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ISO/IEC 27036 (Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships), explained

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ISO/IEC 27036, "Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships," is a four-part International Standard from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 that tells an acquirer and a supplier how to manage the information security risk that sits between them — not inside either organization's own network, but in the handoffs, contracts and shared visibility of the relationship itself. Published across four separately-dated parts (2021, 2022, 2023 and 2016), it is one of the few ISO/IEC standards that names software bill of materials (SBoM) as a defined term in its own text, making it directly relevant to anyone already building SBOM and supply-chain-risk practices around firmware.

Key takeaways

  • Per Part 1's own Clause 1 scope text in the ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021 preview: it "is an introductory part of ISO/IEC 27036.
  • Part 2 is the family's only requirements document.
  • It explicitly excludes business continuity and resiliency ("ISO/IEC 27031 addresses" that separately).
  • Part 1's introduction says it "provides further detailed implementation guidance on the controls dealing with supplier relationships that are described as general recommendations in ISO/IEC 27002".

What do the four parts actually cover?

Part Title Current edition Published What it is
Part 1 Overview and concepts 2nd edition September 2021 Introductory: shared vocabulary and concepts, plus a guided tour of what Parts 2-4 each cover
Part 2 Requirements 2nd edition June 2022 The only part with "shall"-level requirements, for defining, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving acquirer/supplier relationships
Part 3 Guidelines for hardware, software, and services supply chain security 2nd edition June 2023 Guidance on gaining visibility into multi-layered, physically dispersed supply chains, responding to the risks they create, and integrating security into system/software life cycle processes
Part 4 Guidelines for security of cloud services 1st edition October 2016 Guidance for cloud service customers and providers; assumes Parts 1-3 are already being followed

Per Part 1's own Clause 1 scope text in the ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021 preview: it "is an introductory part of ISO/IEC 27036. It provides an overview of the guidance intended to assist organizations in securing their information and information systems within the context of supplier relationships. It also introduces concepts that are described in detail in the other parts of ISO/IEC 27036. This document addresses perspectives of both acquirers and suppliers."

Part 1's definitions matter more to firmware teams than its length suggests. Its "supplier" definition (3.8) adds a note that suppliers include organisations "that do not permit negotiation with agreements, e.g. end-user license agreements, terms of use, or open source products' copyright or intellectual property releases". An open-source library pulled into a firmware build is a supplier relationship in 27036's terms, even though nobody signed a contract.

Requirements vs. guidance: why is Part 2 different?

Part 2 is the family's only requirements document. Secondary summaries describe its requirements as ones an organization can build directly into an ISO/IEC 27001 information security management system (see ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS requirements), assessed alongside that certification. The precise assessment pathway sits in ISO/IEC 27001's own clause text, not this guide — what is confirmed, from Part 2's own catalogue abstract, is that it "specifies fundamental information security requirements for defining, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving supplier and acquirer relationships," applicable to any organization "regardless of type, size and nature."

Parts 1, 3 and 4, by contrast, are guidance documents: they tell you how to think about and implement supplier-relationship security, but do not themselves set a pass/fail bar the way Part 2 does.

Part 2 has two layers, according to the overview presented at NIST's Software Supply Chain Assurance forum in September 2023. Clause 6 adds security requirements to the ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 life cycle processes "regardless of lifecycle phase". Clause 7 covers one supplier relationship from start to end:

Part 2 clause Lifecycle stage What a device maker typically produces
7.1 Supplier relationship planning A list of which suppliers touch firmware, keys or customer data, and how critical each is
7.2 Supplier selection Security questions asked before choosing a module, RTOS, SDK or contract manufacturer
7.3 Supplier relationship agreement Contract terms: SBOM delivery, vulnerability notice times, support period, right to audit
7.4 Supplier relationship management Tracking that the terms are met: advisories received, patches delivered, SBOM updates
7.5 Supplier relationship termination Return or destruction of keys and source, and a plan for parts that leave support

The right-hand column is this guide's illustration of typical outputs, not text quoted from the standard.

What does Part 3 cover, and what does it exclude?

