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OT/ICS security

IEC 62443-2-1: security program requirements for IACS asset owners, explained

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IEC 62443-2-1 is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets security program requirements for the asset owner — the organization that operates an industrial automation and control system (IACS) — rather than for the vendors that build the system's components. A standards-catalogue listing of the current edition gives its scope as specifying "asset owner security program (SP) policy and procedure requirements for an industrial automation and control system (IACS) in operation." Where IEC 62443-3-3 and IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 set technical requirements for systems and components, 62443-2-1 sets the operational, policy-level program an asset owner needs to run around whatever systems and components it has in production.

Key takeaways

  • Because IEC itself calls it a technical revision with a new structure.
  • The 2024 edition groups its requirements into eight SPEs, each with a short code and one or more requirement groups.
  • It asks for policies and procedures around what an old system cannot do, not for technical capabilities the system lacks.
  • 62443-2-1 is the operator's program; the other parts describe what the operator buys and who builds it.

Why is IEC 62443-2-1:2024 a rewrite, not a minor update?

Because IEC itself calls it a technical revision with a new structure. IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (Edition 2.0, published August 2024, IEC webstore) replaces the first edition from 2010 — a fourteen-year gap reflecting how much the asset-owner security landscape changed in the interim. The standard was prepared by IEC TC 65 "in collaboration with the liaison ISA99," and its foreword, readable in IEC's own preview pages, lists three significant technical changes:

  1. "Revised requirement structure into SP elements (SPEs)"— a named grouping structure that did not exist in the 2010 first edition.
  2. "Revised requirements to eliminate duplication of an information security management system (ISMS)", such as ISO/IEC 27001, rather than asking asset owners to maintain two overlapping control sets.
  3. "Defined a maturity model for evaluating requirements", moving away from a binary met/not-met check toward a graded assessment of how well each requirement is actually implemented.

The introduction adds the design intent: requirements "are written to be implementation independent," and the security capabilities that meet them can be "a combination of technical, physical, process and compensating security measures." In the United States the same text is sold by ISA as ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1-2024.

What are the eight Security Program Elements (SPEs)?

The 2024 edition groups its requirements into eight SPEs, each with a short code and one or more requirement groups. The table below is taken from the contents page of IEC's preview, which lists every requirement title; the counts are the number of requirement titles we counted there.

# Security Program Element Code Requirement groups (examples of requirements) Count
1 Organizational security measures ORG ORG 1 organization and policies (ISMS, background checks, supply chain security); ORG 2 assessments and reviews; ORG 3 physical access 11
2 Configuration management CM CM 1 inventory: asset inventory baseline, drawings, configuration settings, change control 4
3 Network and communications security NET NET 1 segmentation (incl. from safety systems); NET 2 wireless; NET 3 remote access 15
4 Component security COMP COMP 1 hardening and portable media; COMP 2 malware; COMP 3 patch management 10
5 Protection of data DATA DATA 1: classification, confidentiality, safety system configuration mode, retention, cryptography, key management, integrity 7
6 User access control USER USER 1 identification and authentication (incl. MFA, password protection); USER 2 authorization (separation of duties, multiple approvals) 23
7 Event and incident management EVENT EVENT 1: detection, reporting, logging, analysis, incident response, vulnerability handling 9
8 System integrity and availability AVAIL AVAIL 1 continuity and resources; AVAIL 2 backup, restore and archive 8
Total 87

That total matches the "roughly 87" figure that standards-reseller summaries give. Clause 4.2 of the standard holds the maturity level definitions and clause 5 covers conformance, conformity evidence, profiles and "conformity assessment for the asset owner role"; their full text sits behind the paywall, which remains the authoritative source for an audit.

How does the standard treat legacy systems?

It asks for policies and procedures around what an old system cannot do, not for technical capabilities the system lacks. The scope states that "the lifespan of an IACS can exceed twenty years, and that many legacy systems contain hardware and software that are no longer supported," and gives the example that "if IACS or component software is no longer supported, security patching requirements cannot be met." It then says plainly: "This document does not specify that an IACS has these technical requirements." Where native capabilities are missing, "compensating security measures can be part of the policies and procedures." The definitions give concrete examples, from "a locked cabinet around a controller" to a supplier putting "a firewall in front of the PLC." The scope also expects the asset owner to "identify the IACS security requirements that are applicable" — wireless or remote-access requirements do not apply where those functions do not exist.

Where does it sit in the series, and why does that matter for operators?

