ERC. FERC's finding was that "the lack of INSM requirements in the currently effective CIP Reliability Standards constitutes a security gap", and it set three objectives: baselining normal network traffic inside the "CIP-networked environment", monitoring for and detecting unauthorized activity, connections, devices and software, and identifying anomalous activity once an adversary is already past the ESP boundary. NERC's Project 2023-03 standard drafting team produced CIP-015-1, which the NERC Board of Trustees adopted on 9 May 2024. FERC approved it via Order No. 907 on 26 June 2025 (Docket No. RM24-7-000, 90 FR 28889, 191 FERC ¶ 61,224), with the order's effective date set at 2 September 2025.
What do the three requirements say, in NERC's own words?
CIP-015-1 is short — three requirements — but each is specific about what a Responsible Entity must document and implement:
| Req. | VRF | What it requires |
|---|---|---|
| R1 | Medium | Implement documented process(es) for internal network security monitoring of networks protected by the entity's ESP(s) for high impact BES Cyber Systems and medium impact BES Cyber Systems with ERC, covering three parts: 1.1 network data feed(s) selected using "a risk-based rationale"; 1.2 method(s) to detect anomalous network activity from those feeds; 1.3 method(s) to evaluate detected anomalies and determine further action |
| R2 | Lower | Retain internal network security monitoring data associated with network activity determined to be anomalous, at minimum until the R1 Part 1.3 action is complete (except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances) |
| R3 | Lower | Protect the data collected under R1 and retained under R2 against the risk of unauthorized deletion or modification (except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances) |
Source: NERC CIP-015-1 standard text, read 2026-11-12.
A quiet but deliberate design choice sits in R2's own note: the Responsible Entity is "not required to retain internal network security monitoring data that is not relevant to anomalous network activity" — the retention duty attaches only to data tied to something flagged as anomalous under R1, not to all collected network data indefinitely. Separately, the standard's compliance section says each Responsible Entity "shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years."
What network activity is out of scope?
CIP-015-2 puts the boundary in a note under R1: network activity "to or from non-CIP devices", activity "to or from low impact BES Cyber Systems (BCS)", and activity "between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters" are "all out of scope." The applicability section adds exemptions for:
- Cyber Systems at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission;
- communication networks and data links between discrete ESPs, and between the Cyber Systems that protect an ESP extending across locations;
- systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. 73.54;
- entities that identify no high impact, or medium impact with ERC, BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002.
That last point is why the CIP-002 categorization guide is the first document to check: categorization decides whether CIP-015 applies at all.
Who must comply?
CIP-015-1 applies to the same functional entity types covered by the CIP suite generally — Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operators and Owners, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners — but only where a Facility has a high impact BES Cyber System, or a medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity, as categorized under CIP-002. A FERC information-collection notice of October 2026 estimates that 360 of about 1,706 US entities registered for CIP standards will carry added paperwork under CIP-015-2.
When do the CIP-015 compliance dates fall?
NERC's Implementation Plan for Project 2023-03 sets a two-phase schedule for CIP-015-1:
Control Centers and backup Control Centerswith applicable high or medium impact (ERC) BES Cyber Systems must comply upon CIP-015-1's own effective date — the Implementation Plan reasons this priority reflects "the increased reliability risk posed by high impact BES Cyber Systems, Control Centers, and backup Control Centers." All other applicable medium impact BES Cyber Systems with ERC(outside Control Centers) get a further 24 calendar months after that effective date, acknowledging "the limited pool of vendors" for INSM tooling and the added complexity of bringing widely dispersed generation and substation assets into scope.