Part 3's own Clause 1 (Scope), in the ISO/IEC 27036-3:2023 preview, states it provides guidance to acquirers and suppliers of hardware, software and services regarding:

  1. "gaining visibility into and managing the information security risks caused by physically dispersed and multi-layered hardware, software, and services supply chains";
  2. "responding to risks stemming from this physically dispersed and multi-layered hardware, software, and services supply chain that can have an information security impact on the organizations using these products and services"; and
  3. "integrating information security processes and practices into the system and software life cycle processes, as described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207, while supporting information security controls, as described in ISO/IEC 27002."

It explicitly excludes business continuity and resiliency ("ISO/IEC 27031 addresses" that separately). Part 3's Clause 3.1 defines software bill of materials (SBoM) as an "inventory of software components, sub-components and dependencies with associated information" — the same concept covered in depth in firmware SBOM: building one when you don't have the source, confirming that supply-chain visibility and SBOM practice sit squarely inside what Part 3 expects an organization to have. The 2023 edition also added an informative Annex B, "Essential elements of a software bill of materials", listed in its contents; the format choice is left open (see CycloneDX vs SPDX).

Three more points from the preview are directly useful to device makers:

  • Relationship types (5.3). The list runs from suppliers that manage the acquirer's systems, through product development and "commercial-off-the-shelf product suppliers", to "open source product suppliers and distributors".
  • Threats (5.2). Part 3 names intentional events "such as malicious code insertion and presence of counterfeit products" and unintentional ones "such as poor software development practices or software vulnerabilities". Counterfeit parts make hardware provenance part of the scope; a hardware bill of materials is the matching artefact.
  • Each link repeats the steps. The introduction says guidance focuses on the first acquirer-supplier link, but "the principal steps should be applied throughout the chain, starting when the first supplier becomes an acquirer". A module maker that buys a chipset SDK is an acquirer too.

How do the parts map to the ISO/IEC 27002 supplier controls?

Part 1's introduction says it "provides further detailed implementation guidance on the controls dealing with supplier relationships that are described as general recommendations in ISO/IEC 27002". In the ISO/IEC 27002:2022 contents, those are five organizational controls:

ISO/IEC 27002:2022 control Closest ISO/IEC 27036 part (this guide's mapping)
5.19 Information security in supplier relationships Part 1 concepts; Part 2 Clause 7.1-7.2
5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements Part 2 Clause 7.3
5.21 Managing information security in the ICT supply chain Part 3 (Annex A maps its Clause 6 to 27002)
5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services Part 2 Clause 7.4
5.23 Information security for use of cloud services Part 4

ISO/IEC 27001's Annex A lists the same controls, so an ISMS audit is where they come up; 27036 is where the detail behind them sits.

Which parts have been revised, and which are current?

ISO/IEC 27036 has gone through a staggered revision wave since 2021:

Part Previous edition Current edition What changed
Part 1 2014 2021 Per its own foreword, a "minor revision": title change, a revised Clause 2, drafting-rule alignment, and the full ISO/IEC 27036 series added to the Bibliography; under periodical review since July 2026
Part 2 2014 2022 Technical revision restating the fundamental requirements
Part 3 2013 2023 Technical revision that broadened the original "ICT supply chain" framing to hardware, software and services generally; structure realigned with the newest ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288; former Annex A removed, Annex B (SBOM elements) added
Part 4 — 2016 (confirmed 2026) No new edition; the systematic review ended with the text confirmed

One easy-to-miss inconsistency this creates: Part 1's own 2021 table of contents still describes Part 3, in its guided-tour section, as "Guidelines for information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain security" — Part 3's pre-2023 title and framing. Part 1 was finalized before Part 3's 2023 revision broadened that scope beyond ICT, so Part 1's internal description of Part 3 is, strictly, out of date relative to Part 3's current text. The September 2023 NIST forum presentation confirmed the family was "undergoing the first round of revisions" at that time, with Part 4's revision "pending ISO/IEC 27017 WD reaching DIS". That dependency has since resolved differently: ISO/IEC 27017:2026 was published in July 2026, and the Part 4 catalogue record shows stage 90.93, "International Standard confirmed", completed 29 August 2026. The Part 1 record shows stage 90.20, "under periodical review", from 15 July 2026.

How does it fit with other supply-chain work?

The same September 2023 presentation describes ISO/IEC 27036 as intentionally aligned with ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 (systems and software engineering life cycle processes), with Part 2 and Part 3 each mapping their own additional requirements onto specific 15288 life cycle process clauses (agreement processes, technical management processes, technical processes). Part 3's own Clause 4 states plainly that its structure "is harmonized with ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207," and that it "is also harmonized with ISO/IEC 27002 and references relevant information security controls within the life cycle processes with the mapping provided in Annex A" — meaning a Part 3 implementation is designed to plug into controls your organization may already run under ISO/IEC 27002, not replace them.

For device and firmware makers, ISO/IEC 27036 sits alongside two other things SoftWSP guides already cover: NIST SP 800-161: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM), which addresses the same supply-chain-trust question from a US federal standards perspective, and the EU Cyber Resilience Act's own supplier and component due-diligence duties — see CRA Annex I explained. None of the three substitute for each other; they overlap in the questions they ask about suppliers without being formally interchangeable. NIST does draw on 27036 directly: SP 800-161r1-upd1 lists ISO/IEC 27036-2 (citing the 2014 edition) in its references, adapts its glossary definition of "visibility" from 27036, and its assessment scoping questionnaire asks: "Does the manufacturer have processes for product integrity that conform to standards such as ISO 27036 or SAE AS6171?" For connected products specifically, ENISA's IoT supply chain guidelines cover similar ground with device examples.

Worked example: what should a device maker ask a module supplier?

Synthetic example, labelled: the company, supplier and answers are invented to show the method.

A maker of smart water meters buys a cellular module that runs the supplier's own firmware. It applies Part 2 Clause 7 and Part 3 to that one relationship:

Question to the supplier Where it comes from Evidence the maker asks for
Which open-source and third-party components are in the module firmware? Part 3 3.1 and Annex B (SBoM) A machine-readable SBOM per firmware release
How will you tell us about vulnerabilities in those components, and how fast? Part 2 7.3 agreement; 7.4 management A named contact and a notice period written into the contract
How long will security updates be provided? Part 2 7.3; 7.5 termination A support end date per module version
Which of your own suppliers (chipset, RTOS, SDK) are you relying on? Part 3 introduction: each supplier is also an acquirer A tier-2 list for the security-relevant components
How are signing keys and source handled at the end of the relationship? Part 2 7.5 A key and source escrow or destruction clause

The answers feed the meter maker's own technical documentation: the module SBOM becomes a nested component in the meter SBOM, and the support end date sets the meter's own support period for that hardware revision.

What is a workable starting point?

  1. Start with Part 1 as a glossary, not a requirements document— it exists to give acquirer and supplier teams shared vocabulary before anyone reads Parts 2-4.
  2. Treat Part 2 as the part worth building a management-system case around, if your organization already runs or is pursuing ISO/IEC 27001 certification; Parts 1, 3 and 4 inform practice without creating an assessable "shall" bar of their own.
  3. Use Part 3's visibility-and-response framing to structure your component sourcing questions— "where did this come from, who touched it, and what happens if it's compromised" maps directly onto the SBOM and vendor-traceability work firmware teams already need for CRA and NIST C-SCRM.
  4. Read Part 4 together with ISO/IEC 27017:2026— Part 4 was confirmed in 2026 without a new edition, so its 2016 text now sits beside a newer cloud-controls standard.
  5. Check the current edition before citing a clause number— three of the four parts have been revised since 2021, and older citations (especially ones referencing the pre-2023 Part 3 as "ICT supply chain security") may point at superseded text.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Ignoring open-source suppliers. Part 1's supplier note covers open-source releases; a supplier register that lists only paid vendors misses most of a firmware image.
  • Asking for an SBOM once. A supplier SBOM describes one firmware release; the agreement should require a new one with each release.
  • Stopping at tier 1. Part 3 expects each supplier to repeat the steps with its own suppliers; ask who they rely on.
  • Writing policy without records. The 27002 supplier controls are checked against evidence: agreements, received SBOMs, advisory notices and support dates per supplier.