62443-2-1 is the operator's program; the other parts describe what the operator buys and who builds it. ISA's own series overview groups the 62443 standards into four layers — General (1-x), Policies & Procedures (2-x), System (3-x), and Component (4-x). 62443-2-1 sits in the Policies & Procedures group, alongside 2-2 (implementation guidance), 2-3 (patch management) and 2-4 (requirements for IACS service providers — the service-provider counterpart to 2-1's asset-owner focus). Its scope says the asset owner "is ultimately accountable for the secure operation of an IACS," but that implementing the capabilities "often includes support from its service providers and product suppliers"; Annex A cross-references its requirements to 2-4.

For a factory operator, the practical split is: 62443-2-1 is the program you run as the entity operating the plant; 62443-3-3 is what you check a system was built to meet before it goes into that plant; 62443-4-1/4-2 are what you'd expect a component vendor to already have done before you buy from them. The risk method that links them is IEC 62443-3-2, which the introduction names for "the identification of risks and the selection of appropriate security requirements."

What does a 2-1 program ask of integrators and device makers?

It turns into concrete asks in contracts and supplier questionnaires. The standard "provides guidance for an asset owner when stating security requirements for their service providers and product suppliers." The table below is our reading of how common 2-1 requirements translate; the requirement titles come from IEC's contents page, the asks are examples.

2-1 requirement Typical ask of the integrator or maintenance provider (2-4) Typical ask of the device maker (4-1 / 4-2)
CM 1.1 Asset inventory baseline Hand over an as-built inventory with firmware versions at SAT Machine-readable component and firmware list, such as an SBOM
COMP 3.3 Security patch status Report which patches are qualified and installed Publish which product versions fix which CVEs
COMP 3.1 Patch authenticity/integrity Install only verified patches Sign updates and document how to verify them
NET 3.2 Remote access connections Use the plant's remote-access route and log sessions Document which ports and services remote support needs
USER 1.9 Multifactor authentication MFA for service engineers' accounts Support for MFA or an external identity provider
EVENT 1.9 Vulnerability handling Pass on supplier advisories that affect the site A disclosure contact and advisories, per IEC 62443-4-1

For a device maker selling into plants, this is where 2-1 becomes visible: plants running the program will ask for inventories, patch status and advisories as normal procurement items.

Worked example: what does a first gap assessment look like?

Hypothetical example: "Plant B", a synthetic two-line bottling plant, not a real site or customer. Plant B runs ISO/IEC 27001 for its office IT and wants a first 2-1 view of its OT.

  1. Set the scopeTwo production lines, one engineering workstation, a remote-support connection used by two machine builders.
  2. Mark not-applicable requirementsNo wireless in production, so NET 2.1–2.3 are marked N/A with that reason.
  3. Reuse the ISMSORG 1.1 (ISMS) and ORG 1.4 (awareness training) are covered by the existing ISO/IEC 27001 controls; the team records the cross-reference instead of writing new policies.
  4. Find the gapsThe team works through CM, NET, COMP and USER. | Requirement | Finding | Action | |---|---|---| | CM 1.1 Asset inventory baseline | Spreadsheet from 2019, firmware versions missing | Rebuild the inventory from a passive recording and supplier lists | | NET 3.1–3.3 Remote access | Two builders use their own always-on routers | Move both to one plant-controlled route with session approval | | COMP 3.3 Security patch status | Unknown for both lines' PLCs | Ask suppliers for advisories; record compensating measures | | USER 1.9 MFA | Shared service account on the HMI | Personal accounts for service engineers; MFA on the remote route |
  5. Rate maturityThe team records, per requirement, whether practice is ad hoc or written and repeated, and plans re-assessment after six months.

What are the common pitfalls?

  • Building a second ISMS. The 2024 edition removed ISMS duplication; map to ISO/IEC 27001 rather than rewriting it.
  • Treating 2-1 as a technical checklist. It sets policy and procedure requirements; technical system requirements sit in 3-3.
  • Undocumented compensating measures. A locked cabinet helps only if it is written down against the requirement it replaces.
  • No supplier asks. A program that never reaches contracts leaves inventory, patch status and remote access in the suppliers' hands.
  • One-time assessment. The maturity model expects repeated, improving practice, not a single audit.

Where should an asset owner start?

  1. Map what you already have under ISO/IEC 27001 (or an equivalent ISMS) firstThe 2024 edition's removal of ISMS-duplicate requirements means an asset owner with a working ISMS should start by identifying the gap, not rebuilding security management from zero.
  2. Organize existing OT security work under the eight SPE headings— most operators already have fragments of configuration management, access control and incident response; the SPE structure gives those fragments a single home.
  3. Expect a maturity assessment, not a binary pass/fail, when evaluating your own program against the 2024 text — plan for "where do we sit on the maturity scale" rather than a simple compliant/non-compliant answer.
  4. Document compensating measures for legacy assets explicitlyThe standard's own accommodation for systems that can't meet a requirement technically only works if the gap and the compensating measure are written down, not assumed.
  5. Buy the standard before an auditThe requirement titles and counts above come from IEC's public contents page; the requirement text, the clause 4.2 maturity definitions and the clause 5 conformity rules are in the purchased document.

The wider OT context, including network architecture and risk assessment, is in our NIST SP 800-82 guide.

SoftWSP's passive OT network assessment gives an asset owner the current-state asset inventory and exposure picture that a 62443-2-1 security program — particularly the Configuration Management and Component Security SPEs — needs as its starting evidence: a device inventory, a map of remote access and the published vulnerabilities that affect identified devices, reviewed by an engineer. See OT Snapshot.

This guide summarises IEC 62443-2-1:2024's public preview pages and standards-catalogue descriptions; it is not a substitute for the purchased standard and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

Put this guide to work

Frequently asked questions

What is IEC 62443-2-1?

The part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series that sets security program requirements for the asset owner — the organization that operates an industrial automation and control system (IACS), as opposed to the vendor that builds it. A standards-catalogue listing of the current edition (iteh.ai, a standards reseller) gives its scope as specifying "asset owner security program (SP) policy and procedure requirements for an industrial automation and control system (IACS) in operation." In the series' own "Policies and procedures" group, 62443-2-1 sits alongside parts covering implementation guidance (2-2), patch management (2-3), and requirements for IACS suppliers and service providers (2-4).

What changed in the 2024 edition?

IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (Edition 2.0, published 6 August 2024) replaces the original 2010 first edition. Per the standards-catalogue summaries this guide checked (iteh.ai and compliance-tooling vendor OneClickComply), the second edition made three structural changes: it reorganized requirements into named Security Program Elements (SPEs); it removed requirements that duplicated an information security management system (ISMS, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001) rather than being 62443-specific; and it introduced a maturity model for evaluating how well each requirement is implemented, rather than a pass/fail check. Exact clause wording sits behind the paywalled standard text, which remains the authoritative source for any conformity claim.

What are the eight Security Program Elements (SPEs)?

Per the same catalogue summaries: Organizational Security Measures, Configuration Management, Network and Communications Security, Component Security, Data Protection, User Access Control, Event and Incident Management, and System Integrity and Availability. Secondary summaries describe roughly 87 individual requirements distributed across these eight elements, but that specific count comes from standards-reseller and compliance-vendor summaries rather than from IEC's or ISA's own published text; the purchased standard itself is the authoritative source for a verified figure.

How does 62443-2-1 relate to 62443-3-3 and 62443-4-1/4-2?

62443-2-1 is policy- and procedure-focused and applies to the asset owner operating a system; 62443-3-3 sets technical system-level requirements (see our [IEC 62443-3-3 guide](/guides/iec-62443-3-3-system-security-requirements/)), and 62443-4-1/4-2 set process and component-level requirements for the vendors building products that go into that system (see [IEC 62443-4-2 vs the Cyber Resilience Act](/guides/iec-62443-4-2-vs-cra/)). Wikipedia's summary of the series structure describes 62443-2-1 as being "aimed at operators of automation solutions" and defining "requirements for how security during the operation of plants is to be considered," explicitly cross-referencing ISO/IEC 27001 — consistent with the 2024 edition's stated goal of removing ISMS duplication rather than reinventing it.

Who publishes it, and is there a US-equivalent standard?

IEC 62443-2-1 is issued by IEC Technical Committee 65 in collaboration with ISA99, per the standards-catalogue summaries this guide checked. The US national equivalent, ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1-2024, carries the same title and 2024 edition and is sold through ISA's own standards store — ISA's product page confirms the title "Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems – Part 2-1: Security Program Requirements for IACS Asset Owners" exists as a current ISA product, though the page itself does not expose further scope or committee detail.

Sources

  1. ISA: ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1-2024 — official product page
  2. ISA: The ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
  3. iteh Standards: IEC 62443-2-1:2024 — catalogue listing (scope, edition, major changes)
  4. OneClickComply: IEC 62443-2-1:2024 — standard summary (Security Program Elements, requirement count, maturity model)
  5. Wikipedia: IEC 62443 — series structure and part 2-1 scope
  6. IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-2-1:2024 — official publication listing (Edition 2.0)
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IEC 62443-2-1: security program requirements for IACS asset owners, explained