ISO/IEC 27402:2023, "Cybersecurity — IoT security and privacy — Device baseline requirements," is a 16-page International Standard from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 that sets a minimum, sector-agnostic set of security and privacy requirements for IoT devices. Published in its First edition on 2023-11-20/21, its catalogue scope statement is compact: "This document provides baseline ICT requirements for IoT devices to support security and privacy controls." The standard is commercial — sold by ISO and IEC rather than published in full for free — so this guide draws on the publicly available catalogue scope and table of contents plus an ISO committee explainer co-authored by the standard's own project leaders, rather than the purchased clause text itself; a purchased copy remains the authoritative source for specific requirement wording for any conformity claim.
Key takeaways
- Because it is meant to be the floor every IoT device can share, with sector rules stacked on top.
- Clause 5 holds all requirements, in two groups with eleven subclauses.
- Subclause 5.1.1 is the engine of the standard: it makes the device's feature list the output of a documented risk process.
- Closely, by design.
Why is it a deliberately small, "horizontal" baseline?
Because it is meant to be the floor every IoT device can share, with sector rules stacked on top. The ISO committee explainer — written by project leaders Elaine Newton (Oracle) and Faud Khan (Sprig/TwelveDot), with ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Technical Programme Manager Hakim Mkinsi — frames the goal as convergence: the standard "seeks to establish a globally harmonised approach to the baseline security and privacy requirements of IoT devices," positioned as "an initial target for all IoT device developers globally."
The standard's own introduction, visible in the publisher's preview, says the requirements "are intended as a baseline, upon which vertical markets (such as health, financial services, industrial, consumer electronics and transportation) can build additional requirements." It names two such vertical documents: ETSI EN 303 645 "for consumer devices and the IEC 62443 series for industrial devices and systems." It also says that while it "can provide requirements for a conformity assessment scheme," sector stakeholders are expected to build schemes "on top" of it. In SC 27's vocabulary this is a horizontal standard; sector documents are vertical.
What does Clause 5 require?
Clause 5 holds all requirements, in two groups with eleven subclauses. The contents page of the standard lists them as follows:
| Subclause | Title | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.1 | Risk management | Documented device-level risk assessment in a system context, and the treatment process that selects features (detail in the next section) |
| 5.1.2 | Information disclosure | Information about the device's features and capabilities made available |
| 5.1.3 | Vulnerability disclosure and handling processes | How vulnerabilities are received and handled |
| 5.2.1 | General | Introduction to the capability requirements |
| 5.2.2 | Configuration | Configurable security settings |
| 5.2.3 | Software reset | Resetting the device's software; Clause 3 defines "factory default" as the state "after factory reset or after final production/assembly" |
| 5.2.4 | User data removal | Removing user data from the device |
| 5.2.5 | Protection of data | Protecting stored and transmitted data, including sensitive security parameters |
| 5.2.6 | Interface access | Restricting access to the device's interfaces |
| 5.2.7 | Software and firmware updates | Update capability, restricted to authorised entities, with validity checks |
| 5.2.8 | User notifications | Telling users about security-relevant events |
Annex A (informative) gives risk-management guidance. The defined terms in Clause 3 show the expected depth: they borrow "critical security parameter" and "sensitive security parameter" from ISO/IEC 19790, and define "trusted computing base" and "fail-safe mode." The full sub-requirement text sits in the purchased standard (16 pages); this table follows the public contents page.
How does the risk clause decide which features a device needs?
Subclause 5.1.1 is the engine of the standard: it makes the device's feature list the output of a documented risk process. Requirement 5.1.1.1.1 states that "IoT devices shall have documentation recording the results of a risk assessment process performed at the IoT device level in the context of a risk assessment at the system level." The assessment must consider the intended use case, the "needs and expectations of interested parties," and the fact that devices "can be constrained (e.g. limited battery, little memory, 'weak' CPU)." A note points to IEC 31010 and ISO/IEC 27005 for techniques.
