The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), enacted by Congress in March 2022 and codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 681-681g, directs the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to stand up a new regulatory program requiring certain critical-infrastructure entities to report cyber incidents and ransom payments. CISA published its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on 4 April 2024, and on 1 October 2026 submitted a draft final rule to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for interagency review — but as of November 2026, no CIRCIA reporting obligation is in force. CISA's own program page states reporting remains voluntary "until the effective date of the final rule." Everything below describing covered entities, triggers, and deadlines reflects the 2024 NPRM's proposed text, which the final rule may change.
Key takeaways
- The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), enacted by Congress in March 2022 and codified at 6 U.S.C.
- CIRCIA itself is a real, enacted statute — it is not proposed.
- Some numbers are already law and cannot change in the final rule.
- The sector-based criteria differ by sector.
Why isn't CIRCIA law yet, and what already is?
CIRCIA itself is a real, enacted statute — it is not proposed. What's still pending is the implementing regulation that would actually impose reporting duties and attach deadlines, penalties and definitions. CISA's rulemaking has repeatedly missed its own targets: the statute required a final rule within 18 months of the April 2024 NPRM, so by October 2025; the federal Unified Agenda listed May 2026 and then September 2026; and the draft final rule only reached OIRA for review on 1 October 2026 (tracked under RIN 1670-AA04, "Final Rule" stage), where it was still pending on 13 November 2026. Town halls on "refining the scope and burden" of the NPRM, first set for March and April 2026, were not held during the lapse in DHS appropriations from 14 February to 30 April 2026 and ran on 15–18 June 2026 instead. After OIRA, the rule still needs Federal Register publication and an effective date; the NPRM itself expected delays "for major rules", and under the Congressional Review Act a major rule generally takes effect no earlier than 60 days after publication or receipt by Congress. Until then, every definition and threshold in this guide is a proposal, not a binding requirement; only the statutory points below are fixed.
What does the statute itself fix, whatever the final rule says?
Some numbers are already law and cannot change in the final rule. Section 681b of title 6 sets them, while leaving the start date to the rule:
| Statutory point | What 6 U.S.C. § 681b says |
|---|---|
| Incident report | Not later than 72 hours after the covered entity "reasonably believes" a covered cyber incident occurred |
| Floor on that deadline | CISA's Director "may not require reporting" any earlier than 72 hours |
| Ransom payment report | Not later than 24 hours after the payment is made, even if the attack is not a covered cyber incident |
| Start date | Reporting duties take effect on the dates the final rule prescribes |
The definitions of covered entity and substantial cyber incident, the report content and the enforcement steps are what the rulemaking decides.
Who would be a "covered entity"?
Per the NPRM, any entity in one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors (as the sectors are defined under Presidential Policy Directive 21) would be covered if it meets either of two tests:
| Test | What it means |
|---|---|
| Size-based | The entity exceeds the Small Business Administration's small-business size standard for its industry |
| Sector-based | The entity meets one or more sector-specific criteria, regardless of size |
The sector-based criteria differ by sector. CISA's NPRM overview gives examples including: Healthcare and Public Health — owns/operates a large or critical-access hospital, or manufactures certain essential drugs or Class II/III medical devices; Energy — required to report to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or to the Department of Energy under OE-417; Information Technology — is an original equipment manufacturer or vendor of operational technology hardware or software components, or knowingly supports federal government IT; Water — owns/operates a community water system or publicly owned treatment works serving 3,300 or more people; and Emergency Services or Government Facilities — serves a population of 50,000 or more. Commercial Facilities, Dams, and Food and Agriculture have no sector-specific criteria proposed — coverage for those sectors runs through the size-based test alone.
Which device makers and OT vendors would the proposed rule reach?
Several of the NPRM's proposed sector-based criteria in § 226.2(b) name manufacturers directly, and they apply "regardless of the specific critical infrastructure sector of which the entity considers itself to be part":
| Proposed criterion | Who it names |
|---|---|
| (b)(3) Critical manufacturing | Entities engaged in primary metal manufacturing; machinery manufacturing; electrical equipment, appliance and component manufacturing; or transportation equipment manufacturing |
| (b)(11)(iii) Public health | Manufacturers of a Class II or Class III medical device |
| (b)(12)(iii) Information technology | An "original equipment manufacturer, vendor, or integrator of operational technology hardware or software components" |
| (b)(6) Bulk electric | Entities required to report under the NERC CIP standards or on DOE form OE-417 |
So a small machine builder, drive maker or OT gateway vendor could be covered even below the SBA size standard. CISA's February 2026 town-hall notice asked for input on the size-based and sector-based criteria, so treat this list as the 2024 proposal.
