OCPP, the Open Charge Alliance's protocol connecting EV charging stations to their backend management systems, still defines Security Profile 1 — an unencrypted WebSocket with only optional HTTP Basic Authentication — as a legal configuration in both OCPP 1.6 and OCPP 2.0.1/2.1, and in 2026 CISA published a run of ICS advisories for real deployments using exactly that gap, including Monta (CVE-2026-95102, CVSS 9.4), Everon (CVE-2026-26288, CVSS 9.4), and Hydro-Québec's Le Circuit Electrique (CVE-2026-20744, CVSS 9.8), all for OCPP WebSocket endpoints accepting connections with no real authentication. The protocol itself has offered a stronger option — Security Profile 2 (TLS plus Basic Auth) and Profile 3 (mutual TLS with client certificates) — since the OCPP 1.6 Security Whitepaper was first published, but the insecure default was never removed, and the pattern of 2026 advisories shows it is still being deployed at scale.
Key takeaways
- OCPP 2.0.1 and 2.1 build the same three Security Profiles into Part 2 of the specification.
- Profile 1 is plaintext, Profile 2 adds server-authenticated TLS with a station password, and Profile 3 adds mutual TLS with a station certificate.
- OCPP has messages for the CSMS to install and rotate station certificates and to push signed firmware; a charger maker has to implement them, not just the transport.
- Because many CSMS back ends accepted a station's identity as its only credential, and CISA coordinated the same four-weakness pattern across many of them in 2026.
What is OCPP and what does it secure by default?
OCPP is the application protocol between a charging station and the Charging Station Management System (CSMS) that authorizes sessions, pushes firmware and sends commands such as Reset or UnlockConnector; on its own, the original 1.6 release secured none of it. OCPP 1.6J carries JSON over a WebSocket. Security came later through the Open Charge Alliance's "Improved security for OCPP 1.6-J" whitepaper, now at Edition 4 (5 February 2026), which OCA says replaces all earlier editions.
OCPP 2.0.1 and 2.1 build the same three Security Profiles into Part 2 of the specification. The current texts on the OCA download page are OCPP 2.0.1 Edition 4 and OCPP 2.1 Edition 2, both dated 3 December 2025 and free to download. OCPP 2.0.1 is also an IEC standard, now IEC 63584-201:2026.
Part 2 states that running OCPP 2.0.1 with no security at all "is NOT considered a valid OCPP 2.0.1 implementation", but Profile 1 stays defined. Requirement A00.FR.201 says it "SHOULD only be used in trusted networks", for example behind a VPN between CSMS and station.
What do Security Profiles 1, 2, and 3 actually require?
Profile 1 is plaintext, Profile 2 adds server-authenticated TLS with a station password, and Profile 3 adds mutual TLS with a station certificate.
| Security Profile 1 | Security Profile 2 | Security Profile 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transport | Plain ws:// WebSocket, no encryption |
wss://, TLS 1.2 or higher |
wss://, TLS 1.2 or higher |
| Charging Station authentication | HTTP Basic Auth, sent in the clear | HTTP Basic Auth, protected by TLS | X.509 client certificate (mutual TLS) |
| CSMS authentication | None | TLS server certificate | TLS server certificate |
| Password rule (2.0.1 Ed. 4, A00.FR.205) | Same as Profile 2 | Minimum 16 characters; maximum set by BasicAuthPassword maxLimit, between 40 and 64; sent as UTF-8 |
Not applicable |
| OCA 2.0.1 certification | Optional item C-61 | Core (mandatory): Basic Authentication and server-side TLS tests | Advanced Security (optional) |
The 1.6 whitepaper uses an older password rule: at least 16 bytes, at most 20 bytes written as up to 40 hexadecimal digits.
For TLS, A00.FR.313 says both sides "SHALL only use TLS v1.2 or above". A00.FR.318 requires the CSMS to support four cipher suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. A00.FR.319 lets the station support either the ECDHE pair or the RSA pair. The specification also forbids reverting "from profile 2 or profile 3 to security profile 1 using OCPP."
The OCA Security Operations Guide v2.0 notes that the 16-character minimum was considered a strong password "by for example CISA" when written. It also notes that the CSMS cannot store this password hashed, because the station must send it. Per-station unique passwords are therefore the main control; our hard-coded credentials guide covers provisioning them in firmware.