Requirement 5.1.1.1.5 then sets the process steps visible in the preview:
- Decide whether different products need separate risk assessment and treatment processes.
- Select risk treatment options from the assessment results.
- Determine all controls needed to implement those options.
- Identify the device's security and privacy features from those controls.
- Compare those features with the list in 5.2, and "verify that no necessary features have been omitted."
Step 5 is what makes 5.2 a baseline: whatever the risk assessment concludes, the device's features are checked against the 5.2 list. A note adds that sector-specific standards can supply the risk assessment or treatment plan, and that "complying with such standards can be used to satisfy requirements in this document."
Where does it sit in the ISO/IEC 27400 family?
ISO/IEC 27402 is the device-level member of a family rooted in ISO/IEC 27400:2022, "Cybersecurity — IoT security and privacy — Guidelines," which gives non-mandatory guidance on IoT risk and controls for an IoT "ecosystem" of service providers, developers and users. The 27402 preview lists three normative references: ISO/IEC 27000 (vocabulary), ISO/IEC 27400:2022 and ISO 31000:2018. Its Clause 4 explains the split: users implement the controls described in 27400, but "these controls cannot be implemented if the IoT devices do not have the supporting functionality," which 27402 supplies. The family continues with ISO/IEC 27403:2024 on IoT-domotics and ISO/IEC 27404:2025 on a consumer IoT labelling framework; this guide treats those two at the family level only.
How does ISO/IEC 27402 map to ETSI EN 303 645 and NISTIR 8259A?
Closely, by design. The SC 27 explainer says development "benefited from taking existing standards and best practices into account, such as an interagency report from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST IR 8259A), the UK's Code of Practice for Consumer IoT (converted to ETSI EN 303 645), and the C2 document on IoT Device Security Baseline Capabilities developed by the Council to Secure the Digital Economy (CSDE) consortium." ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09) has 13 provision groups (5.1 to 5.13) plus data protection provisions in clause 6. NISTIR 8259A (May 2020) defines six technical capabilities, and NISTIR 8259B (August 2021) adds non-technical ones such as documentation.
Topic-level crosswalk drawn up by SoftWSP from the clause, provision and capability titles; it is not an official mapping published by ISO, ETSI or NIST.
| ISO/IEC 27402 | ETSI EN 303 645 provision | NISTIR 8259A / 8259B |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.1 Risk management | No direct provision | NISTIR 8259 foundational activities |
| 5.1.2 Information disclosure | 5.3 (published support period) | 8259B documentation, information dissemination |
| 5.1.3 Vulnerability disclosure and handling | 5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities | 8259B information dissemination |
| 5.2.2 Configuration | 5.1 No universal default passwords; 5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces | Device Configuration |
| 5.2.3 Software reset; 5.2.4 User data removal | 5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data | Device Configuration; Data Protection |
| 5.2.5 Protection of data | 5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters; 5.5 Communicate securely; 5.8 personal data | Data Protection |
| 5.2.6 Interface access | 5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces | Logical Access to Interfaces |
| 5.2.7 Software and firmware updates | 5.3 Keep software updated; 5.7 Ensure software integrity | Software Update |
| 5.2.8 User notifications | 5.3 (update notices to users) | Cybersecurity State Awareness |
| Identifier (term 3.1.1) | — | Device Identification |
See our NIST IoT device cybersecurity requirements guide for the full NIST series. For the EU radio market, EN 18031 is another vertical layer on similar ground.
Worked example: how does a gap analysis look for one device?
Synthetic example: the device, its features and its status are made up.
