EtherNet/IP carries the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) across a large share of North American discrete manufacturing, and CIP's core messaging has no built-in authentication unless a site has deployed ODVA's separate CIP Security extension — a gap CISA has documented across a five-year run of advisories against the Rockwell Automation controllers and adapters that speak it, including a 2021 flaw scored CVSS v3 10.0 (CVE-2021-22681). ODVA has answered that gap with CIP Security since the mid-2010s, now organized as five security profiles, but the CISA record shows the most severe recent failures sit in places CIP Security was never designed to reach: unauthenticated debug ports and packet-parsing bugs, not just stolen or guessed credentials.
Profile descriptions in this guide come from ODVA's CIP Security page and its CIP Security At a Glance overview (PUB00319R2). Advisory facts come from CISA's machine-readable CSAF files. The EtherNet/IP Specification itself (Volume 8 for CIP Security) is sold by ODVA and remains the authoritative text for any single requirement.
Key takeaways
- Profile descriptions in this guide come from ODVA's CIP Security page and its CIP Security At a Glance overview (PUB00319R2).
- The first is a credential-bypass flaw that CIP Security's authentication model was designed to prevent.
- Most EtherNet/IP devices do not write the protocol from scratch.
- EtherNet/IP Confidentiality Profile — the core profile.
Why does CIP have no authentication, by design?
CIP and the EtherNet/IP network that carries it were standardized by ODVA in 2000, building on Rockwell Automation's existing Allen-Bradley protocols, with real-time determinism and broad interoperability as the design goals — not authentication. CIP's explicit messaging (request/response, used for configuration and diagnostics) and implicit messaging (cyclic I/O data) carry no field in the base protocol for a credential or signature. ODVA's own overview states the consequence plainly: "Since legacy CIP does not support user authentication, every user and attacker has the highest access privilege that the object is designed to support." That is a structural gap in the base protocol, not a configuration mistake in any single vendor's implementation — the same pattern documented across Modbus, DNP3, BACnet and PROFINET.
The IANA port registry shows the three ports a firewall rule or capture filter has to know:
| Port | IANA service name | Use |
|---|---|---|
| TCP/UDP 44818 | EtherNet-IP-2 | Explicit messaging (configuration, diagnostics, programming) |
| TCP/UDP 2222 | EtherNet-IP-1 | Implicit I/O data |
| TCP/UDP 2221 | ethernet-ip-s | EtherNet/IP over TLS (TCP) and DTLS (UDP), registered for ODVA on 2015-05-28 |
What do three documented Rockwell advisories show?
| Advisory | CVE | CVSS | Weakness | What happens | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICSA-21-056-03 | CVE-2021-22681 | v3 10.0 | CWE-522, Insufficiently Protected Credentials | Unauthenticated attacker bypasses the verification key securing Logix controller communication, enabling unauthorized configuration or application-code changes | No patch; mitigations incl. CIP Security |
| ICSA-26-195-04 | CVE-2026-10577 | v3.1 10.0 / v4.0 10.0 | CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function | Network-reachable debug port on the 1715-AENTR adapter lets a remote attacker read or delete files, stop tasks, modify memory and change I/O states | Firmware 3.011 and later |
| ICSA-26-167-03 | CVE-2026-11317 | v3.1 7.5 / v4.0 8.7 | CWE-404, Improper Resource Shutdown or Release | A crafted CIP message drives CompactLogix 5370, Compact GuardLogix 5370, ControlLogix 5570 and GuardLogix 5570 controllers into a major nonrecoverable fault | CompactLogix 5370 34.016, Compact GuardLogix 5370 35.015, ControlLogix 5570 36.012, GuardLogix 5570 37.011 |
The first is a credential-bypass flaw that CIP Security's authentication model was designed to prevent. The CSAF record for ICSA-21-056-03 states that the vulnerability "cannot be mitigated with a patch" and that CIP Security "directly addresses this vulnerability". The second and third are not authentication failures at all. One is a debug interface left exposed outside CIP messaging; the other is a parsing fault that a single message triggers, and the advisory text notes that "devices with less memory are more likely to be affected." The v4.0 scores are the Rockwell PSIRT scores in the NVD record.
Which EtherNet/IP stack vulnerabilities reach other vendors' products?
