NIST SP 800-39, "Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View," sets out how an organization should structure information security risk management across three levels at once, rather than treating it as a property of a single system. Authored by NIST's Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative and published in March 2011, its own abstract states the goal is to provide guidance for "an integrated, organization-wide program for managing information security risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the operation and use of federal information systems." NIST's publication page lists it as Final, with no later revision or supersession found as of November 2026, and it describes the guidance as "intentionally broad-based," deliberately leaving assessment, response and monitoring detail to other NIST publications rather than duplicating them.
Key takeaways
- The publication's subtitle — "Organization, Mission, and Information System View" — names exactly these three tiers.
- SP 800-39 gives Tier 1 a named function: the risk executive (function).
- Tier 2 is where risk becomes architecture.
- Frame — establishes the context for risk-based decisions: the organization's risk assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance, and priorities that will shape how risk is assessed and treated at every tier.
What is the three-tier risk management hierarchy?
SP 800-39 organizes risk management activity into three tiers, each addressing a different scope of decision-making:
| Tier | Scope | What happens here |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Organization | Enterprise-wide | Risk management strategy, risk tolerance, investment decisions and governance that apply across every mission and every system |
| Tier 2 — Mission/Business Process | A specific mission or business function | Translating Tier 1 strategy into risk management for the processes and information flows that support a given mission, including how critical a given information system is to that mission |
| Tier 3 — Information System | A single system | Carrying out risk decisions for a specific system's life cycle — categorization, control selection, implementation, assessment and monitoring — consistent with the risk context set by Tier 1 and Tier 2 |
The publication's subtitle — "Organization, Mission, and Information System View" — names exactly these three tiers. The point of the hierarchy is that a Tier 3 decision (should this system accept this risk?) should not be made in isolation from the organization's overall risk tolerance (Tier 1) or the importance of the mission the system supports (Tier 2); each tier both constrains and informs the ones below it, and risk information from Tier 3 flows back up to inform Tier 1 and Tier 2 decisions over time.
Who owns risk at Tier 1?
SP 800-39 gives Tier 1 a named function: the risk executive (function). Section 2.3.2 describes it as "a functional role established within organizations to provide a more comprehensive, organization-wide approach to risk management," serving as "the common risk management resource" for senior leaders, mission and business owners, CIOs, CISOs, system owners and architects. It "presumes neither a specific organizational structure nor formal responsibility assigned to any one individual or group": one person or a group, such as an executive steering committee, can fill it.
Where decisions sit depends on the governance model. Appendix F names three:
| Governance model | Where authority sits | Fits a device or machine maker that… |
|---|---|---|
| Centralized | "Vested solely within central bodies" | Runs one product security team and one PSIRT for all product lines |
| Decentralized | Delegated to subordinate organizations, such as business units | Has acquired brands with their own engineering and release processes |
| Hybrid | Split between a central body and subordinate organizations | Sets company-wide policy centrally but lets each product line run its own release decisions |
What does Tier 2 add?
Tier 2 is where risk becomes architecture. Section 2.4.2 says enterprise architecture "promotes the concepts of segmentation, redundancy, and elimination of single points of failure," and section 2.4.3 places the information security architecture inside it, giving "traceability from the highest-level strategic goals and objectives of organizations" down to specific security solutions. For a product company, a Tier 2 "mission" can be a product family, a cloud update service or a support process that many releases depend on.
What are the four components of the risk management process?
Layered across all three tiers, SP 800-39 defines the risk management process itself as four components, intended to run continuously rather than as a one-time project:
Frame— establishes the context for risk-based decisions: the organization's risk assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance, and priorities that will shape how risk is assessed and treated at every tier. Assess— identifies threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood of occurrence and potential impact, to determine the level of risk facing the organization, mission, or system. NIST SP 800-30 provides the detailed methodology for this component. Respond— once risk has been assessed, selects and carries out an appropriate course of action (e.g., accepting, mitigating, transferring, or avoiding the risk), consistent with the risk tolerance set during Framing. Monitor— verifies over time that implemented responses remain effective, and evaluates whether changes to systems, missions, or the threat environment have altered the risk picture enough to require revisiting an earlier component.
Because Monitor's findings can trigger a return to Frame, Assess, or Respond, SP 800-39 presents this as a cycle integrated into ongoing operations, not a document produced once and filed away.
Which tasks sit inside each component?