A maker of a battery-powered industrial vibration sensor with a gateway already meets ETSI EN 303 645 and wants to state alignment with ISO/IEC 27402. Using the crosswalk, the team sorts the 27402 subclauses into three columns:
| 27402 subclause | Existing evidence (from EN 303 645 work) | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.1 Risk management | None at device level in system context | Gap: write the device risk assessment and treatment plan, including battery and CPU limits |
| 5.1.3 Vulnerability handling | Published CVD policy and intake (EN 303 645 5.2) | Covered; reuse |
| 5.2.2 Configuration | Unique per-device passwords (5.1) | Covered for credentials; review other settings |
| 5.2.3 / 5.2.4 Reset and data removal | Consumer-style data deletion (5.11) | Review: industrial site data and keys on reset |
| 5.2.7 Updates | Signed updates verified on device (5.3, 5.7) | Covered; document who is an "authorised entity" |
| 5.2.8 User notifications | Update notices only | Review: other security-relevant events |
Step 5 of 5.1.1.1.5 then closes the loop: the features chosen from the new risk assessment are compared with the 5.2 list, so no baseline feature is left out. The result is two gaps and two reviews, not a new programme.
How should a device maker start?
Treat it as the floor, not the whole programA medical, automotive or industrial device will need sector rules on top (see our FDA premarket cybersecurity or IEC 62443 guides for two such verticals). Start the risk assessment at design time5.1.1 asks for documented results kept for the device, not a document written for an audit. Reuse EN 303 645 or NISTIR 8259A evidencethrough the crosswalk above instead of starting a parallel compliance program. Run vulnerability handling as a processthat 5.1.3 can point to, built on ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111. Buy the standard before claiming conformityThe public preview stops partway through 5.1.1; specific sub-requirements of 5.1.2 to 5.2.8 are only in the full text. Watch the 27400 familyfor newer sector documents, such as 27403 for connected homes, that may apply on top.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating 5.2 as the whole standard. The 5.1.1 risk record is a requirement in its own right, and it drives 5.2.
- Assuming certification exists. The standard says it "can provide requirements" for a scheme; sector bodies are expected to build one.
- Reading the crosswalk as equivalence. Matching titles do not mean matching sub-requirements; an EN 303 645 test report is evidence, not proof of 27402 conformity.
- Forgetting constrained devices. 5.1.1 asks the assessment to account for battery, memory and CPU limits; a design that cannot verify updates on a small MCU fails 5.2.7 in practice.
- Skipping system context. 5.1.1.1.1 assesses the device "in the context of a risk assessment at the system level"; a device-only view misses gateway and cloud exposure.
What part of this does SoftWSP cover?
Only the firmware evidence. SoftWSP extracts an SBOM from a firmware image (CycloneDX 1.6 JSON) and matches components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories; an AI step drafts a cited report for an engineer to review. That output supports the vulnerability-handling work behind 5.1.3 and the update decisions behind 5.2.7, and it fits the firmware security testing workflow. It does not assess ISO/IEC 27402 conformity or test device behaviour such as reset or interface access. For hands-on help, see Device & Firmware Security and our firmware SBOM guide.
This guide summarises ISO/IEC 27402:2023's public catalogue records, the publisher's preview pages and an ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 explainer by the standard's project leaders, plus the public ETSI and NIST texts; it is not a substitute for the full purchased standard and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is ISO/IEC 27402, and who publishes it?
ISO/IEC 27402:2023, "Cybersecurity — IoT security and privacy — Device baseline requirements," is a 16-page International Standard published 2023-11-20/21 (First edition) by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, the joint technical committee for information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection, under ICS code 35.030. Per the IEC/ISO catalogue listing, its scope statement reads: "This document provides baseline ICT requirements for IoT devices to support security and privacy controls." The standard is sold by ISO and IEC (around CHF 100 for the electronic edition) rather than published openly; this guide cites the publicly available catalogue scope/structure and an ISO committee explainer rather than the full purchased clause text.
What does 'baseline' and 'horizontal' mean for this standard?