Most EtherNet/IP devices do not write the protocol from scratch. They license a commercial stack or embed an open-source one, so a stack bug ships inside many brands at once. CISA has published advisories on three widely used stacks:
| Advisory | Stack | CVE(s) | Score | Issue | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICSA-20-324-03 (Nov 2020) | Real Time Automation 499ES EtherNet/IP Adaptor Source Code | CVE-2020-25159 | v3 9.8 | Stack-based buffer overflow from a crafted packet | 2.28 |
| ICSA-21-105-02 (Apr 2021) | EIPStackGroup OpENer | CVE-2021-27478, -27482, -27498, -27500 | v3 7.5–8.2 | Crafted packets cause denial of service or arbitrary data reads | Commits after 10 Feb 2021 |
| ICSA-26-246-07 (Sep 2026) | Pyramid Solutions NetStaX EtherNet/IP Stack | CVE-2026-78012 | v3 9.8 | A large Class 3 explicit message overruns the application receive buffer with no CIP error returned | v5.6.1 |
The NetStaX advisory is the clearest lesson for product teams. The CSAF file for ICSA-26-246-07 lists eight affected kits, and four of them are the "with CIP Security" variants (EIPA-SECURE, EADK-SECURE, EIPS-SECURE, ESDK-SECURE). A secure transport does not help when the bug sits in the code that parses the message after decryption.
The open-source OpENer stack on GitHub keeps drawing reports: NVD published more than 15 OpENer CVEs between May and October 2026, most of them against v2.3.0 or commit 76b95cf and many of them out-of-bounds reads in ForwardOpen, Common Packet Format and attribute-list parsing. The same pattern appears in general-purpose network code; see embedded TCP/IP stack vulnerabilities.
What do CIP Security's five profiles add?
ODVA's PUB00319R2 says CIP Security "comprises Volume 8 of The EtherNet/IP Specification" and that its properties are "accomplished through five separate security profiles":
EtherNet/IP Confidentiality Profile— the core profile. It secures endpoint-to-endpoint communication using TLS (RFC 5246) for TCP traffic and DTLS (RFC 6347) for UDP class 0/1 I/O, with endpoints authenticated by X.509 certificates or pre-shared keys. Encryption is optional; integrity via HMAC is not. It includes the EtherNet/IP Integrity profile as a subset. This is the profile Rockwell's advisory points to for CVE-2021-22681. CIP User Authentication Profile— authenticates the human or application user, with OpenID Connect or users managed on the device, as a basis for role-based access control. Resource-Constrained CIP Security Profile(added in April 2021) — a lighter variant for devices such as contactors and push-buttons. It "requires only DTLS" and allows a gateway or proxy to handle user authentication. Pull Model Profile— automatic certificate enrollment for device replacement and commissioning, using EST for the certificate request and DNS-SD for discovery. Device-Based Firewall Profile— a simple IP address, port and protocol filter on the device, implemented through a new Ingress Egress Object.
None of these profiles are mandatory for a device to carry EtherNet/IP certification. A vendor chooses whether to implement them, and a site chooses whether to deploy them. ODVA also states that CIP-Security-enabled devices "must still be able to interoperate with devices that do not support CIP Security", so mixed networks are normal. On 22 October 2026 ODVA announced that TÜV Rheinland had certified the CIP Security specification against the applicable requirements of IEC 62443-4-2 at Security Level Capability 3. That certifies the specification, not any one product; each product still needs its own assessment against IEC 62443-4-2's component requirements.
What should a team building an EtherNet/IP product do?
Record the stack in the SBOMName the stack vendor, product and exact version or commit, so an advisory such as ICSA-26-246-07 can be matched on the day it publishes. See firmware SBOM. Fuzz the CIP parsersThe 2026 CVEs cluster in ForwardOpen connection paths, EPATH sizes, Common Packet Format items and Get/Set_Attribute_List counts. Feed malformed lengths into each one. Fail without a major faultA malformed message should return a CIP error, not halt the controller. Bound every receive buffer against the largest Class 3 payload the product accepts. Remove debug and service ports from production firmware, or put them behind authentication. CVE-2026-10577 was a debug interface, not CIP. Implement the Confidentiality Profile(or the Resource-Constrained profile on small devices) and the Pull Model, so customers can turn on CIP Security without manual certificate work. Document ports 44818, 2222 and 2221and which profiles the product supports in the user manual. Publish advisories in CSAFwith fixed versions, as the stack vendors above did.
What does a worked example look like?
Synthetic example, for illustration only. The company, product and versions are invented.
A maker of an EtherNet/IP I/O adapter builds its firmware on a licensed stack. Its release review runs like this:
- The SBOM lists "EtherNet/IP adapter stack 5.5.2 (with CIP Security)" plus an RTOS and a TLS library.
- A CISA advisory for that stack lists every version below 5.6.1, including the CIP-Security variant, at CVSS v3 9.8.
- The team checks the CISA KEV catalog (no entry) and the EPSS score, then rates the fix as release-blocking because the adapter accepts Class 3 messages from any host that reaches TCP 44818.
- The upgraded stack ships in the next firmware. The advisory to customers names the fixed firmware, and states that CIP Security alone does not mitigate the issue.
