Two operators at a control-room desk with a row of monitors, a laptop and keyboards

OT/ICS security

IEC 62443-2-2 (IACS security protection scheme), explained

Last updated:

IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025, "Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 2-2: IACS security protection scheme," is the part of the IEC 62443 series that tells an asset owner how to turn a paper security program into an operating, measurable set of controls on a specific industrial automation and control system (IACS). Published as a Publicly Available Specification — a faster-track, pre-standard publication type, not a full International Standard — on 11 March 2025, it introduces the Security Protection Scheme (SPS) and a three-stage Security Protection Rating (SPR) model that connects 62443-2-1's security-program maturity concepts to 62443-3-3's technical security levels.

Key takeaways

  • That provisional status has a hard deadline attached.
  • The normative references are IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, IEC 62443-2-1, 62443-2-4:2023, 62443-3-2:2020 and 62443-3-3:2013.
  • Clause 6 introduces the document's central measurement concept: a three-stage rating that tracks a system security requirement's fulfillment across the life cycle, rather than a single pass/fail check at commissioning.
  • Synthetic example for illustration; the site and values are invented, and the layout does not reproduce the PAS's own SPR matrix (Clause 6.2).

Why a new part, and why a PAS rather than a standard?

The Introduction states plainly that this document "provides guidance on the development and validation of a set of technical, physical, and process security measures to address risk associated with cyberthreats when operating IACS," aimed at supporting "asset owners, integration service providers, maintenance service providers as well as product suppliers in their activities to provide a combination of technical, physical, and organizational capabilities for protecting IACS against cyberthreat." IEC publishes a PAS — rather than going straight to an International Standard — when a technical committee wants to put emerging content that has not reached full consensus into public circulation faster. Clause 4 is candid about that status here: "the concepts described in this document are not all reflected in currently published documents of the IEC 62443 series," though "none of these concepts contradicts contents of the IEC 62443 documents" — the stated intent is that this PAS's concepts "are expected to be reflected in further editions of IEC 62443 series documents."

That provisional status has a hard deadline attached. The Foreword states the committee has set a 2026 stability date at which the document will be "reconfirmed, withdrawn, or revised," and separately notes that "in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1, IEC PASs are automatically withdrawn after 4 years" if no further action is taken — so this PAS has, structurally, until 2029 at the latest before it is either superseded by a full International Standard or lapses. ISA published its own parallel edition, ISA-TR62443-2-2-2025, on 4 December 2025; ISA99 co-chair Eric Cosman described its purpose in ISA's press release: "ISA-TR62443-2-2 gives asset owners and operators a risk-based approach for day-to-day security actions. By bringing together technical controls, process maturity and clear accountability, this guidance ... can help organizations sustain cyber protection across the entire IACS lifecycle."

What is in the 44 pages?

The IEC webstore record lists Edition 1.0 at 44 pages, and the contents list in IEC's document preview shows how they divide:

Part Title and subclauses (contents list) What it gives you
Clause 5 Security program and security protection scheme: relationship, process steps for generating an SPS How an SPS is derived from the security program
Clause 6 Security protection ratings: use of the 62443-2-1 maturity model to determine SPR values, alternative SPR matrixes, grouping of requirements, tracing to SPEs, views, SPR and SL types (including SL types for products) The rating model
Clause 7 Principal roles: asset owner, integration service provider, maintenance service provider, product supplier, other roles Who does what
Clause 8 Duties and activities in the IACS life cycle: cybersecurity requirement specification, design and implementation, process measures, validation, prediction of SPR-I, periodic revalidation The life-cycle workflow
Annex A (informative) Example methodology for SPR verification: requirements-based, risk-based, simplified questions-based Three ways to check SPR values
Annex B (informative) Maturity level assessment: procedure, attributes, documentation How to assess the process side

The normative references are IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, IEC 62443-2-1, 62443-2-4:2023, 62443-3-2:2020 and 62443-3-3:2013. Parts 4-1 and 4-2 are used in the text (Clause 4) but are not normative references.

The Security Protection Scheme (SPS): what does an asset owner actually build?

