IEC 62443-2-4, "Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 2-4: Security program requirements for IACS service providers," is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets security requirements not for the asset owner who operates an industrial automation and control system (IACS), nor for the vendor who builds its components, but for the System Integrator and Maintenance Service Provider who design, deploy and keep it running. Per the standard's own Section 1 scope — quoted here from ISA's official preview text — it "specifies a comprehensive set of requirements for security capabilities for IACS service providers that they can offer to the asset owner during integration and maintenance activities of an Automation Solution." The current edition, Edition 2.0, was published by IEC Technical Committee 65 on 2023-12-15 and has since been adopted as ANSI/ISA-62443-2-4-2023 and regionally as EN IEC 62443-2-4:2024.
Key takeaways
- IEC 62443-2-4 addresses two service-provider roles that sit between the product supplier and the asset owner, and it treats everything they offer as one Security Program.
- The requirements sit in a single normative table, Table A.1, which the 2023 edition also ships as a CSV file so that asset owners and providers can sort and filter it.
- Each 2-4 requirement is assessed at a maturity level, not just met or missed.
- Very little technically, by IEC's own account.
Two roles, one Security Program: how do they fit together?
IEC 62443-2-4 addresses two service-provider roles that sit between the product supplier and the asset owner, and it treats everything they offer as one Security Program. The standard's own Figure 2 (reproduced in ISA's preview text) lays out the roles it addresses: an Asset Owner operates the IACS; a System Integrator supplies "integration capabilities (design and deployment)"; and together with ongoing "operational and maintenance capabilities (policies and procedures)," these form what the standard — in Section 1 — collectively calls the service provider's Security Program: "Collectively, the security capabilities offered by an IACS service provider are referred to as its Security Program." A footnote in the same section adds that these capabilities are "in general... policy, procedure, practice and personnel related" rather than purely technical controls, distinguishing 2-4 from the technical, component-level requirements in IEC 62443-4-2.
The 2023 edition sharpens both roles in its clause 3 definitions, shown in IEC's own preview pages:
| Role (2023 term) | What the definition covers | Who that often is |
|---|---|---|
| Integration service provider | "design, installation, configuration, testing, commissioning, and handover" of an Automation Solution | System integrator, Main Automation Contractor (MAC), a machine builder that commissions a line on site |
| Maintenance service provider | "support activities for an Automation Solution after handover," including "managing user accounts, security monitoring, and security assessments" | Control-system vendor service unit, OEM remote-support team, a local maintenance contractor |
| Service provider (umbrella) | "internal or external organization, manufacturer, etc." working "in accordance with an agreement with the asset owner" | Any of the above, including the asset owner's own engineering department |
Two consequences follow for device and machine makers. First, the definition explicitly includes a manufacturer, so an OEM that remotely supports machines it sold can be a maintenance service provider in 2-4 terms. Second, handover — defined as the act that "transfers responsibility for operations and maintenance" to the asset owner, usually after the Site Acceptance Test — is the line between the two roles.
The standard is explicit about its sibling specification: "In a related specification, ISA-62443-2-1 describes requirements for the Security Management System of the asset owner." Where 62443-2-1 sets requirements for the organization operating the system, 62443-2-4 sets requirements for the organizations building and maintaining it on the asset owner's behalf — the two are designed to be read as a pair.
What are the Security Program functional areas?
The requirements sit in a single normative table, Table A.1, which the 2023 edition also ships as a CSV file so that asset owners and providers can sort and filter it. Compliance and training summaries describing the standard's structure commonly tabulate its requirements under named Security Program (SP) functional areas, frequently labelled SP.01 through SP.12 and covering areas such as solution staffing, architecture, wireless use, Safety Instrumented System (SIS) integration, configuration management, remote access, event handling, account management, malware protection, patch management, backup/restore, and an assurance area confirming the Automation Solution's security policy is actually enforced. The standard's scope, Security Program/Profiles language, and role diagram are confirmed directly against ISA's own preview text, but the exact SP.01–SP.12 labels and their individual requirement counts come from third-party compliance summaries rather than the paywalled Annex A requirement table itself, which is the authoritative source for a conformance claim. IEC's evaluation methodology does use the same numbering: it cites requirement SP.03.09 (validity of configuration changes) as one that "digital signatures" can satisfy by technical means.