- A fuzzing case for oversized Class 3 requests is added to the regression suite.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Treating CIP Security as a patch. It closes credential and transport gaps; it does not fix parsing bugs, as the NetStaX "-SECURE" kits show.
- Tracking only the product name. Stack advisories name the stack, not your brand, so without an SBOM the match is missed.
- Allowing mixed mode forever. Devices that accept both secure and plain connections keep port 44818 open to anyone on the segment.
- Leaving engineering ports in shipped firmware. Debug consoles become CWE-306 findings.
- Ignoring port 2221 in firewall rules. A rule set that allows only 44818 and 2222 will block CIP Security traffic and push sites back to plain CIP.
What reduces risk on an installed base?
Treat CIP messaging as unauthenticated unless CIP Security is confirmed deployed on both endsThe base protocol has no credential check; the Confidentiality Profile only protects a connection once both the controller or adapter and its peer implement it. Patch to the firmware versions named in CISA's advisories firstCVE-2026-10577 and CVE-2026-11317 are device- and implementation-layer bugs that no CIP Security configuration substitutes for — only the vendor-fixed firmware closes them. Segment before anything elseKeep EtherNet/IP traffic inside the control network, behind an industrial DMZ, with no path from business IT or the internet — see the Purdue Model for OT/ICS network architecture for the segmentation pattern this implements. Restrict CIP's known ports specificallyWhere a managed switch or firewall can filter at this level, limit TCP/UDP 44818 and UDP 2222 (and 2221 where CIP Security runs) to the engineering workstations and HMI systems that genuinely need CIP access, and block inbound CIP traffic from any untrusted segment. Deploy CIP Security on new and replacement hardwareFor the credential and transport-layer gaps it was built to close — the class CVE-2021-22681 falls into — CIP Security is the direct fix; for debug-port and packet-parsing bugs like the 2026 CVEs, network-layer controls and vendor patches remain the real security model.
NIST SP 800-82's OT security guidance and IEC 62443-3-3's system security requirements both treat these layered, network-level compensating controls as the baseline for industrial protocols generally, EtherNet/IP and CIP included, alongside Modbus, DNP3, BACnet and PROFINET.
What can a passive capture show about EtherNet/IP?
SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek connection logs and the ICSNPP EtherNet/IP log from a mirror-port capture, without touching production traffic. From those logs it lists which hosts spoke EtherNet/IP, which side answered (labelled as the PLC role), the ports each host used, and remote-access sessions such as SSH, Telnet, RDP or VNC. A session on port 2221 shows traffic on the registered TLS/DTLS port; the capture cannot see inside it, so the inventory does not claim CIP Security is configured correctly. The capture does not identify a device's make, model or firmware, so it does not match CISA advisories by itself. That matching happens on firmware: SoftWSP's device and firmware security review extracts an SBOM, matches the stack and other components against NVD, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and drafts a cited report. AI drafts the narrative; an engineer reviews every finding before it reaches a report.
This guide draws on ODVA's CIP Security page, overview PDF and press releases, IANA's port registry, CISA's CSAF advisory files and NVD records. It is not a substitute for the EtherNet/IP Specification, the vendors' own advisories, or an engineer's assessment of a specific network.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Does EtherNet/IP have authentication built in?
Not in the base protocol. EtherNet/IP is the Ethernet-based network that carries the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) — the application-layer protocol ODVA (Open DeviceNet Vendors Association, now operating simply as ODVA) standardized in 2000 from a joint effort with Rockwell Automation. CIP's core messaging — the explicit and implicit messages a controller, HMI or I/O adapter exchanges over TCP/UDP port 44818 and UDP port 2222 — carries no credential, certificate or session key unless a device and its peer have both implemented ODVA's separate CIP Security extension. Per ODVA's own CIP Security page, the specification exists specifically because CIP and EtherNet/IP devices were otherwise exposed to attack: without it, any station that can reach that port can send CIP messages a device will act on.
What does CIP Security actually add?
Per ODVA's published CIP Security materials, CIP Security is not one feature but a set of profiles layered onto EtherNet/IP as Volume 8 of the EtherNet/IP specification. The EtherNet/IP Confidentiality Profile secures endpoint-to-endpoint communication for data integrity and confidentiality using TLS (RFC 5246) for TCP-based traffic and DTLS (RFC 6347) for UDP-based traffic, authenticating endpoints with X.509 certificates or pre-shared keys. The CIP User Authentication Profile adds user-level authentication (including OpenID Connect) on top of that device-level trust. ODVA added a Resource-Constrained CIP Security Profile in 2021 so smaller embedded devices can implement DTLS alone, without the overhead of full TLS, and a Pull Model Profile supports automated, certificate-based provisioning. None of these profiles are mandatory for a device to carry the EtherNet/IP name — a vendor has to choose to implement and a site has to choose to deploy them.