Appendix E summarizes the process as twelve tasks:
| Component | Task | Name | What the task asks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frame | 1-1 | Risk assumptions | Assumptions that affect how risk is assessed, responded to and monitored |
| Frame | 1-2 | Risk constraints | Constraints on assessment, response and monitoring |
| Frame | 1-3 | Risk tolerance | The organization's level of risk tolerance |
| Frame | 1-4 | Priorities and trade-offs | Priorities and trade-offs in managing risk |
| Assess | 2-1 | Threat and vulnerability identification | Threats to and vulnerabilities in systems and their environments |
| Assess | 2-2 | Risk determination | Risk if identified threats exploit identified vulnerabilities |
| Respond | 3-1 | Risk response identification | Alternative courses of action |
| Respond | 3-2 | Evaluation of alternatives | Evaluate those alternatives |
| Respond | 3-3 | Risk response decision | Decide the course of action |
| Respond | 3-4 | Risk response implementation | Implement it |
| Monitor | 4-1 | Risk monitoring strategy | Purpose, type and frequency of monitoring |
| Monitor | 4-2 | Risk monitoring | Verify compliance, response effectiveness, and identify changes |
Which risk responses does SP 800-39 allow?
Task 3-1 lists five responses: "(i) risk acceptance; (ii) risk avoidance; (iii) risk mitigation; (iv) risk sharing; (v) risk transfer; or (vi) a combination of the above." The device examples are illustrations, not NIST text:
| Response | SP 800-39's condition | Device maker example |
|---|---|---|
| Accept | Risk is "within the organizational risk tolerance" | A low-severity CVE in a component that is present but not exposed on any interface, recorded with the reasoning |
| Avoid | Risk "exceeds the organizational risk tolerance" and is removed by eliminating the activity or technology | Dropping a legacy remote-management protocol from the next firmware |
| Mitigate | The portion "that cannot be accepted, avoided, shared, or transferred" | Patching the component, or disabling the affected service by default |
| Share | Shifts "a portion of risk responsibility or liability" to a party better placed to handle it | Agreeing with a module supplier that it ships fixed firmware within a set time |
| Transfer | Shifts "the entire risk responsibility or liability," for example via insurance | Cyber insurance; NIST notes transfer "reduces neither the likelihood of harmful events occurring nor the consequences" |
NIST also describes a "course of action" as a time-phased combination: accept briefly, then avoid, then mitigate.
How do the trust models apply to suppliers and customers?
Appendix G describes how one organization gains enough trust in another to rely on its products or services. It says "no single trust model is inherently better than any other model":
| Trust model | SP 800-39's basis for trust | Where a device maker meets it |
|---|---|---|
| Validated | A body of evidence, such as "security plan, assessment results" | Your customer asks for an SBOM, test reports and a vulnerability handling policy |
| Direct historical | The other party's track record | A long-standing customer relies on your past advisory record |
| Mediated | A mutually trusted third party | A certification body or test lab vouches for the product |
| Mandated | A mandate from an authority, such as a regulation or directive | A regulator requires conformity before market access |
| Hybrid | A combination of the above | Most real supplier relationships |
Validated trust is the one product teams can most influence: "the more evidence provided between organizations as well as the quality of such evidence, the greater the degree of trust that can be achieved."
How does SP 800-39 relate to SP 800-37 and SP 800-30?
SP 800-39 sits at the top of a deliberately layered set of NIST risk publications. It sets the organization-wide structure — the three tiers and the four-component process — while leaving the operational detail to publications built specifically for that purpose:
- NIST SP 800-37, the Risk Management Framework (RMF), operationalizes the Assess, Respond and Monitor components for a single Tier 3 information system through its seven steps (Prepare, Categorize, Select, Implement, Assess, Authorize, Monitor).
- NIST SP 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (Rev. 1), provides the detailed methodology behind the Assess component specifically — identifying threat sources, threat events, vulnerabilities, likelihood and impact.
- NIST SP 800-53 supplies the control catalog that the Respond component draws from once a risk response has been selected.
Read together, SP 800-39 answers "how should risk management be structured across the organization," while SP 800-37 and SP 800-30 answer "how do we actually assess and manage risk for this system" — a device or firmware maker building an internal risk program benefits from reading SP 800-39 first to set that structure before adopting RMF-style system-level steps. The CSRC abstract adds that the guidance is "complementary to and can be used as part of a more comprehensive Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program"; NIST IR 8286 covers that link, and CSF 2.0's GOVERN Function plays a similar Tier 1 role.
How does a device maker map the three tiers?
SP 800-39 was written for federal information systems, so mapping it onto a product company is an adaptation. One workable mapping:
| Tier | Product company equivalent | Typical artifacts |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | The company | Product security policy, written risk tolerance (for example, which known-vulnerability states may ship), PSIRT charter |
| Tier 2 | A product family or shared service | Reference architecture, shared SDK and update service, supplier list per family |
| Tier 3 | One product model and its firmware release | SBOM, risk assessment, release decision, advisories |
Worked example: how does one CVE decision move through the tiers?
Synthetic example. The company, product, CVE and dates are invented to show the flow; they do not describe any real product or NIST guidance.
A router maker's Tier 1 tolerance (Task 1-3) reads: "No shipping firmware with a vulnerability listed in CISA's KEV catalog in a component reachable from the WAN side."
