Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

NERC CIP-006: physical security for BES cyber systems, explained

Last updated:

NERC CIP-006-6, "Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems," is the mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard requiring utilities and grid operators to document a Physical Security Plan covering ten requirement parts, retain physical-access and visitor logs for at least ninety calendar days, and retain compliance evidence for three calendar years — the counterpart to CIP-005's electronic access controls. Per its own Purpose clause it exists "to manage physical access to Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems... against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability." CIP-006-6 was approved by FERC on 21 January 2016 (Order No. 822) and became effective 1 July 2016; it remains the enforceable version today, even though a virtualization-focused successor, CIP-006-7.1, is already FERC-approved for a 2028 compliance date (see below).

Key takeaways

  • Part 1.10 traces to a FERC directive and a NERC-petitioned interpretation (Docket No.
  • The difference decides which requirement parts a device falls under.
  • Part 1.10 responds to FERC Order No.
  • Part 2.1 — "Require continuous escorted access of visitors ...

Who must comply?

CIP-006 applies to Balancing Authorities, Distribution Providers that own certain load-shedding, special protection, under-voltage/under-frequency load-shedding, or Transmission Protection Systems, Generator Operators and Owners, Interchange Coordinators/Authorities, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners. The substantive obligations attach to High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems — categorized under the separate CIP-002 process — plus their associated Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and, for several parts, Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Protected Cyber Assets (PCA). Exemption 4.2.3.5 of CIP-006-6 excludes entities with no high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems. Physical security for low impact assets sits in CIP-003 instead: Attachment 1 Section 2 of CIP-003-9 requires entities to "control physical access, based on need as determined by the Responsible Entity," to the asset or the locations of its low impact BES Cyber Systems.

What does R1's Physical Security Plan require in its ten parts?

Requirement R1 requires "one or more documented physical security plan(s) that collectively include all of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-006-6 Table R1 — Physical Security Plan." The ten parts scale obligations by impact rating and connectivity:

Part Requirement (quoted from the standard) Applies to
1.1 Define operational or procedural controls to restrict physical access Medium Impact systems without External Routable Connectivity; PACS associated with High Impact systems or Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity
1.2 "Utilize at least one physical access control to allow unescorted physical access ... to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access" Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity, and associated EACMS/PCA
1.3 "Where technically feasible, utilize two or more different physical access controls ... to collectively allow unescorted physical access ... to only those individuals who have authorized" access High Impact systems and associated components
1.4 Monitor for unauthorized access through a physical access point into a Physical Security Perimeter High and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity
1.5 Issue an alarm or alert in response to detected unauthorized physical access "within 15 minutes of detection," to identified incident response personnel Same scope as 1.4
1.6 Monitor each Physical Access Control System for unauthorized physical access to the PACS itself High Impact and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity
1.7 Issue an alarm or alert for unauthorized PACS access "within 15 minutes," to identified personnel Same scope as 1.6
1.8 Log entry of each individual with authorized unescorted physical access into each Physical Security Perimeter, identifying the individual and date/time of entry High Impact systems and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity, with associated EACMS/PCA
1.9 "Retain physical access logs of entry ... for at least ninety calendar days" Same scope as 1.8
1.10 Restrict physical access to cabling and other nonprogrammable communication components between Cyber Assets in the same Electronic Security Perimeter where they run outside a Physical Security Perimeter; otherwise document and implement encryption, link monitoring with a 15-minute alarm, or "an equally effective logical protection" High Impact systems and Medium Impact systems at Control Centers, with associated PCA

Part 1.10 traces to a FERC directive and a NERC-petitioned interpretation (Docket No. RD10-13-000) that identified encryption and circuit monitoring as acceptable alternatives when physical cable protection isn't feasible — entities should not assume cabling restriction is the only compliant option.

What counts as a PACS, and what is "locally mounted hardware"?

The difference decides which requirement parts a device falls under. CIP-006-6 defines "locally mounted hardware or devices" at a Physical Security Perimeter as items such as "motion sensors, electronic lock control mechanisms, and badge readers" that do "not contain or store access control information or independently perform access authentication." Those are excluded from the PACS definition. A controller or server that holds the credential database or makes the access decision is a PACS; CIP-002-5.1a gives "authentication servers, card systems, and badge control systems" as examples.

