ISO/SAE 21434:2021, "Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering," is the joint ISO/SAE standard that gives vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers a common engineering process for managing cybersecurity risk across a vehicle's electrical and electronic (E/E) systems. Per a standards-catalogue listing of the document, its scope is to specify "engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces." It was jointly developed by ISO technical committee TC 22/SC 32 and SAE's Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee, published in its first edition on 30 August 2021, and runs 81 pages across 15 clauses plus annexes. Where UN R155 is the binding type-approval law requiring a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS), ISO/SAE 21434 is the voluntary engineering standard manufacturers commonly build that CSMS around.
Key takeaways
- It applies to series production.
- Clause 15 defines the methods that turn a vehicle's E/E architecture into a documented, prioritised set of cybersecurity goals that Clauses 9–14 then have to satisfy.
- UN Regulation No 155, published in the EU Official Journal on 9 March 2021 (OJ L 82, p.
- Synthetic example: no real company or product.
What does the standard say about its own scope?
The ISO/SAE 21434:2021 preview published on iTeh (cover, foreword, introduction and clauses 1 to 5) answers most "does it apply to us?" questions in the standard's own words:
- It applies to series production. It covers "series production road vehicle E/E systems, including their components and interfaces, whose development or modification began after the publication of this document." Clause 4 adds that this means "not a prototype", and that aftermarket and service parts are included.
- Back-end servers are context, not scope. "Systems external to the vehicle (e.g. back-end servers) can be considered for cybersecurity purposes but are not in the scope of this document."
- It names no technology. "This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity."
- It replaced SAE J3061. The foreword states that the first edition "cancels and supersedes SAE J3061:2016", with a "complete rework of contents and structure". It was prepared by ISO/TC 22/SC 32 and the SAE TEVEES18A Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee, and is published by ISO in Switzerland and by SAE International in the USA.
- Its only normative reference is functional safety. Clause 2 lists ISO 26262-3:2018 (the concept phase of the functional-safety standard) and nothing else.
- It is voluntary. The SAE board rule quoted in the foreword reads: "The use of this document is entirely voluntary."
The introduction also says the document "can be used to implement a cybersecurity management system including cybersecurity risk management", which is the bridge to UN R155 below.
How are the fifteen clauses organised?
The clauses follow the lifecycle of an item, with organisational and supply-chain clauses first and the risk-assessment toolbox last:
| Clauses | What they cover |
|---|---|
| 1–3 | Scope, normative references, terms and definitions |
| 4 | General considerations |
| 5–8 | Organizational and project-dependent cybersecurity management; distributed cybersecurity activities (the supplier-interface clauses); continual cybersecurity activities |
| 9–11 | Concept phase (item definition and TARA inputs); product development; cybersecurity validation |
| 12–14 | Production; operations and maintenance; end of cybersecurity support and decommissioning |
| 15 | Threat analysis and risk assessment methods (TARA) |
Clauses 5 to 15 each carry their own objectives, provisions and work products, which the introduction defines as "the results of cybersecurity activities that fulfil one or more associated requirements." Every provision has a fixed identifier: RQ for a requirement, RC for a recommendation, PM for a permission and WP for a work product, followed by the clause number and a sequence number. [RQ-05-01], for example, is the first requirement of Clause 5: the organisation "shall define a cybersecurity policy" that acknowledges road vehicle cybersecurity risks and records executive management's commitment to manage them. Supplier contracts and audit checklists quote these identifiers, so it pays to use them in your own evidence index.
The preview also shows how the standard expects to sit beside existing quality systems: Clause 5 lists IATF 16949 with ISO 9001, Automotive SPICE and ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 as "existing evidence of conformity" that can be reused, and a note points vulnerability disclosure rules toward ISO 29147.
The same listing notes at least three annexes attached to the normative clauses: Annex A (a summary of activities and work products), Annex B (cybersecurity culture examples), and Annex D (cybersecurity relevance assessment methods) — the informative material that turns the clause requirements into something a program can actually run against.
TARA: what is Clause 15's risk engine?