How do maturity levels ML-1 to ML-4 work?
Each 2-4 requirement is assessed at a maturity level, not just met or missed. The 2023 edition defines the levels in its Table 1 (the abbreviation list names CMMI as the model behind them), and IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024, the evaluation methodology for 2-4, spells out the evidence each level needs in clauses 6.3 to 6.6 of its preview text:
| Level | What TS 62443-6-1 says about it | Evidence an evaluator looks for |
|---|---|---|
| ML-1 | Service performed "in an ad-hoc and often undocumented" manner | Records of execution, e.g. an interview record or a statement of work |
| ML-2 | Service provided "according to repeatable, written policies" | Evidence of existence (EoE): documented processes, training material and training records, including for subcontractors |
| ML-3 | Process "practiced for an asset owner" | Proof of execution (PoE) from at least one asset-owner project, often anonymised because of NDAs |
| ML-4 | Effectiveness measured and improved over time | KPIs, the procedure for using them, and audit or management-meeting records showing improvement over "typically" one year after reaching ML-3 |
Two rules from the same document matter in procurement. Third-party evaluations "shall only be performed with ML-2 or higher," and an overall ML for a whole provider "is presently not defined within the IEC 62443 series" — the level is evaluated per requirement.
How do Profiles adapt the standard to other contexts?
Profiles let a sector or a large buyer cut the full requirement set down to the subset that matters, and 2-4 addresses this directly in its own scope text: "Because not all requirements apply to all industry groups and organizations, Subclause 4.1.4 provides for the development of Profiles that allow for the subsetting of these requirements. Profiles are used to adapt this document to specific environments, including environments not based on an IACS." In practice, this lets an industry group or large service provider define a tailored, smaller requirement set appropriate to its own context — a chemical-plant integrator and a building-automation integrator need not meet an identical checklist. TS 62443-6-1 adds that requirements for cyber security profiles are specified in IEC TS 62443-1-5, and that an evaluation can cover "a particular requirements subset" defined by such a profile.
What changed in the 2023 edition?
Very little technically, by IEC's own account. IEC published Edition 2.0 of 62443-2-4 on 2023-12-15 (IEC webstore), superseding the 2015 edition and its 2017 amendment. The foreword of the new edition states that it "contains editorial updates and clarifications and does not contain significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition." The main clarification: some requirements "could have been interpreted as requirements for technical capabilities," so they are now "expressed as requirements for the use/configuration of technical capabilities." The edition was prepared by IEC TC 65 in liaison with the WIB (International Instrumentation Users Association), and its scope now speaks of "security-related processes" where the first edition said "security capabilities."
The companion evaluation document exists as well: IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024, "Security evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-2-4," published 2024-03-12. Note its footnote: where it refers to 2-4 without a date, it means the 2015 edition plus AMD1:2017, so check which edition an evaluation report names.
How is a service provider evaluated or certified?
An evaluation follows the method in TS 62443-6-1 clause 5, and it can be first-party (self-assessment), second-party (by the asset owner) or third-party (by a conformity assessment body), using the ISO/IEC 17000 terms:
Scope the subject under evaluation (SuE):the integration service, the maintenance service or both; the organisational unit that runs it; the requirements claimed (all, or a profile subset); and the requested ML per requirement. Write conformity statementsthat explain how each piece of evidence meets a requirement at the requested ML. Mark out-of-scope and not-applicable requirementsNot-applicable ones need a rationale, which the evaluator examines. Have every in-scope requirement examined— evidence must be "valid, consistent, veritable, trustworthy."
For third-party certificates, IEC's Systems Committee Smart Energy notes that IECEE certificates "include capability certifications of IEC 62443-2-4 Process, Products and Solutions." A certificate is only as useful as its scope, so read the edition, the services covered and the ML per requirement.
Worked example: how would a machine builder scope its first evaluation?
Hypothetical example: "Line-OEM", a synthetic maker of packaging lines, not a real company or customer. Line-OEM commissions lines at plants and offers a remote-support contract afterwards. A plant running a 2-1 program asks it to show 2-4 conformance before renewing the contract.