How does OCPP handle certificates and signed firmware?
OCPP has messages for the CSMS to install and rotate station certificates and to push signed firmware; a charger maker has to implement them, not just the transport. The main messages:
| Message | Purpose | Version |
|---|---|---|
SignCertificate / CertificateSigned |
Station sends a CSR; CSMS returns the signed certificate (Profile 3 key rotation) | 1.6 whitepaper, 2.0.1, 2.1 |
InstallCertificate, GetInstalledCertificateIds, DeleteCertificate |
Manage CA certificates the station trusts | 1.6 whitepaper, 2.0.1, 2.1 |
ExtendedTriggerMessage |
CSMS asks a 1.6 station to start a certificate update | 1.6 whitepaper |
SignedUpdateFirmware (1.6) / UpdateFirmware with signingCertificate and signature (2.0.1) |
Firmware download with a signature to check | 1.6 whitepaper, 2.0.1 |
SecurityEventNotification, GetLog |
Report security events and upload security logs | 1.6 whitepaper, 2.0.1, 2.1 |
Get15118EVCertificate, GetCertificateStatus |
Relay ISO 15118 contract certificates and OCSP status | 2.0.1, 2.1 |
For signed firmware, the 1.6 whitepaper requires the station to validate the signature "over the entire firmware file using the RSA-PSS or ECSchnorr algorithm for signing, and the SHA256 algorithm for calculating hash values", and to report an InvalidFirmwareSignature security event when it fails. That makes OCPP firmware updates a supply-chain control only if the station refuses to install on failure; our OTA update security guide covers key storage and rollback.
Why do real CISA advisories keep citing missing authentication on OCPP endpoints?
Because many CSMS back ends accepted a station's identity as its only credential, and CISA coordinated the same four-weakness pattern across many of them in 2026. In CISA's CSAF records as of 13 November 2026, 17 ICS advisories mention OCPP, all numbered in 2026. Fifteen describe CSMS back ends, and most repeat the same set:
| Weakness (CWE) | CISA CVSS 3.1 | Typical wording | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Missing authentication (CWE-306) | 9.4 | "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to impersonate charging stations" | CVE-2026-95102, Monta, 1 October 2026; CVE-2026-26288, Everon |
| No limit on authentication attempts (CWE-307) | 7.5 | Brute force or denial of service | CVE-2026-24696, Everon |
| Shared session per station ID (CWE-613) | 7.3 | "allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier" | CVE-2026-20748, Everon |
| Exposed station identifiers (CWE-522) | 6.5 | Identifiers "publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms" | CVE-2026-93474, Monta |
The advisories run from EVMAPA (CVE-2025-54816, 22 January 2026) through a batch of six on 26 February 2026 (CloudCharge, EV2GO, Chargemap, SWTCH, ev.energy and Mobility46 with CVE-2026-27028) to EVoke Systems (June) and Monta (October). Hydro-Québec scored its CVE-2026-20744 at 9.8 and "updated the majority of charging stations to disable OCPP". Everon "shut down their platform on December 1st, 2025", and EV2GO "did not respond to CISA's request for coordination." Monta's mitigation note says it supports "OCPP 1.6 Security Profile 2 (HTTP Basic Auth with TLS)" and encourages operators to enable it. The fix existed in the protocol, but it was switched off.
Can a firmware bug on the charger itself be triggered over OCPP?
