NERC CIP-007, "Cyber Security — System Security Management," is the mandatory NERC Reliability Standard that sets the day-to-day technical security baseline for North American bulk power system cyber assets: which network ports and services stay open, how security patches get evaluated and applied, how malicious code is deterred and handled, what gets logged and alerted on, and how system access is authenticated and controlled. Per its own Purpose statement, it exists "to manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)." The currently enforceable version, CIP-007-6, was approved by FERC on 21 January 2016; a successor, CIP-007-7.1, is FERC-approved, mandatory from 1 July 2028 — see the revision section below.
Key takeaways
- For a device maker, the practical question is what the customer will need to show for your relay, RTU, gateway or HMI once it sits inside an Electronic Security Perimeter.
- All five Requirements carry a Medium Violation Risk Factor.
- The clock starts when a patch is released by a source the utility has documented under Part 2.1, not when the utility notices it.
- CIP-007 binds the utility, but almost every Part needs information or features only the vendor can provide.
Who does CIP-007 apply to, and for which systems?
CIP-007-6 names its "Responsible Entities" in Section 4.1: Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers (those owning specified load-shedding, Special Protection System/Remedial Action Scheme, or transmission Protection System facilities), Generator Operators, Generator Owners, Interchange Coordinators or Interchange Authorities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Operators and Transmission Owners. The Requirements apply to high- and medium-impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated EACMS, PACS and Protected Cyber Assets (PCA). Each table row narrows that further, for example to "Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity" or to systems "at Control Centers". Five categories are exempt, including facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and systems regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 C.F.R. § 73.54.
For a device maker, the practical question is what the customer will need to show for your relay, RTU, gateway or HMI once it sits inside an Electronic Security Perimeter. The answer is in the five tables below.
What do the five requirements require, table by table?
CIP-007-6 organizes its obligations into five Requirements, each a table of Parts with Applicable Systems, Requirements and Measures:
| Req. | Table | What it requires |
|---|---|---|
| R1 | Ports and Services | Enable "only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed," including port ranges for dynamic ports; protect unnecessary physical I/O ports used for network connectivity, console commands or Removable Media |
| R2 | Security Patch Management | Track patch-release sources; evaluate new patches for applicability "at least once every 35 calendar days"; within 35 days of that evaluation, apply the patch, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing one; implement mitigation plans within their stated timeframe |
| R3 | Malicious Code Prevention | Deploy methods to "deter, detect, or prevent malicious code"; mitigate detected code; where signatures or patterns are used, have a process to test and install updates |
| R4 | Security Event Monitoring | Log successful logins, failed access and login attempts, and detected malicious code; alert on detected malicious code and on logging failure; keep logs for at least 90 consecutive calendar days where technically feasible; review a summary or sample of logs at intervals no greater than 15 calendar days |
| R5 | System Access Control | Enforce authentication of interactive user access where technically feasible; inventory enabled default and generic accounts; identify who can use shared accounts; change known default passwords; for password-only authentication, enforce length (at least the lesser of eight characters or the device maximum), complexity, and changes at least every 15 calendar months; limit or alert on unsuccessful authentication attempts |
All five Requirements carry a Medium Violation Risk Factor. Time Horizons are "Same Day Operations" for R1 and R3, "Operations Planning" for R2 and R5, and "Same Day Operations and Operations Assessment" for R4.
How does the 35-day patch clock work for vendor patches?
The clock starts when a patch is released by a source the utility has documented under Part 2.1, not when the utility notices it. The standard's Guidelines and Technical Basis explain that a patch may come from "an original source (such as an operating system vendor), but must be approved or certified by another source (such as a control system vendor)" before it can be applied; in that case the control-system vendor is the documented source. The Guidelines name "the National Vulnerability Database, Operating System vendors, or Control System vendors" as sources an entity could monitor.
Part 2.1: name the sourceEach updateable Cyber Asset needs a tracked source. Devices with no user-updateable firmware, or whose vendor no longer exists, need none. Part 2.2: evaluate every 35 daysEvery security patch released since the last evaluation is assessed for applicability; a patch for a component the utility does not have is documented as not applicable. Part 2.3: act within 35 days of the evaluationApply it, create a dated mitigation plan, or revise an existing plan. Part 2.4: implement the planThe Guidelines state "there is no maximum timeframe in this requirement", since patching carries its own reliability risk; plans can name events such as the next scheduled outage.