CIP-015-1's effective-date formula (first day of the first calendar quarter 36 months after the FERC order's effective date) resolves to 1 October 2028, the date NERC's CIP-015-1 page lists. The same page lists an inactive date of 30 September 2029, because CIP-015-2 replaces it the next day. The CIP-015-2 implementation plan makes CIP-015-2 effective on the later of 12 months after CIP-015-1's effective date or the first quarter-day 12 months after FERC's approval order took effect, and then phases the new scope in:
| Date | Standard in effect | What must be monitored |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Oct 2028 | CIP-015-1 | High and medium impact (ERC) BCS and their PCA at Control Centers and backup Control Centers |
| 1 Oct 2029 | CIP-015-2 (Phase 1) | Adds EACMS and PACS associated with those Control Center systems, and the Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) supporting them |
| 1 Oct 2030 | CIP-015-2 (Phase 2a) | Medium impact BCS with ERC, their PCA and supporting SCI at all other assets — the original CIP-015-1 24-month date, carried forward |
| 1 Oct 2031 | CIP-015-2 (Phase 2b) | EACMS, PACS and SCI associated with those non-Control Center medium impact systems |
Sources: NERC CIP-015-1 and CIP-015-2 standard pages (effective dates) and the CIP-015-2 implementation plan (12- and 24-month phase offsets), read 2026-11-12. The 2030 and 2031 dates apply those offsets to the 1 October 2029 effective date.
What did CIP-015-2 change, and is it approved?
In Order No. 907, FERC found CIP-015-1 "not fully responsive" to Order No. 887 because it excludes Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) located outside the ESP, which present "potential avenues for attackers to infiltrate BES Cyber Systems." FERC directed a fix within 12 months, and its Order No. 907-A of 21 August 2025 limited the "CIP-networked environment" to communications among BES Cyber Systems, EACMS, PACS and Protected Cyber Assets (excluding PACS-to-non-PACS-controller traffic).
NERC's Board adopted CIP-015-2 on 17 June 2026 and filed it the next day; FERC issued its order on 10 August 2026 in Docket No. RD26-6-000, according to NERC's CIP-015-2 page and a Federal Register notice of 13 October 2026 that describes "the changes implemented through Order RD26-6-000."
| Element | CIP-015-1 | CIP-015-2 |
|---|---|---|
| Systems monitored | Networks inside the ESP of high and medium (ERC) BCS | Activity between BCS and their associated EACMS, PACS and PCA, plus supporting SCI |
| Requirements | R1 (Parts 1.1–1.3), R2, R3 | Same three requirements, wording carried over |
| Effective | 1 Oct 2028 | 1 Oct 2029, retiring CIP-015-1 |
What evidence will an auditor ask for?
The Measures in the standard list example evidence, which is a practical checklist for an audit file:
| Part | Example evidence named in the standard |
|---|---|
| R1.1 | Documentation of network data feeds, with "a documented risk-based rationale that describes how network data feed(s) were selected" |
| R1.2 | Records of anomalous network detection events; INSM system configuration settings; the network communication baseline used for detection; or other detection methods |
| R1.3 | Evaluation methods; actions taken on detected anomalies; or escalation processes "that could include CIP-008 Cyber Security Incident response plan(s)" |
| R2 | Retention processes, system configurations or system-generated reports showing retention long enough to finish the Part 1.3 action |
| R3 | Documentation of how INSM data is protected from unauthorized deletion or modification |
The R1.3 escalation path links straight to the CIP-008 incident response guide, and sensor placement usually follows the zones in the Purdue model guide.
How do the dates work out for one entity?
Worked example — a synthetic entity, for illustration only. A Transmission Owner has one primary Control Center (high impact), one backup Control Center, and six substations with medium impact BES Cyber Systems with ERC.
- By 1 October 2028, INSM under CIP-015-1 covers the networks inside the ESPs at the primary and backup Control Centers.
- By 1 October 2029, under CIP-015-2, monitoring at both Control Centers extends to the EACMS and PACS associated with those systems and to the Shared Cyber Infrastructure supporting them.
- By 1 October 2030, the six substations' medium impact BCS, their PCA and supporting SCI come into scope.
- By 1 October 2031, the substations' associated EACMS and PACS follow.
- A re-categorization under CIP-002 that turns a substation's ERC off, or adds one, changes which line of the table applies, so the categorization record and the INSM plan should be reviewed together.