SoftWSP's firmware assessments build part of the component-level evidence a Part 2 or Part 3 supplier-relationship program needs: an SBOM extracted from a supplier's firmware image and matched against known vulnerabilities, with a cited report for engineer review. The supplier's processes and contracts remain for your own team to assess. See device & firmware security.

This guide summarises ISO's own published preview text of ISO/IEC 27036-1 and -3, their catalogue records, and independent secondary analysis of the standard; it is not a substitute for the purchased ISO/IEC text and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is ISO/IEC 27036?

ISO/IEC 27036, "Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships," is a four-part International Standard from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 covering how an acquirer and a supplier manage the information security risks that travel through their relationship. Part 1 (2021) gives an overview and shared concepts; Part 2 (2022) sets fundamental requirements; Part 3 (2023) gives guidelines for hardware, software and services supply chain security; and Part 4 (2016) gives guidelines for cloud services.

What's the difference between Part 2 and the other three parts?

Part 2 is the only part that states requirements ("shall"-level obligations); Parts 1, 3 and 4 are guidance. Secondary summaries describe Part 2's requirements as ones an organization can build into an ISO/IEC 27001 information security management system; ISO/IEC 27001's own text is the authoritative source for the exact assessment mechanics.

How current is each part of ISO/IEC 27036?

As of this guide's publication: Part 1 was revised in September 2021 (a minor revision, per its own foreword, of the 2014 edition), Part 2 in June 2022, and Part 3 in June 2023 (a technical revision that broadened its 2013 "ICT supply chain" scope to hardware, software and services generally). Part 4 has not been revised since its original October 2016 edition.

Does ISO/IEC 27036 require a software bill of materials?

Part 3's own terms clause defines "software bill of materials (SBoM)" as an "inventory of software components, sub-components and dependencies with associated information," and Part 3's guidance on integrating security into life cycle processes assumes that kind of visibility is available. Part 3 does not itself mandate producing an SBOM as a pass/fail requirement — it is guidance, not Part 2's requirements text.

How does ISO/IEC 27036 relate to NIST SP 800-161 (C-SCRM)?

Both address cybersecurity supply chain risk management, from different standards bodies (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 vs. NIST), and cover overlapping ground: supplier/acquirer risk assessment, visibility into multi-tier supply chains, and life-cycle integration of security practices. No primary citation establishes formal equivalence or mutual recognition between the two, so a claim that one substitutes for the other is not established and would need confirmation directly from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 or NIST, not assumption from this guide.

Sources

  1. ISO: ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021 — Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships — Part 1: Overview and concepts (catalogue record)
  2. ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021 — Document Preview (foreword, introduction, scope, table of contents; iTeh Standards sample PDF)
  3. ISO: ISO/IEC 27036-2:2022 — Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships — Part 2: Requirements (catalogue record)
  4. ISO: ISO/IEC 27036-3:2023 — Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships — Part 3: Guidelines for hardware, software, and services supply chain security (catalogue record)
  5. ISO/IEC 27036-3:2023 — Document Preview (foreword, introduction, scope, clause 3 term definitions including SBoM; iTeh Standards sample PDF)
  6. ISO: ISO/IEC 27036-4:2016 — Information security for supplier relationships — Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services (catalogue record)
  7. Nadya Bartol (Boston Consulting Group): "ISO/IEC 27036 — Cybersecurity - Supplier relationships", presented at NIST's Software Supply Chain Assurance (SSCA) forum, 12 September 2023
  8. ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021 catalogue record on iTeh Standards (stage 90.20, under periodical review from 15 July 2026)
  9. ISO/IEC 27036-4:2016 catalogue record on iTeh Standards (stage 90.93, International Standard confirmed, 29 August 2026)
  10. ISO/IEC 27017:2026 catalogue record on iTeh Standards (published July 2026)
  11. ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — Document Preview (contents incl. controls 5.19-5.23; iTeh Standards sample PDF)
  12. NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Update 1: Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations
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ISO/IEC 27036 (Cybersecurity — Supplier relationships), explained