  • PACS fall under Parts 1.1, 1.6 and 1.7 (restricted access to the PACS itself, monitoring and 15-minute alarms) and the R3 test cycle. The Guidelines add that a PACS placed inside the PSP it controls carries "no additional obligation" for Parts 1.1, 1.6 and 1.7 beyond the PSP's own controls.
  • Locally mounted hardware falls under R3 only: readers, lock mechanisms and sensors are tested every 24 calendar months with the PACS.
  • Two controls at one door can satisfy Part 1.3. The Guidelines, citing FERC Order No. 706 paragraph 572, accept "a combination of card key and pin code" on a single perimeter, run on one PACS "but more than one authentication method must be utilized." A locked gate plus a locked building works only if "no single authenticator (e.g., key or card key) would provide access through both."

What does Part 1.10 mean for cabling outside the PSP?

Part 1.10 responds to FERC Order No. 791, paragraph 150. It covers only the stretch of cable and nonprogrammable components that is inside an Electronic Security Perimeter but outside a Physical Security Perimeter, typically at a control center whose ESP spans two rooms or buildings. The Guidelines list the components in scope: "unmanaged switches, hubs, patch panels, media converters, port savers, and couplers" — parts that would be BES Cyber Assets or PCA if they were programmable.

Physical options named in the Guidelines include conduit, secured cable trays, armored cabling and optical ground wire (OPGW), protecting "the entire length of the cabling including any termination points" protected. An entity that chooses a logical option "is under no obligation to justify or explain why it chose logical protections over physical protections," but an "equally effective logical protection" has to be documented as such. The intent "is not to require physical protection of third party components," consistent with Order 791-A, when an entity relies on leased communications and protects them with encryption.

For product teams, a link-supervision alarm that reaches responders within 15 minutes, or encryption of inter-building traffic, becomes compliance evidence.

R2: the Visitor Control Program

Requirement R2 requires a documented visitor control program with three parts, scoped to High and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity:

  • Part 2.1 — "Require continuous escorted access of visitors ... within each Physical Security Perimeter, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances."
  • Part 2.2 — "Require manual or automated logging of visitor entry into and exit from the Physical Security Perimeter that includes date and time of the initial entry and last exit, the visitor's name, and the name of an individual point of contact," except during Exceptional Circumstances.
  • Part 2.3 — "Retain visitor logs for at least ninety calendar days."

R3: PACS maintenance and testing

Requirement R3 requires "maintenance and testing of each Physical Access Control System and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar months to ensure they function properly," for High Impact systems and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity. This is a recurring functional-test cycle, not a retention window: a badge reader that logs correctly but has gone untested for over two years is an R3 gap.

Evidence retention: three calendar years

Per CIP-006-6's Compliance section, "the applicable entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years" — the same retention period used across the CIP suite (see CIP-010 and CIP-011). This window is separate from, and longer than, the 90-day retention that Parts 1.9 and 2.3 require for the access and visitor logs themselves, so entities need a process that turns 90-day logs into evidence lasting three years.

CIP-006-7.1 is already approved — the 2028 compliance clock is running

CIP-006-6 is the standard enforced today, but a successor is already locked in. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), approving 11 modified CIP Reliability Standards together as part of NERC's Project 2016-02 virtualization package — published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 at 91 FR 13957, naming "CIP-006-7.1 (Cyber Security—Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems)" among them. The order itself states "this final action is effective May 26, 2026."

Per NERC's implementation plan, the revised standards take effect on the later of 1 April 2026 or "the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after" the order's effective date. NERC's own July 2026 Standards, Compliance, and Enforcement Bulletin confirms the resulting literal date, listing "CIP-006-7.1 – Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems" among standards for which "the revised standards will become effective July 1, 2028." The package's driver is virtualization: four new NERC Glossary terms (Cyber System, Management Interface, Shared Cyber Infrastructure, Virtual Cyber Asset) and revised existing ones. The CIP-006-7.1 text itself shows that some obligations move or change wording:

Item CIP-006-6 CIP-006-7.1
Table R1 Ten parts, 1.1-1.10 Nine parts, 1.1-1.9
Cabling outside the PSP Part 1.10 Moved to CIP-005-8 Part 1.6: confidentiality and integrity controls, or physical controls on the cabling
Part 1.6 exclusions None Real-time Assessment and monitoring data between Control Centers subject to CIP-012, and "time-sensitive communication of Protection Systems"
Part 1.3 qualifier "Where technically feasible" "per system capability"
Applicable Systems BCS, EACMS, PCA, PACS Adds "SCI supporting an Applicable System" to each row
Visitor control exception CIP Exceptional Circumstances in Parts 2.1 and 2.2 Moved to the R2 requirement text
Functional entities Includes Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority That entry is absent from Section 4.1

The "per system capability" change has a condition attached. Order No. 919 directs NERC to develop criteria for invoking the exception, mandatory reporting to the ERO Enterprise when entities use it, and an annual report to FERC. NERC's petition, quoted in the order, gives "a firmware-based 'black box' device with limited configuration capabilities" as the kind of system the phrase is meant for.

