Engineer working on a laptop connected to a device test rig, surrounded by wiring harnesses and test hardware

Firmware vulnerabilities & fixes

ISO/IEC 27005:2022 (information security risk management), explained

Last updated:

ISO/IEC 27005, "Guidance on managing information security risks," is the ISO/IEC standard most organizations reach for when an ISMS built on ISO/IEC 27001 needs an actual process for its risk assessment and treatment clauses. The current 4th edition was published in October 2022, replacing the 2018 edition, and realigned the standard's structure and vocabulary with both ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and the generic risk-management standard ISO 31000:2018. Unlike ISO/IEC 27001, it is guidance only — there is nothing in it to certify against — but it is often the document that actually decides how an organization's risk register gets built.

ISO/IEC standards are commercial, copyrighted documents. This guide draws on ISO's publicly indexed abstract/scope language as reproduced by secondary standards-analysis sources (PECB's published comparison of the 2018 and 2022 editions, Wikipedia's sourced edition history) rather than the purchased standard text, which remains the authoritative source for clause-level detail — what follows is a starting point, not a verbatim quotation of the full standard.

Key takeaways

  • ISO/IEC standards are commercial, copyrighted documents.
  • Each stage should leave a record behind, and for a device or software supplier the most useful scope is usually one product family and its supporting services rather than the whole company.
  • For the asset-based approach, the assets are the device's hardware, firmware components, keys, data and services, and most likelihood evidence comes from public vulnerability data about the components inside the firmware.
  • Synthetic example.

What it guides you through, and what it doesn't require

ISO/IEC 27005's own scope statement, as indexed on ISO's catalogue, says it exists to help organizations fulfil ISO/IEC 27001's requirements for addressing information security risk and to perform information security risk assessment and treatment activities — applicable to "all organizations, regardless of type, size or sector." It supplements ISO/IEC 27001's clause 6.1.2 (risk assessment) and 6.1.3 (risk treatment), which state what an ISMS must do about risk without prescribing exactly how to run the process — ISO/IEC 27005 is the "how." It has no clauses of its own that an auditor checks off during an ISO/IEC 27001 certification audit; a certification body audits conformance to 27001's own clauses, with 27005 serving as explanatory background a Statement of Applicability or risk methodology can reference.

The five-stage process, and two ways to identify risk

The 2022 edition organizes the risk management cycle into five stages: context establishment, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk treatment — dropping "risk acceptance" as its own sixth stage and instead treating acceptance of residual risk as a decision made inside the treatment stage once a treatment option is chosen. For risk identification specifically, the 2022 edition sets out two approaches an organization can use: an event-based approach, a higher-level, strategic view of how risk sources could affect stakeholders' objectives, useful for an initial or organization-wide pass; and an asset-based approach, the more familiar, granular analysis of specific assets, the threats facing them and their vulnerabilities, used to drive concrete treatment decisions. The standard also replaced the earlier term "incident scenario" with risk scenario — a sequence or combination of events leading from an initial cause to an unwanted consequence — matching ISO 31000:2018's vocabulary more closely than the 2018 edition did.

What does each stage produce for a device product line?

Each stage should leave a record behind, and for a device or software supplier the most useful scope is usually one product family and its supporting services rather than the whole company. PECB's comparison of the 2018 and 2022 editions notes that the 2022 text adds explicit guidance on documented information about the process and about its results (clauses 10.4.2 and 10.4.3), and that residual-risk acceptance now sits in clause 8.6.3 as a decision after treatment. The table below shows what that looks like for a hardware maker. The examples are illustrative, not quoted from the standard.

