Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

Phoenix Contact PLCnext Control and classic ILC/AXC controller security: CVEs, ports and hardening

Last updated:

Phoenix Contact controllers come in two security generations: the classic line (ILC, AXC 1050/3050, RFC 4xx) programmed with PC Worx, whose management protocol on TCP port 1962 has had no authentication by design since Phoenix Contact first published CVE-2019-9201 in June 2019, and PLCnext Control, a Linux-based runtime with user management, a firewall and a Web-based Management (WBM). Securing them means keeping classic controllers in closed, firewalled zones with unused ports switched off, and keeping PLCnext firmware at or above the fixed versions in Phoenix Contact PSIRT and CERT@VDE advisories, with authentication and the firewall on.

Key takeaways

  • Phoenix Contact sells two controller families that look similar on a DIN rail but behave differently on the network.
  • PC Worx has no authentication because Phoenix Contact designed the classic line for closed industrial networks, a point the vendor repeats in its classic-line advisories since 2019.
  • The controller CVEs split into design-level weaknesses in the classic line and fixable bugs in PLCnext firmware.
  • A firmware inventory needs the article number and firmware version for every controller, because Phoenix Contact advisories list affected products by both.

What are PLCnext Control and the classic ILC/AXC line?

Phoenix Contact sells two controller families that look similar on a DIN rail but behave differently on the network. Phoenix Contact's application note 110637 defines the classic line as controllers "based on classic control technology in accordance with IEC 61131": ILC 1xx, AXC 1050 (XC), AXC 3050, RFC 4xx, FC 350 PCI ETH, PC WORX SRT and PC WORX RT BASIC. It states plainly that "device management and configuration for these devices are executed without authentication." These controllers are engineered with PC Worx or PC Worx Express, part of the Automation Worx Software Suite.

PLCnext Control is the newer platform: AXC F 1152, 1252, 2152 and 3152, RFC 4072S and 4072R, the EPC and BPC edge controllers and Virtual PLCnext Control, programmed with PLCnext Engineer. It runs Linux with nftables, OpenVPN, strongSwan and SSH, and its security settings live in the WBM. CODESYS also sells a separate runtime for this hardware, Control for PLCnext SL, which is patched by CODESYS rather than Phoenix Contact. CODESYS Advisory 2019-08, for example, lists CODESYS Control for PLCnext before 3.5.16.0 as affected by the weak credential protection in CVE-2019-9013, although NVD's CPE list for that CVE leaves the product out. See the CODESYS runtime guide for that path.

Property Classic line (ILC, AXC 1050/3050, RFC 4xx) PLCnext Control (AXC F x152/1252, RFC 4072x, vPLCnext)
Engineering tool PC Worx / PC Worx Express PLCnext Engineer
Authentication on engineering protocol None by design (CVE-2019-9201) User authentication, on by default
Engineering port TCP 1962; 41100 for OPC and debug mode TCP 41100 (remoting)
Logic integrity check None by design (CVE-2022-31800) Integrity check present; bypass shown in CVE-2023-46144
Firewall None on the controller nftables; off by default on first generation, on by default on secure-by-default devices
Fix path for protocol weakness Network isolation and port disabling only Firmware updates and configuration

Why does PC Worx have no authentication?

PC Worx has no authentication because Phoenix Contact designed the classic line for closed industrial networks, a point the vendor repeats in its classic-line advisories since 2019. CERT@VDE VDE-2019-015, first released on 7 August 2019 and updated on 21 June 2022 to add more controllers, assigns this to CVE-2019-9201. NVD describes it as "multiple Phoenix Contact devices allow remote attackers to establish TCP sessions to port 1962 and obtain sensitive information or make changes, as demonstrated by using the Create Backup feature to traverse all directories," and scores it 9.8 (CVSS v3.1, Primary). Phoenix Contact's own advisory PDF says the issue was originally published on 24 June 2019.

The impact, in the advisory's words: an unauthorized attacker on an unprotected open network "can change or download the device code/configuration, start or stop services, update or modify the firmware or shutdown the device." CISA republished it as ICSA-22-172-05 on 21 June 2022.