Clause 1's Scope defines the SPS as "a set of technical, physical, and process security measures" whose design, implementation and operation is meant to "manage the risks resulting from cyberthreats to each of the IACS included in [the asset owner's] operating facility." Figure 1 lays this out across a simplified IACS life cycle — Specification, Design & Implementation, Verification & Validation, Operation & Maintenance, and Decommissioning — with the SPS taking shape as "technical security measures applied to automation solution" plus "process security measures," validated before an "Approved SPS" hands over from engineering to operations, and then periodically revalidated during operation (Clause 8.6 notes revalidation "can be triggered by MOC [management of change], following incidents and/or at a defined time interval").

Clause 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 draw a precise line between two terms that are easy to conflate:

Term Definition (verbatim) Scope
Security Program (SP) "portfolio of security services, including integration services and maintenance services, and their associated policies, procedures and products that are applicable to the IACS" Organization-wide, per IEC 62443-2-1
Security Protection Scheme (SPS) "set of technical, physical, and process security measures designed to address cyber security concerns of an IACS during operation" Per-IACS, operational output of the SP

How do target, implemented and operated SPRs differ?

Clause 6 introduces the document's central measurement concept: a three-stage rating that tracks a system security requirement's fulfillment across the life cycle, rather than a single pass/fail check at commissioning. Verbatim from Clause 3.1.5-3.1.7:

Rating Definition (verbatim) When it applies
Target SPR (SPR-T) "levels of the system security requirements that an asset owner desires to be fulfilled during operation" Specification
Implemented SPR (SPR-I) "levels of the system security requirements which can be fulfilled during implementation by the designed technical, physical, and process security measures, under the assumption that the process security measures will be executed during operation with a demonstrated repeatability and effectiveness" Design/implementation, predicted ahead of operation (Clause 8.5.4)
Operated SPR (SPR-O) "levels of system security requirements that have been fulfilled by the technical, physical, and process security measures at a given point of time during operation, with demonstrated process security measures that are repeatable and effective" Operation, re-assessed periodically

Clause 6.2 ties the SPR value for a given requirement to two inputs: the technical Security Level (SL) that the deployed controls can support (Clause 3.1.4, sourced from 62443-3-3: "measure of confidence that the IACS is free from vulnerabilities and functions in the intended manner"), and the maturity level of the process measures sustaining it — defined in Clause 3.1.8 (sourced from 62443-2-1) as a "qualitative method of characterizing the capability of an organization to implement security requirements according to documented policies and procedures and their historical performance in doing so." A requirement with strong technical controls but weak, undocumented process discipline around them does not earn a high SPR under this model — the rating is explicitly a combination of both, not the technical capability alone. Clause 6.3 also allows asset owners to define "alternative SPR matrixes for internal purposes," and Clause 6.6 introduces "views" (including a dashboard-style "generic view," per Figure 8) for presenting SPR status across a set of requirements.

Two definition notes make the model concrete. Clause 3.1.3 ties every rating to the system security requirements of IEC 62443-3-3:2013 and changes their subject by context: "The control system shall provide the capability to …" for products, "The zone of the automation solution shall provide the capability to …" for automation solutions, and "The IACS in operation shall provide the capability to …" for an operating system. And the note to 3.1.8 says maturity levels "express the level of confidence that process security measures are executed by the personnel in charge during operation of the IACS with a demonstrated repeatability and effectiveness."

Worked example: what does an SPR record look like?

Synthetic example for illustration; the site and values are invented, and the layout does not reproduce the PAS's own SPR matrix (Clause 6.2). A water utility tracks two 62443-3-3 requirements for one pump-station zone:

Requirement Target (SPR-T) Designed measures Implemented (SPR-I) Operated (SPR-O), month 6
SR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication SL 2, with a repeatable account-review process Directory accounts on HMIs and engineering stations; quarterly access review SL 2 capability, review process assumed to run SL 2 capability, but two of three reviews missed: process not demonstrated, rating below target
SR 5.1 Network segmentation SL 2, with change-controlled conduit rules Firewall between zone and plant network; rule changes through management of change SL 2 capability, change control assumed to run SL 2 capability, change record for every rule change: target met

An SL-only view shows both requirements as met. The SPR view shows that SR 1.1 is not, because the process side failed. The fix is scheduled, evidenced reviews, not a new product.

Which roles does 62443-2-2 name, and how does it connect the rest of the series?

