UL 2900-2-2 has never become an ANSI-approved standard: ISA's 2019 appeal against UL's bid for American National Standard approval — arguing the document duplicated the established ISA/IEC 62443 series — was upheld by a UL appeal panel, and the document — "Outline of Investigation for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 2-2: Particular Requirements for Industrial Control Systems" — remains stuck at Outline of Investigation status to this day. It was published in March 2016 by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (now operating as UL Standards & Engagement / UL Solutions) as the industrial-control-systems companion to UL 2900-1 within UL's software cybersecurity series. Unlike its healthcare sibling UL 2900-2-1, which went on to ANSI adoption and FDA recognition, UL 2900-2-2's stalled status is as informative for an OT/ICS vendor as the document's content itself.
UL's Outlines of Investigation are commercial documents. This guide draws on catalogue listings and published summaries of the outline's title, date and scope, plus independent secondary reporting — not the full purchased text. A purchased copy remains the authoritative source for any requirement detail.
Key takeaways
- UL's Outlines of Investigation are commercial documents.
- As a Part 2 document, it adds particular requirements for ICS to the general requirements of UL 2900-1.
- UL sought American National Standard (ANSI) approval for UL 2900-2-2, the same path UL 2900-1 and UL 2900-2-1 both completed successfully.
- Nearly every UL 2900-2-2 area has a counterpart in IEC 62443-4-2 or 62443-4-1.
What does the scope section actually cover?
The outline's scope, as quoted in Black Duck's UL 2900 overview, says it "applies to the evaluation of industrial control systems components." The listed ICS asset types are Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), process control systems, data acquisition systems, historians/data loggers/data storage systems, control servers, SCADA servers, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI), Input/Output (IO) servers, fieldbuses, networking equipment for ICS systems, data radios, smart sensors, and controllers and embedded system/controllers.
As a Part 2 document, it adds particular requirements for ICS to the general requirements of UL 2900-1. Per the same overview, UL 2900-1 applies to products "evaluated and tested for vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware" and covers three things: the vendor's risk management process for the product, the methods for testing for vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware, and the presence of security risk controls in the product's architecture and design.
Why did it never become a standard?
UL sought American National Standard (ANSI) approval for UL 2900-2-2, the same path UL 2900-1 and UL 2900-2-1 both completed successfully. It did not succeed. Per reporting in ISA's own inTech magazine (March/April 2019), an appeal panel convened by UL ruled in favour of an appeal brought by ISA — the International Society of Automation, the standards-development organisation behind the ISA/IEC 62443 series — against UL's bid for ANSI approval. ISA's argument, as reported: UL "failed to follow a key clause in the UL accredited standards procedures that is intended to prevent duplication and overlap," and cybersecurity expert review found the UL document substantially duplicated the already-established ISA/IEC 62443 series covering industrial automation and control systems security.
The same article adds three details that matter to a vendor weighing the document today:
- UL acknowledged the overlap problem. "Prior to the appeal, UL had acknowledged that it missed earlier opportunities to identify potential overlap and duplication."
- The IEC route was closed in practice. IEC leaders from TC 65, the IEC committee that works with ISA99, "had previously indicated that the UL standard would have a very low chance" of becoming an international standard.
- 62443 has the wider policy footprint. ISA notes that the ISA/IEC 62443 series "is cited throughout the U.S. NIST Cybersecurity Framework."
The practical consequence is durable, not temporary. Per the same reporting, without ANSI approval UL 2900-2-2 is also not eligible to become an internationally recognised standard through the IEC. Black Duck's current UL 2900 overview still says UL 2900-2-2 "has not been developed into a standard and published" — a decade after its publication, it remains what it was in March 2016: an Outline of Investigation, not a ratified standard.
How do its test areas line up with IEC 62443?
Nearly every UL 2900-2-2 area has a counterpart in IEC 62443-4-2 or 62443-4-1. That overlap is what ISA flagged, and it is also what lets a vendor reuse evidence. IEC 62443-4-2:2019 defines component requirements against seven foundational requirements (FRs) from IEC TS 62443-1-1: identification and authentication control (IAC), use control (UC), system integrity (SI), data confidentiality (DC), restricted data flow (RDF), timely response to events (TRE) and resource availability (RA). IEC 62443-4-1:2018 sets secure development lifecycle requirements, from security requirements definition through verification and validation, defect management, patch management and product end-of-life.
The table is our reading of where each area lands; it is not an official crosswalk from UL, ISA or IEC.
| UL 2900 series area (UL 2900-1 scope, applied to ICS by 2900-2-2) | Closest IEC 62443-4-2 FR | Closest IEC 62443-4-1 practice |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor risk management process for the product | — | Security management; management of security-related issues |
| Security risk controls in architecture and design | IAC, UC, DC, RDF, SI | Secure by design |
| Testing for known vulnerabilities and malware | SI | Security verification and validation testing |
| Testing for software weaknesses | RA, SI | Secure implementation; security verification and validation testing |
Two differences remain once the overlap is mapped. 62443-4-2 grades requirements by capability security level (SL-C), so a component can claim SL-C 2 against one FR and SL-C 3 against another, and a buyer can ask for a specific level per requirement. And 62443-4-1 audits the development organisation separately from the product, while UL CAP folds the vendor process into the product evaluation.
The overlap ISA flagged is the same overlap an ICS vendor evaluating UL 2900-2-2 today will notice immediately — see our guides to IEC 62443-4-1 (secure development lifecycle), IEC 62443-4-2 (component technical requirements), and IEC 62443-3-3 (system security requirements). Where UL 2900-1 and UL 2900-2-1 found a real regulatory foothold through FDA recognition for medical devices, UL 2900-2-2 has no equivalent regulatory anchor in the ICS/OT space — NERC CIP and sector-specific regulation reference IEC 62443 and bespoke frameworks, not UL 2900-2-2. For the asset-owner view of the same components, NIST SP 800-82 is the usual US reference.
UL CAP or ISASecure: which path fits an ICS component?
For most ICS component makers, the 62443-based ISASecure path is the default and UL CAP is the contract-driven exception. Both are voluntary third-party certifications; they differ in what they certify.
| UL CAP with UL 2900-1 / 2900-2-2 | ISASecure CSA | ISASecure SDLA | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basis | UL 2900-1 plus the ICS outline | IEC 62443-4-2 and 62443-4-1 | IEC 62443-4-1 |
| What is certified | A product, with its vendor's process reviewed | A component: software application, embedded device, host device or network device | A named development organisation and a specific version of its documented lifecycle process |
| Current version | Outline of Investigation (March 2016) | CSA 1.0.0, effective 28 August 2019 | SDLA 3.0.0, effective 16 June 2020 |
| Standards status | Outline of Investigation, no ANSI approval | ANSI/ISA and IEC standards | ANSI/ISA and IEC standards |
| When it fits | A buyer contract names UL CAP or UL 2900 | A buyer asks for a 62443-certified component | Several products share one development process |
ISASecure describes SDLA certification as a certifier evaluating the documented process and then reviewing "representative artifacts to verify that each ISASecure SDLA requirement is being followed" for products in scope. The same artefacts (threat models, test reports, vulnerability records) are what a UL CAP evaluation asks the vendor process to show, which is why one evidence base can serve both.
Worked example: one RTU, two buyer requests
Synthetic example: no real company or product. A maker of a remote terminal unit for water utilities (embedded Linux, Modbus/TCP and DNP3, a web configuration page) gets two requests in the same quarter: a US system integrator's contract that names "UL 2900-2-2 or equivalent", and a European utility tender that asks for IEC 62443-4-2 SL-C 2.
Ask what "equivalent" meansThe integrator confirms in writing that an ISASecure CSA certificate is accepted. One certification now covers both requests. Build one evidence folderThe team assembles the threat model, the interface list (Modbus/TCP, DNP3, HTTPS, SSH service port), the secure-update design and the vulnerability-handling procedure. Generate the component inventoryAn SBOM of firmware 5.1.0 shows a BusyBox build, an OpenSSL branch and a Modbus stack. Matching it against CISA's ICS advisories and NVD gives a dated list of known issues to fix or explain before the lab sees it. Map once, file twiceThe 62443-4-2 requirement table goes to the utility; the same rows, re-labelled by UL 2900-2-2 area, answer the integrator's questionnaire. Keep the inventory currentA later firmware release gets a new SBOM and a new match run, so the evidence still describes what ships.
Takeaway. The evidence is shared; only the label on the certificate differs. Ask buyers early whether a 62443 certificate satisfies a UL 2900-2-2 clause.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Calling it a standard. UL 2900-2-2 is an Outline of Investigation; proposals and datasheets should say so.
- Running two programmes for one product. Separate UL and 62443 projects double the cost of evidence that overlaps almost row by row.
- Ignoring the process side. Both UL CAP and 62443-4-1 look at how the vendor handles vulnerabilities after release, not only at the tested build.
- Testing a build that never ships. A certificate tied to an older firmware version answers fewer questions with each release.
- Mixing up levels. 62443-4-1 maturity levels describe the vendor process; 62443-4-2 SL-C describes the component; neither maps to a UL grade.
Where should an ICS vendor start?
Default to IEC 62443 for ICS component securityIt is the standard ISA successfully defended as the established reference, has broad international adoption, and (unlike UL 2900-2-2) is a ratified, ANSI/IEC-recognised standard family. Only pursue UL 2900-2-2-style testing if a specific contract or buyer names UL CAPUL continues to offer UL 2900-1/2900-2-2-based advisory, testing and certification services voluntarily; absent a buyer requirement, it adds cost without the regulatory or standards-body backing IEC 62443 already has. Write "or equivalent" into the conversationWhen a buyer names UL 2900-2-2, ask in writing whether an IEC 62443-4-2 or ISASecure certificate is accepted before scoping a UL engagement. Pair whichever path you choose with the general UL 2900-1 requirements, since UL 2900-2-2 is a Part 2 document that adds particular requirements to Part 1, not a standalone document. Describe the status precisely in customer material: "UL 2900-2-2, Outline of Investigation (March 2016)", not "UL 2900-2-2 standard".
SoftWSP supports both sides of that work. For the shop floor, a passive OT network assessment maps what is actually running against IEC 62443 and UL 2900-series expectations alike: see OT Snapshot. For the component maker, the platform extracts a firmware SBOM as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON and matches it against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, with a cited report drafted for an engineer to review; see Device & Firmware Security and the free SBOM viewer. Certification itself stays with the accredited lab.
This guide draws on published summaries of UL 2900-2-2's title, date and scope, ANSI's and UL's catalogue listings, IEC and ISASecure publication pages, and independent secondary reporting (including ISA's own account of its successful appeal); it is not a substitute for the full purchased outline or for UL's current, authoritative standards catalogue, and does not constitute compliance advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is UL 2900-2-2, and who publishes it?
UL 2900-2-2, "Outline of Investigation for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 2-2: Particular Requirements for Industrial Control Systems," is a security evaluation document published by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL; now operating as UL Standards & Engagement / UL Solutions). It was published in March 2016 and is sold, not freely available. Unlike UL 2900-1 and UL 2900-2-1, it has never been elevated from an Outline of Investigation to a full UL/ANSI standard — see below.
What does UL 2900-2-2 actually cover, per its own scope section?
Its scope, as quoted in Black Duck's UL 2900 overview, says the outline "applies to the evaluation of industrial control systems components," including programmable logic controllers (PLCs), distributed control systems (DCS), process control systems, data acquisition systems, historians, data loggers and data storage systems, control servers, SCADA servers, remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), human-machine interfaces (HMIs), I/O servers, fieldbuses, networking equipment for ICS systems, data radios, smart sensors, and controllers and embedded systems. It adds ICS-specific particular requirements to the general requirements of [UL 2900-1](/guides/ul-2900-1-software-cybersecurity/), which cover the vendor's risk management process, testing for vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware, and security risk controls in the product's architecture and design.
Why has UL 2900-2-2 never become an ANSI-approved standard?
Per reporting in ISA's own inTech magazine, an appeal panel formed by UL ruled in favour of an appeal brought by ISA (the International Society of Automation, the standards-development organisation behind the ISA/IEC 62443 series) against UL's bid to have 2900-2-2 approved as an American National Standard. ISA argued UL "failed to follow a key clause in the UL accredited standards procedures that is intended to prevent duplication and overlap," contending the document substantially duplicated the already-established ISA/IEC 62443 series. The panel's ruling meant UL 2900-2-2 did not gain ANSI approval at that time, and — per the same reporting — without ANSI approval it is also not eligible to become an internationally recognised standard through the IEC. Black Duck's current UL 2900 overview still states that it "has not been developed into a standard and published."
Should an OT/ICS vendor use UL 2900-2-2, or go straight to IEC 62443?
UL itself positions UL 2900-2-2 as a companion to UL 2900-1 under the UL Cybersecurity Assurance Program (UL CAP) — a voluntary, buyer-requested certification path, not a regulatory requirement. Because it never obtained ANSI approval and its content overlaps with the far more widely adopted [IEC 62443 series](/guides/iec-62443-4-1-secure-development-lifecycle/) (the standard ISA's appeal was defending), independent industry guidance generally points ICS component vendors toward IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 for product-level and process-level security assurance, reserving UL 2900-1/2900-2-2-style testing for buyers or contracts that specifically name UL CAP as a requirement.
Sources
- ANSI Webstore: UL 2900-2-2 Ed. 1-2016 — Outline of Investigation for Software Cybersecurity for Network-Connectable Products, Part 2-2 (published 2016-03-30)
- UL Standards & Engagement: standards catalogue listing for UL 2900-2-2 (Wayback Machine copy, 16 April 2020)
- ISA (International Society of Automation), inTech magazine: "UL panel upholds ISA appeal of UL cybersecurity standard" (March/April 2019)
- Black Duck (blackduck.com): "What Is UL 2900 and How Does It Work?" — UL 2900 series overview, UL 2900-1 scope, UL 2900-2-2 scope list and outline-only status
- IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Technical security requirements for IACS components (seven foundational requirements, SL-C)
- IEC Webstore: IEC 62443-4-1:2018, Secure product development lifecycle requirements
- ISASecure: IEC 62443 Component Security Assurance (CSA) certification (CSA 1.0.0, effective 28 August 2019)
- ISASecure: IEC 62443 Security Development Lifecycle Assurance (SDLA) certification (SDLA 3.0.0, effective 16 June 2020)
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