What would trigger a mandatory report?
| Term | Proposed definition |
|---|---|
| Covered cyber incident | A substantial cyber incident experienced by a covered entity |
| Substantial cyber incident | A cyber incident that actually leads to at least one of four impacts (below) — risk of an impact that doesn't materialize does not qualify |
The four substantial-incident impacts, per the NPRM: (1) a substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of the entity's information system or network; (2) a serious impact on the safety and resilience of its operational systems and processes; (3) a disruption of its ability to engage in business or industrial operations, or deliver goods or services; or (4) unauthorized access to its information system, network, or nonpublic information, facilitated through a compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service provider or other third-party data host, or through a supply-chain compromise.
Excluded even if one of those impacts occurs: lawfully authorized activity by a U.S. or state/local/tribal/territorial government entity, an event perpetrated in good faith at the specific request of the system owner or operator (e.g. authorized penetration testing), and a bare threat to disrupt used as extortion with no actual impact.
CISA's fact sheet gives illustrative examples on both sides. Likely to qualify: a DDoS attack that renders services unavailable to customers for an extended period; a ransomware attack that locks a covered entity out of its industrial control system; unauthorized access to a business system caused by a tampered automatic software update or compromised managed-service-provider credentials. Likely not to qualify: a brief outage of a non-critical public-facing website; a single phished credential blocked by enforced multi-factor authentication; malware that antivirus software quarantines before it executes; blocked phishing attempts or failed login attempts; routine vulnerability scanning with no evidence of penetration.
What are the proposed deadlines?
| Report | Proposed deadline | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
| Covered cyber incident report | 72 hours | From when the entity reasonably believes a covered cyber incident occurred |
| Ransom payment report | 24 hours | From when a ransom payment (by the entity or on its behalf) is disbursed |
| Supplemental report | Promptly | New substantial information on a prior incident, or a later ransom payment tied to one |
Covered entities would also have to preserve data and records relevant to the incident or payment — indicators of compromise, relevant log entries, forensic artifacts, and communications with the threat actor — starting from the date of the reasonable belief (or payment) and continuing until two years after the last related CIRCIA report, even if the entity itself is exempt from direct reporting under a "substantially similar reporting" exception to another federal agency.
What a report would have to contain, and how it would be submitted
Per the NPRM, every CIRCIA report would identify the covered entity (name, entity type, physical address, sector(s), other identifiers) and provide contact information. Incident and ransom-payment reports would additionally need a description of the incident (impacts, exploited vulnerabilities, tactics/techniques/procedures, indicators of compromise), information on the perpetrator's identity if known, and mitigation/response activities — plus, for ransom payments specifically, the demand and payment details. Reports would go through a single, dynamic, web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form; a covered entity could designate a third party to report on its behalf, but compliance responsibility stays with the covered entity itself. The NPRM also proposes that CIRCIA reports be treated as protected commercial/financial/proprietary information, exempt from FOIA disclosure, inadmissible as evidence from the act of submission alone, and shielded by a "no cause of action" liability protection for the submission itself.
What would a report need from device firmware and logs?
The proposed report content and preservation lists ask for device-level facts that only firmware and logs hold. Per the NPRM's § 226.8 and § 226.13:
| Proposed requirement | Device or firmware data that answers it |
|---|---|
| Affected "networks, devices, and/or information systems", with technical details and physical locations (§ 226.8(a)(1)) | Asset inventory with model, serial and site |
| Vulnerabilities exploited, including "the specific products or technologies and versions" (§ 226.8(c)) | Running firmware version and its component list (SBOM), matched to the advisory |
| Dates the incident began and was detected, and the timeline of compromised system communications (§ 226.8(a)(3)) | Time-synchronized security logs and network records |
| Relevant log entries, including firewall, VPN, remote desktop and endpoint (§ 226.13(b)(1)(iii)) | Syslog export from gateways, HMIs and engineering workstations |
| System information such as "operating systems, version numbers, patch levels, and configuration settings" (§ 226.13(b)(1)(vii)) | Firmware and configuration baselines |
The NPRM adds that an entity "is not required to create any data or records it does not already have". A device that never logged logins, or a fleet with no firmware inventory, leaves the report thin. SoftWSP's device firmware security service extracts a CycloneDX SBOM from a firmware image and matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories; the free SBOM viewer shows what such a component list holds.
How would CIRCIA overlap with NERC CIP-008 reporting?