Clause 7 names the principal parties involved in building and sustaining an SPS: the asset owner (the Introduction specifies this "also includes the operator of the IACS"), the integration service provider, the maintenance service provider, the product supplier, and an open "other roles" category. Clause 8 walks through the duties each role carries across the life cycle — generating the cybersecurity requirement specification (CRS), designing and implementing technical security measures, documenting process security measures, validating the SPS, and periodically revalidating it during operation.

Clause 4 states this part's function directly: it "describes the activities for the design, implementation, and validation of an SPS and the use of IEC 62443-2-1, IEC 62443-2-4, IEC 62443-3-2, IEC 62443-3-3, IEC 62443-4-1, and IEC 62443-4-2 for supporting these activities." In other words, 62443-2-2 does not introduce a competing set of requirements — it is the connective document showing how an asset owner's security-program maturity work (62443-2-1), a system's risk assessment (62443-3-2), its technical security requirements (62443-3-3), and the supplier-side secure-development and component requirements (62443-4-1, 62443-4-2) all feed into one operating, rated scheme for a specific IACS.

The parts it connects, with the editions the IEC webstore lists:

Part Edition and publication date What it feeds into the SPS
IEC 62443-2-1:2024 Edition 2.0, 7 August 2024 Security program elements and the maturity model
IEC 62443-2-4:2023 Edition 2.0, 15 December 2023 Requirements for integration and maintenance service providers
IEC 62443-3-2:2020 Edition 1.0, 24 June 2020 Zones, conduits and target security levels from the risk assessment
IEC 62443-3-3:2013 Edition 1.0, 7 August 2013 System security requirements and security levels
IEC 62443-4-1:2018 Edition 1.0, 15 January 2018 The product supplier's secure development process
IEC 62443-4-2:2019 Edition 1.0, 27 February 2019 Component requirements and SL capability

One dating quirk: the PAS lists "IEC 62443-2-1:—" as a document under preparation (footnoted as IEC/FDIS 62443-2-1:2024), although 62443-2-1:2024 was published on 7 August 2024, before the PAS itself. Cite the published 2024 edition.

What does a protection scheme ask of a product supplier?

The product supplier is one of the principal roles (Clause 7.5), and the PAS keeps a separate track for products: Clause 6.7.2 covers "SL types for products". In practice an asset owner building an SPS needs four things from a device or component maker:

  1. Stated capabilityThe security level capability (SL-C) of each component against IEC 62443-4-2, so the integrator can design to the target.
  2. Development process evidenceEvidence, such as an IEC 62443-4-1 assessment, that the product is built and maintained under a secure development life cycle.
  3. Operating guidanceHardening and secure-configuration documentation; a capability that depends on an undocumented setting rarely survives into the operated rating.
  4. Vulnerability information for the product's lifeRevalidation during operation needs advisories, fixed versions and component lists; see IEC 62443-2-3 patch management.

For component makers selling into the EU, the same evidence feeds CRA technical documentation; IEC 62443-4-2 vs CRA maps the overlap. The wider OT programme around all of this is covered in our NIST SP 800-82 guide.

Which mistakes weaken a protection scheme?

  • Reporting component SL-C as the system rating. Capability is an input; SPR-O also needs demonstrated process measures.
  • Treating SPR-I as SPR-O. SPR-I assumes the process measures will run (3.1.6); SPR-O requires that they demonstrably do (3.1.7).
  • Leaving out physical measures. The SPS is defined as technical, physical and process measures (3.1.2).
  • Hard-coding today's security levels. The note to 3.1.4 says the definition of security levels "is expected to evolve".
  • Contracting service providers without 62443-2-4 requirements, so the maintenance side of the scheme has no agreed duties.

Where should an asset owner start?