Monitor (4-2), Tier 3On 3 March, matching the SBOM of firmware 5.4 against public data flags a newly KEV-listed CVE in the bundled web server (see KEV and EPSS prioritization). Assess (2-1, 2-2), Tier 3Engineers confirm the web server is reachable from the WAN only when remote management is switched on; risk for that configuration is high. Frame check, Tier 1The finding breaks the stated tolerance for that configuration, so acceptance is off the table. Respond (3-1 to 3-3), Tier 2Alternatives: patch now, or disable remote management by default across the product family. The family owner picks both: a configuration change in 5.4.1 within days, the patched component in 5.5. Respond (3-4), Tier 3Releases ship; the advisory states affected versions and the workaround. A VEX statement records the status per version. Monitor (4-1), Tier 1The risk executive (function) reviews why the component was WAN-reachable at all and tightens the family reference architecture.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Skipping Frame. Without a written tolerance, every Tier 3 decision is argued from scratch.
- Using only "mitigate." Accept and avoid are legitimate responses when recorded with reasons.
- Treating transfer as risk reduction. NIST says it changes neither likelihood nor consequences.
- Letting Tier 3 findings stop at engineering. Patterns across releases belong at Tier 1 and Tier 2.
- Citing SP 800-39 as a requirement. It is federal guidance; for a device maker it is a structure to borrow.
What is a workable starting point?
Write down Tier 1 before building Tier 3 paperworkAn organization that jumps straight to system-level risk assessments without first agreeing on organizational risk tolerance ends up with inconsistent, uncomparable risk calls across systems. Name the Tier 2 missions a given system actually supportsThis is what lets a Tier 3 risk decision be weighed against mission impact, rather than evaluated as if every system mattered equally. Treat Frame as a living artifact, not a one-time memoRisk tolerance and assumptions should be revisited whenever Monitor surfaces a material change, not only when a new system is onboarded. Use SP 800-39 for structure, not for assessment or control detailWhen it's time to actually assess a system's risk or select controls, move to SP 800-30 and SP 800-53/SP 800-37 respectively — SP 800-39 intentionally does not duplicate that content.
SoftWSP's firmware and device security assessments produce evidence — components from an extracted SBOM, known CVEs matched against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories, in a cited report an engineer reviews — that can feed a Tier 3 risk assessment and response decision within a broader SP 800-39-style risk management program: see Device & Firmware Security.
This guide summarises NIST SP 800-39 (March 2011) and its relationship to SP 800-37 and SP 800-30; it is not a substitute for the full text and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NIST SP 800-39?
"Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View" — a NIST publication authored by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative. Per its own abstract, it provides guidance for "an integrated, organization-wide program for managing information security risk to organizational operations..., organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the operation and use of federal information systems." It was published in March 2011 and NIST's own publication page lists it as current (Final), with no later revision or withdrawal notice found as of November 2026.
What are the three tiers in SP 800-39's risk management hierarchy?
SP 800-39 frames information security risk management as a multi-tiered activity: Tier 1, the organization level, where enterprise-wide risk management strategy, risk tolerance and governance are set; Tier 2, the mission/business process level, where that strategy is translated into risk management for specific mission and business functions, including how information systems support them; and Tier 3, the information system level, where risk decisions are carried out for individual systems, consistent with the risk context and priorities set at Tier 1 and Tier 2. The publication's own abstract frames this as the "Organization, Mission, and Information System View" in its subtitle.
What are the four components of the risk management process?
Frame, Assess, Respond and Monitor. Frame establishes the context for risk-based decisions — assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance and priorities. Assess identifies threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood and impact to determine risk. Respond selects and implements a course of action once risk has been assessed, consistent with the organization's risk tolerance. Monitor verifies that implemented risk responses remain effective over time and that changes to systems or environments are evaluated for their effect on risk. SP 800-39 presents these as an ongoing, cyclical process rather than a one-time sequence.
How does SP 800-39 relate to SP 800-37 and SP 800-30?
SP 800-39 sits above both in NIST's risk management publication set: it provides the organization-wide risk management structure (the three tiers and the Frame/Assess/Respond/Monitor process), while [NIST SP 800-37](/guides/nist-sp-800-37-risk-management-framework/) operationalizes the Assess, Respond and Monitor components for a single information system through the seven-step Risk Management Framework (RMF), and NIST SP 800-30 provides detailed methodology for the Assess component specifically — conducting a risk assessment. SP 800-39's own abstract describes its guidance as "intentionally broad-based," leaving assessment, response and monitoring detail to "other supporting NIST security standards and guidelines," which is exactly the role SP 800-37 and SP 800-30 fill.
Sources
- NIST: SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View — publication page
- NIST SP 800-39 (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative), full text PDF
- NIST: SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations — publication page
- NIST: SP 800-30 Rev. 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments — publication page
- NIST: IR 8286, Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) — publication page
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