What do real, documented CIP/EtherNet/IP security failures look like?
CISA's ICS advisory archive shows a recurring pattern across Rockwell Automation's EtherNet/IP product lines, spanning five years. CVE-2021-22681 (CISA ICSA-21-056-03, CVSS v3 10.0, CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials) let an unauthenticated attacker bypass the verification key Studio 5000 Logix Designer uses to authenticate with Logix controllers, enabling unauthorized configuration or application-code changes across RSLogix 5000, Studio 5000 and multiple ControlLogix/CompactLogix/GuardLogix/DriveLogix/SoftLogix families — Rockwell's own advisory states patching the key mechanism itself was infeasible, and names CIP Security's TLS/DTLS transport as the compensating control. CVE-2026-10577 (CISA ICSA-26-195-04, published 14 July 2026, CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 both 10.0, CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function) is a network-reachable debug port on the 1715-AENTR EtherNet/IP adapter with no authentication at all, letting a remote attacker read or delete files, stop tasks, modify memory and change I/O states — fixed in firmware 3.011. CVE-2026-11317 (CISA ICSA-26-167-03, published 16 June 2026, CVSS v3.1 7.5, CWE-404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release) shows a different failure mode: a single crafted CIP message crashes CompactLogix 5370, Compact GuardLogix 5370, ControlLogix 5570 and GuardLogix 5570 controllers into a major nonrecoverable fault requiring a program download to recover, with lower-memory devices worse affected.
Would CIP Security have stopped all three of those CVEs?
No — and that distinction matters for prioritizing fixes. CVE-2021-22681 is explicitly a credential/authentication weakness, which is exactly what CIP Security's TLS/DTLS transport and endpoint authentication are built to close, per Rockwell's own advisory. CVE-2026-10577, by contrast, is an unauthenticated debug interface outside CIP messaging entirely — a device-level design flaw that only a firmware update removes; CIP Security secures CIP traffic, not an unrelated debug port left open on the same device. CVE-2026-11317 is a parsing/resource-handling bug triggered by a malformed but otherwise-valid CIP message — encrypting and authenticating the channel with CIP Security does not stop a legitimately-authenticated engineering workstation, or an attacker who has already reached one, from sending a message that crashes the controller's packet-handling code. Only the vendor-patched firmware versions close that specific hole, matching the same pattern documented across Modbus, DNP3, BACnet and PROFINET: cryptographic security and implementation-bug patching are separate problems, and a protocol extension that solves the first does nothing for the second.
What actually reduces EtherNet/IP and CIP risk today?
The same layered approach NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3 and CISA's recommended practices describe for every industrial protocol with optional security: segment EtherNet/IP traffic behind an industrial DMZ so controllers and adapters are never reachable from business IT or the internet; restrict TCP/UDP 44818 and UDP 2222 to the engineering workstations and HMI systems that actually need CIP access; patch to the vendor-fixed firmware named in each CISA advisory, since no amount of network segmentation closes a debug-port or packet-parsing bug by itself; and deploy CIP Security — at minimum the EtherNet/IP Confidentiality Profile — on new and replacement hardware that supports it, since it is the one control here that directly closes credential and transport-level gaps like CVE-2021-22681.
Sources
- ODVA: CIP Security — EtherNet/IP Confidentiality Profile, CIP User Authentication Profile, Resource-Constrained profile, TLS/DTLS
- ODVA: "CIP Security Enhanced to Support Resource-Constrained EtherNet/IP Devices" (press release, April 2021)
- ODVA: "CIP Security At a Glance" technology overview (PUB00319R2, PDF)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-21-056-03 (Update A): Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers — CVE-2021-22681
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-195-04: Rockwell Automation 1715-AENTR EtherNet/IP Adapter — CVE-2026-10577
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-167-03: Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers — CVE-2026-11317
- NIST Special Publication 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (September 2023)
- CISA: Recommended Practices (control systems network segmentation, defense-in-depth, minimizing network exposure)
- IANA: Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry (EtherNet-IP-2 44818, EtherNet-IP-1 2222, ethernet-ip-s 2221 TLS/DTLS)
- ODVA: "CIP Security Earns IEC 62443-4-2 Certification" (press release, 22 October 2026)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-21-056-03 Rockwell Automation Logix Controllers (Update A), machine-readable advisory
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-26-246-07 Pyramid Solutions NetStaX EtherNet/IP Stack — CVE-2026-78012
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-20-324-03 Real Time Automation 499ES EtherNet/IP — CVE-2020-25159
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-21-105-02 EIPStackGroup OpENer Ethernet/IP
- NVD: CVE-2026-10577 (Rockwell PSIRT CVSS v4.0 10.0)
- EIPStackGroup: OpENer open-source EtherNet/IP stack (GitHub)
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