Utilities would likely face two clocks for one event. NERC CIP-008 requires notifying E-ISAC and CISA's NCCIC one hour after determining a Reportable Cyber Security Incident, while CIRCIA would allow 72 hours. The NPRM's § 226.4(a) "substantially similar reporting" exception would excuse a CIRCIA report only where CISA has a published CIRCIA Agreement with the other federal agency covering substantially similar information and timeframes, and preservation duties would still apply. Until such an agreement exists and is posted, plan for both reports.
Worked example: how would the CIRCIA clocks run for a machine builder?
The timeline below is synthetic and illustrative: the company and times are invented, the deadlines are the NPRM's proposals, and nothing applies until a final rule takes effect.
| Time | Event | Proposed consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Day 0, 06:30 | Ransomware encrypts the engineering file server and the plant's HMI servers at a machinery manufacturer; assembly stops | Possible impact (3): disruption of industrial operations |
| Day 0, 11:00 | Incident lead concludes a covered cyber incident occurred | 72-hour clock starts; preservation begins (§ 226.13(c)) |
| Day 2, 09:00 | Company pays the ransom | Payment falls within 72 hours, so one joint report is allowed by Day 3, 11:00 (§ 226.5(c)) |
| Day 3, 11:00 | Joint report filed | Supplemental reports follow as substantial new information emerges |
| Last report + 2 years | Preservation period ends | Logs, firmware versions and threat-actor messages are kept until then |
Had the payment come on Day 4, after the incident report, a supplemental report would be due within 24 hours of payment.
What is a workable starting point, given the uncertainty?
Don't build your incident-response runbook around the NPRM's exact numbers yetCISA's June 2026 town halls sought input on "refining the scope and burden" of the 2024 proposal, so the final rule may change its scope and triggers — treat every proposed figure here as directional, not final, apart from the statutory 72-hour and 24-hour deadlines. Map your own sector exposure nowIf your organization sits in one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, work out under the proposed sector- and size-based tests whether you'd likely be a covered entity — that scoping exercise doesn't change once the final rule lands, even if the specific criteria shift slightly. Reuse your CRA or other 72-hour reporting muscleIf you already triage and report under the EU Cyber Resilience Act's 24-hour/72-hour vulnerability and incident reporting, the operational pattern — on-call roster, pre-written report templates, evidence logging of when you became aware — transfers directly to a future CIRCIA obligation. Report voluntarily where it costs littleCISA explicitly encourages voluntary incident sharing now; doing so can build the internal habit of fast, structured incident reporting before it becomes mandatory. Track RIN 1670-AA04, not news aggregators, for the actual statusReginfo.gov's OIRA review tracker is the authoritative source for whether the rule has cleared interagency review and moved to Federal Register publication.
Can AI help draft a 72-hour incident report?
CIRCIA's proposed reporting clock — 72 hours for a covered cyber incident, 24 for a ransom payment — doesn't leave room to write a report from scratch while an incident is still being triaged, which is exactly the gap SoftWSP's AI narration is built for, not a gap it closes by detecting the incident itself. Once a firmware or pcap-derived finding has been confirmed — affected asset, matched CVE, KEV or EPSS status — AI drafts a plain-language incident description an engineer can adapt directly into the CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form's required fields, citing the specific evidence behind each claim. AI doesn't decide whether an incident meets the "substantial" threshold or submit the report; a person makes that determination and files it, exactly as the proposed rule requires a covered entity to do itself.
SoftWSP's PSIRT-as-a-service can help device makers and critical-infrastructure vendors stand up the intake, triage and reporting workflow CIRCIA's final rule will likely require, reusing the same evidence trail used for CRA and other regulatory reporting: see PSIRT as a service.
This guide summarizes CISA's own public CIRCIA program page and NPRM materials as of November 2026; CIRCIA's implementing regulation is not final, every proposed definition, deadline and penalty described above may change before the final rule is published, and this guide is not legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
Is CIRCIA reporting mandatory right now?
No. As of 1 October 2026, CISA's own CIRCIA page states plainly: "Until the effective date of the final rule, organizations are not required to submit covered cyber incident or ransom payment reports," while adding that CISA "strongly encourages organizations to continue voluntarily sharing cyber event information." The statute itself, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, was enacted in March 2022 and is codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 681-681g, but it does not create reporting duties on its own — it only takes effect once CISA's implementing regulation is final. CISA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on 4 April 2024 (89 FR 23644) with definitions and deadlines that are proposed, not binding, and on 1 October 2026 submitted a draft final rule (tracked as RIN 1670-AA04) to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for the interagency review that precedes Federal Register publication — a step short of a final, binding rule. Treat every figure in this guide drawn from the NPRM as proposed and subject to change in the final text.