The utility can only meet steps 1 and 2 if its vendor publishes security fixes in a form it can track. Ranking which applicable patches to install first is a separate task; see KEV and EPSS prioritization and the CVSS calculator.
What does CIP-007 ask of a device or firmware vendor?
CIP-007 binds the utility, but almost every Part needs information or features only the vendor can provide. The table lists what customers commonly ask for in procurement and technical reviews.
| Part | What the utility must show | What the vendor can supply |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Each enabled port is needed | Port and service list per firmware version, with purpose, protocol and whether it can be disabled |
| 1.2 | Unneeded physical ports are protected | Documentation of USB, serial and console ports and how to disable or lock them |
| 2.1-2.2 | A tracked patch source | A security advisory page or feed, with fixed versions and release dates |
| 2.3 | Apply or mitigate | Advisories with workarounds, so a mitigation plan has something to say |
| 3.1 | Malicious code is deterred, detected or prevented | Statement of supported methods: application allowlisting, signed firmware, or confirmation that code cannot be altered |
| 4.1-4.3 | Security events logged, alerted and retained | Logging of successful and failed logins, syslog export, an event when logging fails |
| 5.2, 5.4 | Default and generic accounts inventoried, default passwords changed | A complete list of factory accounts, including service accounts, and a way to change every password |
| 5.5-5.7 | Password parameters and lockout | Configurable password length, complexity and lockout or alert thresholds |
Two Guidelines points help vendors with limited devices. Part 1.1 itself says that "if a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed." And for R3, a Cyber Asset with "no updateable software" whose "executing code cannot be altered" is "considered to have its own internal method of deterring malicious code." Both need documentation the vendor supplies. Hard-coded accounts are the opposite case: they make Part 5.4 impossible; see how to fix hard-coded credentials in embedded firmware.
How is CIP-007 enforced, and what evidence is kept?
The Compliance Enforcement Authority, NERC or the relevant Regional Entity, monitors CIP-007 through Compliance Audits, Self-Certifications, Spot Checking, Compliance Investigations, Self-Reporting and Complaints. Responsible Entities keep evidence for each Requirement for three calendar years, or until mitigation of a non-compliance is complete, whichever is longer.
What changes in CIP-007-7.1, and when does it apply?
CIP-007-6 stays enforceable until 30 June 2028; CIP-007-7.1 takes effect on 1 July 2028, per NERC's CIP-007-7.1 standard page. FERC approved it in Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000), issued 19 March 2026; per the Federal Register notice, the Commission "approves 11 modified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards", and the order is effective 26 May 2026. Entities may adopt early at six, 12 or 18 months after that date.
| Topic | CIP-007-6 | CIP-007-7.1 |
|---|---|---|
| Applicable systems | BES Cyber Systems, EACMS, PACS, PCA | Adds Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) supporting an Applicable System |
| R1 title and Part 1.1 | Ports and Services; enable only needed logical ports | System Hardening; "Disable or prevent unneeded routable protocol network accessibility on each Applicable System, per system capability" |
| New Part 1.3 | — | On SCI, prevent sharing of CPU and memory between virtual Cyber Assets of medium or high impact systems and those that are not |
| Exception wording | "where technically feasible" | "per system capability" in Parts 1.1, 4.1-4.3, 5.1, 5.4, 5.6 and 5.7 |
| R2 | Security Patch Management | Renamed Cyber Security Patch Management; 35-day clocks unchanged |
| Functional entities | Includes Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority | Seven entity types, without Interchange Coordinator |
NERC explained "per system capability" with the example of "a firmware-based 'black box' device with limited configuration capabilities": if the entity can show the system cannot perform the action, it documents that and decides on its own mitigation. Order No. 919 directs NERC to develop criteria and mandatory reporting for this exception. For vendors, that raises the value of written capability statements: "this device cannot disable port 502" becomes evidence the customer files.
Worked example: what does one 35-day cycle look like for an RTU advisory?
Synthetic example. Product, versions and dates are invented for illustration.
A utility runs a fictional "Halcyon RTU-500" on firmware 3.1 at medium impact substations and lists the Halcyon security advisory page as its Part 2.1 source.