Stage Record to keep Device-maker example
Context establishment Scope, risk criteria (acceptance and assessment criteria), chosen method "Gateway family, firmware 2.x, plus the update server"; a 3 × 3 consequence/likelihood scale with written level definitions
Risk identification Risk scenarios, each with a risk owner "An attacker on the plant LAN uses a known flaw in the embedded web server to take admin control"; owner: firmware lead
Risk analysis Consequence and likelihood ratings, level of risk Consequence high (control of field data), likelihood medium (LAN-only exposure)
Risk evaluation Risks compared with the acceptance criteria and ranked Level above the "must treat" line, ranked first for the next release
Risk treatment Treatment option, controls, risk treatment plan, residual-risk decision Update the component, disable remote admin by default, residual risk signed off by the product owner

The 2022 edition also lists a semi-quantitative analysis technique next to the qualitative and quantitative ones, per the same PECB analysis. A semi-quantitative scale (numbers attached to defined levels) suits product teams well: it is quick to apply per scenario and still gives a sortable risk register.

Why did the 2022 edition change at all?

ISO/IEC 27005's revision history tracks the series it supports: the 2008 and 2011 editions predate ISO/IEC 27001:2013's current clause structure, the 2018 edition aligned loosely with 27001:2013, and the 2022 edition followed 27001's own 2022 revision (itself mainly an Annex A control restructuring — see our ISO/IEC 27001 guide) and ISO 31000's 2018 revision of the generic risk-management framework. The practical effect for an organization already running an ISMS: a risk methodology written against the 2018 edition's six-stage model, with "risk acceptance" as a separate step and "incident scenario" terminology, should be re-checked against the 2022 structure and vocabulary rather than assumed to still match the current edition word-for-word.

Where do likelihood and consequence inputs come from for firmware?

For the asset-based approach, the assets are the device's hardware, firmware components, keys, data and services, and most likelihood evidence comes from public vulnerability data about the components inside the firmware. ISO/IEC 27005 leaves the choice of sources to you; the inputs below are the ones a product team can actually cite in a risk register.

Input Where it comes from What it supports
Component inventory An SBOM generated at build time or extracted from the shipped image (see firmware SBOM) The asset list the risk scenarios are built on
Known vulnerabilities and severity CVE records and CVSS scores in the NIST National Vulnerability Database Technical severity, one input to consequence
Observed exploitation The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog Raises likelihood when a matched CVE is listed
Predicted exploitation FIRST EPSS, which estimates "the probability that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days" A daily, comparable likelihood signal per CVE
Exposure and predisposing conditions Your own architecture: network reachability, authentication in front of the flaw, default settings Adjusts likelihood up or down for this product
Consequence Intended use, data handled, safety role, number of units in the field The business and customer impact of the scenario

A CVSS base score measures severity, not risk; it says nothing about whether your configuration exposes the flaw or how many customers depend on the function. Use it with the other rows, not in place of them. Our guide to KEV and EPSS prioritization covers how the two exploitation signals differ, and the CVSS calculator shows which metrics drive a base score. For scale definitions, NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1 publishes five-level likelihood and impact tables that many teams borrow, even under an ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS.

Worked example: one risk scenario for a synthetic gateway

Synthetic example. The company, product and ratings are invented to show the process; they describe no real device.

  1. ContextA maker of an industrial sensor gateway (call it GW-200, firmware 2.4) sets the scope as the gateway firmware plus its update server. Its criteria use consequence 1 to 3 and likelihood 1 to 3; level = consequence × likelihood; 6 or more must be treated before the next release, 3 to 4 may be accepted by the product owner with a written reason, 1 to 2 are accepted.
  2. Identification (asset-based)The SBOM for 2.4 lists an embedded web server version with a published CVE that allows authentication bypass on the management page. Risk scenario: "Attacker on the customer LAN bypasses login and changes sensor forwarding settings." Risk owner: firmware lead.
  3. AnalysisConsequence 3: an attacker could alter the data the customer's control system receives. Likelihood 2: the CVE is absent from KEV, its EPSS probability is above the company's watch threshold, and the management page is reachable from the LAN only. Level 6.
  4. Evaluation6 meets the "must treat" line, so the scenario goes to the top of the 2.5 release list.
  5. TreatmentOption chosen: modify the risk. Firmware 2.5 updates the web server component and ships with remote management off by default. Re-rated likelihood 1; residual level 3. The product owner accepts it in writing, with the date and the reason.
  6. MonitoringThe scenario is re-opened when a new CVE matches a component, when the CVE enters KEV, or at the next release, which matches the 2022 edition's emphasis on monitoring risk-related events (Annex A.2.7, per PECB's summary).