Clause 15 defines the methods that turn a vehicle's E/E architecture into a documented, prioritised set of cybersecurity goals that Clauses 9–14 then have to satisfy. A detailed explainer this guide checked describes TARA as a seven-step process: asset identification, threat scenario identification, impact rating (scored across safety, financial, operational and privacy dimensions), attack path analysis, attack feasibility rating, risk value determination, and risk treatment — where each risk ends up avoided, reduced, shared/transferred, or accepted. The exact wording and step boundaries vary slightly between the secondary sources this guide checked, which is unsurprising for a methodology whose clause-level text sits behind ISO's paywall; what is consistent across sources is that TARA output — not an auditor's opinion — is what sets the cybersecurity goals the rest of the standard works against.
The definitions in Clause 3 fix the vocabulary of that analysis. A damage scenario is an "adverse consequence involving a vehicle or vehicle function and affecting a road user"; a threat scenario is a "potential cause of compromise of cybersecurity properties of one or more assets in order to realize a damage scenario"; and risk is expressed "in terms of attack feasibility and impact". The abbreviations list includes CVSS, which is one of the inputs a team can use when rating the feasibility of a known vulnerability.
What is a Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL)?
ISO/SAE 21434 pairs TARA with a Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) concept, described by an automotive-cybersecurity explainer this guide checked as the standard's rough counterpart to the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) used in the functional-safety standard ISO 26262. Rather than a binary compliant/non-compliant gate, CAL is meant to communicate how much engineering rigor a given item or component's assessed risk calls for — development and verification methods, vulnerability-analysis depth, and assessment approach can all scale with the assigned CAL. The standard's own Annex E, which defines the exact CAL level count and thresholds, is paywalled; multiple secondary sources describe a four-level 1–4 scale, but the purchased standard, not this guide, is the authoritative source for that figure in a supplier contract or an audit.
What does UN R155 require, and which clause answers it?
UN Regulation No 155, published in the EU Official Journal on 9 March 2021 (OJ L 82, p. 30) and in force since 22 January 2021, applies to vehicles of categories M and N, to category O trailers "if fitted with at least one electronic control unit", and to L6 and L7 vehicles with automated driving from level 3. It places two layers of duty on the vehicle manufacturer: a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) with a Certificate of Compliance valid for three years, and cybersecurity requirements for each vehicle type it approves.
ISO/SAE 21434 is voluntary; UN R155 is the binding type-approval regulation that actually gates market access in UNECE 1958 Agreement countries. An automotive-cybersecurity compliance explainer this guide checked puts the division plainly: "the UN R155 regulation defines what must be established for vehicle cybersecurity, [and] the ISO/SAE 21434 standard provides the framework for how to implement it." The table is our reading of where the standard's clauses answer the regulation's paragraphs; it is not an official correspondence table.
| UN R155 paragraph | What it requires | ISO/SAE 21434 clauses that produce the evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 7.2.2.1 | CSMS covers development, production and post-production phases | 5, 6, 9–14 |
| 7.2.2.2 (b)–(d) | Identify risks, considering the threats in Annex 5 Part A; assess, categorise and treat them; verify they are managed | 9, 15 |
| 7.2.2.2 (e), 7.3.6 | Test the cybersecurity of a vehicle type, before type approval | 10, 11 |
| 7.2.2.2 (g), 7.2.2.4 | Monitor, detect and respond to attacks, threats and vulnerabilities, continually and after first registration | 8, 13 |
| 7.2.2.3 | Mitigate threats and vulnerabilities that need a response "within a reasonable timeframe" | 8, 13 |
| 7.2.2.5, 7.3.2 | Manage dependencies on suppliers and supplier-related risks | 7 (cybersecurity interface agreement), 6 |
| 7.4.1 | Report monitoring results to the approval authority "at least once a year" | Output of 8 and 13 |
Annex 5 Part A groups the threats into seven areas, from back-end servers and communication channels to update procedures and "potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited if not sufficiently protected or hardened". Two of its examples read like a firmware review checklist: software bugs, "particularly true if software has not been tested to verify that known bad code/bugs is not present", and "remainders from development (e.g. debug ports, JTAG ports, microprocessors, development certificates, developer passwords)".