Yes. Several charger-side CVEs are reachable by whoever controls the OCPP channel, so a compromised CSMS, or a man in the middle on a Profile 1 link, can attack the station:
| CVE | Product | Issue | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-5517 | ABB Terra AC wallbox | Heap overflow from an unchecked OCPP field | 6.8 (CVSS 3.1) |
| CVE-2026-8986 | Autel MaxiCharger, firmware through V1.03.51 | OS command injection via a crafted GetDiagnostics URL from "a malicious or compromised OCPP server" |
9.8 NVD, 9.5 CVSS 4 |
| CVE-2026-13214 | Zephyr RTOS OCPP 1.6 client | Stack overflow in GetConfiguration key handling (50-byte buffer), GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2 |
9.8 CVSS 3.1 (Zephyr, the CNA) |
| CVE-2026-10848, CVE-2026-13217 | Zephyr OCPP 1.6 client | RPC frame parsing flaws; CVE-2026-13217 is a NULL pointer dereference on a CALLRESULT uid (GHSA-w234-pcxp-4q8r) |
8.6 NVD; 5.9 CVSS 3.1 (Zephyr, the CNA) for CVE-2026-13217 |
| CVE-2026-44101 | Phoenix Contact CHARX OCPP Agent on CHARX SEC-3xxx firmware before 1.9.1 | Missing authentication lets a remote attacker reconfigure the back-end connection (VDE-2026-008) | 9.8 CVSS 3.1, 9.3 CVSS 4.0 (CERT@VDE, the CNA) |
For CVE-2025-5517, ABB's advisory 9AKK108471A8948 lists Terra AC UL40/80A and MID/Juno CE up to 1.8.32, UL32A and JP up to 1.8.2, and PTB up to 1.8.21, fixed in 1.8.33 or 1.8.34 by model. CISA republished it as ICSA-26-146-01. ABB writes that it "strongly recommend[s] not use unsafe mode(http) to connect your charger to your backend even though OCPP is allowed to do in this way." SaiFlow, which reported it, describes one crafted message crashing the charger.
Treat every OCPP message from the CSMS as untrusted input in the station firmware. Bound every string to its schema length (CiString50 and the like), never pass a URL to a shell, and track your OCPP stack in the firmware SBOM. The same lesson applies to back ends: open-source CSMS SteVe had a WebSocket handshake authentication bypass (CVE-2024-44843), and EVerest's libocpp crashed on oversized JSON before 0.26.2 (CVE-2025-59398).
What did independent researchers find beyond what CISA disclosed?
SaiFlow showed in 2023 that a second connection under a real station's identity can hijack or knock out that station. In How Mishandling of WebSockets Can Cause DoS and Energy Theft, it wrote that "the OCPP standard doesn't define how a CSMS should accept new connections from a charge point when there is already an active connection." Its companion post, Hijacking EV Charge Points to Cause DoS, lists three 1.6J authentication methods (identity alone, identity plus credentials, identity plus client certificate) and found that "In most cases, the CSMS providers are configured to enforce the above-mentioned weak authentication method #1." Its recommended fix is for the CSMS to hold both connections and probe with a WebSocket ping or OCPP heartbeat until it identifies the real one.
Pen Test Partners' 2021 review of smart chargers found problems around OCPP rather than in it. Wallbox's API had two insecure direct object references. On the Growatt platform behind Project EV chargers, any charger could be controlled with only the username or a predictable serial number. Their own EO mini pro had a service on TCP port 2000 with no authentication that allowed reading and writing configuration. SEC Consult found a similar shortcut in Schneider Electric's EVlink City, Parking and Smart Wallbox stations: undocumented, hard-coded HTTP cookie values log an attacker into the web interface with admin rights (CVE-2021-22707, 9.4 per Schneider, 9.8 per NVD), fixed in firmware R8 V3.4.0.1 according to Schneider's SEVD-2021-194-06.
How does OCPP security relate to ISO 15118?
They secure different links. OCPP protects the station-to-CSMS link; ISO 15118 protects the vehicle-to-station link and carries Plug & Charge contract certificates. OCPP 2.0.1 bridges the two: the station relays certificate requests with Get15118EVCertificate and checks status with GetCertificateStatus. A station that runs Plug & Charge over a Profile 1 OCPP link exposes those exchanges to anyone on the path. The PKI, SLAC and Brokenwire issues are covered in our ISO 15118 security guide.
Does upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 or 2.1 fix this on its own?
No. The newer versions raise the certification baseline, not the deployed configuration. SaiFlow wrote that OCPP 2.0.1 "will require CP credentials as the minimal obligatory security profile", which matches OCA's Core certification profile. But:
Profile 1 is still defined in 2.0.1 and 2.1"Built on OCPP 2.0.1" does not mean "deployed with Profile 2 or 3"; the CISA advisories describe back ends with no real authentication regardless of version. Duplicate-connection handling is CSMS behaviourNo version number resolves it; the CSMS has to implement it.
Worked example: how would you move a synthetic charger fleet from Profile 1 to Profile 3?