2 MarchHalcyon publishes an advisory: firmware 3.2 fixes a buffer overflow in the web interface. The 35-day evaluation window covers it. 20 MarchAt its regular evaluation (35 days after the last one), the utility marks the patch applicable: the web interface is enabled on 14 units. 20 March to 24 AprilWithin 35 days of that evaluation, the utility must act. Testing shows 3.2 needs an outage, so it writes a dated mitigation plan: disable the web interface now (also tightening R1.1), install 3.2 at each site's next scheduled outage. 22 MarchThe web interface is disabled on all 14 units; netstat-style port listings are saved as R1 and plan evidence. By the outage datesFirmware 3.2 is installed and the plan is closed under Part 2.4.
The plan works because the vendor's advisory named the affected component and a workaround.
What are the common pitfalls?
- One 35-day deadline instead of two. Evaluation runs every 35 days; action is due 35 days after each evaluation.
- No documented patch source for embedded devices. "We check the vendor website sometimes" does not start or stop a clock.
- Port lists that differ by firmware version. A vendor list for 3.1 does not prove what 3.2 opens.
- Undocumented service accounts. A factory account missing from the vendor's list breaks Part 5.2 and Part 5.4.
- Treating "technically feasible" as a blanket exemption. CIP-007-6 still expects a documented basis per Cyber Asset, and CIP-007-7.1's "per system capability" adds FERC-directed reporting.
How does CIP-007 fit with the rest of the CIP suite and other frameworks?
CIP-007 is one standard in NERC's CIP suite: CIP-013 covers vendor risk at procurement, CIP-004 covers who may access systems, and CIP-010 covers baselines and change control, including patch installs. Outside NERC, IEC 62443 addresses industrial automation security generally, IEC 62443-2-3 addresses patch management between asset owners and suppliers, IEC 62351 addresses power-system protocol security, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS supports threat-informed planning. None replaces CIP-007 for a North American utility, but a vendor that already meets IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements has most of the CIP-007 feature list covered.
What is a workable starting point?
Treat R2's 35/35-day clock as two deadlines, each with its own evidence. Build R4 retention and review into toolingA 90-day minimum and a 15-day review interval are checked against configuration, not policy. Document technical limits per Cyber AssetParts 1.1, 4.3, 5.1, 5.6 and 5.7 depend on technical feasibility; write down why. Prepare for CIP-007-7.1 nowSCI, the new CPU and memory isolation Part and "per system capability" reporting apply from 1 July 2028, earlier for early adopters. For vendors: publish a CIP-007 pack per firmware version: port list, account list, logging capabilities, password options and an advisory feed.
SoftWSP's device firmware security assessment extracts an SBOM from a firmware image as CycloneDX 1.6 JSON, matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA CSAF ICS advisories, and produces an AI-drafted report with a citation for each finding, reviewed by an engineer. That gives a vendor or utility a cited list of known vulnerabilities in the firmware's components, useful input when evaluating vendor patches under Part 2.2. The OT Snapshot builds an inventory of hosts, ports, services and protocols seen in captured traffic, which helps check R1 port lists against what devices actually use; it does not read installed patch levels or test passwords.
This guide quotes NERC's published text of CIP-007-6 (including its Guidelines and Technical Basis) and CIP-007-7.1, and the Federal Register text of FERC Order No. 919 (91 FR 13957); it is not a substitute for the full standards, NERC's Implementation Plan, or FERC's complete order, and does not constitute compliance or legal advice.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is NERC CIP-007?
CIP-007, "Cyber Security — System Security Management," is a mandatory, FERC-approved Reliability Standard from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Per its own Purpose statement, it exists "to manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)." The currently enforceable version is CIP-007-6, approved by FERC on 21 January 2016; it applies to Balancing Authorities, certain Distribution Providers, Generator Operators and Owners, Interchange Coordinators or Interchange Authorities, Reliability Coordinators, and Transmission Operators and Owners, specifically for their high- and medium-impact BES Cyber Systems and associated Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS), Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and Protected Cyber Assets (PCA).
What do Requirements R1 through R5 each require?