What would count as a "covered entity" under the proposed rule?
Per CISA's own NPRM informational overview, any entity in one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors (as defined by Presidential Policy Directive 21) that either exceeds the Small Business Administration's small-business size standard for its industry, or meets one or more sector-specific criteria regardless of size. The sector-based criteria vary by sector: examples in CISA's overview include owning/operating a large or critical-access hospital or manufacturing certain essential drugs or Class II/III medical devices (Healthcare and Public Health); being required to report under NERC or DOE's OE-417 (Energy); being an original equipment manufacturer or vendor of operational technology hardware or software (Information Technology); or owning/operating a community water system serving 3,300 or more people (Water). Three sectors — Commercial Facilities, Dams, and Food and Agriculture — have no sector-specific criteria in the NPRM and rely on the size-based test alone. These are proposed criteria; CISA states the final rule may define them differently.
What would trigger a mandatory report, and what wouldn't?
Per the NPRM, a "covered cyber incident" is a "substantial cyber incident" experienced by a covered entity, and a cyber incident is substantial if it leads to at least one of four impacts: a substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of the entity's information system or network; a serious impact on the safety and resilience of its operational systems and processes; a disruption of its ability to engage in business or industrial operations or deliver goods or services; or unauthorized access facilitated through a compromise of a cloud/managed/third-party hosting provider or a supply-chain compromise. Excluded even then: lawfully authorized government activity, good-faith security testing done at the system owner's request, and a bare threat of disruption used as extortion (with no actual impact). CISA's companion fact sheet gives illustrative, non-exhaustive examples on both sides: a ransomware attack that locks a covered entity out of its industrial control system would likely qualify; a blocked phishing attempt, a failed login attempt, or malware that antivirus software successfully quarantines before execution would likely not.
What are the proposed deadlines, and what happens if an entity misses them?
Per the NPRM: a covered cyber incident must be reported no later than 72 hours after the entity reasonably believes it occurred; a ransom payment made as a result of a ransomware attack must be reported no later than 24 hours after the payment is disbursed; and a supplemental report is required promptly if substantial new information emerges about a previously reported incident, or if a ransom payment is later made related to one. Data and records relevant to the incident must be preserved starting from the date the entity formed its reasonable belief (or the payment date) through two years after the last related CIRCIA report. For enforcement, the NPRM proposes that CISA may first issue a Request for Information (RFI) to an entity it believes failed to report; if the entity does not adequately respond, CISA's Director may issue a subpoena no earlier than 72 hours after the RFI, and can refer continued non-compliance to the Department of Justice (failure to comply with a subpoena is punishable as contempt of court) or to DHS's Suspension and Debarment Official. None of this is in force yet — see the first FAQ above.
Sources
- CISA: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) — official program page (current voluntary-reporting status, statutory background)
- CISA: CIRCIA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking — Informational Overview (April 2024; unofficial NPRM summary: statutory authority, applicability criteria, covered cyber incident definition, deadlines, reporting content, enforcement, rulemaking schedule)
- CISA: "What Would Be a Covered Cyber Incident Under CIRCIA as Proposed in 6 CFR § 226.1?" fact sheet (April 2024; substantial-incident impact tests, exclusions, illustrative qualifying/non-qualifying examples)
- CISA: Covered Entity Fact Sheet (NPRM summary of the 16-sector, size-based and sector-based applicability test)
- Federal Register: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) Reporting Requirements, 89 FR 23644 (4 April 2024) — official NPRM docket entry
- Reginfo.gov (OMB/OIRA): Pending EO 12866 Regulatory Review — RIN 1670-AA04, CIRCIA Reporting Requirements, Final Rule stage, received by OIRA 1 October 2026
- 6 U.S.C. § 681b — Required reporting of certain cyber incidents (statutory 72-hour and 24-hour deadlines, final-rule deadline), Cornell Legal Information Institute
- Reginfo.gov (OMB/OIRA): Unified Agenda Fall 2025 entry for RIN 1670-AA04 (Final Rule listed for 09/2026)
- Federal Register: Town Hall Meetings To Provide Input on CIRCIA Rulemaking, revised schedule, 91 FR 30498 (26 May 2026)
- 5 U.S.C. § 801 — Congressional review (60-day effective-date rule for major rules), Cornell Legal Information Institute
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