Synthetic example; the fleet and numbers are invented for illustration. An operator runs 400 AC chargers on OCPP 1.6J with Profile 1 and one shared password, and plans the move over three firmware releases:
| Step | Change | Check before the next step |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Install the CSMS CA certificate with InstallCertificate; switch to Profile 2 with a unique 16+ character password per station |
Every station connects over wss://; no InvalidTLSVersion or InvalidTLSCipherSuite security events |
| 2 | Station generates a key pair; SignCertificate / CertificateSigned deliver a client certificate |
Each certificate's subject matches the station identity |
| 3 | Switch to Profile 3; CSMS rejects connections without a valid client certificate | Profile 1 and 2 connection attempts are refused and logged |
The operator also blocks a second connection under an identity that is already connected until a heartbeat confirms which one is real.
What should charging station operators and manufacturers check?
Check which Security Profile is enforced on every connection, not which OCPP version is supported. Use Profile 2 at minimum and Profile 3 for public infrastructure, matching OCA's Core and Advanced Security tiers. Give every station its own passwordof at least 16 characters; never a fleet-wide one. Treat station identifiers as publicThe CWE-522 findings show they appear on charging maps. Reject or alert on duplicate connectionsfor an identity that is already connected, and rate-limit authentication. Implement certificate and signed-firmware messagesand refuse unsigned firmware. Fuzz the station's OCPP parseragainst oversized and malformed messages; CVE-2025-5517 and CVE-2026-13214 came from unchecked lengths. Track OCPP stack CVEsand rank them with KEV and EPSS data.
For the wider OT security baseline around charging sites, see the NIST SP 800-82 guide.
Where does SoftWSP fit?
SoftWSP works on charger firmware and on network captures, not inside the OCPP protocol. Our firmware security service builds a CycloneDX SBOM from a charger image and matches its components against NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS and CISA ICS advisories. AI drafts a cited report and an engineer reviews every finding. OT Snapshot reads Zeek logs from a mirror port and lists which hosts talk to which ports and services. That shows whether chargers reach their CSMS over cleartext HTTP or TLS, but it does not parse OCPP messages or test authentication.
This guide draws on the Open Charge Alliance's OCPP 2.0.1 Edition 4, OCPP 2.1 Edition 2, OCPP 1.6 security whitepaper Edition 4, Security Operations Guide v2.0 and certification pages; the IEC webstore; CISA's CSAF records for the 17 OCPP advisories numbered in 2026; ABB's advisory 9AKK108471A8948; NVD; SaiFlow's 2023 and 2025 posts; and Pen Test Partners' 2021 post, all read on 2026-11-14.
Put this guide to work
Frequently asked questions
What is OCPP and what does it secure (or fail to secure) by default?
OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol), maintained by the Open Charge Alliance (OCA), is the dominant application-layer protocol between an EV charging station (the Charge Point, or in OCPP 2.x terms the Charging Station) and the backend Charging Station Management System (CSMS) that authorizes charging sessions, pushes firmware, and issues remote commands like reset or unlock-connector. OCPP 1.6 runs as OCPP 1.6J over WebSockets (an earlier SOAP-based OCPP-S variant exists but is not addressed by the security backport). Critically, the base OCPP 1.6 specification defines no mandatory transport security at all — security was added later, via a dedicated document titled 'Improved security for OCPP 1.6-J,' commonly called the OCPP 1.6 Security Whitepaper, now at Edition 4. That whitepaper defines three Security Profiles, and Profile 1 — unencrypted WebSocket with optional HTTP Basic Authentication — is still a legal, implementable configuration today. OCPP 2.0.1 and 2.1 build the same three-profile model directly into the core specification rather than bolting it on afterward, but Profile 1 remains defined in those versions too, meaning the insecure option was never removed, only joined by better ones.
What do OCPP Security Profiles 1, 2, and 3 actually require?
Security Profile 1 ('Unsecured Transport with Basic Authentication') uses a plain ws:// WebSocket with no transport encryption at all; HTTP Basic Authentication is optional on top of that plaintext channel, meaning even the credential can be sent in the clear. Security Profile 2 ('TLS with Basic Authentication') requires a wss:// WebSocket secured with TLS 1.2 or higher, with the Charging Station authenticating to the CSMS via HTTP Basic Auth over that encrypted channel and the CSMS authenticating to the Charging Station via its TLS server certificate; OCPP 2.0.1 Edition 4 Part 2 (requirement A00.FR.205) sets the BasicAuthPassword at a minimum of 16 characters and a maximum defined by the BasicAuthPassword maxLimit, which must be between 40 and 64 characters, sent as UTF-8, which the OCA's own Security Operations Guide notes was, at time of writing, considered a strong password length by CISA guidance. Security Profile 3 ('TLS with Client-Side Certificates') adds mutual TLS: the Charging Station presents its own X.509 client certificate rather than (or in addition to) a Basic Auth password, so both ends authenticate cryptographically. All three profiles exist, unchanged in concept, across OCPP 1.6 (via the Security Whitepaper backport), OCPP 2.0.1, and OCPP 2.1 — the protocol family has never deprecated Profile 1.
Why do real CISA ICS advisories keep citing missing authentication on OCPP WebSocket endpoints?
Because Profile 1 (or a Profile 2/3 deployment that silently falls back to no authentication) is still common in production, and 2026 alone produced a run of CISA ICS advisories describing exactly that gap on live CSMS backends. ICSA-26-274-02 (Monta, all versions) lists CVE-2026-95102 (CVSS 9.4) for OCPP WebSocket endpoints that 'lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to impersonate charging stations.' ICSA-26-062-08 (Everon OCPP Backends) lists CVE-2026-26288 (CVSS 9.4) for the same pattern, plus CVE-2026-20748 for session hijacking where the backend 'allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier,' letting the most recent connection displace the legitimate charger. ICSA-26-188-01 (Hydro-Québec's Le Circuit Electrique) lists CVE-2026-20744 (CVSS 9.8) because its 'charging station websocket endpoint accepts connections without proper authentication,' and Hydro-Québec's own stated remediation was to disable OCPP on most of its charging stations outright rather than fix the authentication gap in place. Related advisories for CTEK Chargeportal (ICSA-26-078-06), ev.energy (ICSA-26-057-07), EV2GO (ICSA-26-057-04, where the vendor did not respond to CISA's coordination request), EVMAPA (ICSA-26-022-08, CVE-2025-54816, CVSS 9.4), and mobility46.se (CVE-2026-27028) describe the same missing-authentication and publicly-discoverable-charger-ID pattern. The repetition across independent vendors in a single year indicates a systemic deployment gap, not an isolated bug in one product.
What did independent security researchers find beyond the CISA advisories?
SaiFlow, an EV-charging-focused security research firm, published findings in 2023 on two compounding weaknesses in OCPP 1.6J. First, the OCPP standard 'doesn't define how a CSMS should accept new connections from a charge point when there is already an active connection' — different CSMS implementations handle a second, attacker-initiated connection using the same charger identity inconsistently, and SaiFlow called the case where the CSMS silently keeps the old session but routes traffic to the new one 'the most problematic since neither the CSMS nor the CP won't notify the Charge Point Operator.' Second, SaiFlow documented that OCPP 1.6J's authentication model supports three methods — charger identity alone, identity plus credentials, and identity plus client certificate — and that most CSMS providers default to identity-alone, the weakest option, which is brute-forceable since charger identifiers are static for the device's lifetime. Combined, SaiFlow stated these two gaps 'could lead to a vast Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack on the EVSE network' and could additionally expose CSMS credentials or payment data to an attacker who successfully hijacks a connection. Separately, Pen Test Partners' earlier (2021-era) research into home and public charger hardware and backend APIs found insecure direct object references, an unauthenticated configuration service on TCP port 2000 of an EO mini pro charger, and a Shenzhen Growatt cloud platform behind Project EV chargers where any charger could be locked or unlocked using only its username or a predictable serial number — stopping active charging sessions was possible through that gap.
Is there a documented firmware-level vulnerability in a specific charging station model, not just a backend API gap?
Yes. CVE-2025-5517, disclosed by ABB and covered in CISA ICS advisory ICSA-26-146-01, is a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) in ABB Terra AC wallbox firmware, CVSS v3.1 score 6.8, with the vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H. The root cause is that affected firmware versions (Terra AC UL40/80A through 1.8.32, UL32A through 1.8.2, MID/CE through 1.8.32, the PTB variant through 1.8.21, and the JP variant through 1.8.2) do not validate the length of a specific field in an incoming OCPP message; a specially crafted, oversized OCPP message sent to the charger — either via a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted OCPP connection or directly from a compromised CSMS server — triggers the overflow, which SaiFlow's disclosure write-up states can crash the charger into an unresponsive state (a denial-of-charge condition) and, per ABB's own advisory, carries potential for further memory corruption. ABB's fix was firmware updates (for example 1.8.33 or 1.8.34 depending on model), and both ABB and CISA's mitigation guidance for this specific CVE explicitly call out ensuring the OCPP link between charger and CSMS runs over HTTPS/TLS rather than unencrypted HTTP — i.e., this firmware bug is more dangerous precisely because Profile 1-style unencrypted deployments make the triggering message easier to inject in the first place.
Does moving to OCPP 2.0.1 or 2.1 fix these problems by itself?
Only partially, and only if the better Security Profile is actually configured and enforced — the version number alone does not guarantee it. SaiFlow's own assessment states that OCPP 2.0.1 'will require CP credentials as the minimal obligatory security profile,' which closes off the identity-alone authentication weakness that OCPP 1.6J permits by default; this matches the OCA's certification requirements, where OCPP 2.x core certification mandates support for at least Security Profile 2, versus OCPP 1.6 where the original base spec had no security requirement at all until the Security Whitepaper backport. But two caveats apply directly from the sourced material above. First, Profile 1 is still a defined, legal configuration in OCPP 2.0.1 and 2.1 — 'supports Profile 2' is not the same claim as 'is deployed using Profile 2,' and several of the 2026 CISA advisories describe backends that were simply not enforcing authentication regardless of which OCPP version the fleet ran. Second, the connection-handling ambiguity SaiFlow flagged (what a CSMS does when a second connection arrives using the same charger identity) is a CSMS implementation behavior, not something the OCPP version number fixes on its own; SaiFlow's own recommended mitigation is for CSMS operators to validate connections via ping/heartbeat requests, which is an operational control layered on top of the protocol rather than a protocol-level guarantee.
Sources
- Open Charge Alliance: Download OCPP (versions 1.6, 2.0.1, 2.1, and OCPP 1.6 Security Whitepaper Edition 4)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-274-02: Monta (OCPP WebSocket missing authentication, CVE-2026-95102, CVSS 9.4)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-062-08: Everon OCPP Backends (missing authentication and session hijacking, CVE-2026-26288 / CVE-2026-20748)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-188-01: Hydro-Québec Le Circuit Electrique charging station backend (CVE-2026-20744, CVSS 9.8)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-022-08: EVMAPA EV charging stations (CVE-2025-54816, CVSS 9.4)
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-26-146-01 / ABB advisory: Terra AC wallbox heap buffer overflow (CVE-2025-5517)
- SaiFlow: Hijacking EV Charge Points to Cause DoS
- SaiFlow: ABB Terra AC Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2025-5517)
- Open Charge Alliance: OCPP Security Operations Guide v2.0
- Open Charge Alliance: Improved security for OCPP 1.6-J, Edition 4 (5 February 2026, zip)
- Open Charge Alliance: OCPP 2.0.1 certification profiles (Core mandatory, Advanced Security optional)
- IEC 63584-201:2026, Open Charge Point Protocol 2.0.1
- ABB Cybersecurity Advisory 9AKK108471A8948: Terra AC wallbox OCPP heap overflow (CVE-2025-5517)
- NIST NVD: CVE-2026-8986 (Autel MaxiCharger OCPP GetDiagnostics command injection)
- NIST NVD: CVE-2026-13214 (Zephyr OCPP 1.6 client stack overflow)
- NIST NVD: CVE-2026-44101 (CHARX OCPP Agent missing authentication)
- CERT@VDE VDE-2026-008: Phoenix Contact multiple vulnerabilities in CHARX SEC-3xxx charging controller firmware (CVE-2026-44101)
- Zephyr security advisory GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2: OCPP GetConfiguration stack buffer overflow (CVE-2026-13214)
- Zephyr security advisory GHSA-w234-pcxp-4q8r: OCPP CALLRESULT NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2026-13217)
- SaiFlow: How Mishandling of WebSockets Can Cause DoS and Energy Theft (February 2023)
- Pen Test Partners: Smart car chargers. Plug-n-play for hackers? (30 July 2021)
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