In practice, manufacturers build their CSMS around the standard's organizational and project-dependent cybersecurity management clauses (5–8), and type-approval auditors commonly reference it when assessing whether a CSMS meets R155's risk-management expectations — but holding an ISO/SAE 21434-conformant process does not, on its own, equal R155 certification. Software updates fall under the companion UN R156 and ISO 24089. See our dedicated UN R155, R156 and ISO/SAE 21434 guide for the regulation's dates and vehicle-category coverage.
Is a second edition on the way?
Industry trackers reported that, as of October 2026, a second edition of ISO/SAE 21434 had moved from systematic review into an Approved Work Item with a working draft under ISO/TC 22/SC 32 — reportedly with no intended change to overall scope or structure, but folding in verification-and-validation guidance (currently drafted separately as ISO/SAE TR 8477) and new "generic component" / "out of context" application guidance. Those reports come from industry trackers; ISO's project page for the edition is the reference for any date or scope change. The 2021 first edition already defines "out-of-context" as "not developed in the context of a specific item", for example a processing unit "with assumed cybersecurity requirements to be integrated in different items."
Worked example: what does an ECU supplier hand over?
Synthetic example: no real company or product. A Tier 2 supplier builds a telematics control unit (TCU) for two OEMs: a Linux-based application processor, a cellular modem, a CAN interface and a diagnostic port. One OEM's CSMS audit is due, and its purchasing team sends a cybersecurity questionnaire.
Agree the work splitSupplier and OEM sign a cybersecurity interface agreement, the standard's term for the customer–supplier agreement on distributed activities, with a RASIC table that says who is responsible, accountable, supporting, informed and consulted for each activity. Share TARA inputsThe OEM owns the item-level TARA. The supplier supplies the component's assets, interfaces (cellular, CAN, UDS diagnostics) and assumed operating environment. Deliver the component inventoryA firmware SBOM of release 4.0.2 lists the kernel, bootloader, modem stack and open-source libraries. Matching it against NVD and CISA KEV gives a dated vulnerability list; each entry gets a triage decision, the activity Clause 3 defines as determining relevance "to an item or component." Close development remaindersThe debug UART and JTAG pads named in R155 Annex 5 are disabled in production units, with test evidence. Commit to monitoringThe agreement records how the supplier reports new vulnerabilities to the OEM, using the ISO 29147 / 30111 disclosure process, so the OEM can meet R155's yearly reporting.
Takeaway. The OEM signs the R155 application, but its monitoring and supplier paragraphs are only as good as the inventory and vulnerability records each supplier hands over.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Confusing the standard with the approval. A conformant process supports a CSMS audit; it is not an R155 certificate.
- Running TARA after design freeze. Goals written after the architecture is fixed tend to describe controls already built.
- Leaving back-end systems out of the risk picture. The standard scopes them out, but R155 Annex 5 Part A starts with back-end server threats.
- One SBOM per programme. Each software release changes the component list; vulnerability monitoring has to follow the release that is in the field.
- Mixing up assessment schemes. TISAX assesses information security at a supplier's sites; it does not assess a product against ISO/SAE 21434.
Where should a supplier start?
Start item definition and TARA before writing a line of codeClause 15's output — the cybersecurity goals — is a direct input to Clause 9's concept phase; retrofitting a TARA onto an already-built E/E architecture produces weaker goals than running it first. Use CAL to set engineering rigor per item, not as a one-time labelA high-CAL item should get deeper vulnerability analysis and verification, not just a higher number in a spreadsheet. Treat Clauses 7–8 (distributed and continual cybersecurity activities) as your supplier-contract clausesMost real E/E architectures split cybersecurity work across a Tier 1/Tier 2 supply chain; these clauses are where that split gets formalised into a Cybersecurity Interface Agreement. Keep a traceable cybersecurity case, linking TARA goals through to the specific product-development and validation work products that address them — the same traceability discipline firmware teams already apply when mapping requirements to CWE Top 25 weaknesses or IEC 62443-4-1 process evidence. Index your evidence by work-product IDAuditors and OEM questionnaires quote RQ and WP identifiers; a table that links each to a document saves rework at every audit. Plan for continual activities from day oneClause 8 vulnerability management and R155's monitoring duty both run for the life of the vehicle type, so budget monitoring per released software version. The same discipline is what FDA expects of medical device makers in its premarket cybersecurity guidance.