Pick the roleCommissioning is integration work; the remote-support contract after SAT is maintenance work. Line-OEM scopes the maintenance service first, because that is what the contract covers. Pick the requirementsIt claims the remote access, account management, patch management, malware protection, backup/restore and event-handling areas, and marks SIS integration as not applicable with a rationale (its lines use safety PLCs supplied and maintained by the plant). Pick a level per requirementIt has written procedures and training records for remote sessions and patch delivery, so it requests ML-2; for event handling, where only ad-hoc tickets exist, it requests ML-1 and records that a third-party evaluation would need ML-2. Collect evidence| Requirement area | ML requested | Evidence of existence | Proof of execution (for a later ML-3) | |---|---|---|---| | Remote access | ML-2 | Remote session procedure, approval form, training log | Anonymised session logs from one plant | | Patch management | ML-2 | Patch qualification procedure, release notes template | Patch report sent to one plant | | Account management | ML-2 | Joiner/leaver checklist for service engineers | Account review record | | Event handling | ML-1 | Ticket history | — | Agree the evaluatorA second-party review by the plant is enough for the renewal; a third-party certificate would wait until every claimed requirement reaches ML-2.
What are the common pitfalls?
- One badge for everything. No overall ML is defined; ask for the ML per requirement and the edition evaluated.
- Confusing ML with SL. Maturity levels rate processes; security levels in 3-3 and 4-2 rate technical robustness of systems and components.
- Reading requirements as product features. The 2023 edition and TS 62443-6-1 both stress that 2-4 requirements are about processes for using technical capabilities, not about building them.
- Ignoring subcontractors. ML-2 evidence includes training records for subcontractors and consultants, not only staff.
- No rationale for "not applicable". Evaluators examine every N/A decision.
- Claiming ML-4 too early. It needs measured improvement over a significant period, typically one year after ML-3.
Where should a service provider start?
Identify which role you're assessed under firstA System Integrator's design/deployment obligations and a Maintenance Service Provider's ongoing operational obligations draw on the same Security Program functional areas but apply at different points in the Automation Solution's lifecycle — confirm which (or both) your contract scope covers before building evidence. Pair your 2-4 evidence with the asset owner's 2-1 program, since the two specifications are designed to interlock — a service provider's Security Program exists to support the Security Management System the asset owner runs under 62443-2-1. Check whether a Profile already exists for your industrybefore building a bespoke interpretation of the base requirement set from scratch — Subclause 4.1.4 exists specifically so sector groups can publish a tailored subset. Track cross-references into 62443-3-3 and 62443-4-2Where your integration work asserts that a security measure is "supported in the Automation Solution," the base standard expects that claim to trace back to a system- or component-level requirement in 62443-3-3 or 4-2, not stand alone. Patch work also draws on IEC 62443-2-3, and a product you supply into the solution answers to IEC 62443-4-1. Use IEC TS 62443-6-1 as your self-assessment templateIts Table 1 lists acceptable evaluation criteria and example evidence for each requirement at each ML, so a first-party review in that format carries over directly to a later third-party evaluation.
Machine builders who also need the EU Machinery Regulation angle should read IEC 62443 and the Machinery Regulation; the wider OT picture is in our NIST SP 800-82 guide.
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot gives integrators and maintenance providers current-state evidence for a site: from a passive traffic recording it produces a device inventory, a map of remote access and the published vulnerabilities that affect identified devices, reviewed by an engineer. It does not evaluate or certify 2-4 conformance.
This guide summarises IEC 62443-2-4's publicly available scope, foreword and definitions text (via ISA's and IEC's official preview pages), IEC TS 62443-6-1's preview text, and standards-catalogue summaries; it is not a substitute for the full purchased standard and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is IEC 62443-2-4, and who does it apply to?
Per the standard's own Section 1 scope statement (quoted from ISA's official preview of the ANSI-adopted text), it "specifies a comprehensive set of requirements for security capabilities for IACS service providers that they can offer to the asset owner during integration and maintenance activities of an Automation Solution." That targets two roles distinct from the asset owner covered by [IEC 62443-2-1](/guides/iec-62443-2-1-asset-owner-security-program/): the **System Integrator**, who provides "integration capabilities (design and deployment)," and the **Maintenance Service Provider**, who delivers the ongoing "operational and maintenance capabilities (policies and procedures)" the standard's own Figure 2 maps directly onto the Automation Solution. Collectively, the standard calls what a service provider offers its **Security Program**.