ISO/IEC 27402 deliberately specifies only a small, generic set of requirements meant to apply to IoT devices regardless of sector — a 'horizontal' standard, in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27's own terminology, as opposed to a 'vertical' standard written for one application domain. An ISO committee explainer co-authored by the standard's own project leaders, Elaine Newton (Oracle) and Faud Khan (Sprig/TwelveDot), states the goal directly: ISO/IEC 27402 "seeks to establish a globally harmonised approach to the baseline security and privacy requirements of IoT devices," intended as "an initial target for all IoT device developers globally," on top of which "vertical markets (such as health, financial services, industrial, consumer electronics and transportation) can build additional requirements for the expected use and risks of IoT devices in their applications."
What are the standard's two requirement clauses?
Per the published table of contents (Scope; Normative references; Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms; Overview; Requirements; Bibliography), the substantive requirements sit in Clause 5, split into two subclauses: **5.1 Requirements for IoT device policies and documentation** — covering risk-assessment documentation, information disclosure and vulnerability disclosure/handling processes — and **5.2 Requirements for IoT device capabilities and operations** — covering configuration, software reset, user-data removal, data protection, interface access control, secure software/firmware update execution (restricted to authorised entities, with update-validity verification and options to configure automatic updates), event logging, and user notification. An informative annex gives risk-management guidance based on ISO 31000.
How does ISO/IEC 27402 fit into the broader ISO/IEC 27400 family?
ISO/IEC 27402 is the device-level member of a family rooted in **ISO/IEC 27400:2022**, "Cybersecurity — IoT security and privacy — Guidelines," which gives higher-level guidance on IoT risks, principles and controls for IoT service developers and IoT users across a system's lifecycle, describing an "IoT ecosystem" of service providers, developers and users. ISO/IEC 27402 narrows that guidance into mandatory, device-focused baseline requirements; the family has since grown further, with ISO/IEC 27403:2024 covering IoT-domotics (connected-home environments) and ISO/IEC 27404:2025 defining a cybersecurity labelling framework for consumer IoT. Treat the family relationship as a map of the series rather than a verified clause-by-clause comparison against 27400/27403/27404's own primary texts.
How does 27402 relate to ETSI EN 303 645 and NIST IR 8259A?
Rather than compete with them, ISO/IEC 27402 was built to harmonise with them: the same ISO committee explainer states development of the standard "benefited from taking existing standards and best practices into account, such as an interagency report from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST IR 8259A), the UK's Code of Practice for Consumer IoT (converted to [ETSI EN 303 645](/guides/etsi-en-303-645-consumer-iot-security/)), and the C2 document on IoT Device Security Baseline Capabilities developed by the Council to Secure the Digital Economy (CSDE) consortium." Compare also our [NIST IoT device cybersecurity requirements guide](/guides/nist-iot-device-cybersecurity-requirements/) (the NISTIR 8259 series/SP 800-213) and [OWASP IoT Top 10 guide](/guides/owasp-iot-top-10/) — all describe overlapping device-baseline ground from different standards bodies, and 27402's explicit goal is to be the globally harmonised convergence point rather than a fourth independent list.
Sources
- ISO: ISO/IEC 27402:2023 — official catalogue listing
- IEC Webstore: ISO/IEC 27402:2023 — publication record (edition, date, ICS code, price)
- ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 committee: "ISO 27402: Ensuring Security and Privacy in the Evolving Landscape of IoT Devices" — explainer by project leaders Elaine Newton and Faud Khan
- iteh Standards: ISO/IEC 27402:2023 — catalogue listing (table of contents, clause structure)
- ISO: ISO/IEC 27400:2022, Cybersecurity — IoT security and privacy — Guidelines (parent standard in the series)
- iTeh Standards: ISO/IEC 27402:2023 publisher preview PDF (contents, introduction, Clauses 1–4, start of 5.1.1)
- ETSI EN 303 645 V3.1.3 (2024-09), Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements
- NIST IR 8259A, IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline (May 2020)
- NIST IR 8259B, IoT Non-Technical Supporting Capability Core Baseline (August 2021)
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