  1. Treat SPS as the deliverable, not the Security Program itselfIf your 62443-2-1 security program exists only as policy documents with no per-IACS technical-plus-process-plus-physical package behind it, you have a Security Program but not a Security Protection Scheme in this document's sense.
  2. Don't rate SPR on technical controls aloneClause 6.2's model combines a requirement's Security Level with the maturity of the process measures keeping it effective — a well-configured firewall rule set backed by no change-control discipline does not earn a high operated rating under this framework.
  3. Separate the three SPR stages explicitly in your documentationTarget (what you want), Implemented (what design predicts you'll get), and Operated (what's demonstrably true right now) answer different questions; conflating them hides the gap between design intent and operational reality that Clause 8.5.4's "prediction of SPR-I" is meant to surface before handover.
  4. Put a revalidation trigger on the calendar, not just an intervalClause 8.6 ties periodic SPS revalidation to management-of-change events and incidents as well as a defined time interval — a fixed annual review misses the scheme drifting out of alignment after an unplanned change.
  5. Check the PAS's 2026 stability date and withdrawal clock before building long-term tooling on its exact clause numbersAs a Publicly Available Specification rather than a finalized International Standard, 62443-2-2's content is explicitly provisional input to future 62443-2-1/3-x/4-x editions; confirm current status at webstore.iec.ch before citing a clause number in a compliance claim.

SoftWSP's OT Snapshot can supply one input to an operated review. From Zeek and ICSNPP logs of a passive traffic capture, it lists which hosts talk to each other over which industrial protocols (Modbus, S7comm, DNP3, EtherNet/IP, BACnet) and where SSH, Telnet, RDP or VNC sessions appear, so an engineer can compare observed traffic with the documented zones, conduits and remote-access rules. It does not rate SPR, SL or maturity: see OT Snapshot.

This guide quotes IEC's own published text of IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025 (Foreword, Introduction, Scope, Normative references, Terms and definitions, Clause 4 and the contents list) as reproduced in its document preview, the IEC webstore records of the related parts, and ISA's press release on the parallel ISA-TR62443-2-2-2025 edition; it is not a substitute for the full specification and its Annexes A and B, and does not constitute compliance advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is IEC 62443-2-2, and what kind of document is it?

IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025, "Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 2-2: IACS security protection scheme," is a Publicly Available Specification (PAS) — not a full International Standard — published by IEC Technical Committee 65 in liaison with ISA99 (the ISA committee on security for industrial automation and control systems). Per its own Clause 1 scope text, it "provides guidance on the development, validation, operation, and maintenance of a set of technical, physical, and process security measures called Security Protection Scheme (SPS)," with the goal of giving "the asset owner implementing an IACS Security Program (SP) ... mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the design, implementation and operation of an SPS manage the risks resulting from cyberthreats to each of the IACS included in its operating facility." It was published 11 March 2025, Edition 1.0, 44 pages, ISBN 978-2-8327-0299-4, with a stability date of 2026 on the IEC webstore. As a PAS rather than an International Standard, it also carries a specific expiry rule: per its own Foreword, "IEC PASs are automatically withdrawn after 4 years" unless reconfirmed, withdrawn or revised into a full standard first.

What is a Security Protection Scheme (SPS), and how does it relate to an asset owner's Security Program?

The standard's own terms and definitions (Clause 3.1.2) define SPS as a "set of technical, physical, and process security measures designed to address cyber security concerns of an IACS during operation," distinct from the broader Security Program (SP, Clause 3.1.1): a "portfolio of security services, including integration services and maintenance services, and their associated policies, procedures and products that are applicable to the IACS," sourced from [IEC 62443-2-1](/guides/iec-62443-2-1-asset-owner-security-program/)'s own definition. In plain terms: the asset owner's Security Program is the organization-wide policy and procedure framework; the Security Protection Scheme is what that program produces for one specific IACS — the actual combination of technical controls, physical controls and documented process measures protecting that system during operation. Clause 5.1 and Figure 2 depict the SPS as the operational output that a Security Program generates and sustains for each IACS in a facility, not a separate, parallel activity.

What are Security Protection Ratings (SPR), and how do they differ from 62443-3-3's Security Levels (SL)?