What do utilities ask PACS and device vendors for?

Much of the CIP-006 evidence comes out of vendor products. CIP-013-2 also names PACS: its R1 supply chain plan covers "high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)," including vendor disclosure of known vulnerabilities and verification of "software integrity and authenticity of all software and patches." See CIP-013.

CIP provision Product feature that makes it easy Evidence the utility keeps
Parts 1.4, 1.5 Door-forced and door-held alarms, forwarded to a monitored console Alarm and notification logs with timestamps
Parts 1.6, 1.7 Tamper switch on the controller enclosure Tamper alarm records
Parts 1.8, 1.9 and 2.2, 2.3 Exportable entry and visitor logs, stored at least 90 days Exported logs, retention setting
R3 Part 3.1 Test mode and a per-device test report Dated test records every 24 calendar months
CIP-005-8 Part 1.6 Link-loss alarm or encryption on inter-building links Configuration showing encryption or alarm path
CIP-013-2 Parts 1.2.4, 1.2.5 Published advisories, signed firmware or hashes Vendor notices, verification records

Worked example: one substation control house

Synthetic example, for illustration only. A Transmission Owner's 345 kV substation is categorized medium impact under CIP-002, and its relays are reachable over routable protocols from the control center, so the BES Cyber Systems have External Routable Connectivity.

  1. The control house is the PSP. Part 1.2 needs at least one physical access control: a badge reader on the door, decided by a PACS controller in the yard cabinet.
  2. Parts 1.4 and 1.5 need a door-forced alarm reaching the incident response contacts within 15 minutes, proven by a timed door event.
  3. Because the PACS controller sits outside the PSP, Parts 1.6 and 1.7 need their own controls: a tamper switch on the cabinet alarms the same way.
  4. Visitors, such as a relay vendor's field engineer, are escorted continuously and logged with first entry, last exit and a point of contact.
  5. Every 24 calendar months the reader, lock, door contact and controller are tested and the results dated.
  6. Part 1.10 does not apply: it covers High Impact systems and Medium Impact systems at Control Centers only.

A workable starting point

  1. Match access control strength to impact rating before anything elseA single physical access control (Part 1.2) is sufficient for Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity, but High Impact systems need two or more different controls (Part 1.3) — confirm impact categorization under CIP-002 first, since it drives which Part 1 sub-requirements apply.
  2. Treat the 15-minute alarm window as a hard operational SLA, not a logging nicetyParts 1.5 and 1.7 require alerting "within 15 minutes of detection" to identified incident response personnel — this needs a tested notification path, not just a system capable of generating an alert.
  3. Don't confuse the 90-day log retention with the three-year evidence retentionR1 Part 1.9 and R2 Part 2.3 only require keeping the raw access/visitor logs for 90 days; the Compliance section separately requires evidence of each requirement for three calendar years — build a process that captures compliance evidence before the 90-day logs age out.
  4. Schedule PACS functional testing on a 24-month calendar, separate from access reviewsR3's test-and-maintain cycle is about hardware functioning correctly, not about who has access — a badge system with clean logs can still fail an R3 audit if it hasn't been tested in over two years.
  5. Plan the 2028 move nowMap each Part 1.10 control to CIP-005-8 Part 1.6, and evaluate the Shared Cyber Infrastructure and Virtual Cyber Asset terms before virtualizing access-control or monitoring servers.

SoftWSP does not produce CIP-006 evidence such as access or visitor logs. For vendors of PACS controllers, relays and RTUs, a firmware security analysis extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image and matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CSAF advisories, with an AI-drafted, cited report reviewed by an engineer, which supports the vulnerability disclosures CIP-013-2 asks of vendors. For a utility, a passive OT Snapshot inventories the hosts and ports seen in a mirror-port capture, including any PACS controllers on the network.

This guide quotes NERC's own published text of CIP-006-6 and the Federal Register text of FERC Order Nos. 822 and 919; it is not a substitute for the full standard, NERC's Implementation Plan, or compliance/legal advice. CIP-006-6 remains the enforceable standard as of this guide's publication — CIP-006-7.1 is approved and becomes mandatory at a later effective date.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is NERC CIP-006-6, and who must comply?