Later advisories describe the same design from other angles:

  • No logic integrity check. VDE-2022-025 (CVE-2022-31800, CISA ICSA-22-172-03) says an unauthenticated remote attacker could upload malicious logic to devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR, and that the classic controllers do not feature logic integrity and authenticity checks by design.
  • Tampered logic files. VDE-2023-055 (CVE-2023-46141) says logic files generated by Automation Worx could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection.
  • Bypassable CRC warning. VDE-2023-057 (CVE-2023-46143) says the CRC check that warns when the engineering tool's application and the PLC's differ can be manipulated.

None of these has a firmware fix. All list every firmware version of the affected controllers.

Which CVEs and advisories cover Phoenix Contact controllers?

The controller CVEs split into design-level weaknesses in the classic line and fixable bugs in PLCnext firmware. The table gives the CVSS score NVD displays, with the source (NVD's own analysis, or CERT@VDE as CNA where NVD has not scored the record). PLCnext advisories from 2025 onward carry CVSS v4.0 scores from CERT@VDE.

CVE Products (per advisory) What it allows CVSS (source) Advisory / fixed in
CVE-2019-9201 Classic line: ILC 1x0/1x1/3xx, AXC 1050/3050, RFC 4xx, FC 350, PC WORX SRT/RT BASIC Unauthenticated TCP 1962 sessions; code, config, firmware changes 9.8 v3.1 (NVD) VDE-2019-015, ICSA-22-172-05; no fix
CVE-2022-31800 Classic line, ProConOS-based Unauthenticated upload of malicious logic 9.8 v3.1 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2022-025, ICSA-22-172-03; no fix
CVE-2023-46141 Classic line, Automation Worx, PC Worx, Config+ Full device access, remote and unauthenticated 9.8 v3.1 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2023-055; no fix
CVE-2023-46143 Classic line, Automation Worx Modify applications on the PLC without integrity check 7.5 v3.1 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2023-057; no fix
CVE-2021-33541 ILC 1x0, ILC 1x1 Crafted IP packets stop all network communication until restart 7.5 v3.1 (NVD) VDE-2021-019; no fix
CVE-2023-46142 PLCnext AXC F x152, RFC 4072, EPC, BPC, PLCnext Engineer ≤ 2024.0 Low-privileged attacker gains full access 8.8 v3.1 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2023-056
CVE-2023-46144 Same as above Manipulated application passes the integrity check 6.5 v3.1 (NVD) VDE-2023-058
CVE-2020-12519 PLCnext AXC F x152, RFC 4072S Reverse shell with root privileges 9.8 v3.1 (NVD); CNA 8.8 VDE-2020-049; 2021.0 LTS
CVE-2021-34570 PLCnext AXC F x152, RFC 4072S Crafted JSON to /auth/access-token restarts the controller 7.5 v3.1 (NVD) VDE-2021-029; 2021.0.5 LTS
CVE-2025-41666 to -41668 PLCnext AXC F x152, BPC 9102S, RFC 4072S Symbolic-link file replacement gives read, write and execute on any file 8.8 v3.1 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2025-054; 2025.0.2
CVE-2025-41669 PLCnext devices incl. AXC F 1252, vPLCnext Engineer user installs an unverified APP via WBM, root code execution 8.7 v4.0 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2026-050; 2026.0.3
CVE-2025-41769 PLCnext devices incl. AXC F 1252, vPLCnext PROFINET service buffer overflow in the default configuration; reboot or code execution 9.3 v4.0 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2025-056; 2026.0.3
CVE-2025-41770 Same as above Unauthenticated DoS of the PLCnext Engineer interface 8.7 v4.0 (CERT@VDE) VDE-2025-056; 2026.0.3

The PLCnext firmware also bundles a Linux userland, and Phoenix Contact publishes "multiple Linux component vulnerabilities" advisories with each LTS release. VDE-2024-071 (9 December 2024), for example, lists the OpenSSH race CVE-2024-6387 and Git CVE-2024-32002 among the issues fixed in 2024.0.6 LTS, and the earliest PLCnext advisory, VDE-2019-009, listed the BusyBox ntpd flaw CVE-2016-6301 for AXC F 2152 firmware below 2.0. VDE-2026-084 (4 November 2026) covers the Wibu CodeMeter Runtime bundled in PLCnext firmware 2025.0 to below 2026.0.6. For how bundled OpenSSH builds are tracked, see the OpenSSH firmware guide.

As of 2026-11-18, none of the CVEs in the table is in the CISA KEV catalog (version 2026.11.17), and the catalog has no Phoenix Contact entry at all. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-17 range from 0.0019 (CVE-2025-41670) to 0.0316 (CVE-2019-9201). For how to weigh the two, see KEV and EPSS prioritization.

How do you find firmware versions on Phoenix Contact controllers?

A firmware inventory needs the article number and firmware version for every controller, because Phoenix Contact advisories list affected products by both.

  1. PLCnext, firmware 2025.0 and newerLog in to WBM 2 at https://<controller-ip>/wbm and open System, then Update. The PLCnext Info Center says the installed firmware version is shown in the Version column of the update list.
  2. PLCnext, firmware 2019.0 LTS to 2024.6These use the earlier WBM, which the Info Center documents separately; WBM 2 arrived with firmware 2025.0.
  3. Classic lineRecord the exact model and article number, for example ILC 191 ETH 2TX or AXC 1050 2700988, and the firmware version from the PC Worx project or the controller's manual. Compare the version with the port-disabling thresholds in the next section, since that is the only security-relevant threshold for most classic models.
  4. Engineering softwareRecord PC Worx, PLCnext Engineer and CodeMeter versions on each engineering station; several advisories (VDE-2023-055, VDE-2023-056, VDE-2026-084) cover the tool or its licensing runtime, not only the controller.

How should classic ILC and AXC controllers be hardened?

Classic line hardening is network isolation plus switching off the engineering ports the firmware lets you switch off, because no update adds authentication. Phoenix Contact's application note 110637 gives the steps:

  1. Keep the controller out of public networks, and use a VPN where remote access is needed.
  2. Put a firewall in front of each controller or cell, and use it to segment the network or isolate a controller.
  3. Disable unused portsIn PC Worx, the CPU_Set_Value_Request service in the CPU Service Editor switches off port 7 (echo server), port 21 (FTP), port 1962 (communication with PC Worx) and port 41100 (OPC and debug mode in PC Worx). The note warns that once 1962 or 41100 is off, PC Worx can no longer reach the controller, and re-enabling them needs a reset to default settings that deletes the application, except on AXC 1050 (XC) and AXC 3050, which can re-enable them from the WBM.
  4. Change the WBM password on AXC 1050 and AXC 3050The note gives the default WBM password as "private" and says port settings in the WBM need that password.
  5. Switch the web server to HTTPS (port 443)in PC Worx where the controller supports it.
  6. On ILC 151 GSM/GPRS, enable the port filter, which blocks ports 0 to 2000 except 80 and port 41100, and use a SIM service with VPN.

The minimum firmware for switching ports off, per the application note and VDE-2019-015:

Controller Article no. Ports can be disabled from firmware
ILC 1x0 All variants Not possible
ILC 1x1 (incl. GSM/GPRS 2700977) All variants 4.42
ILC 3xx All variants 3.98
AXC 1050 / AXC 1050 XC 2700988 / 2701295 3.01 (WBM from 5.00)
AXC 3050 2700989 5.60 (WBM from 6.30)
RFC 470 PN 3TX / RFC 470S PN 3TX 2916600 / 2916794 4.20
RFC 460R PN 3TX 2700784 5.00
RFC 460R PN 3TX-S 1096407 5.30
RFC 480S PN 4TX 2404577 6.10

CISA's ICSA-22-172-05 lists RFC 430 ETH-IB, RFC 450 ETH-IB, PC WORX SRT, PC WORX RT BASIC and FC 350 PCI ETH as "no fix". For those and for ILC 1x0, the firewall is the only control. For the logic-integrity CVEs, VDE-2023-055 adds that connections between Automation Worx and the controller must stay in a locally protected environment or a VPN, and that project files should not be emailed without separate integrity and authenticity checks.

How should PLCnext Control be hardened?

PLCnext hardening starts with firmware currency and then uses the controls the WBM provides: user management, the firewall, system services and Security Profiles. Phoenix Contact's general application note 107913 frames the same list for all its network-capable devices.

  1. Update to a current releaseThe 2025 and 2026 advisories above are fixed in 2025.0.2 and 2026.0.3, and VDE-2026-084 in 2026.0.6. Phoenix Contact's 2023 advisories recommend always using the latest LTS version.
  2. Change the default admin passwordAccording to the User Authentication page, user authentication is enabled by default and each controller ships with an admin user whose unique default password is printed on the housing; Phoenix Contact says to use it only for initial access. If authentication is disabled, the WBM, the OPC UA server and PLCnext Engineer access need no login, but admin can still log in over SFTP and SSH.
  3. Create named users with rolesin the User Management tab (firmware 2022.0 LTS and newer) instead of sharing admin, and remove accounts that are no longer needed.
  4. Turn the firewall onThe WBM 2 firewall page says it is off by default on AXC F x152 and RFC 4072x and on by default on secure-by-default devices such as the AXC F 1252. Restrict 41100, 22 and 443 to engineering hosts. Do not set HTTPS to Reject or Drop before you have another way in; the page warns that this locks you out of the WBM until a reset to default settings.
  5. Disable unused system servicesThe System Services page lets an admin switch off services such as the App Manager, PLCnext Store, Proficloud, OPC UA, EtherNet/IP, Modbus client and PROFINET device. Disabling PROFINET also disables DCP, which PLCnext Engineer uses to set IP addresses. If APPs are not needed, VDE-2026-050 suggests disabling the App Manager to reduce exposure to CVE-2025-41669.
  6. Consider a Security ProfileOn AXC F x152 (2022.0 LTS to 2024.6) and RFC 4072S, activating a Security Profile replaces the admin user with SecurityAdmin, switches on the firewall and deactivates most system services after reboot, per the Info Center.
  7. Send security notifications to syslog, and protect the SD card, which holds the overlay file system and user credentials when one is used.

PROFINET itself needs extra firewall rules on PLCnext, because Phoenix Contact removed the PROFINET and SNMP rules from the default firewall configuration. The PROFINET guide covers that protocol and CVE-2025-41769 in more depth.

How do you segment and monitor Phoenix Contact controllers?

Segmentation follows the same zone model for both generations, but classic controllers need it as the primary control. Place controllers in cell zones per the Purdue model, allow TCP 1962 and 41100 only from the PC Worx or PLCnext Engineer workstation, and route remote access through a VPN gateway. The IEC 62443-4-2 guide explains the component requirements that PLCnext's user management and firewall are meant to meet.

Alerts worth writing on a network monitor:

  • Any TCP connection to port 1962 or 41100 from a host that is not a named engineering workstation.
  • Port 1962 or 41100 reachable across a zone boundary, or from the business network.
  • New SSH or SFTP sessions to a PLCnext controller outside a change window.
  • WBM logins from new hosts, and any PLCnext APP installation; VDE-2026-050 recommends watching security notifications for unexpected APP installs.
  • Bursts of traffic toward an ILC 1x1, the pattern behind the network-load denial of service in VDE-2018-012 (CVE-2018-25112).

Worked example: what does a review of one assembly cell find?

Synthetic example, not a real plant. A cell has two ILC 151 ETH controllers, one AXC 1050, one AXC F 2152 and one engineering laptop.

Observation Why it matters Action
ILC 151 ETH at firmware 4.30 Below the 4.42 threshold for disabling ports 1962 and 41100 Update to 4.42 or later, then disable unused ports
Port 1962 on all classic controllers reachable from the office VLAN CVE-2019-9201: unauthenticated changes from any reachable host Firewall to the engineering laptop only
AXC 1050 WBM still on the default password Port settings in the WBM rely on that password Change it, then disable FTP and echo
AXC F 2152 at 2024.0.5 LTS with firewall off Below the 2024.0.6 LTS, 2025.0.2 and 2026.0.3 fixes; first-generation default Update, enable firewall, restrict 41100/22/443
AXC F 2152 runs App Manager and Proficloud, neither used Extra attack surface (CVE-2025-41669 path) Disable both system services

How can SoftWSP help with Phoenix Contact controllers?

SoftWSP matches the models and versions you give it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories with deterministic code, and an AI-written summary cites the record behind each finding; an engineer reviews every report before it is sent. For a controller list, Device & Firmware Security takes article numbers and firmware versions. A passive OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port capture and shows which hosts connect to ports 1962, 41100, 22 and 443 on each controller. It has no PC Worx or PLCnext Engineer protocol decoder, so that traffic appears at connection level only, and it cannot read firmware versions off the wire.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Waiting for a classic-line firmware fix for CVE-2019-9201 or CVE-2022-31800; Phoenix Contact lists none, so the firewall is the fix.
  • Disabling port 1962 on an ILC without planning for the reset to defaults needed to re-enable it.
  • Assuming a PLCnext firewall is on because the controller is new; first-generation AXC F x152 and RFC 4072x ship with it off.
  • Updating the controller but not PLCnext Engineer, PC Worx or the CodeMeter runtime on the engineering station.
  • Matching only on product family; advisories list article numbers, and the AXC F 1252 and Virtual PLCnext Control appear only in newer advisories.

This guide draws on Phoenix Contact PSIRT advisories and application notes 110637 and 107913, CERT@VDE advisories VDE-2018-012, VDE-2019-009, VDE-2019-015, VDE-2020-049, VDE-2021-019, VDE-2021-029, VDE-2022-025, VDE-2023-055 to -058, VDE-2024-071, VDE-2025-054, VDE-2025-056, VDE-2026-050 and VDE-2026-084, CISA ICS advisories ICSA-22-172-03 and ICSA-22-172-05, the PLCnext Info Center, NVD records, CISA's KEV catalog version 2026.11.17 and FIRST EPSS data dated 2026-11-17, all read on 2026-11-18. It is general information, not a substitute for Phoenix Contact's product-specific security guidance for your exact model and firmware.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

Do Phoenix Contact classic line controllers authenticate PC Worx connections?

No. Phoenix Contact's advisory for CVE-2019-9201 (CERT@VDE VDE-2019-015, Update A of 21 June 2022) says the classic line controllers, ILC 1x0, ILC 1x1, ILC 3xx, AXC 1050, AXC 3050, RFC 4xx, FC 350 PCI ETH, PC WORX SRT and PC WORX RT BASIC, are designed for closed industrial networks and that their device management and configuration protocols do not feature authentication. NVD describes the issue as remote attackers establishing TCP sessions to port 1962 and obtaining sensitive information or making changes, and scores it 9.8. Per the advisory, an attacker on an unprotected network can change or download code and configuration, start or stop services, update or modify the firmware, or shut the device down. There is no firmware fix that adds authentication; the remedies are closed networks, firewalls and, on supported firmware, switching the engineering ports off.

Which ports should I restrict on PLCnext Control and classic ILC/AXC controllers?

On classic line controllers, Phoenix Contact's application note 110637 (June 2022) names port 1962 (communication with PC Worx), port 41100 (OPC and debug mode in PC Worx), port 21 (FTP) and port 7 (echo server) as the ports that can be switched off on supported firmware. On PLCnext Control, the predefined firewall rules in the PLCnext Info Center list TCP 41100 for remoting such as PLCnext Engineer, TCP 22 for SSH and SFTP, TCP 80 and 443 for HTTP, HTTPS and the Web-based Management, TCP 4840 for OPC UA, TCP 44818 for EtherNet/IP, TCP 502 for Modbus TCP and UDP 123 for NTP. Allow 41100, 22 and the management ports only from named engineering hosts.

Is the PLCnext firewall on by default?

It depends on the generation. The PLCnext Info Center page for the WBM 2 firewall says that on first-generation PLCnext Control devices such as the AXC F x152 series and RFC 4072x the firewall is deactivated by default and is activated when a Security Profile is switched on. On secure-by-default devices such as the AXC F 1252 and Virtual PLCnext Control the firewall is active by default. The same documentation notes that user authentication cannot be disabled on secure-by-default devices or with an active Security Profile.

Is any Phoenix Contact controller CVE in the CISA KEV catalog?

No. As of 2026-11-18, the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.11.17, 1,782 entries) has no Phoenix Contact entry. FIRST EPSS scores dated 2026-11-17 for the controller CVEs in this guide range from about 0.002 to 0.032, with CVE-2019-9201 the highest at 0.0316. That does not make the classic line safe: CVE-2019-9201 describes missing authentication by design, which an attacker who can reach port 1962 needs no exploit to use.

How do I find the PLCnext firmware version on a controller?

On firmware 2025.0 and newer, log in to the Web-based Management (WBM 2) and open System, then Update; the PLCnext Info Center says the installed firmware version is shown in the Version column of the update list. Compare that version with the fixed versions in Phoenix Contact's advisories, for example 2026.0.3 for VDE-2025-056 and VDE-2026-050, 2025.0.2 for VDE-2025-054, and 2024.0.6 LTS for VDE-2024-071. Record the article number as well, because the advisories list affected products by model and article number, and Virtual PLCnext Control and the EPC and BPC edge devices appear in some advisories but not others.

Sources

  1. Phoenix Contact PSIRT: Product Security Incident Response Team, recent security advisories and archive
  2. CERT@VDE: Phoenix Contact advisory list
  3. CERT@VDE VDE-2019-015: Security Advisory for multiple Industrial Controllers (CVE-2019-9201; initial 7 August 2019, Update A 21 June 2022)
  4. CERT@VDE VDE-2022-025: Vulnerability in classic line industrial controllers (CVE-2022-31800; 21 June 2022)
  5. CERT@VDE VDE-2023-055: Automation Worx and classic line controllers, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource (CVE-2023-46141; 12 December 2023)
  6. CERT@VDE VDE-2023-057: Classic line industrial controllers, inadequate integrity check of PLC applications (CVE-2023-46143; 12 December 2023)
  7. CERT@VDE VDE-2023-056: PLCnext, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource (CVE-2023-46142; 12 December 2023)
  8. CERT@VDE VDE-2023-058: PLCnext Control, download of code without integrity check (CVE-2023-46144; 12 December 2023)
  9. CERT@VDE VDE-2025-056: Improper Input Validation Vulnerabilities in PLCnext Firmware (CVE-2025-41769, -41770, -41771; 12 August 2026)
  10. CERT@VDE VDE-2026-050: PLCnext Firmware Security Issues Related to APPs and Configuration Files (CVE-2025-41669, -41670; 27 May 2026)
  11. CERT@VDE VDE-2025-054: Multiple Vulnerabilities in PLCnext Firmware (CVE-2025-41665 to -41668; 8 July 2025)
  12. CERT@VDE VDE-2020-049: Multiple vulnerabilities in PLCnext Control devices < 2021.0 LTS (17 December 2020)
  13. CERT@VDE VDE-2024-071: Multiple Vulnerabilities in PLCnext Firmware, fixed in 2024.0.6 LTS (9 December 2024)
  14. CERT@VDE VDE-2026-084: CodeMeter Runtime Security Vulnerabilities in License Validation in the PLCnext Firmware (4 November 2026)
  15. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-172-05: Phoenix Contact Classic Line Industrial Controllers (CVE-2019-9201; 21 June 2022), CSAF
  16. CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-172-03: Phoenix Contact Classic Line Controllers (CVE-2022-31800; 21 June 2022), CSAF
  17. Phoenix Contact Application note 110637_en_00: Security notes for classic PLCs, Measures to protect devices based on classic control technology (June 2022, PDF)
  18. Phoenix Contact Application note 107913_en_04: Measures to protect network-capable devices with communication interfaces, solutions, and PC-based software (December 2023, PDF)
  19. PLCnext Info Center: WBM 2 Security, Firewall (protocols and ports, default firewall state)
  20. PLCnext Info Center: WBM 2 Introduction (secure-by-default devices, login)
  21. PLCnext Info Center: Security, User Authentication (firmware 2019.0 LTS to 2024.6)
  22. PLCnext Info Center: Configuration, System Services
  23. PLCnext Info Center: WBM 2 System, Update
  24. NVD: CVE-2019-9201 (classic line controllers, TCP port 1962)
  25. NVD: CVE-2025-41769 (PLCnext PROFINET service buffer overflow)
  26. NVD: CVE-2020-12519 (PLCnext Control before 2021.0 LTS, privilege management)
  27. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (data mirror on GitHub)
  28. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

Phoenix Contact PLCnext Control and classic ILC/AXC controller security: CVEs, ports and hardening