What are the Security Program functional areas?
The standard's own introduction groups its requirements under named Security Program (SP) functional areas, commonly tabulated by compliance summaries as SP.01 through SP.12 — covering, among others, solution staffing, architecture, wireless use, Safety Instrumented System (SIS) integration, configuration management, remote access, event handling, account management, malware protection, patch management, backup/restore, and assurance that the Automation Solution security policy is actually enforced. The series relationship and the Security Program/Profiles language are confirmed directly against ISA's official preview text; the precise SP.01–SP.12 labels and per-area requirement counts come from standards-training and compliance-summary sources rather than the paywalled standard body's own published text; the paywalled standard itself remains the authoritative source for the exact area list for any conformity claim.
What are "Profiles," and why does the standard need them?
Section 1 states directly: "Because not all requirements apply to all industry groups and organizations, Subclause 4.1.4 provides for the development of Profiles that allow for the subsetting of these requirements. Profiles are used to adapt this document to specific environments, including environments not based on an IACS." In other words, a service provider or industry group can define a tailored subset of the full requirement set for a given context, rather than every provider needing to meet every requirement in the base standard — one reason the 2023 edition's own abstract (per standards-catalogue summaries) frames the requirements as adaptable to "non-IACS contexts" as well as traditional industrial environments.
How does it relate to 62443-2-1, 3-3, and 4-2, and what changed in the 2023 edition?
The standard's own scope text is explicit: "In a related specification, ISA-62443-2-1 describes requirements for the Security Management System of the asset owner" — 2-4 is the service-provider counterpart to 2-1's asset-owner focus. Its Figure 2 also notes that "some of these capabilities reference security measures defined in ISA-62443-3-3 that the service provider must ensure are supported in the Automation Solution," tying integration work back to [62443-3-3's](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/) system-level requirements, and compliance summaries describe cross-references to [62443-4-2's](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-component-requirements/) component requirements as well. IEC published a new **Edition 2.0** of 62443-2-4 on **2023-12-15** (adopted as ANSI/ISA-62443-2-4-2023 in April 2024, and regionally as EN IEC 62443-2-4:2024 / BS EN IEC 62443-2-4:2024), superseding the original 2015 text plus its 2017 amendment. Catalogue listings describe continuity of the same Security Program/Profiles structure, with a companion evaluation-methodology standard, ISA-62443-6-1, initiated to define how conformance to 2-4 itself gets assessed. The 2023 edition's full changed clauses sit behind the paywalled standard text, which remains the authoritative source for the specific 2023-vs-2015 clause differences.
Sources
- ISA: official preview PDF of ANSI/ISA-62443-2-4-2018 (IEC 62443-2-4:2015+AMD1:2017 CSV) — verbatim Scope, Introduction and series diagram
- IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-2-4:2023 — official publication listing (Edition 2.0, TC 65, published 2023-12-15)
- ANSI Webstore: IEC 62443-2-4 Ed. 2.0 b:2023 — publication record
- iteh Standards: IEC 62443-2-4:2023 — catalogue listing (scope, edition, page count)
- ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards — series overview
- ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance: Applying ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and the 62443 Series (white paper) — 2-4's relationship to 2-1 and asset-owner roles
- IEC 62443-2-4:2023 preview pages (foreword change statement, scope, clause 3 definitions), iTeh Standards catalogue
- IEC Webstore: IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024 — Security evaluation methodology for IEC 62443-2-4 (published 2024-03-12)
- IEC TS 62443-6-1:2024 preview pages (scope, evaluation method, maturity-level evidence), iTeh Standards catalogue
- IEC Systems Committee Smart Energy: IEC 62443 (IECEE capability certifications of IEC 62443-2-4)
About this guide
SoftWSP OT/ICS Desk
Covers the OT/ICS security cluster: 71 guides.

In this cluster
Questions about this page?