What is a workable starting point?
Build the risk-based rationale for Part 1.1's data feed selection earlyThe CIP-015-2 plan cites "a relatively small vendor marketplace" and outages that sensor installs "could require" as reasons for the phased dates — early vendor selection and network-tap planning avoids a late scramble. Separate "collect" from "retain" in your designR1's data feeds can be broad, but R2's retention duty attaches only to data tied to activity actually determined anomalous under Part 1.2 — building a pipeline that distinguishes the two from the start avoids over-retaining raw network capture that CIP-015-1 never required you to keep. Treat R3's data-integrity protection as a forensic-chain-of-custody requirement, not just storage security — the standard's own language ties it explicitly to "unauthorized deletion or modification," the same concern that drives evidence handling in incident response generally. Track CIP-002 categorization changes against the compliance clockA Facility's Control Center status or ERC determination decides which date applies to it. Design sensor placement for the CIP-015-2 scope from the startEACMS, PACS and SCI follow 12 months after each BCS date, so a design that only fits inside the ESP will need rework within a year.
What are the common CIP-015 planning pitfalls?
- Planning against CIP-015-1 alone. It is inactive from 30 September 2029; the plan that matters through 2031 is CIP-015-2's.
- Keeping every packet. R2 does not ask for it, and R3 then has to protect all of it.
- No written rationale for feed choices. Part 1.1's evidence is the rationale, not just a sensor list.
- Detection with no evaluation path. Part 1.3 needs a defined next step, often a CIP-008 escalation.
- Monitoring between ESPs. That traffic is out of scope, and CIP-005 governs what crosses the ESP boundary.
What should OT device makers expect from utilities?
Utilities building INSM will ask suppliers which protocols, ports and peers a device uses in normal operation, because that is the baseline Part 1.2 detects against; the CIP-007 guide covers the related ports-and-services duty. A short, accurate communication profile per product saves both sides time.
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot helps with that groundwork, not with CIP-015 compliance itself. From Zeek logs of a capture you supply (conn.log plus Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP and BACnet logs), it lists hosts, protocols and roles and flags SSH, Telnet, RDP and VNC sessions, in an AI-drafted, cited report an engineer reviews. It is a point-in-time snapshot: it does not monitor continuously, detect anomalies or retain INSM data.
This guide quotes NERC's published text of CIP-015-1 and CIP-015-2, their implementation plans and standard pages, and the Federal Register texts of FERC Orders No. 887 and 907 and the October 2026 FERC-725B notice, read 2026-11-12. It is not a substitute for the full standards or for compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NERC CIP-015-1, and why does it exist?
CIP-015-1, "Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring," is a mandatory NERC Reliability Standard whose Purpose clause states it exists "to improve the probability of detecting anomalous or unauthorized network activity in order to facilitate improved response and recovery from an attack." It is the Bulk Electric System's first CIP standard to require internal (east-west) network monitoring inside an Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP), rather than only perimeter-facing (north-south) controls. NERC developed it in response to a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directive, Order No. 887 (19 January 2023, 182 FERC ¶ 61,021), which found that existing CIP standards left "a security gap" once an adversary got past the perimeter, since nothing required monitoring of what happened to network traffic after that point.
What do CIP-015-1's three requirements actually say?
Per NERC's published standard text: Requirement R1 (Violation Risk Factor: Medium) requires each Responsible Entity to implement documented process(es) for internal network security monitoring of networks protected by its Electronic Security Perimeter(s) covering high impact BES Cyber Systems and medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity (ERC), broken into three parts: Part 1.1, implement — "using a risk-based rationale" — network data feed(s) to monitor network activity including connections, devices and network communications; Part 1.2, implement method(s) to detect anomalous network activity from those feeds; and Part 1.3, implement method(s) to evaluate detected anomalous activity to determine further action. Requirement R2 (VRF: Lower) requires retaining internal network security monitoring data associated with activity determined anomalous, at minimum until the Part 1.3 action is complete — data that turns out not to be anomalous does not have to be retained. Requirement R3 (VRF: Lower) requires protecting both the data collected under R1 and the data retained under R2 against the risk of unauthorized deletion or modification. Both R2 and R3 apply except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances.