Per the standard's own text: R1 (Table R1 — Ports and Services) requires enabling "only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed" and protecting unnecessary physical I/O ports. R2 (Table R2 — Security Patch Management) requires tracking patch sources, evaluating new patches "at least once every 35 calendar days," and within 35 days of that evaluation either applying the patch or creating/revising a dated mitigation plan. R3 (Table R3 — Malicious Code Prevention) requires deploying methods to "deter, detect, or prevent malicious code," mitigating detected code, and keeping signature/pattern update processes current. R4 (Table R4 — Security Event Monitoring) requires logging successful logins, failed access/login attempts and detected malicious code at minimum, generating alerts for specific event types, retaining logs "for at least the last 90 consecutive calendar days" where technically feasible, and reviewing a sample of logged events at least every 15 calendar days. R5 (Table R5 — System Access Control) requires authentication enforcement, inventorying default/generic accounts, identifying individuals with shared-account access, changing known default passwords, enforcing minimum password length/complexity for password-only authentication, periodic password changes, and limiting or alerting on unsuccessful authentication attempts.
What happens if a Responsible Entity misses the patch evaluation or review deadlines?
The specific numeric deadlines are baked directly into the Requirements, not left to interpretation: Part 2.2 sets patch evaluation at "at least once every 35 calendar days," Part 2.3 gives 35 calendar days after that evaluation to act, Part 4.4 sets log-review intervals "no greater than 15 calendar days," and Part 5.6 sets password-change periodicity at "at least once every 15 calendar months" where password-only authentication and technical feasibility apply. CIP-007-6's Compliance section requires each Responsible Entity to retain evidence of every requirement for three calendar years, and the NERC Compliance Enforcement Authority (NERC or the applicable Regional Entity) monitors compliance through audits, self-certifications, spot checks, self-reporting and complaint-driven investigations — each Requirement also carries its own Violation Risk Factor (CIP-007-6 sets all five at "Medium").
Is CIP-007-6 still the current version, or has it been replaced?
CIP-007-6 remains the currently enforceable text as of this guide's publication. A successor, CIP-007-7.1, has already been approved, with a later mandatory date: per the Federal Register notice of FERC's Order No. 919 (Docket No. RM24-8-000, 91 FR 13957, issued 19 March 2026, published 24 March 2026, effective 26 May 2026), the Commission "approves 11 modified Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards," explicitly including "CIP-007-7.1 (Cyber Security — Systems Security Management)." NERC's own implementation plan, quoted in the order, sets the new standards' effective date as "the later of April 1, 2026, or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order" — which, measured from the order's 26 May 2026 effective date, lands on **1 July 2028**. Responsible Entities may also early-adopt starting 6, 12 or 18 months after the order's effective date. Until a Responsible Entity's own early-adoption or mandatory date arrives, CIP-007-6 is what an auditor measures compliance against.
What does the CIP-007-7.1 revision actually change?
The revision is part of NERC's Project 2016-02 (Virtualization), which FERC's Order No. 919 approved together with four new NERC Glossary definitions — Cyber System, Management Interface, Shared Cyber Infrastructure and Virtual Cyber Asset — and 18 revised definitions, specifically to let Responsible Entities apply virtualization technology to BES Cyber Systems in a way the CIP suite's traditionally hardware-centric assumptions did not clearly accommodate. The order also describes a related, narrower change: replacing a self-implementing "technical feasibility exception" phrase with "per system capability" language in places, after NERC reported a significant decrease in submitted technical feasibility exceptions under the old wording. NERC publishes the clean CIP-007-7.1 text, whose version history records the FERC order approving it on 19 March 2026 (Docket No. RM24-8-000); that text is the authoritative source for exactly which Requirements or Parts change wording.
Sources
- NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-007-6 — Cyber Security - System Security Management (official standard text: Purpose, Applicability, Requirements R1-R5 with full Tables, Compliance section, approved by FERC 21 January 2016)
- Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards, 91 FR 13957, Docket No. RM24-8-000 (FERC order approving CIP-007-7.1 and 10 other modified CIP standards, issued 19 March 2026)
- Federal Register: Order No. 919; Virtualization Reliability Standards — listing page
- NERC: Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (BES Cyber System, EACMS, PACS, PCA, CIP Senior Manager definitions used throughout CIP-007-6)
- NERC: Reliability Standard CIP-007-7.1 — Cyber Security – Systems Security Management (Table R1 System Hardening, per system capability, SCI; version history)
- NERC: CIP-007-6 standard page — status "Mandatory Subject to Enforcement", effective 07/01/2016, inactive 06/30/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
- NERC: CIP-007-7.1 standard page — status "Subject to Future Enforcement", FERC order 03/19/2026, effective 07/01/2028 (read 2026-11-13)
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