Clause 6 introduces Security Protection Ratings as a three-stage rating applied over an IACS's life cycle, defined verbatim in Clause 3.1.5-3.1.7: **target security protection ratings (SPR-T)** are "levels of the system security requirements that an asset owner desires to be fulfilled during operation"; **implemented security protection ratings (SPR-I)** are the levels "which can be fulfilled during implementation by the designed technical, physical, and process security measures, under the assumption that the process security measures will be executed during operation with a demonstrated repeatability and effectiveness"; and **operated security protection ratings (SPR-O)** are the levels "that have been fulfilled by the technical, physical, and process security measures at a given point of time during operation, with demonstrated process security measures that are repeatable and effective." This differs from [62443-3-3](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/)'s Security Level (SL), which Clause 3.1.4 (sourced from 62443-3-3) defines as a "measure of confidence that the IACS is free from vulnerabilities and functions in the intended manner" — SL is fundamentally a technical-capability rating, whereas SPR layers in the maturity of the process measures (drawn from [62443-2-1](/guides/iec-62443-2-1-asset-owner-security-program/)'s maturity model) needed to sustain that capability operationally. Clause 6.2 states SPR values are determined by combining a system security requirement's SL with the maturity level of the process measures that keep it effective in practice.

Who are the five principal roles, and how does 62443-2-2 fit with the rest of the 62443 series?

Clause 7 names five principal roles involved in building and sustaining an SPS: the **asset owner** (which the Introduction clarifies "also includes the operator of the IACS"), the **integration service provider**, the **maintenance service provider**, the **product supplier**, and unspecified "other roles." Clause 4 states the document "describes the activities for the design, implementation, and validation of an SPS and the use of IEC 62443-2-1, IEC 62443-2-4, IEC 62443-3-2, IEC 62443-3-3, IEC 62443-4-1, and IEC 62443-4-2 for supporting these activities" — in other words, 62443-2-2 does not replace those parts, it is the connective layer showing an asset owner how to combine 62443-2-1's security-program/maturity model, [62443-3-2](/guides/iec-62443-3-2-security-risk-assessment/)'s risk assessment, 62443-3-3's system security requirements, and [62443-4-1](/guides/iec-62443-4-1-secure-development-lifecycle/)/[62443-4-2](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/)'s supplier-side requirements into one operational scheme. Clause 4 also notes candidly that "the concepts described in this document are not all reflected in currently published documents of the IEC 62443 series" and "none of these concepts contradicts" them — 62443-2-2 is explicitly forward-looking input intended to shape future editions of the other parts, not a finalized cross-reference to settled text. One normative-reference quirk worth flagging: this PAS cites "IEC 62443-2-1:—" as a reference still "under preparation" (footnoted, at time of publication, as "IEC/FDIS 62443-2-1:2024") — [IEC 62443-2-1:2024](/guides/iec-62443-2-1-asset-owner-security-program/) has since been finalized and published (7 August 2024), so readers should treat 62443-2-2's own normative-reference list as slightly dated relative to the now-published 2-1 edition.

Sources

  1. IEC: IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025 — Security for industrial automation and control systems — Part 2-2: IACS security protection scheme (webstore record: Edition 1.0, 11 March 2025, 44 pages, ISBN 978-2-8327-0299-4, TC 65, stability date 2026)
  2. IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025 — Document Preview (Foreword, Introduction, full Scope Clause 1 with Figure 1 SPS life cycle, Normative references Clause 2, Terms/definitions Clause 3 including SPR-T/SPR-I/SPR-O, abbreviated terms, Clause 4 relationship to other 62443 documents; iTeh Standards sample PDF, reproduced here under IEC's short-quotation allowance)
  3. ISA: "Update to ISA/IEC 62443 Series Includes Guidance on Security Protection Schemes for IACS" — official press release (4 December 2025) announcing ISA-TR62443-2-2-2025, with quote from ISA99 co-chair Eric Cosman
  4. Wikipedia: IEC 62443 (series structure, part-by-part summary; cross-checked against the IEC webstore and ISA press release above for this guide)
  5. IEC: IEC 62443-2-1:2024 webstore record (Edition 2.0, publication date 2024-08-07)
  6. IEC: IEC 62443-2-4:2023 webstore record (Edition 2.0, 2023-12-15)
  7. IEC: IEC 62443-3-2:2020 webstore record (Edition 1.0, 2020-06-24)
  8. IEC: IEC 62443-3-3:2013 webstore record (Edition 1.0, 2013-08-07)
  9. IEC: IEC 62443-4-1:2018 webstore record (Edition 1.0, 2018-01-15)
  10. IEC: IEC 62443-4-2:2019 webstore record (Edition 1.0, 2019-02-27)
Was this guide helpful?

In this cluster

IEC 62443-2-2 (IACS security protection scheme), explained