Who must comply, and when?
CIP-015-1 applies to the same Responsible Entity types as other CIP standards — Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operators and Owners, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners — but only for Facilities with high impact BES Cyber Systems or medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity; entities with no such systems (per CIP-002's categorization) are exempt, along with Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission- and NRC-regulated Cyber Systems and a few ESP-to-ESP communication-link exemptions. NERC's Implementation Plan (Project 2023-03) sets a two-phase compliance schedule keyed to CIP-015-1's own effective date: Control Centers and backup Control Centers with applicable BES Cyber Systems must comply immediately on that effective date, while other medium impact BES Cyber Systems with ERC (outside Control Centers) get 24 additional calendar months. FERC approved CIP-015-1 via Order No. 907 on 26 June 2025 (Docket No. RM24-7-000, 90 FR 28889, 191 FERC ¶ 61,224), with the order itself effective 2 September 2025; per the Implementation Plan's 36-months-after-FERC-approval formula, that puts the Control Center compliance date at 1 October 2028 and the remaining-assets date at 1 October 2030.
Is CIP-015-1 already being superseded?
It is being replaced by an expanded version, CIP-015-2, that keeps CIP-015-1's requirements. In the same Order No. 907, FERC found CIP-015-1 "not fully responsive" to its original Order No. 887 directive because it excludes Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) located outside the ESP, leaving what FERC called a reliability gap — and directed NERC to submit a fix within 12 months. FERC also issued a clarifying Order No. 907-A on 21 August 2025 scoping the "CIP-networked environment" to communications between BES Cyber Systems, EACMS, PACS and Protected Cyber Assets. NERC's Project 2025-02 produced the result, CIP-015-2, which carries forward CIP-015-1's Control Center / non-Control-Center phased structure for the original BCS scope while adding new EACMS/PACS/Shared Cyber Infrastructure monitoring on a 12-month offset from each corresponding CIP-015-1 date. FERC issued its order on CIP-015-2 on 10 August 2026 (Docket No. RD26-6-000); NERC lists CIP-015-2 as effective 1 October 2029, with CIP-015-1 governing the 1 October 2028 Control Center date until it goes inactive on 30 September 2029.
Sources
- NERC: CIP-015-1 — Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring (full standard text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R3 with Measures, Compliance, Violation Severity Levels, Version History)
- NERC: Implementation Plan — Project 2023-03 Internal Network Security Monitoring (CIP-015-1 effective date formula and the Control Center / 24-month phased compliance dates)
- Federal Register: Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard CIP-015-1 (FERC Order No. 907, Docket No. RM24-7-000, 90 FR 28889, approved 2025-06-26, published 2025-07-02)
- NERC: Implementation Plan — Project 2025-02 Internal Network Security Monitoring (CIP-015-2; background on FERC Order No. 907 and Order No. 907-A, and the carried-forward CIP-015-1 phased dates)
- NERC: CIP-015-2 — Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring (standard text, adds EACMS, PACS and SCI)
- NERC: CIP-015-2 standard page (board adoption 17 June 2026, filing 18 June 2026, FERC order 10 August 2026, effective 1 October 2029)
- NERC: CIP-015-1 standard page (effective 1 October 2028, inactive 30 September 2029)
- NERC: Implementation Plan — Project 2025-02 (CIP-015-2, February 2026, Phase 1 / 2a / 2b compliance dates)
- Federal Register: FERC Order No. 887, Internal Network Security Monitoring for High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems (88 FR 8354, 9 February 2023)
- Federal Register: FERC-725B information collection, update to CIP-015-2 (91 FR 64921, 13 October 2026, Docket No. RD26-6-000)
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