CIP-006, "Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems," is the mandatory, FERC-approved NERC Reliability Standard that governs how utilities and grid operators control physical access to BES Cyber Systems. Per its own Purpose clause, it exists "to manage physical access to Bulk Electric System (BES) Cyber Systems by specifying a physical security plan in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)." The currently enforceable version, CIP-006-6, was approved by FERC on 21 January 2016 in Order No. 822 (Docket No. RM15-14-000), published in the Federal Register at 81 FR 4177, and became effective and enforceable on 1 July 2016. It applies to Balancing Authorities, Distribution Providers meeting specific ownership criteria, Generator Operators and Owners, Interchange Coordinators/Authorities, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners, for High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems categorized under the separate [CIP-002](/guides/nerc-cip-002-bes-cyber-system-categorization/) process, plus their associated Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and, for some parts, Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS).

What does Requirement R1's Physical Security Plan actually require?

R1 requires one or more documented physical security plans covering ten parts (CIP-006-6 Table R1). Key obligations, quoted from the standard's own requirement table: Part 1.2 requires entities to "utilize at least one physical access control to allow unescorted physical access ... to only those individuals who have authorized unescorted physical access" for Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity; Part 1.3 raises that to "two or more different physical access controls" for High Impact systems; Parts 1.4/1.5 require monitoring for unauthorized access through a physical access point and issuing an alarm or alert "within 15 minutes of detection"; Parts 1.6/1.7 require the same monitoring and 15-minute alerting for unauthorized access to the Physical Access Control System itself; Parts 1.8/1.9 require logging each authorized individual's entry (identity, date, time) and retaining those logs "for at least ninety calendar days"; and Part 1.10 requires restricting physical access to cabling and other nonprogrammable communication components, or — where that restriction isn't implemented — documenting and implementing an alternative such as encryption or alarmed monitoring.

What do Requirement R2 (Visitor Control) and R3 (PACS Maintenance) require?

R2 requires a visitor control program with three parts: Part 2.1 requires "continuous escorted access of visitors ... within each Physical Security Perimeter, except during CIP Exceptional Circumstances" for High and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity; Part 2.2 requires manual or automated logging of visitor entry and exit, including "date and time of the initial entry and last exit, the visitor's name, and the name of an individual point of contact"; and Part 2.3 requires retaining those visitor logs "for at least ninety calendar days." R3 requires "maintenance and testing of each Physical Access Control System and locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar months to ensure they function properly," for High Impact systems and Medium Impact systems with External Routable Connectivity. Per the Compliance section, evidence for all three requirements must be retained "for three calendar years."

Is CIP-006-6 already being replaced, and by when do entities need to comply?

Yes — a successor, CIP-006-7.1, is already FERC-approved, though CIP-006-6 remains the enforceable standard today. On 19 March 2026 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), published in the Federal Register on 24 March 2026 at 91 FR 13957, approving 11 modified CIP Reliability Standards as part of NERC's Project 2016-02 virtualization package — explicitly naming "CIP-006-7.1 (Cyber Security—Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems)" alongside CIP-002-7, CIP-003-10, CIP-004-8, CIP-005-8, CIP-007-7.1, CIP-008-7.1, CIP-009-7.1, CIP-010-5, CIP-011-4.1 and CIP-013-3. The order's own text states the final action "is effective May 26, 2026." NERC's own July 2026 Standards, Compliance, and Enforcement Bulletin confirms the resulting literal date, listing "CIP-006-7.1 – Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems" among standards for which "the revised standards will become effective July 1, 2028."

Sources

  1. NERC: CIP-006-6 — Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems (currently effective standard, full text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R3 with Tables, Compliance, Evidence Retention)
  2. NERCipedia: CIP-006-6 — Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems (standard summary, secondary corroboration of Purpose, Requirements and retention text)
  3. Federal Register: Order No. 822; Revised Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, 81 FR 4177 (FERC, Docket No. RM15-14-000, issued 2016-01-21, published 2016-01-26) — approves CIP-006-6 among seven CIP v5 standards
  4. Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards, 91 FR 13957 (FERC, Docket No. RM24-8-000, issued 2026-03-19, published 2026-03-24, effective 2026-05-26) — lists CIP-006-7.1 among the 11 approved standards
  5. NERC: Standards, Compliance, and Enforcement Bulletin, 6-12 July 2026 — confirms CIP-006-7.1 becomes effective 1 July 2028
  6. NERC: CIP-006-7.1 — Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems (FERC-approved virtualization revision, Tables R1-R3)
  7. NERC: CIP-005-8 — Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) (Part 1.6, communication links spanning a single ESP between PSPs)
  8. NERC: CIP-013-2 — Cyber Security – Supply Chain Risk Management (R1 covers associated PACS)
  9. NERC: CIP-003-9 — Cyber Security – Security Management Controls (Attachment 1 Section 2, low impact physical security)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster