Unitronics Vision, Samba and UniStream PLC/HMI controllers were the target of a campaign that, beginning on 22 November 2023, compromised internet-exposed Vision Series devices at US water and wastewater facilities; CISA and its partners attribute it to IRGC-affiliated cyber actors using the persona CyberAv3ngers. The actors reached the devices on the default PCOM port, TCP 20256, and logged in with default or no passwords, the weakness tracked as CVE-2023-6448 and listed in CISA's KEV catalog. Securing these controllers means taking them off the internet, changing every default password, updating to VisiLogic 9.9.00 and PLC OS 12.38 or UniLogic 1.35.227, and putting remote access behind a VPN or gateway with multifactor authentication.
Key takeaways
- A Unitronics controller is reached through its engineering protocol, its HMI and web services, and whatever remote-access path the integrator set up.
- CISA published an alert on 28 November 2023 saying it was "responding to active exploitation of Unitronics programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector".
- CVE-2023-6448 records that VisiLogic before 9.9.00 left Vision and Samba devices with a default administrative password.
- Unitronics' advisory list, as of 2026-11-20, has 15 entries from 2011-001 to 2024-009, and NVD holds a few more CVEs that the list does not include.
How are Unitronics controllers reached on the network?
A Unitronics controller is reached through its engineering protocol, its HMI and web services, and whatever remote-access path the integrator set up. Unitronics publishes its security advisories on its Security Advisories page, and its hardening pages for Vision and Samba and UniStream name the services to control:
| Service or path | Product line | What Unitronics or CISA says |
|---|---|---|
| PCOM over TCP, default port 20256 | Vision, Samba | Unitronics calls PCOM "a built-in communication protocol for development and management"; CISA's ICSA-23-348-15 says actors are "actively targeting TCP 20256" |
| PCOM access levels and multifactor access | Vision, Samba | Unitronics describes Blocked Access, Operator and Technician levels, and multifactor authentication configured with SB 314 and SDW 10 |
| Information Mode password, default 1111 | Vision Legacy (120, 230, 280, 290, 530) | ICSA-24-109-01: change the default 1111 "Info Mode" password via SI 253 |
| Modbus | Vision, Samba | Unitronics: limit the Modbus master accessible address space with SB 305 and SI 165 to 168 |
| UniLogic connection, VNC server, web server, FTP server | UniStream | Unitronics: change the PLC default passwords, set VNC passwords, set users for web server screens; "It's mandatory to set authentication for FTP Server" |
| Remote access | All | Unitronics: no port forwarding to automation equipment; use a firewall and VPN, such as its UCR routers, or its UniCloud platform |
The engineering software is part of the attack surface. Vision and Samba controllers are programmed with VisiLogic, UniStream controllers with UniLogic, and both appear in CVE records as the affected product. AA23-335A also warns that the PLCs "may be rebranded and appear as originating from different manufacturers and companies", so an asset list that shows another brand can still contain a Unitronics controller.
What happened in the November 2023 water utility attacks?
CISA published an alert on 28 November 2023 saying it was "responding to active exploitation of Unitronics programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector". In the case CISA described, the affected municipality's water authority took the system offline and switched to manual operations, and CISA said there was no known risk to the municipality's drinking water or water supply.
Joint advisory AA23-335A, first published on 1 December 2023 and updated on 18 December 2024, comes from the FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, the Israel National Cyber Directorate, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and the UK NCSC; the updated advisory adds the extent of the activity. What the authoring agencies state:
- Attribution. "IRGC-affiliated cyber actors using the persona 'CyberAv3ngers'" began targeting "Israeli-made Unitronics Vision Series" PLCs and HMIs in November 2023. The advisory calls CyberAv3ngers "an Iranian IRGC-affiliated cyber persona" and notes that several of its claimed compromises in Israel "are false".
- Scope. Beginning on 22 November 2023, the actors accessed multiple US water and wastewater facilities, "likely by compromising internet accessible devices with default or no passwords". Between November 2023 and January 2024 they "compromised at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in the WWS Sector in the United States", likely in four waves.
- Access. The actors authenticated "to internet-connected devices with communications set to the default TCP port 20256", and the devices "either had a default password in place or no password".
- Actions on the device. They erased the ladder logic and downloaded their own with no inputs or outputs, renamed devices, set the software version to an older one so the engineering workstation could not connect, disabled upload and download, password-protected the upload settings, changed the port from 20256 to 20257, and displayed the defacement "You have been hacked, down with Israel. Every equipment 'made in Israel' is CyberAv3ngers legal target."
- Sectors. The PLCs are common in water and wastewater and are also used in energy, food and beverage manufacturing, transportation systems and healthcare. The NCSC observed targeting of PLC devices in the United Kingdom as well.
The advisory says that with this access, deeper device and network access "could render additional, more profound cyber-physical effects". It does not say the actors exploited a software flaw: the entry point was an exposed port and a default or empty password. That is why the BOD 23-02 guide on internet-exposed management interfaces and the guide to hard-coded and default credentials apply here as much as any patch.
Why is CVE-2023-6448 a password problem with a software fix?
CVE-2023-6448 records that VisiLogic before 9.9.00 left Vision and Samba devices with a default administrative password. The NVD record reads: "Unitronics VisiLogic before version 9.9.00, used in Vision and Samba PLCs and HMIs, uses a default administrative password. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can take administrative control of a vulnerable system." NVD and CISA's ICSA-23-348-15 both score it 9.8 (CVSS v3.1), with weakness CWE-1188, insecure default initialization.
The fix is a software change that forces the configuration change. Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisory 2023-001, published 19 December 2023, lists VisiLogic below 9.9.00 and OS below 12.38 as affected and says the patched version forces:
- changing the default administrative password;
- setting a password on PCOM-enabled sockets;
- controlling remote allowed PCOM operations using SDW10 roles.
CISA added CVE-2023-6448 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-12-11 with a due date of 2023-12-18 and known ransomware use "Unknown". The KEV note says that while it is possible to change the default password, implementors "are encouraged to remove affected controllers from public networks and update the affected firmware". The CVE-2023-6448 advisory page summarizes the record.
Updating VisiLogic on a workstation does not by itself change the controllers in the field. AA23-335A therefore asks for both: upgrade engineering workstations to VisiLogic 9.9.00 and upgrade the firmware of every Vision series PLC/HMI to the newest firmware for that model, then apply the security-related ladder logic elements to the project files on those devices.
Which other Unitronics CVEs are there?
Unitronics' advisory list, as of 2026-11-20, has 15 entries from 2011-001 to 2024-009, and NVD holds a few more CVEs that the list does not include. They fall into five families:
| CVE | Product and flaw | Score (scorer) | Fixed version or measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-27767 | UniStream: authentication bypass over Ethernet (Unitronics 2024-001) | NVD 9.8; INCD 10.0 | UniLogic 1.35.227 or later |
| CVE-2024-27768 | UniStream: path traversal that may allow remote code execution (2024-002) | NVD 9.8 | UniLogic 1.35.227 or later |
| CVE-2024-27769 to CVE-2024-27773 | UniStream: information exposure, path traversal, OS command injection, use of less trusted source (2024-003 to 2024-007) | NVD 8.8 each | UniLogic 1.35.227 or later |
| CVE-2024-27774 | UniStream: production information embedded in firmware, CWE-259 (2024-008) | NVD 6.5; INCD 7.5 | UniLogic 1.35.227 or later |
| CVE-2026-45449 to CVE-2026-45452 | UniStream Pro (B10, C10) only: OS command injection, buffer overflow, improper authentication, format string | INCD 8.3 each; NVD Deferred | UniLogic 1.41.329 or later, per the CNA description |
| CVE-2024-1480 | Vision Legacy 120, 230, 280, 290, 530: Information Mode password retrievable without authentication (2024-009) | Dragos 7.5; NVD Deferred | All versions affected; change the 1111 Info Mode password, SB 314, multi-factor VPN |
| CVE-2024-38434, CVE-2024-38435 | Vision PLC: dangerous function allowing security feature bypass; exception handling flaw allowing denial of service | INCD 6.5 each; NVD 7.5 for 38435 | NVD's configuration for 38435 lists VisiLogic before 9.9.01 |
| CVE-2015-6478, CVE-2015-7905, CVE-2015-7939 | VisiLogic OPLC IDE: ActiveX control and code injection flaws | CISA 7.3, 8.6, 9.8 | VisiLogic 9.8.09 or newer (ICSA-15-274-02A) |
| CVE-2016-4519 | VisiLogic OPLC IDE: stack overflow from a crafted .vlp project file | NVD v3.0 9.8 | VisiLogic 9.8.30 or later (Unitronics 2016-001) |
| CVE-2011-5086 | UniOPC server: IP*Works! SSL component | NVD v2 6.8 | UniOPC 2.0.0; CISA says the vulnerable https50.ocx stays until removed manually |
The UniStream set came from Claroty Team82, which reports that it found "around 480 internet-exposed and vulnerable UniStream devices" with public scanning services, and that these devices are not preconfigured to be reachable online. Unitronics' advisories for the set give the same five steps: update to UniLogic 1.35.227 or later, keep PLCs off direct internet access, use long complex passwords and change the default, use UniCloud for two-factor access, and keep devices updated.
The 2015 and 2016 VisiLogic flaws, and CVE-2016-4519 in particular, are engineering-workstation risks: NVD describes CVE-2015-6478 as reached through a crafted web site and CVE-2015-7939 and CVE-2016-4519 through crafted .vlp project files, so they hit the engineer's PC rather than the controller. NVD's descriptions for CVE-2015-6478 and CVE-2015-7905 name VisiLogic before 9.8.02, while CISA's advisory recommends 9.8.09; use the higher version. For the Vision Legacy controllers, CVE-2024-1480 has no fixed firmware in either the CISA or the Unitronics advisory, so the mitigations are the only option.
Are Unitronics vulnerabilities exploited in the wild?
One is in CISA KEV: CVE-2023-6448 is the only KEV entry with Unitronics as the vendor as of 2026-11-20 (catalog version 2026.11.18, 1,786 entries). None of the UniStream, Vision Legacy or VisiLogic engineering-software CVEs is in the catalog.
FIRST EPSS scores published on 2026-11-19, the latest as of 2026-11-20, are low across the board:
| CVE | EPSS | Percentile |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2015-7939 | 0.04962 | 0.924 |
| CVE-2015-7905 | 0.04734 | 0.920 |
| CVE-2016-4519 | 0.04499 | 0.917 |
| CVE-2023-6448 (KEV) | 0.02089 | 0.820 |
| CVE-2024-27772 | 0.01731 | 0.781 |
| CVE-2024-27768 | 0.00854 | 0.591 |
| CVE-2024-27767 | 0.00684 | 0.534 |
| CVE-2024-1480 | 0.00503 | 0.438 |
The ranking shows why EPSS alone misleads for this vendor. The campaign that hit water utilities used a default password, not a code flaw, and EPSS gives CVE-2023-6448 a score of about 2 percent even though it is confirmed exploited. Rank Unitronics findings by reachability and KEV status first, as the KEV and EPSS prioritization guide explains: a Vision PLC answering on TCP 20256 from the internet comes before any EPSS-ranked CVE.
How do you find the versions to compare?
Unitronics fixes arrive in the engineering software and the PLC operating system, so the inventory needs both. A practical sequence:
Record the series and modelVision and Samba fixes come through VisiLogic and the Vision OS; UniStream fixes through UniLogic; UniStream Pro B10 and C10 have their own CVEs; Vision 120, 230, 280, 290 and 530 are the Vision Legacy models in ICSA-24-109-01. Record the VisiLogic or UniLogic version on every engineering workstationCVE-2023-6448 is fixed from VisiLogic 9.9.00, the UniStream March 2024 set from UniLogic 1.35.227, and the UniStream Pro set from UniLogic 1.41.329. Record the PLC OS versionUnitronics names OS 12.38 for Vision and Samba, and for UniStream it recommends "updating controllers and development tools to version 1.35.227 and above". AA23-335A asks for the newest firmware for each Vision model. Check the password settings, not only the versionA controller on a patched OS can still carry a project with weak PCOM settings; confirm that the administrative, PCOM socket, Info Mode, upload and SD card passwords are set. Do not rely on CPE matching aloneNVD's configurations for the Unitronics CVEs name the software (VisiLogic, UniLogic), not the controller hardware, and CVE-2024-1480 and the 2026 UniStream Pro CVEs had no NVD configuration as of 2026-11-20. Track the vendor and CISA advisories directly, as the IEC 62443-2-3 patch management guide describes.
How should Unitronics PLCs be hardened?
The measures below come from AA23-335A, CISA's ICSA-23-348-15 and Unitronics' own pages. AA23-335A lists three immediate steps:
UpgradeMove engineering workstations to VisiLogic 9.9.00 and upgrade the firmware of all Vision series PLC/HMI devices to the newest firmware for that model, ensuring a strong password is used. Replace all default passwordsEnsure the Unitronics PLC default password is not in use (CISA's ICSA-23-348-15 names it as "1111"), and apply the security-related ladder logic elements: TCP/IP passwords, upload project file passwords, Info Mode passwords and SD card passwords. Disconnect the PLC from the public internetEither disable remote programming or require a strong password for it, change the default port and default PLC device name, and place the PLC behind a firewall that can detect brute-force attempts on the device password.
The follow-up steps in the same advisory, and Unitronics' equivalents:
- Multifactor authentication for remote access. A VPN or gateway "can enable multifactor authentication for remote access even if the PLC does not support multifactor authentication". Unitronics offers SB 314 and SDW 10 multifactor access on Vision and Samba, and two-factor access through UniCloud for UniStream.
- Use PCOM roles and client-mode sockets. Unitronics recommends blocking PCOM access until needed, granting Operator or Technician rights only as required, reducing "SERVER" mode sockets and configuring unused sockets in "Client" mode.
- Lock down UniStream services. Set VNC passwords, user access control for HMI and web server screens, and authentication on the FTP server.
- Allowlist hosts and segment. Use an allowlist of IPs for access, and zone the network with the Purdue model and the NIST SP 800-82 OT security guide.
- Back up logic and configurations. CISA asks for tested backups of logic and configuration and familiarity with factory reset and redeployment; the 2023 actors erased the original ladder logic and did not burn their own to the device, which prevented its retrieval.
- Make integrators apply the same measures. CISA asks owners to "confirm third-party vendors" apply these countermeasures to their exposure of these devices and all installed equipment.
These measures map onto CISA's Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, which AA23-335A cites, and onto the low-cost steps in the OT security guide for small manufacturers. If a controller also serves Modbus, the Modbus guide covers that protocol's weaknesses.
How do you monitor Unitronics controllers?
Start with a baseline of who talks to each controller and on which ports, then watch for the behaviour AA23-335A describes. Useful flow-level signals:
- Any connection to TCP 20256 from outside the control network, and repeated connection attempts that look like password guessing.
- A controller that stops answering on 20256 and starts answering on 20257, the port change the 2023 actors made.
- PCOM sessions from hosts other than named engineering workstations, especially downloads outside a maintenance window.
- VNC, web or FTP sessions to UniStream controllers from outside the engineering zone.
- Remote sessions from an integrator's address that do not pass through the agreed VPN or gateway.
Flow records show who connected to which port and when; seeing whether a PCOM session read data or downloaded a new program needs a protocol decoder. Map alerts to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS techniques; AA23-335A itself maps the activity in the Enterprise matrix to Brute Force, Default Accounts, Stored Data Manipulation and Internal Defacement.
Worked example: what does a review of a small water system find?
Synthetic example, not a real site. A small water system has two booster stations, each with a Vision PLC/HMI on a cellular router, a UniStream controller at the treatment plant, and an integrator who connects remotely.
| Observation | Why it matters | Action |
|---|---|---|
| One booster station router forwards TCP 20256 to the Vision PLC | The exact exposure used in the 2023 campaign | Remove the port forward; give the integrator VPN access with multifactor authentication |
| Vision project last built with VisiLogic 9.8.x | Below 9.9.00 for CVE-2023-6448 | Update the engineering workstation to 9.9.00 or later, update the PLC OS to 12.38 or later, rebuild and download the project with new passwords |
| Integrator laptop on VisiLogic 9.8.x | Also below 9.8.30 for CVE-2016-4519, a crafted project file flaw | Update the integrator's VisiLogic as part of the contract |
| UniStream on UniLogic 1.34 | Below 1.35.227 for CVE-2024-27767 to CVE-2024-27774 | Update UniLogic and the controller to 1.35.227 or later |
| UniStream FTP server enabled without authentication | Unitronics says FTP authentication is mandatory | Set FTP authentication or disable the service |
| No offline copy of either Vision program | Recovery after a logic wipe depends on the integrator | Back up logic and configuration and practise a factory reset and redeploy |
Where does passive monitoring fit in a Unitronics review?
A passive capture shows who talks to the controllers without sending a packet to them, which suits small sites where nobody wants a scanner touching a PLC that runs a pump. SoftWSP's OT Snapshot reads Zeek and ICSNPP logs from a mirror-port recording and builds a host-by-port inventory, including hosts using TCP 20256, VNC, web and FTP ports, and lists remote-access sessions (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC) that cross from outside the private address range. It has no PCOM decoder, so PCOM traffic shows at connection level only, without commands or program downloads. For a controller and software list with versions, Device & Firmware Security identifies components and versions and matches them against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. An engineer reviews every AI-drafted, cited report before it is sent.
What are the common pitfalls?
- Updating VisiLogic on the engineering workstation and assuming the PLCs are fixed; AA23-335A asks for the newest firmware on every Vision device as well.
- Changing the port from 20256 and leaving the device on the internet; the 2023 actors moved compromised devices to 20257 themselves.
- Trusting an asset list that shows another brand, when AA23-335A warns that the PLCs may be rebranded.
- Ranking by EPSS and missing CVE-2023-6448, which is in KEV with an EPSS score near 2 percent.
- Waiting for a firmware fix for CVE-2024-1480 on Vision Legacy controllers, where the vendor lists all versions as affected and offers mitigations only.
- Leaving an integrator's port forward in place after commissioning, the configuration mistake Claroty Team82 says explains internet-exposed UniStream devices.
This guide draws on the CISA alert of 28 November 2023; joint advisory AA23-335A (FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, INCD, CCCS, NCSC; updated 18 December 2024); CISA ICS advisories ICSA-11-279-03A, ICSA-15-274-02A, ICSA-23-348-15 and ICSA-24-109-01; Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisories 2016-001, 2023-001, 2024-001 to 2024-009 and its Cyber Protection pages; the Claroty Team82 UniStream research; and NVD records. KEV and EPSS facts are as of 2026-11-20. It is general information, not a substitute for Unitronics' product-specific advisories or a check of your exact model, OS and software version.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is CVE-2023-6448 and which version fixes it?
NVD describes CVE-2023-6448 as follows: Unitronics VisiLogic before version 9.9.00, used in Vision and Samba PLCs and HMIs, uses a default administrative password, and an unauthenticated attacker with network access can take administrative control. NVD and CISA's ICS advisory ICSA-23-348-15 both score it 9.8 (CVSS v3.1). Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisory 2023-001 lists VisiLogic below 9.9.00 and PLC OS below 12.38 as affected, and says the patched version forces a change of the default administrative password, a password on PCOM-enabled sockets and control of remote PCOM operations through SDW10 roles. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-12-11.
Who attacked Unitronics PLCs at US water utilities in 2023?
The joint advisory AA23-335A from FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, the Israel National Cyber Directorate, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and the UK NCSC attributes the activity to cyber actors affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) using the persona CyberAv3ngers. It says that beginning on 22 November 2023 they accessed multiple US water and wastewater facilities that operate Unitronics Vision Series PLCs, likely by compromising internet-accessible devices with default or no passwords. The December 2024 update says that between November 2023 and January 2024 the actors compromised at least 75 devices, including at least 34 in the US water and wastewater sector.
Which port does a Unitronics Vision PLC use and should it be changed?
Vision and Samba controllers are programmed and managed over PCOM, and CISA's ICSA-23-348-15 names TCP 20256 as the default port. CISA says cyber actors are actively targeting TCP 20256 after identifying it through network probing, and recommends using a different TCP port if possible. AA23-335A adds that the actors themselves changed the port from 20256 to 20257 on compromised devices to lock operators out. Changing the port only reduces casual scanning; the measures that matter are a strong password, a password on PCOM sockets, no direct internet exposure and a VPN or gateway with multifactor authentication for remote access.
Are the UniStream vulnerabilities fixed?
Yes for the March 2024 set. Unitronics advisories 2024-001 to 2024-008 cover CVE-2024-27767 to CVE-2024-27774 on all UniStream products and name UniLogic 1.35.227 or later as the fix; NVD scores CVE-2024-27767, an authentication bypass, at 9.8. Four newer CVEs published on 2026-10-15, CVE-2026-45449 to CVE-2026-45452, affect only UniStream Pro (B10 and C10) with UniLogic versions before 1.41.329, according to the Israel National Cyber Directorate as CNA, which scores each 8.3; NVD had not scored them as of 2026-11-20.
Is there a fix for CVE-2024-1480 on Vision Legacy controllers?
No fixed version is listed. CISA's ICSA-24-109-01 and Unitronics advisory 2024-009 list all versions of the Vision 120, 230, 280, 290 and 530 as affected by CVE-2024-1480, which lets the Information Mode password be retrieved without authentication (Dragos as CNA scores it 7.5). The mitigations are to change the default 1111 Info Mode password via SI 253, implement PLC multi-factor access using SB 314, and put a multi-factor VPN in front of the Ethernet port.
Sources
- CISA alert: Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems (28 November 2023)
- CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, INCD, CCCS, NCSC: AA23-335A IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities (web page)
- FBI IC3: AA23-335A joint Cybersecurity Advisory PDF (updated 18 December 2024)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-23-348-15 Unitronics Vision and Samba Series, Update A (CVE-2023-6448)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-24-109-01 Unitronics Vision Legacy series, Update A (CVE-2024-1480)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-15-274-02A Unitronics VisiLogic OPLC IDE Vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-6478, CVE-2015-7905, CVE-2015-7939)
- CISA CSAF: ICSA-11-279-03A Unitronics UniOPC Server (CVE-2011-5086)
- Unitronics: Cybersecurity, Security Advisories list
- Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisory 2023-001: Default administrative password (CVE-2023-6448)
- Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisory 2024-001: Improper Authentication (CVE-2024-27767)
- Unitronics Cybersecurity Advisory 2024-009: Vision Legacy, Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format (CVE-2024-1480)
- Unitronics: Cyber Protection, Vision and Samba Series
- Unitronics: Cyber Protection, UniStream Series
- Claroty Team82: New critical vulnerabilities in Unitronics UniStream devices uncovered
- NVD: CVE-2023-6448 (Unitronics VisiLogic default administrative password)
- NVD: CVE-2024-27767 (Unitronics UniStream UniLogic authentication bypass)
- NVD: CVE-2024-1480 (Unitronics Vision Information Mode password)
- NVD: CVE-2024-38435 (Unitronics Vision PLC denial of service)
- NVD: CVE-2026-45451 (Unitronics UniStream Pro improper authentication)
- NVD: CVE-2016-4519 (Unitronics VisiLogic OPLC IDE stack buffer overflow)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (data mirror on GitHub)
- FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
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