SoftWSP supports the inventory and monitoring part of this work for Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. The platform extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, drafts a cited report for an engineer to review, and sends watchlist alerts when a new CVE matches a tracked CVE id or vendor/product. TARA, CAL assignment and triage decisions stay with the engineering team. See device & firmware security services, or open an SBOM in the free SBOM viewer.
This guide summarises the publicly available front matter and opening clauses of ISO/SAE 21434:2021 and the published text of UN Regulation No 155; it is not a substitute for the purchased standard and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is ISO/SAE 21434?
Per a standards-catalogue listing of the document (iteh.ai, a standards reseller that republishes ISO's own front-matter and abstract text), ISO/SAE 21434:2021's scope reads: "This document specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces." It was jointly developed by ISO technical committee TC 22/SC 32 (Road vehicles — Electrical and electronic components and general system aspects) together with SAE's Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee, published as a first edition on 30 August 2021, and runs 81 pages across 15 clauses plus annexes. It applies to series-production road-vehicle E/E systems whose development began after publication, and it is technology-agnostic: it specifies engineering outcomes and work products, not a mandated tool or architecture.
What is TARA, and how many steps does it have?
TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) is the subject of the standard's Clause 15, and its output — a documented set of cybersecurity goals for each identified risk — feeds every other clause. Per a detailed automotive-engineering explainer this guide checked (Jama Software), TARA runs as a seven-step process: asset identification, threat scenario identification, impact rating (scored across safety, financial, operational and privacy dimensions), attack path analysis, attack feasibility rating, risk value determination, and risk treatment, where each identified risk is avoided, reduced, shared/transferred, or accepted. Other secondary explainers this guide checked group the same activity into five or six stages instead of seven — expected paraphrase drift around a methodology whose exact clause wording sits behind ISO's paywall. Treat the step names above as the consistent core across sources, not a verbatim clause-15 quote.
What is a Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL)?
ISO/SAE 21434 defines a Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) as its rough counterpart to the Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) used in the functional-safety standard ISO 26262 — a way to state, in terms of required engineering rigor rather than a pass/fail test, how much assurance work a given item or component needs. An automotive-cybersecurity explainer this guide checked (Embitel) confirms the standard "defines Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CALs)" as the TARA-driven counterpart to ASIL. The standard's own Annex E is paywalled; a four-level 1-4 scale is widely reported by secondary industry sources, but the purchased standard, not this guide, is the authoritative source for that specific count.
Does ISO/SAE 21434 compliance satisfy UN R155, and is a new edition coming?
No — ISO/SAE 21434 is a voluntary engineering standard, not the legal text itself. Per an automotive-cybersecurity compliance explainer this guide checked (Autocrypt), "the UN R155 regulation defines what must be established for vehicle cybersecurity, [and] the ISO/SAE 21434 standard provides the framework for how to implement it" — manufacturers commonly build their Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) around it, and approval authorities commonly reference it during a CSMS audit, but holding an ISO/SAE 21434-conformant process is not, by itself, a UN R155 type-approval certificate. See our [UN R155, R156 and ISO/SAE 21434 guide](/guides/automotive-cybersecurity-un-r155-r156/) for the regulatory detail. Separately, industry trackers reported in October 2026 that a second edition had moved into early drafting at ISO/TC 22/SC 32; that status is not confirmed by ISO's own catalogue, so treat any second-edition timeline as unconfirmed until checked there.
Sources
- iTeh Standards: ISO/SAE 21434:2021 — catalogue listing (scope, edition, pages, ICS code, committee)
- Jama Software: What Is ISO 21434? Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering Explained (clause structure, TARA steps)
- Embitel: What is ISO 21434 (Cybersecurity Assurance Levels, TARA)
- Autocrypt: UNECE Regulation and ISO Standards for Automotive Compliance (R155/R156 vs. ISO/SAE 21434 & ISO 24089)
- ISO/SAE 21434:2021 preview PDF (iTeh): foreword, introduction, clauses 1-4 and the start of clause 5 (scope, normative reference, terms, RQ/RC/PM/WP identifiers)
- UN Regulation No 155: uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cybersecurity and cybersecurity management system (OJ L 82, 9.3.2021, p. 30)
- SAE International: ISO/SAE 21434 product page
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