Can a 27005-style assessment serve the CRA's product risk assessment?

Partly. The method carries over, but the scope and the outputs must change. Article 13(2) of the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) requires manufacturers to "undertake an assessment of the cybersecurity risks associated with a product with digital elements" and to use the outcome across planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenance. Article 13(3) says that assessment must be documented, updated as appropriate during the support period, and based on the product's intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use. It must also state which Annex I Part I(2) requirements apply and how they are implemented. Article 13(4) puts it in the technical documentation, and Article 13(7) requires updating it as vulnerabilities and other information come in. Most of these obligations apply from 11 December 2027 (Article 71).

An ISMS risk register scoped to the company will not meet that on its own. A product-scoped assessment that uses the 27005 stages, keeps the scenario records shown above and adds the Annex I mapping can. See our guides to the Cyber Resilience Act and IEC 62443-3-2 security risk assessment for the product and OT-system views.

Where this sits next to NIST's risk publications

Teams that also touch US federal or federally-adjacent work will recognize the same problem addressed from a different standards family: NIST SP 800-30 (conducting risk assessments), SP 800-39 (organization-wide risk management) and the SP 800-37 Risk Management Framework cover the same assess-treat-monitor cycle for federal information systems. Neither family formally references the other for conformance purposes, so an organization operating under both typically keeps them as parallel processes — ISO/IEC 27005 under an ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS, NIST SP 800-30/39 under an RMF/SP 800-53 program — rather than merging them into a single risk methodology document.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • CVSS used as the risk level. A 9.8 on an unreachable debug service and a 6.5 on the internet-facing login page do not rank the way their scores suggest.
  • Company-wide scope only. An event-based pass over the organization is a good start, but it never produces the per-product scenarios a customer or a CRA technical file asks for.
  • No named risk owner. ISO/IEC 27001 clause 6.1.2 expects risk owners to be identified; "security team" is not an owner who can accept residual risk for a product.
  • Register frozen after the first release. New CVEs, KEV additions and each firmware release change likelihood; without trigger criteria for re-assessment, the register goes stale.
  • Undefined scales. "Medium likelihood" with no written definition gives different ratings from different engineers for the same scenario.
  • Supplier risk left out. Third-party components and contract manufacturers belong in the scenarios; ISO/IEC 27036 covers the supplier-relationship side.

A workable starting point

  1. Don't treat ISO/IEC 27005 as something to certify againstOnly ISO/IEC 27001 is certifiable; 27005 is the methodology an auditor expects your risk assessment and treatment records to be consistent with, not a separate audit target.
  2. Re-check a pre-2022 risk methodology against the current five-stage structureIf your documented process still has a standalone "risk acceptance" stage or uses "incident scenario" language, it was likely written against the 2018 edition.
  3. Pick event-based or asset-based (or both) deliberatelyUse the event-based approach for an organization-wide first pass, and the asset-based approach where you need concrete, assignable treatment decisions for specific systems or firmware.
  4. Keep your NIST and ISO risk processes separate but cross-referenced, if you run both — don't try to collapse SP 800-30/39 and ISO/IEC 27005 into one methodology document; map their outputs to each other instead.
  5. Budget for a purchased copy before citing clause numbersThis guide describes the standard's structure at a high level; a purchased copy from ISO, IEC or a national member body carries the exact clause text and numbering.

SoftWSP's device and firmware security assessments can supply the asset-based risk evidence — a component inventory and its known-CVE exposure — that an ISO/IEC 27005-style risk assessment needs as input: see Device & Firmware Security. The platform extracts a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from a firmware image, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. The likelihood and consequence ratings, the risk owner and the acceptance decision stay with your team.

This guide summarizes ISO's publicly indexed catalogue information and independent secondary analysis of the 2022 revision; ISO/IEC 27005's full operative text is copyrighted and must be purchased from ISO, IEC or a national standards body. This guide is not a substitute for the full standard or for compliance/legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is ISO/IEC 27005, and who publishes it?

ISO/IEC 27005 is "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidance on managing information security risks," published jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) under their joint technical committee ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. The current edition is the 4th, published in October 2022, which replaced the 3rd edition from 2018; earlier editions date to 2011 and 2008. Like other ISO/IEC standards, its full text is copyrighted and must be purchased from ISO, IEC or a national standards body (for example BSI, ANSI or DIN) — this guide draws on the publicly available scope/abstract text ISO publishes on its own catalogue page plus independent secondary analysis of the 2022 revision, not the purchased standard.

Is ISO/IEC 27005 certifiable, and how does it relate to ISO/IEC 27001?

No. ISO/IEC 27005 is explicitly guidance, not a set of auditable requirements — only ISO/IEC 27001 (the information security management system, or ISMS, requirements standard) is certifiable. ISO/IEC 27005 exists to help an organization fulfil ISO/IEC 27001's own risk-related clauses (notably clause 6.1.2, information security risk assessment, and 6.1.3, risk treatment) by supplying a detailed process those clauses reference but do not fully spell out themselves. See our guide to [ISO/IEC 27001](/guides/iso-iec-27001-isms-requirements/) for the certifiable ISMS requirements this guidance supports.

What changed in the 2022 edition compared with 2018?

The 2022 edition realigned its structure and terminology with ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and with ISO 31000:2018, the generic risk management standard. It restructured the risk management process around five stages — context establishment, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk treatment — removing risk acceptance as its own standalone process step and instead addressing residual-risk acceptance as a decision point inside the treatment stage. It also introduced two explicit risk identification approaches: an "event-based" approach (a higher-level view of how risk sources could affect an organization's objectives) and an "asset-based" approach (the more granular, traditional asset/threat/vulnerability analysis), and it replaced the term "incident scenario" with "risk scenario" to align with ISO 31000 vocabulary.

How does ISO/IEC 27005 relate to NIST's risk publications like SP 800-30 and SP 800-39?

They cover similar ground from different standards families: ISO/IEC 27005 guides information security risk management generally (for any organization, regardless of sector), while [NIST SP 800-30](/guides/nist-sp-800-30-risk-assessment/) and [SP 800-39](/guides/nist-sp-800-39-managing-information-security-risk/) are US government publications written primarily for US federal information systems and the [SP 800-37 Risk Management Framework](/guides/nist-sp-800-37-risk-management-framework/) they feed into, though both are widely used outside government too. Neither family formally cross-references the other as a conformance mechanism; an organization using both typically treats ISO/IEC 27005 as the risk-process layer under an ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS and NIST SP 800-30/39 as the risk-process layer under an RMF/SP 800-53 program, rather than trying to merge the two into one combined process.

Sources

  1. ISO: ISO/IEC 27005:2022 — Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidance on managing information security risks (catalogue page)
  2. ISO/IEC 27001:2022, clauses 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 (risk assessment and risk treatment), ISO catalogue page
  3. PECB: ISO/IEC 27005:2022 — Main Changes and Implications (secondary analysis of the 2018-to-2022 revision)
  4. Wikipedia: ISO/IEC 27005 (edition history, 2008-2022, and relationship to ISO 31000)
  5. ISO 31000:2018 — Risk management — Guidelines, ISO catalogue page
  6. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Article 13(2)-(4) and (7) on the product cybersecurity risk assessment, and Article 71 on application dates, EUR-Lex
  7. NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, CSRC publication page
  8. FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), probability that a published CVE is exploited in the next 30 days
  9. NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

ISO/IEC 27005:2022 (information security risk management), explained